Ex Parte Kim et alDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardApr 28, 201612357632 (P.T.A.B. Apr. 28, 2016) Copy Citation UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE 12/357,632 01122/2009 68103 7590 05/02/2016 Jefferson IP Law, LLP 1130 Connecticut Ave., NW, Suite 420 Washington, DC 20036 FIRST NAMED INVENTOR Hyun-jin KIM UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www .uspto.gov ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 0503-0033 1059 EXAMINER LAMB, CHRISTOPHER RAY ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2695 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 05/02/2016 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address( es): usdocketing@jeffersonip.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte HYUN-JIN KIM, YONG-GOOK PARK, JI-YEONKWAK, andMIN-KYUPAR Appeal2014-006448 Application 12/357,632 1 Technology Center 2600 Before JEAN R. HOMERE, KARA L. SZPONDOWSKI, and SHARON PENICK, Administrative Patent Judges. PENICK, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL This is an appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner's Final Rejection of claims 1--48. (Appeal Br. 2.) We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b)(l). We affirm. Invention Appellants' invention relates to a user interface which displays an object, and senses user input to determine if the displayed object is 1 According to Appellants, the real party in interest is Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. (Appeal Br. 2.) Appeal2014-006448 Application 12/357 ,632 approached or touched, and to control the display accordingly. (Abstract, i1 6.) Illustrative Claim Claim l, reproduced below with key limitations emphasized, is illustrative: 1. An electronic apparatus, the apparatus comprising: a display unit to display an object; a sensing unit to sense position and pressure of a user input; and a control unit to: determine a type of the user input as an approach and control the display unit to display a first data related to the displayed object based on the sensed position, if the sensed pressure is lower than a first predetermined value or if the sensed pressure is 0, and determine the type of the user input as a touch and control the display unit to display a second data related to the displayed object based on the sensed pos1t10n, if the type of the user input is not determined as the approach. Rejections The Examiner rejects claims 1-17, 19, 22--40, 42, and 46--48 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as anticipated by Hotelling et al. (US 2006/0161870 Al; July 20, 2006) (hereinafter "Hotelling"). (Final Action 2-7.) The Examiner rejects claims 18, 20, 21, 41, and 43--45 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Hotelling in view of Huh (US 2007/0229476 Al; Oct. 4, 2007). (Final Action 7-9.) 2 Appeal2014-006448 Application 12/357 ,632 Issue Did the Examiner err in finding Hotelling discloses the limitation of a control unit to "determine a type of user input as an approach ... if the sensed pressure is lower than a first predetermined value or if the sensed pressure is O" as recited in claim 1? ANALYSIS Appellants contend that Hotelling does not disclose the determination of user input comprising an approach if sensed pressure is lower than a first predetermined value or is zero. (Appeal Br. 4.) The Examiner finds that Hotelling discloses three input levels, proximity, light touch, and hard touch. (Final Action 2-3.) The Examiner further finds that light touch and hard touch are detected at different levels of sensed pressure, and that the detection of an approach with no sensed pressure corresponds to Hotelling's proximity input level. (Id.) Appellants agree with the Examiner that Hotelling recites three types of input - proximity, a light touch, and a heavy touch, which are sensed through a proximity sensor or a touch screen. (Appeal Br. 5.) Appellants argue, however, that Hotelling does not disclose the disputed limitation because the device of Hotelling does not determine the type of user input using a pressure sensor, but rather with a proximity sensor. (Id.) According to Appellants, in Hotelling, "[ e ]ven when a touch input is sensed after a proximity input is sensed, the proximity sensor may still sense the proximity. Hotelling does not provide any feature of excluding the proximity input." (Id.) Consequently, Appellants argue that "Hotelling is unable to distinguish a proximity from a touch" and that in Hotelling "Heavy 3 Appeal2014-006448 Application 12/357 ,632 Touch and Proxnn1ty ... are not distinguished from one another." (Id. at 5- 6; Reply Br. 3--4.) These arguments are not persuasive. As the Examiner correctly finds (Final Action 2-3) and Appellants agree (Appeal Br. 5), Hotelling discloses that proximity, light touch, and heavy touch can be separately determined, and each initiates different display elements or actions. (Hotelling i-fi-1 90-100, Figs. 8-9.) Thus we agree with the Examiner that Appellants' interpretation of Hotelling is untenable. In particular, the Examiner finds: Hotelling clearly discloses how to sense a touch. Obviously if the screen is touched it has also been approached, so clearly the touch detection would have to have priority in determining which sort of input it is. There's no way for Hotelling to achieve the three input levels it specifically discloses (proximity, light touch, and hard touch) if Hotelling cannot distinguish between an approach and a touch. (Answer 11-12.) We do not agree with Appellants' statement2 that "Hotelling fails to disclose how to reconcile the proximity sensor indicating a proximity event while the touch sensor indicates that a touch event is occurring." (Appeal Br. 7.) Instead, we agree with the Examiner that, "if the screen is touched it has also been approached, so clearly the touch detection would have to have priority in determining which sort of input it is" (Answer 11-12) and find this to be explained by Hotelling (at i-fi-1 90-100, Figs. 8-9.) We are also not persuaded by Appellants' argument that Hotelling does not disclose the determination of user input comprising an approach if 2 While this argument by Appellants (Appeal Br. 6-8; Reply Br. 4) is styled as an objection to the alleged use of hindsight, as the rejection of claim 1 is an anticipation rejection, we address it as an argument alleging deficiencies in the disclosure of the prior art. 4 Appeal2014-006448 Application 12/357 ,632 sensed pressure is lower than a first predetermined value, but is not zero. (Appeal Br. 6; Reply Br. 3.) We agree with the Examiner that the claim contains a limitation in the alternative and that the teaching of one of these alternatives is sufficient for an anticipatory rejection. (Answer 11.) The broadest reasonable interpretation of this alternative limitation in light of the specification is that it specifies two apparatuses, in the alternative - one in which the user input is determined to be an approach if the sensed pressure is lower than a predetermined value, and another in which the user input is determined to be an approach if the sensed pressure is zero. (Spec. i-fi-18, 58, 64, 65, 67, 72, 76.) In all cases in which the sensed pressure intensity is zero, it will be less than a predetermined value of pressure sensed, thus the alternate interpretation urged by the Appellants which requires both comparisons to be made in each approach determination is not reasonable. Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner's 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) rejection of claim 1, and the rejection of claims 2-17, 19, 22--40, 42, and 46--48 not separately argued with specificity. Additionally, we sustain the Examiner's 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) rejection of claims 18, 20, 21, 41, and 43--45 as obvious over Hotelling and Huh, argued on the same grounds. DECISION We affirm the Examiner's decision rejecting claims 1--48. Pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l )(iv), no time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended. AFFIRMED 5 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation