Ex Parte Izadi et alDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardJan 18, 201713493497 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 18, 2017) Copy Citation United States Patent and Trademark Office UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O.Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 13/493,497 06/11/2012 Shahram Izadi MS6-0046USC1 8591 22801 7590 01 LEE & HAYES, PLLC 601 W. RIVERSIDE AVENUE SUITE 1400 SPOKANE, WA 99201 EXAMINER HARRIS, DOROTHY H ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2625 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 01/20/2017 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): lhptoms @ leehay es .com u sdocket @ micro soft .com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte SHAHRAMIZADI, ABIGAIL J. SELLEN, RICHARD M. BANKS, STUART TAYLOR, STEPHEN E. HODGES, and ALEX BUTLER1 Appeal 2016-003506 Application 13/493,497 Technology Center 2600 Before MICHAEL J. STRAUSS, AARON W. MOORE, and PHILLIP A. BENNETT, Administrative Patent Judges. BENNETT, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s final rejection of claims 1—3, 5—8, 11—20, and 22—24, which are all of the pending claims. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We affirm-in-part. 1 Appellants’ Brief (App. Br.) identifies the real party in interest as Microsoft Technology Licensing, LLC. App. Br. 3. Appeal 2016-003506 Application 13/493,497 CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER The claims are directed to interacting with physical and digital objects via a multi-touch device. Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of the claimed subject matter: 1. A method comprising: detecting a physical object in relation to a component of a multi-touch device; receiving input at the component of the multi-touch device responsive to detection of the physical object and without user- input to the component of the multi-touch device, wherein the input includes data received from the physical object by another component of the multi-touch device; synchronizing the data between the physical object and a memory component associated with the multi-touch device responsive to detecting the physical object, wherein the synchronizing comprises storing the data from the physical object on the memory component associated with the multi- touch device and storing the data from the memory component associated with the multi-touch device on the physical object such that the data is synchronized between the memory component and the physical object. The prior art relied upon by the Examiner in rejecting the claims on REFERENCES appeal is: Kuzunuki Freeman US 5,732,227 US 6,725,427 B2 Mar. 24, 1998 Apr. 20, 2004 June 8, 2006 Oct. 12, 2006 Dec. 28, 2006 Blythe Parry Hinckley US 2006/0119541 A1 US 2006/0230192 A1 US 2006/0294247 A1 2 Appeal 2016-003506 Application 13/493,497 REJECTIONS Claims 1—3, 7, 8, 16, 23, and 24 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Blythe and Hinckley. Final Act. 6. Claims 5, 6, 15, 17—19 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Blythe, Hinckley, and Parry. Final Act. 15. Claims 11—13 and 22 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Blythe, Hinckley, and Kuzunuki. Final Act. 19. Claim 14 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Blythe, Hinckley, Kuzunuki, and Freeman. Final Act. 22. Claim 20 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Blythe, Hinckley, Parry, and Kuzunuki. Final Act. 23. ISSUES FOR DECISION (1) Did the Examiner err in concluding Blythe and Hinckley render claim 1 obvious? (2) Did the Examiner err in finding Blythe teaches “receiving input from the physical object. . . upon detection ...” and “uploading data associated with the physical object responsive to receiving input from the physical object by the component of the multi-touch device,” as recited in claim 7? (3) Did the Examiner err in finding Hinckley teaches “storing of the uploaded data associated with the physical object to a remote network storage location to which the memory component of the multi-touch device is connected,” as recited in dependent claim 23? 3 Appeal 2016-003506 Application 13/493,497 ANALYSIS First Issue We are persuaded the Examiner erred in concluding claim 1 is rendered obvious by Blythe and Hinckley. As noted above, claim 1 recites: receiving input at. . . the multi-touch device . . . wherein the input includes data received from the physical object by another component of the multi-touch device; synchronizing the data between the physical object and a memory component associated with the multi-touch device responsive to detecting the physical object, wherein the synchronizing comprises storing the data from the physical object on the memory component associated with the multi- touch device and storing the data from the memory component associated with the multi-touch device on the physical object such that the data is synchronized between the memory component and the physical object. The recitation of “the data” throughout the “synchronizing” limitation derives antecedent basis from the immediately preceding “receiving” limitation (“wherein the input includes data received from the physical object”). As written, then, the “synchronizing” recited in claim 1 requires storing the data from the physical object on the multi-touch device, and then storing that same data from the multi-touch device back to the physical object.2 The Examiner does not identity, and we do not discern, any teaching in Blythe or Hinckley of a synchronization process in which data is 2 We acknowledge this interpretation of claim 1 may be inconsistent with and unsupported by the embodiments described in the Specification. Nevertheless, it is inappropriate to use the written description to circumvent the plain language of the claim. Process Control Corp. v. HydReclaim Corp., 190 F.3d 1350, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (holding that courts do not redraft claims and must “construe claims based on the patentee’s version of the claim as he himself drafted it”). We are constrained to evaluate the claims before us. 4 Appeal 2016-003506 Application 13/493,497 stored from a physical object to a multi-touch device, and that same data is