Ex Parte Knighton et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Aug 17, 2017

12715807 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 17, 2017)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
12/715,807 03/02/2010 Mark S. Knighton 4956P024D 9505
140830 7590 08/17/2017
Thomas Coester Law Corporation dba TCIP
PO Box 5876
Santa Monica, CA 90409
EXAMINER
TANG, KAREN C
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2447
MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE
08/17/2017 PAPER
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte MARK S. KNIGHTON, SHANE R. ARNEY,
PETER J. DELAURENTIS, and TODD C. MOYER
____________

Appeal 2015-005940
Application 12/715,807
Technology Center 2400
____________

Before CARLA M. KRIVAK, JEFFREY S. SMITH, and
JON M. JURGOVAN, Administrative Patent Judges.

SMITH, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the rejection of
claims 11–21. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.

Representative Claim
11. A method comprising:
establishing a communications session over a distributed
network between at least two nodes wherein images can be
exchanged and viewed;
capturing from an imaging device a discrete image
responsive to a discrete input of a user during the
communications session;
inferring a destination for the discrete image from the
session context; and
sending the discrete image to the destination within the
communications session;
wherein a number of pixels present in the sent image is
greater than a number of pixels that are present in a screen of a
node at which the discrete image was captured.

Prior Art
Cooper US 6,795,106 B1 Sept. 21, 2004
Criminisi US 2006/0193509 A1 Aug. 31, 2006
Wensley US 2007/0198744 A1 Aug. 23, 2007

Examiner’s Rejection
Claims 11–21 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable
over Cooper, Wensley, and Criminisi.

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ANALYSIS
We adopt the findings of fact made by the Examiner in the Final
Action and Examiner’s Answer as our own. We concur with the conclusions
reached by the Examiner for the reasons given in the Examiner’s Answer.
We address the following arguments from the Reply Brief for emphasis.
Appellants contend that paragraphs 106–115 of Wensley are not
supported by parent application 11/164,645.1 Reply Br. 4. Paragraphs 106–
115 of Wensley teach creating a session with a group of people and
exchanging image files during the session. We find this teaching supported
by Wensley ’737 in at least the Title, Abstract, Figures 1–9, and paragraphs
20, 21, 26, 133, 134, and 140–167. For example, the Title of Wensley ’737
teaches concurrent collaboration of media. Figure 8 of Wensley ’737, which
is on the front page of both Wensley and Wensley ’737, shows a real time
collaboration system including a plurality of portable devices synchronized
with each other to show the exact same content, as disclosed in paragraph
134, corresponding exactly to paragraph 187 of Wensley. Paragraph 140 of
Wensley ’737 teaches an interactive, collaborative system for delivery,
viewing, moving, sorting, commenting on, editing, listening, and marking of
images, video, audio, animation, text, rich media documents, and other
objects, in real-time, across computer platforms, networks, and operating
systems; again, corresponding to exactly paragraph 193 of Wensley. Thus,
we find the teaching of Wensley relied on by the Examiner for supporting
the rejection, namely, creating a session with a group of people and

1 Filed Nov. 30, 2005; published May 31, 2007 as Pub. No. US
2007/0124737 A1. In our Decision, we cite to paragraph numbers of the
published application, and refer to the parent application as “Wensley ’737.”
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exchanging image files during the session, is found word for word in both
Wensley and Wensley ’737 (which has the earlier filing date).
We further highlight that paragraphs 196–206 of Wensley ’737
disclose additional support for creating a session and exchanging images
during the session. For example, paragraph 196 discloses an advertising
agency communicating with a client in a collaborative meeting by using
instant messaging and media windows to discuss and view images.
Paragraph 197 discloses a professional photographer showing images to a
customer in a local workspace and agreeing to purchase terms using instant
messaging. Paragraph 198 discloses a property management firm working
with a maintenance crew using the collaborative system to visually inspect
property, where the maintenance crew sends images from their mobile
devices so that management team can review the images in real-time.
Appellants contend that the Examiner has not explained how each
element is disclosed by the combination of Cooper and Wensley, and also
has not explained how Levine is part of the rejection. Reply Br. 5.
Appellants, however, have not persuasively rebutted the Examiner’s findings
that Cooper teaches the establishing, capturing, inferring, and sending
limitations recited in the claimed method. See Final Act. 5. As explained in
more detail below, Appellants have also not persuasively rebutted the
Examiner’s finding that paragraphs 206 and 207 of Wensley (corresponding
to paragraphs 153 and 154 of Wensley ’737) teach a number of pixels in a
sent image can be greater than the number of pixels that are present in the
screen of a capture node. Ans. 5–7.
We find that the Examiner has persuasively explained how the
combined teachings of Cooper and Wensley render claim 11 obvious. We
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find the teachings of Criminisi and Levine cumulative to the teachings of
Cooper and Wensley. We further find that although Levine is discussed in
the body of the rejection, Levine is not identified in the statement of the
rejection and is, therefore, not part of the rejection. Rather, the rejection is
based on the combination of Cooper, Wensley, and Criminisi.
We further highlight that Wensley alone teaches the limitations
recited in claim 11 in at least the Title, Abstract, Figures 7 and 8, paragraphs
22, 23, 186, 187, and 193–215, also found in the disclosure of Wensley ’737.
For example, paragraphs 200, 201, 206, 207, 209, 210, and 215 of Wensley
(corresponding to paragraphs 147, 148, 153, 154, 156, 157, and 167 of
Wensley ’737) disclose a real-time interactive collaborative environment for
sharing images by establishing a communications session over a network,
capturing an image from an imaging device, inferring a destination, and
sending the image to the destination. The specific examples of establishing,
capturing, inferring, and sending disclosed in paragraphs 196–206 of
Wensley ’737 further highlight that Wensley alone teaches the limitations of
claim 11.
Appellants contend the Examiner has not explained how the prior art
teaches “the number of pixels present in the sent image is greater than a
number of pixels that are present in a screen of a node at which the discrete
image was captured.” Reply Br. 5–7. Appellants find support for this
limitation in paragraph 106 of Appellants’ Specification, which discloses “a
cellular phone may have the ability to capture a high resolution image, but
has a low resolution display.” The scope of this limitation, when read in
light of Appellants’ Specification, encompasses at least a cell phone with a
camera and a screen, where the screen has lower resolution than the camera.
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Paragraphs 22 and 23 of Wensley (corresponding to paragraphs 20
and 21 of Wensley ’737) teach a wireless device such as a cell phone having
both a camera and a limited resolution screen, where the cell phone
communicates with a server and other devices over a network connection,
and adapts user interface elements to the display of the wireless device.
Appellants’ contention that “there is no suggestion (by Wensley) that the
screen at the capture node is not such a high resolution screen” (Reply Br. 7)
is inconsistent with the limited resolution screen of Wensley.
We further highlight that Wensley’s paragraph 186 (corresponding to
paragraph 133 of Wensley ’737) discloses dynamically reproducing content
in the clients collaborative system, given different display attributes such as
screen resolution. Paragraph 201 of Wensley (corresponding to paragraph
148 of Wensley ’737) discloses image thumbnails may be resized.
Paragraphs 206 and 207 of Wensley (corresponding to paragraphs 153 and
154 of Wensley ’737) disclose displaying an image as either low-resolution
or high-resolution, where the high-resolution image is displayed on high-
resolution devices.
Thus, we find Wensley teaches (a) using a cell phone with a camera
and a low-resolution screen as a node in a collaborative system was known
in the prior art; (b) capturing images with the cell phone’s camera and
sending the images to other devices in the collaborative system was known
in the prior art; (c) high-resolution images were known in the prior art; and
(d) adjusting a high-resolution image to match different resolutions of
different displays in the collaborative system was known in the prior art.
Appellants have not persuasively explained why using a camera on a
cell phone to capture and transmit an image having a comparatively higher
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resolution than the screen of the cell phone was “uniquely challenging or
difficult for one of ordinary skill in the art” who can capture and transmit an
image with a camera on a cell phone having a low-resolution screen, as
taught by Wensley, and display the image on different devices according to
the resolution of each device, as taught by Wensley. See Leapfrog Enters.,
Inc. v. Fisher-Price, Inc., 485 F.3d 1157, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (citing KSR
Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 419 (2007)). Appellants have also
not persuasively explained why capturing and sending an image as taught by
Wensley from a node comprising a cell phone with a low-resolution screen,
does anything more than yield the predictable result of sending an image
with a comparatively higher resolution than the screen of the cell phone.
“The combination of familiar elements according to known methods is likely
to be obvious when it does no more than yield predictable results.” KSR,
550 U.S. at 416.
We further highlight that the difference between the resolution of the
cell phone screen and that of the cell phone camera does not affect any steps
of the method recited in claim 11. Each step of the claimed method would
be performed the same, regardless of the resolution of the screen of the cell
phone. Appellants have not persuasively explained why choosing a
resolution of a cell phone’s screen lower than the resolution of the cell
phone’s camera was beyond the level of skill at the time of the invention,
considering Wensley’s teachings. Appellants also have not shown that
choosing the resolution of the screen to be lower than the resolution of the
camera yields any unexpected result from the claimed method.
Appellants contend that the Examiner has not answered Appellants’
arguments for the patentability of claims 12, 14–16, and 19. Reply Br. 4.
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We find Appellants’ arguments from the Appeal Brief do not persuasively
rebut the Examiner’s rejection made in the Final Action. But, we briefly
address Appellants’ arguments below.
For claim 12, Appellants contend that Cooper does not teach capture
of images and automatic sharing during a teleconference. App. Br. 13.
However, claim 12 does not recite automatic sharing during a conference.
Appellants’ contention is not commensurate with the scope of claim 12.
Cumulative to the teachings of Cooper, we highlight Wensley teaches
capture of images and automatic sharing during a teleconference, throughout
the entire reference, as discussed at length in our analysis of claim 11.
For claims 14 and 15, Appellants contend Cooper teaches presenting a
video stream at a destination, but does not teach presenting an image at the
destination. App. Br. 13–14. According to Appellants, a person of ordinary
skill in the art would understand the plain meaning of “image” excludes
video. Id. Our reviewing court has held that to determine the meaning of a
claim term, we look to those sources that show what a person of ordinary
skill in the art would have understood disputed claim language to mean, such
as the state of the art. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1314 (Fed.
Cir. 2005). Here, the state of the art as evidenced by Cooper shows that a
person of ordinary skill in the art would use the terms image and video
interchangeably. See Cooper, Figure 2A (“image analyzer 212” is located
within “video camera interface 208”); col. 1, ll. 30–40 (using the word
“image” when discussing the video stream). Cumulative to the teachings of
Cooper, we highlight Wensley teaches presenting the image at the
destination as discussed at length in our analysis of claim 11.
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For claim 16, Appellants contend Cooper does not teach sending a
video clip to the destination. App. Br. 14–15. We disagree for the reasons
given by the Examiner. We further highlight Wensley teaches sending a
video clip to the destination in at least paragraph 207.
For claim 19, Appellants contend that Criminisi does not teach
“transmitting to the destination spatial coordinates associated with a point of
view of the imaging device during image capture” or “organizing the
discrete image at the destination based at least in part on the spatial
coordinates.” App. Br. 15. Appellants’ contentions are inconsistent with the
teachings of the stereo-based image taught by Criminisi beginning with the
front page, through the figures and detailed description, and ending with the
claims. We highlight the Abstract of Criminisi teaches “the kernel image
indicates the 3-dimensional surface shape of the object to be located from a
point of view.”
We sustain the rejection of claims 11–21 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).

DECISION
The rejection of claims 11–21 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) is affirmed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.50(f).

AFFIRMED