Ex Parte Izadi et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Jan 18, 2017

13493497 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 18, 2017)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/493,497 06/11/2012 Shahram Izadi MS6-0046USC1 8591
22801 7590 01
LEE & HAYES, PLLC
601 W. RIVERSIDE AVENUE
SUITE 1400
SPOKANE, WA 99201
EXAMINER
HARRIS, DOROTHY H
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2625
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
01/20/2017 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
lhptoms @ leehay es .com
u sdocket @ micro soft .com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte SHAHRAMIZADI, ABIGAIL J. SELLEN,
RICHARD M. BANKS, STUART TAYLOR,
STEPHEN E. HODGES, and ALEX BUTLER1
Appeal 2016-003506
Application 13/493,497
Technology Center 2600
Before MICHAEL J. STRAUSS, AARON W. MOORE, and
PHILLIP A. BENNETT, Administrative Patent Judges.
BENNETT, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s final
rejection of claims 1—3, 5—8, 11—20, and 22—24, which are all of the pending
claims. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm-in-part.
1 Appellants’ Brief (App. Br.) identifies the real party in interest as
Microsoft Technology Licensing, LLC. App. Br. 3.
Appeal 2016-003506
Application 13/493,497
CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
The claims are directed to interacting with physical and digital objects
via a multi-touch device. Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of the
claimed subject matter:
1. A method comprising:
detecting a physical object in relation to a component of a
multi-touch device;
receiving input at the component of the multi-touch device
responsive to detection of the physical object and without user-
input to the component of the multi-touch device, wherein the
input includes data received from the physical object by another
component of the multi-touch device;
synchronizing the data between the physical object and a
memory component associated with the multi-touch device
responsive to detecting the physical object, wherein the
synchronizing comprises storing the data from the physical
object on the memory component associated with the multi-
touch device and storing the data from the memory component
associated with the multi-touch device on the physical object
such that the data is synchronized between the memory
component and the physical object.
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner in rejecting the claims on
REFERENCES
appeal is:
Kuzunuki
Freeman
US 5,732,227
US 6,725,427 B2
Mar. 24, 1998
Apr. 20, 2004
June 8, 2006
Oct. 12, 2006
Dec. 28, 2006
Blythe
Parry
Hinckley
US 2006/0119541 A1
US 2006/0230192 A1
US 2006/0294247 A1
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Application 13/493,497
REJECTIONS
Claims 1—3, 7, 8, 16, 23, and 24 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over Blythe and Hinckley. Final Act. 6.
Claims 5, 6, 15, 17—19 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over Blythe, Hinckley, and Parry. Final Act. 15.
Claims 11—13 and 22 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Blythe, Hinckley, and Kuzunuki. Final Act. 19.
Claim 14 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Blythe, Hinckley, Kuzunuki, and Freeman. Final Act. 22.
Claim 20 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Blythe, Hinckley, Parry, and Kuzunuki. Final Act. 23.
ISSUES FOR DECISION
(1) Did the Examiner err in concluding Blythe and Hinckley render
claim 1 obvious?
(2) Did the Examiner err in finding Blythe teaches “receiving input
from the physical object. . . upon detection ...” and “uploading data
associated with the physical object responsive to receiving input from the
physical object by the component of the multi-touch device,” as recited in
claim 7?
(3) Did the Examiner err in finding Hinckley teaches “storing of the
uploaded data associated with the physical object to a remote network
storage location to which the memory component of the multi-touch device
is connected,” as recited in dependent claim 23?
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ANALYSIS
First Issue
We are persuaded the Examiner erred in concluding claim 1 is
rendered obvious by Blythe and Hinckley. As noted above, claim 1 recites:
receiving input at. . . the multi-touch device . . . wherein
the input includes data received from the physical object by
another component of the multi-touch device;
synchronizing the data between the physical object and a
memory component associated with the multi-touch device
responsive to detecting the physical object, wherein the
synchronizing comprises storing the data from the physical
object on the memory component associated with the multi-
touch device and storing the data from the memory component
associated with the multi-touch device on the physical object
such that the data is synchronized between the memory
component and the physical object.
The recitation of “the data” throughout the “synchronizing” limitation
derives antecedent basis from the immediately preceding “receiving”
limitation (“wherein the input includes data received from the physical
object”). As written, then, the “synchronizing” recited in claim 1 requires
storing the data from the physical object on the multi-touch device, and then
storing that same data from the multi-touch device back to the physical
object.2 The Examiner does not identity, and we do not discern, any
teaching in Blythe or Hinckley of a synchronization process in which data is
2 We acknowledge this interpretation of claim 1 may be inconsistent with
and unsupported by the embodiments described in the Specification.
Nevertheless, it is inappropriate to use the written description to circumvent
the plain language of the claim. Process Control Corp. v. HydReclaim
Corp., 190 F.3d 1350, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (holding that courts do not
redraft claims and must “construe claims based on the patentee’s version of
the claim as he himself drafted it”). We are constrained to evaluate the
claims before us.
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Application 13/493,497
stored from a physical object to a multi-touch device, and that same data is
then stored back to the physical object. Accordingly, the cited combination
does not teach or otherwise suggest the recited “synchronizing” step and we
do not sustain the rejection of claim 1. For the same reason, we do not
sustain the rejection of claims 2, 3, 5, 6, and 24, which depend from claim 1.
Second Issue
Claim 7 stands rejected as obvious over Blythe and Hinckley and
recites:
7. A method comprising:
detecting a physical object in relation to a component of a
multi-touch device;
receiving input from the physical object by the component
of the multi-touch device upon detection and without input at the
component of the multi-touch device from the user; and
uploading data associated with the physical object by the
component of the multi-touch device responsive to receiving
input from the physical object by the component of the multi-
touch device, the uploading comprising uploading data from the
physical object.
In concluding the combined teachings of Blythe and Hinckley render claim 7
obvious, the Examiner finds Blythe teaches all of the limitations except
“without input at the component of the multi-touch device from the user,”
and that Hinckley supplies the teaching missing from Blythe. Final Act. 10—
12.
Appellants contend neither Blythe nor Hinckley, alone or in
combination, teach either the “receiving” step or the “uploading” step recited
in the claimed method. App. Br. 23—24. With respect to “receiving,”
Appellants argue the Examiner’s finding that Blythe teaches “receiving input
from the physical object by the component of the multi-touch device upon
detection” is unsupported because Blythe merely teaches a handshake
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between devices. Id. According to Appellants, a handshake cannot be
considered receiving input because the purpose of a handshake is merely to
“allow unique identification” of a device. Id. (quoting Blythe 115).
We are not persuaded that the Examiner has erred in rejecting claim 7.
Blythe describes a multi-touch device in the form of an interactive display
system which shares data with data-receiving devices such as cell phones,
game pieces, and other electronic devices. Blythe 13—14. The Examiner
finds, and we agree, Blythe teaches “receiving input from the physical object
by the component of the multi-touch device upon detection” because it
discloses that when the interactive display system detects the data-receiving
device, the interactive display system receives ID signals and symbology
from the data-receiving device. Blythe H 31, 43, and 44. Blythe’s ID
signals and symbology include data such as identifying information (| 33)
and positioning information (| 35).
We also agree with the Examiner that Blythe teaches “uploading data
associated with the physical object by the component of the multi-touch
device responsive to receiving input from the physical object by the
component of the multi-touch device.” As found by the Examiner, Blythe
discloses using the interactive display system as a collaborative download
surface for sharing data between multiple data-receiving devices. Final Act.
11 (citing Blythe 56—58). More specifically, Blythe discloses “[i]n some
embodiments, it may be useful for the various data-receiving devices (Dl,
D2, DN; FIG. 6), positioned on the display surface (14; FIG. 2) to
communicate with each other.” Blythe 1 58. Blythe explains how this
communication is achieved: “a first data-receiving device (Dl; FIG. 6) can
transmit data information to the controller (18; FIG. 2) via its transmitter
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(60; FIG. 5), and the controller, in turn, can relay that information to a
second data-receiving device (D2; FIG. 6) optically, as described
hereinabove.” Id. (emphasis added). Thus, in allowing for sharing data
between multiple data-receiving devices, Blythe teaches the data-receiving
device uploads “data information to the controller via its transmitter.”
We are not persuaded by Appellants’ argument that Blythe’s
handshake process is inapposite here. Irrespective of its purpose, the
handshake process described paragraph 15 of Blythe involves the inputting
of data from the data-receiving devices to the interactive display system.
The language of Appellants’ claims does not exclude a handshake, and the
broad term “input” encompasses a handshake as described in Blythe,
because the ordinary and customary meaning of input is “information fed
into a data processing system or computer.”3 Merriam-Webster Online
(found at https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/input); see also
Microsoft Computer Dictionary, Fifth Edition, 2002 (defining input as
“[information entered into a computer or program for processing, as from a
keyboard or from a file stored in a disk drive”). Both the ID signals and the
symbology passed from Blythe’s data-receiving devices are properly
understood as “information fed into” his interactive display system. As we
noted previously, Blythe teaches these signal include data such as
identifying information (| 33) and positioning information (| 35). Thus, we
find unpersuasive Appellants’ contention that Blythe’s handshake protocol
does not support the Examiner’s rejection of claim 7, and we sustain the
3 Appellants do not provide a lexicographic definition for “input” in the
specification. We therefore accord this term its ordinary and customary
meaning, and find the use of dictionary definitions appropriate here.
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Application 13/493,497
rejection of claim 7. Appellants present similar arguments for patentability
of independent claim 19. For the same reasons, we do not find Appellants’
arguments regarding claim 19 to be persuasive and sustain its rejection.
Third Issue
Claim 23 depends from claim 7 and recites the additional step of
“storing of the uploaded data associated with the physical object to a remote
network storage location to which the memory component[4] of the multi-
touch device is connected.” App. Br. 37 (Claims Appendix).
Noting Blythe and Hinckley teach all limitations of claim 7 from
which claim 23 depends, the Examiner finds Hinckley teaches the additional
“storing” limitation recited in claim 23. Final Act. 13—14 (