Ex Parte Kingsborough et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Aug 22, 2017

11459733 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 22, 2017)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
11/459,733 07/25/2006 Donald Kingsborough 4189-02200 1878
30652 7590
CONLEY ROSE, P.C.
5601 GRANITE PARKWAY, SUITE 500
PLANO, TX 75024
EXAMINER
BOVEJA, NAMRATA
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3682
MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE
08/22/2017 PAPER
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte DONALD KINGSBOROUGH, TALBOTT ROCHE,
TERI LLACH, and JULIANNA SHAW
Appeal 2015-0073841
Application 11/459,7332
Technology Center 3600
Before JOSEPH A. FISCHETTI, TARA L. HUTCHINGS, and
MATTHEW S. MEYERS, Administrative Patent Judges.
MEYERS, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
Final Rejection of claims 1, 2, 4—8, and 10-29. We have jurisdiction under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.
1 Our decision references Appellants’ Appeal Brief (“Appeal Br.,” filed
March 23, 2015) and Reply Brief (“Reply Br.,” filed August 3, 2015), the
Examiner’s Answer (“Ans.,” mailed June 3, 2015), and Final Office Action
(“Final Act.,” mailed October 24, 2014).
2 Appellants identify Safeway, Inc. as the real party in interest (Appeal
Br. 4).
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CLAIMED INVENTION
Appellants’ claims relate “generally to methods and apparatus for
conducting retail sales and, more particularly, to methods and apparatus for
payment for retail purchases by consumers enrolled in payment and/or
loyalty programs offered by a retailer” (Spec. 12).
Claim 1 is the sole independent claim on appeal. Claim 1, reproduced
below, is illustrative of the subject matter on appeal:
1. A method of enrolling a customer in a merchant
payment program offered by an enrolling merchant’s computer
system, the enrolling merchant’s computer system comprising
software which causes the enrolling merchant’s computer system
to perform the method, the method comprising:
(a) receiving, by the enrolling merchant’s computer
system, from the customer while the customer is at a point of
sale, via a merchant’s computer system input device, payment
account information which identifies at least one financial
resource for completing a transaction with the enrolling
merchant’s computer system;
(b) receiving, by the enrolling merchant’s computer
system, from the customer while the customer is at the point of
sale, a unique identifier which is unique to the customer and
which differs from the payment account information;
(c) associating, by the enrolling merchant’s computer
system, the unique identifier with the payment account
information; and
(d) registering, by the enrolling merchant’s computer
system, the customer in the merchant payment program based on
receipt of the payment account information and the unique
identifier, wherein registering enables the customer to initiate
another transaction with the enrolling merchant’s computer
system involving the payment account information, via provision
of the unique identifier.
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REJECTIONS
Claims 1, 2, 4—8, and 10-29 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as
directed to non-statutory subject matter.
Claims 1, 2, 4, 5, 7, 8, 10, and 12—29 are rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as unpatentable over Iannacci (US 7,318,049 B2, iss. Jan. 8, 2008).
Claim 6 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over
Iannacci and Mann, III (US 2003/0061167 Al, pub. Mar. 27, 2003).
Claim 11 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over
Iannacci and Official Notice.
ANALYSIS
Non-statutory subject matter
The Appellants argue the claims as a group. See Appeal Br. 6—21.
We select independent claim 1 as representative. Claims 2, 4, 8, and 10-29
stand or fall with independent claim 1. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv).
In rejecting claims 1, 2, 4—8, and 10-29 as being directed to ineligible
subject matter, the Examiner finds that the claims are directed to an abstract
idea of “enrolling a customer in a merchant payment program[, which] is a
method of organizing human activities. In this case the human activity is
enrolling a person in a payment program” (Final Act. 5; see also Ans. 18).
In response, Appellants
[a]ssum[e], without conceding, that (1) the Office Action’s
characterization of the instant claims as merely directed to the
concept of “enrolling a customer in a merchant payment
program, see id., and, assume[]without conceding that (2)
“enrolling a customer in a merchant payment program” would be
deemed to be a “method of organizing human activities,” id.,
such that a full analysis for subject matter eligibility is needed,
the pending claims would still recite patent eligible subject
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matter. That is, under the full Alice analysis, Appellants’ claims
include significantly more than the alleged abstract idea.
(Appeal Br. 14).
Under 35 U.S.C. § 101, an invention is patent-eligible if it claims a
“new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.”
35 U.S.C. § 101. The Supreme Court, however, has long interpreted § 101
to include an implicit exception: “laws of nature, natural phenomena, and
abstract ideas” are not patentable. See, e.g., Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS
BankInt7, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2354 (2014).
In determining whether independent claim 1 falls within the excluded
category of abstract ideas, we are guided in our analysis by the Supreme
Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo and Alice. Alice, 134 S. Ct.
at 2355 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S.
Ct. 1289, 1296—97 (2012)). In accordance with that framework, we first
must determine whether the claim is “directed to” a patent-ineligible abstract
idea. If so, we then consider the elements of the claim — both individually
and as an ordered combination — to assess whether the additional elements
transform the nature of the claim into a patent-eligible application of the
abstract idea. Id. This is a search for an “inventive concept” — an element
or combination of elements sufficient to ensure that the claim amounts to
“significantly more” than the abstract idea itself. Id.
Turning to the first part of the analysis, we agree with the Examiner
“that the claims are directed to an abstract idea of ‘enrolling a customer in a
merchant payment program’” (Final Act. 5). In making this determination,
we note that the Specification discloses that the present invention “relates
generally to methods and apparatus for conducting retail sales and, more
particularly, to methods and apparatus for payment for retail purchases by
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consumers enrolled in payment and/or loyalty programs offered by a
retailer” (Spec. 12). Accordingly to the Specification “[merchants have
attempted to minimize the inconvenience to shoppers which results from
requiring the shopper to present a loyalty card in order to receive discounts
on goods and/or other benefits” {id. 13). The Specification observes,
however, that “[drawbacks of such loyalty and payment systems include the
requirement that a consumer must carry a physical device such as a card,
RFID tag or mobile telephone or consent to a biometric scan, a process
disliked by many” {id. 1 5). The Specification, thus, identifies “needs exist
for the development for methods for improving the convenience of a
customer’s shopping experience, especially in the areas of improved
transaction speed, enhanced loyalty programs, and combinations thereof’
{id.). And to address this need, the Specification proposes a process which
“enables a customer to enroll in a card-free program offered by a merchant”
{id. 17). And, taking independent claim 1 as representative, the claimed
subject matter is generally directed to “[a] method of enrolling a customer in
a merchant payment program offered by an enrolling merchant’s computer
system” which includes steps for “(a) receiving . . . payment account
information,” “(b) receiving ... a unique identifier,” “(c) associating ... the
unique identifier with the payment account information,” and
“(d) registering . . . the customer in the merchant payment program.”
Here, we find the concept of “enrolling a customer in a merchant
payment program” to which independent claim 1 has been found to be
directed to is similar to, for example, anonymous loan shopping” {Mortgage
Grader, Inc. v. First Choice Loan Services Inc., 811 F.3d 1314, 1320 (Fed.
Cir. 2016)), “a loan-application clearinghouse or, more simply, coordinating
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loans” (LendingTree, LLC v. Zillow, Inc., 656 Fed. App’x. 991, 996 (Fed.
Cir. 2016)), and “categorical data storage” (Cyberfone Systems, LLC v. CNN
Interactive Group, Inc., 558 Fed. Appx. 988, 992 (Fed. Cir. 2014)), which
have been found to be abstract ideas. Furthermore, the claim steps of
receiving information, associating information, and storing the associated
information, i.e., registering, accomplishes little more than to collect data,
analyze it, and store the data based on the analysis, amounting to a
combination abstract-idea processes. Cf. Electric Power Group, LLC v.
Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2016). While the data as claimed are
more particularly limited to the field of enrolling customers in a merchant
payment program, said limitation simply provides a contextual description
of the data, which are within the realm of abstract ideas. Cf. CyberSource
Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“The
Court [Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978)] rejected the notion that the
recitation of a practical application for the calculation could alone make the
invention patentable.”) Furthermore, the Federal Circuit held that the claims
were directed to an abstract idea, explaining that “[t]he advance they purport
to make is a process of gathering and analyzing information of a specified
content, then displaying the results, and not any particular assertedly
inventive technology for performing those functions.” Elec. Power Grp.,
830 F.3d at 1354.
Accordingly, we find that independent claim 1 involves nothing more
than steps of receiving information, associating information, and storing the
associated information, i.e., registering — activities squarely within the
realm of abstract ideas. See, e.g., Elec. Power Grp., LLC, 830 F.3d at 1353—
54 (when “the focus of the asserted claims” is “on collecting information,
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analyzing it, and displaying certain results of the collection and analysis,”
the claims are directed to an abstract idea). See also Accenture Global
Servs., GmbHv. Guidewire Software, Inc., 728 F.3d 1336, 1344-45 (Fed.
Cir. 2013) (claims reciting “generalized software components arranged to
implement an abstract concept [of generating insurance-policy-related tasks
based on rules to be completed upon the occurrence of an event] on a
computer” not patent eligible).
We also are not persuaded by Appellants’ argument that independent
claim 1 is not directed to an abstract idea because it “requires i) performance
of the recited tasks by an ‘enrolling merchant’s computer system,’ and ii)
receipt of payment account information ‘via a merchant’s computer system
input device’” (Appeal Br. 9-11), and as such, “is patent eligible under the
streamlined analysis because Appellants’ method sufficiently limits its
practical application and is not an attempt to pre-empt or tie-up the alleged
abstract idea of ‘enrolling a customer in a merchant payment program’” {id.
at 11—12 (citing 2014 Interim Guidance on Patent Subject Matter Eligibility,
Fed. Reg., Vol. 79, No. 241 at 74625.); see also Reply Br. 6—9). Even if the
claims clearly do not pre-empt “enrolling merchant’s computer system,” the
lack of pre-emption does not demonstrate patent eligibility. See Ariosa
Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2015),
cert, denied, 136 S. Ct. 2511 (2016) (“Where a patent’s claims are deemed
only to disclose patent ineligible subject matter under the Mayo framework,
as they are in this case, preemption concerns are fully addressed and made
moot.”); see also OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359,
1362—63 (Fed. Cir.), cert, denied, 136 S. Ct. 701 (2015).
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Appellants also argue that rejection is improper because the “[t]he
Examiner’s Answer identifies at least two other abstract ideas which are
narrower in scope tha[n] the originally identified abstract idea” (Reply Br.
6—8). However, the Court found in Alice that it need not labor to delimit the
precise contours of the “abstract ideas” category in that case. See Alice, 134
S. Ct. at 2357. We also note that “an abstract idea can generally be
described at different levels of abstraction.” Apple, Inc. v. Ameranth, Inc.,
842 F.3d 1229, 1240 (Fed. Cir. 2016). The Examiner’s “slight revision of its
abstract idea analysis does not impact the patentability analysis.” Id. at
1241. Thus, Appellants’ argument is not persuasive.
Turning to the second step of the analysis, the Examiner finds
the method steps of claim 1 are not enough to quality as
“significantly more.” The steps of receiving payment account
information from the customer (i.e. receiving data), receiving a
unique identifier from the customer (i.e. receiving data),
associating the unique identifier with the payment account
information (i.e. storing data), and registering the customer is the
merchant payment program (i.e. storing data) are all steps
requiring no more than a generic computer to perform generic
computer functions. Specifically, receiving data and storing data
are well-understood, routine and conventional activities
previously known in the industry.
(Ans. 18). We agree with the Examiner.
Appellants, on the other hand, first argue that the “claims include
significantly more than the alleged abstract idea because the method is tied a
particular machine (Appeal Br. 14—17). More particularly, Appellants argue
that independent claim 1 recites an “enrolling merchant’s computer system
[which] is a physical computer device” that is specifically programmed to
perform the claimed method {id. at 15 (citing Spec. 1187)). However, there
is no indication in the record that any specialized computer hardware or
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other “inventive” computer components are required. In fact, the
Specification merely discloses that it utilizes a “computer system 500 [that]
is comprised of a processor subsystem 502 coupled to a memory subsystem
504 by a bus subsystem (not shown)” (Spec. 1187). As such, we are not
persuaded that independent claim 1 is adequately tied to “a particular
machine or apparatus.” Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 600 (2010).
Appellants also argue that “the Examiner has not shown, and has
merely concluded, the steps performed by the enrolling merchant’s computer
system are merely ‘well-understood, routine and conventional activities
previously known in the industry’” (Appeal Br. 16 (citing Final Act. 5); see
also Reply Br. 11—12). However, Appellants’ argument is not persuasive
because it fails to provide adequate evidence or technical reasoning why the
steps of independent claim 1, i.e., “(a) receiving . . . payment account
information,” “(b) receiving ... a unique identifier,” “(c) associating ... the
unique identifier with the payment account information,” and “(d)
registering . . . the customer in the merchant payment program,” considered
individually or as an ordered combination, are anything more than well-
understood, routine, and conventional activities of a computer. See
Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 716 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“[T]he
claimed sequence of steps comprises only ‘conventional steps, specified at a
high level of generality,’ which is insufficient to supply an ‘inventive
concept.’”) (Citing Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2357) (internal citations omitted).
Appellants next argue that the claims include significantly more than
the alleged abstract idea because the method improves upon existing
enrollment schemes (Appeal Br. 17—18; see also Reply Br. 14—15). More
particularly, Appellants argue “[bjecause merchants may themselves enroll
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a customer in a payment program based on receipt of both the payment
account information and the unique identifier, Appellants’ method provides
merchants benefits which accompany no need for third party enrollment
service providers” {id. at 18). However, we find that the “improvement” to
which the Appellants refers is a business improvement rather than an
improvement to a technological or technical field. Furthermore, Appellants
have not provided evidence that the programming related to their
“improvement” would entail anything atypical from conventional
programming.
Appellants further argue that the claims include significantly more
than the alleged abstract idea because the method embodies a solution
necessarily rooted in computer technology (Appeal Br. 18—20; see also
Reply Br. 13—14). More particularly, Appellants argue
[t]hat is, the implementation of the claimed method by the
enrolling merchant’s computer system does not utilize
technology which requires physical devices or personally
intrusive scans to process a payment; instead, the enrolling
merchant’s computer system utilizes technology which receives
payment account information and a unique identifier to enroll a
customer in a merchant’s payment program, which allows the
customer to initiate another transaction via provision of the
unique identifier.
(Appeal Br. 19; see also Reply Br. 10-11). Although Appellants’ claimed
method may improve a customer’s experience by “not utilizing] technology
which requires physical devices or personally intrusive scans to process a
payment” (Appeal Br. 19). Appellants have not established that the claimed
method improves the technology of the computer itself, for example, or
some other relevant technology. Nor have Appellants provided adequate
evidence or technical reasoning that independent claim 1 improves some
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existing technological process or solves some technological problem in
conventional industry practice. Versata Dev. Grp., Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc.,
793 F.3d 1306, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert, denied, 136 S. Ct. 2510, 195 L.
Ed. 2d 841 (2016) (finding that the “claims recit[ed] a commonplace
business method aimed at processing business information despite being
applied on a general purpose computer.”); see also Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2359.
At best, Appellants’ claimed method improves a business problem of
customer satisfaction by “minimiz[ing] the inconvenience to shoppers which
results from requiring the shopper to present a loyalty card in order to
receive discounts on goods and/or other benefits” (Spec. 1 3).
Appellants last argue that the “claims do not generally recite ‘use the
Internet’ to perform a business practice[; but] instead recite a specific way to
enroll customers into a merchant payment program offered by the enrolling
merchant’s computer system (Appeal Br. 20). Specifically, Appellants
contend that “the claimed method recites an enrolling merchant’s computer
system in the context of at least one other structural computer components
(e.g., the merchant’s computer system input device) which imparts a
networked structural context for the enrolling merchant’s computer system”
(id.). However, as discussed above, there is no indication in the record that
any specialized computer hardware or other “inventive” computer
components are required (see, e.g., Spec. 1187). And, as the Federal Circuit
stated: “after Alice, there can remain no doubt: recitation of generic
computer limitations does not make an otherwise ineligible claim patent-
eligible.” DDR Holdings, LLCv. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1256
(Fed. Cir. 2014).
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In view of the foregoing, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection under
35 U.S.C. § 101 of independent claim 1, and claims 2, 4, 8, and 10-29,
which fall with independent claim 1.
Obviousness
Independent claim 1 and dependent claims 2, 4, 5, 7, 8, 10, and 12—29
We are persuaded the Examiner erred in finding that Iannacci
discloses or suggests “an enrolling merchant’s computer system which
registers a customer in the merchant payment program based on receipt, by
the enrolling merchant’s computer system, of payment account information
and a unique identifier from the customer as required by Appellants’ claim
1” (Appeal Br. 26; see also Reply Br. 16—17).
The Examiner maintains the rejection is proper, and relies on
Iannacci, at column 52, lines 57—66, column 54, lines 55—59, column 58,
line 59, and column 79, lines 30—50, as disclosing the argued subject matter
(see Final Act. Ans. 7—10; see also Ans. 4—7, 20-24).
Iannacci is directed to “an on-line, interactive, and fully integrated
benefit-driven value exchange and settlement program that monitors,
evaluates, and manages economic and personal benefits and executes
functions to produce and acquire the maximum or preferred benefit items for
users by guiding and automating appropriate payment and settlement
actions” (Iannacci, Abstract). Iannacci discloses that its universal account
identifier provides “one account and access mechanism (e.g., magnetic stripe
card, smart card, personal digital device) [that] gives consumers convenient
access to all their payment, award, and loyalty accounts” (id. at col. 24,11.
40-43; see also id. at col. 26,11. 56—64). Iannacci discloses “the universal
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card issuer or universal server receives the transaction information and
identifies the universal cardholder and merchant” {id. at col. 34,11. 53—55;
see also id. at col. 52,11. 52—57). The universal server then “determine[s]
that the merchant either has existing, or may obtain, such associated
payment and award processing accounts” and also “determine[s] that the
universal cardholder either has existing, or may obtain, such associated
payment and redemption accounts” {id. at col. 35,11. 9-13; see also id. at
col. 79,11. 1—50). To obtain an award processing account, Iannacci discloses
an “Instant-In” account enrollment system and process would
automatically and immediately enroll a universal account owner
in a membership program by supplying approved owner
information to the option supplier or payment/award issuer if
such action was required to obtain beneficial option offers and if
the owner permit[t]ed such Instant-In functions”
{Id. at col. 26,11. 43—50).
In operation, Iannacci discloses that “[universal cardholder 110 and
merchant 120 exchange information via link 115” and “[mjerchant 120 and
universal server 135 exchange information with each other via links 125 and
130, respectively” {id. at col. 53,1. 66 —col. 54,1. 3; see also id. at Fig. 1).
Iannacci further discloses that “[l]ink 115 allows universal cardholder 110 to
exchange transaction related information, such as a universal account
identifier delivered as a number, with merchant 120” and “[o]nce received in
the course of a transaction (e.g., a point-of-sale transaction), merchant 120
can then re-transmit (possibly via a credit card processor) such universal
card number and other transaction information ... to universal server 135
for appropriate processing” {id. at col. 54,11. 4—12). Iannacci also discloses
that its COMM PORT 210 “is configured to communicate via
telecommunications links or some other network topology to universal
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account owners such as universal cardholder 110 (FIG. 1), merchants such
as merchant 120 (FIG. 1). . ., and payment and award issuers such as
payment/award issuer 165 (FIG. 1)” {id. at col. 58, lines, 48—54), but also
could be configured to communicate “in a closed intranet environment
utilizing conventional networking protocols such as TCP/IP and the like”
{id. at col. 58,11. 59-61; see also id. at Fig. 2).
After reviewing the cited portions of Iannacci, we agree with
Appellants that there is nothing in the relied upon portions of Iannacci that
discloses or suggests the argued subject matter {see Appeal Br. 23—27).
Although we agree with the Examiner that Iannacci discloses “an enrolling
merchant’s computer system which registers a customer in the merchant
payment program based on receipt, by the enrolling merchant’s computer
system” of a “universal account identifier” {see Final Act. 7), we cannot
agree with the Examiner that “Iannacci explicitly discloses receiving both
pieces of data (e.g. universal account number [characterized by the
Examiner as the claimed “payment account information,”] and PIN/personal
security word [characterized by the Examiner as the claimed “unique
identifier which is unique to the customer and which differs from the
payment account information,”]) from the customer while the customer is at
the POS device of the merchant (i.e. part of the merchant computer system)”
(Ans. 20 (emphasis omitted)).
The difficulty with the Examiner’s finding is that Iannacci does not
disclose that its merchant computer system receives a PIN or “personal
security word,” i.e., “a unique identifier which is unique to the customer and
which differs from the payment account information,” as required by
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limitation [b] of independent claim 1. Instead, the cited portion of Iannacci
discloses that its system
contemplates the use of voice response units (e.g., VRUs
maintained by a universal server processing system or credit card
issuer or payment/award issuer) that may be operated to allow
universal cardholder 110 to enter a universal account identifier
into a data processing system maintained by universal server 135
or payment/award issuers 165.
(Iannacci, col. 54,11. 49-55 (emphasis added)). Put simply, only the
universal account number is received. Regarding the portion of Iannacci
relied on by the Examiner that refers to a “personal security word,” Iannacci
merely discloses that “voice response operation is well known in the
transaction processing area especially in the case where personal checks are
authorized only after a customer speaks a personal security word into a VRU
via a telephone connection” {id. at col. 54,11. 55—59). Stated another way,
the personal security word mentioned in Iannacci is not described as a
second piece of data received in an enrollment method, i.e., a unique
identifier which is unique to the customer and which differs from the
payment account information. Thus, Iannacci fails to disclose or suggest “an
enrolling merchant’s computer system which registers a customer in the
merchant payment program based on receipt, by the enrolling merchant’s
computer system, of payment account information and a unique identifier
from the customer as required by Appellants’ claim 1.”
In view of the foregoing, we do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection
of independent claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). For the same reasons, we
also do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 2, 4, 5, 7, 8, 10, and
12—29, which depend therefrom.
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Dependent claims 6 and 11
Claims 6 and 11 depend from independent claim 1. The Examiner’s
rejections of claim 6 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) based on Mann, in
combination with Iannacci, and claim 11 based on Official Notice, in
combination with Iannacci, do not cure the deficiency in the Examiner’s
rejection of independent claim 1. Therefore, we do not sustain the
Examiner’s rejections of claims 6 and 11 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) for the
same reasons set forth above with respect to independent claim 1.
DECISION
The Examiner’s rejection of claims 1, 2, 4—8, and 10-29 under 35
U.S.C. § 101 is affirmed.
The Examiner’s rejections of claims 1, 2, 4—8, and 10-29 under 35
U.S.C. § 103(a) are reversed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv).
AFFIRMED
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