then stored back to the physical object. Accordingly, the cited combination does not teach or otherwise suggest the recited “synchronizing” step and we do not sustain the rejection of claim 1. For the same reason, we do not sustain the rejection of claims 2, 3, 5, 6, and 24, which depend from claim 1. Second Issue Claim 7 stands rejected as obvious over Blythe and Hinckley and recites: 7. A method comprising: detecting a physical object in relation to a component of a multi-touch device; receiving input from the physical object by the component of the multi-touch device upon detection and without input at the component of the multi-touch device from the user; and uploading data associated with the physical object by the component of the multi-touch device responsive to receiving input from the physical object by the component of the multi- touch device, the uploading comprising uploading data from the physical object. In concluding the combined teachings of Blythe and Hinckley render claim 7 obvious, the Examiner finds Blythe teaches all of the limitations except “without input at the component of the multi-touch device from the user,” and that Hinckley supplies the teaching missing from Blythe. Final Act. 10— 12. Appellants contend neither Blythe nor Hinckley, alone or in combination, teach either the “receiving” step or the “uploading” step recited in the claimed method. App. Br. 23—24. With respect to “receiving,” Appellants argue the Examiner’s finding that Blythe teaches “receiving input from the physical object by the component of the multi-touch device upon detection” is unsupported because Blythe merely teaches a handshake 5 Appeal 2016-003506 Application 13/493,497 between devices. Id. According to Appellants, a handshake cannot be considered receiving input because the purpose of a handshake is merely to “allow unique identification” of a device. Id. (quoting Blythe 115). We are not persuaded that the Examiner has erred in rejecting claim 7. Blythe describes a multi-touch device in the form of an interactive display system which shares data with data-receiving devices such as cell phones, game pieces, and other electronic devices. Blythe 13—14. The Examiner finds, and we agree, Blythe teaches “receiving input from the physical object by the component of the multi-touch device upon detection” because it discloses that when the interactive display system detects the data-receiving device, the interactive display system receives ID signals and symbology from the data-receiving device. Blythe H 31, 43, and 44. Blythe’s ID signals and symbology include data such as identifying information (| 33) and positioning information (| 35). We also agree with the Examiner that Blythe teaches “uploading data associated with the physical object by the component of the multi-touch device responsive to receiving input from the physical object by the component of the multi-touch device.” As found by the Examiner, Blythe discloses using the interactive display system as a collaborative download surface for sharing data between multiple data-receiving devices. Final Act. 11 (citing Blythe 56—58). More specifically, Blythe discloses “[i]n some embodiments, it may be useful for the various data-receiving devices (Dl, D2, DN; FIG. 6), positioned on the display surface (14; FIG. 2) to communicate with each other.” Blythe 1 58. Blythe explains how this communication is achieved: “a first data-receiving device (Dl; FIG. 6) can transmit data information to the controller (18; FIG. 2) via its transmitter 6 Appeal 2016-003506 Application 13/493,497 (60; FIG. 5), and the controller, in turn, can relay that information to a second data-receiving device (D2; FIG. 6) optically, as described hereinabove.” Id. (emphasis added). Thus, in allowing for sharing data between multiple data-receiving devices, Blythe teaches the data-receiving device uploads “data information to the controller via its transmitter.” We are not persuaded by Appellants’ argument that Blythe’s handshake process is inapposite here. Irrespective of its purpose, the handshake process described paragraph 15 of Blythe involves the inputting of data from the data-receiving devices to the interactive display system. The language of Appellants’ claims does not exclude a handshake, and the broad term “input” encompasses a handshake as described in Blythe, because the ordinary and customary meaning of input is “information fed into a data processing system or computer.”3 Merriam-Webster Online (found at https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/input); see also Microsoft Computer Dictionary, Fifth Edition, 2002 (defining input as “[information entered into a computer or program for processing, as from a keyboard or from a file stored in a disk drive”). Both the ID signals and the symbology passed from Blythe’s data-receiving devices are properly understood as “information fed into” his interactive display system. As we noted previously, Blythe teaches these signal include data such as identifying information (| 33) and positioning information (| 35). Thus, we find unpersuasive Appellants’ contention that Blythe’s handshake protocol does not support the Examiner’s rejection of claim 7, and we sustain the 3 Appellants do not provide a lexicographic definition for “input” in the specification. We therefore accord this term its ordinary and customary meaning, and find the use of dictionary definitions appropriate here. 7 Appeal 2016-003506 Application 13/493,497 rejection of claim 7. Appellants present similar arguments for patentability of independent claim 19. For the same reasons, we do not find Appellants’ arguments regarding claim 19 to be persuasive and sustain its rejection. Third Issue Claim 23 depends from claim 7 and recites the additional step of “storing of the uploaded data associated with the physical object to a remote network storage location to which the memory component[4] of the multi- touch device is connected.” App. Br. 37 (Claims Appendix). Noting Blythe and Hinckley teach all limitations of claim 7 from which claim 23 depends, the Examiner finds Hinckley teaches the additional “storing” limitation recited in claim 23. Final Act. 13—14 (Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation