Ex Parte Harris et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Jun 19, 2017

13717434 (P.T.A.B. Jun. 19, 2017)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/717,434 12/17/2012 Daniel I. HARRIS P022839-PTFC-CHE 1021
65798 7590 06/20/2017
MILLER IP GROUP, PLC
GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION
42690 WOODWARD AVENUE
SUITE 300
BLOOMFIELD HILLS, MI 48304
EXAMINER
JELSMA, JONATHAN G
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
1721
MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE
06/20/2017 PAPER
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte DANIEL I. HARRIS, LOREN DEVRIES,
CHARLES MACKINTOSH, JOHN P. SALVADOR and
DEREK S. KILMER1
Appeal 2016-005657
Application 13/717,434
Technology Center 1700
Before BRADLEY R. GARRIS, PETER F. KRATZ, and
CHRISTOPHER L. OGDEN, Administrative Patent Judges.
GARRIS, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134, Appellants appeal from the Examiner’s
rejections under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) of independent claims 1 and 14 as
unpatentable over Lemer (US 2010/0266912 Al, pub. Oct. 21, 2010) in
view of either Chikugo (US 2011/0086285 Al, pub. Apr. 14, 2011) or
Oomori (US 2010/0159340 Al, pub. Jun. 24, 2010) and further in view of
Hirakata (US 2006/0042845 Al, pub. Mar. 2, 2006), of remaining
independent claim 10 as unpatentable over these first mentioned references
1 GM Global Technology Operations LLC, is identified as the real party in
interest. App. Br. 4.
Appeal 2016-005657
Application 13/717,434
in combination with Frait (US 2012/0011961 Al, Jan. 19, 2012), and of
remaining dependent claims 2—9, 11—13, and 15—20 as unpatentable over the
first mentioned references alone or in combination with additional prior art.
We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6.
We AFFIRM.
Appellants claim a method for controlling a start time of a fuel cell
system comprising providing a plurality of inputs that identity operating
conditions of the system, a controller programmed for determining a
maximum allowable start time of the system using the plurality of inputs and
whether a non-driver initiated restart request has occurred, and determining a
maximum compressor speed and airflow (independent claims 1 and 10). In
a narrower embodiment, the method of claim 1 uses “a stand-by-to-run
transition when a fast start is not requested” (dependent claim 4). Appellants
also claim a control system analogous to the claimed method for controlling
a start time of the fuel cell system (independent claim 14).
A copy of representative claims 1 and 4, taken from the Claims
Appendix of the Appeal Brief, appears below.
1. A method for controlling a start time of a fuel cell
system, said system including a fuel cell stack having a cathode
side and a compressor providing air to the cathode side of the
fuel cell stack, said method comprising:
providing a plurality of inputs that identify operating
conditions of the fuel cell system;
a controller programmed for:
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Appeal 2016-005657
Application 13/717,434
determining whether a non-driver initiated restart request
has occurred;
determining a maximum allowable start time of the fuel
cell system using a hybridization control strategy, the plurality
of inputs, and whether the non-driver initiated restart request
has occurred; and
determining a maximum compressor speed and airflow to
provide the maximum allowable start-time of the fuel cell
system using the determined maximum allowable start time, a
requested stack power, and an energy consumption and noise
optimization strategy.
4. The method according to claim 1 wherein
determining a maximum compressor speed and airflow to
provide the maximum allowable start-time of the fuel cell
system includes considering compressor noise and compressor
parasitic power consumption when determining the maximum
compressor speed and flow and using a stand-by-to-run
transition when a fast start is not requested.
Appellants present arguments specifically directed to the independent
claims and dependent claim 4 only (App. Br. 9—19). Therefore, the other
dependent claims under rejection will stand or fall with their parent
independent claims, of which claim 1 is representative.
We will sustain the Examiner’s rejections for the reasons given in the
Final Action, the Answer, and below.
In rejecting the independent claims, the Examiner finds that Lemer
discloses a method and system for assessing the time a fuel cell has been
shut down in order to provide for an efficient next system startup sequence
but does not explicitly teach determining a maximum compressor speed and
airflow as claimed (see, e.g., Final Action 5—7 and 9-12 (citing, e.g., Lemer
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27—28, 30)). Nevertheless, the Examiner concludes that it would have
been obvious to provide Lemer with the step and means taught by either
Chikugo or Oomori for determining such a maximum compressor speed and
airflow {id.), and Appellants do not contend otherwise in their Appeal Brief
{see generally App. Br.).
Further regarding the independent claims, the Examiner finds that
neither Lemer nor Chikugo nor Oomori explicitly teaches a controller
programmed for determining whether a non-driver initiated restart request
has occurred but that Hirakata teaches using a temperature maintenance
system having a non-driver initiated restart request in order to restart and
thereby heat up an inactive fuel cell to avoid damage from freezing
temperatures {see, e.g., Final Action 7—8 and 12—13). The Examiner
concludes that it would have been obvious to provide Lemer with Hirakata’s
temperature maintenance system in order to prevent the fuel cell from
freezing (id. at 8—9 and 13).
Appellants argue that “the combination of the cited prior art
references does not teach or suggest determining a maximum allowable start
time using, inter alia, whether a non-driver initiated restart request has
occurred [as required by the independent claims]” {see, e.g., App. Br. 11).
More specifically, Appellants argue that “[t]he Examiner’s addition of the
Hirakata reference, which merely discloses a non-driver initiated restart to
maintain a certain temperature to prevent a fuel cell from freezing, fails to
teach or suggest determining a maximum allowable start time using, inter
alia, whether a non-driver initiated restart request has occurred” {id.).
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Application 13/717,434
The Examiner responds as follows:
The combination of the method of LERNER of providing an accurate
time that a vehicle has been shut down, with the method of
HIRAKATA of using a non-driver initiated restart request, such as the
temperature maintenance operation of HIRAKATA would result in
the claim limitation of “determining a maximum allowable start time
of the fuel cell system using ... whether the non-driver initiated restart
request has occurred”. In other words[,] when the teachings of
HIRAKATA are combined with the teachings of LERNER, the
temperature maintenance operation of HIRAKATA becomes a point
of LERNER as to when the fuel cell has been stopped and would be
used in the estimate to determine the start-up sequence.
(Ans. 4—5.)
Appellants do not identify with any reasonable specificity error in the
Examiner’s determination that providing Lemer with Hirakata’s temperature
maintenance system having a non-driver initiated restart request would have
resulted in the independent claim limitation argued above. More
specifically, Appellants fail to explain why the proposed combination of
prior art would not have resulted in providing Lemer’s controller for
establishing the next system start-up sequence with means for assessing
whether Hirakata’s restart request has occurred. Likewise, Appellants fail to
identify a distinction between their claimed maximum allowable start time
and the start time determined by the modified controller of Lemer for
establishing the next start-up sequence.
In their Reply Brief, Appellants “agree [] that some of the operating
conditions disclosed by Lemer and Hirakata may require longer start times
and some of the operating conditions disclosed by Lemer and Hirakata may
require shorter start times, but nothing in Lemer and Hirakata teaches using
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certain operating parameters of the fuel cell system to determine what the
maximum start time can be to meet the parameters, and then providing a
maximum compressor speed and airflow necessary so that a maximum start
time is not exceeded” (Reply Br. 3).
Aside from not explicatively distinguishing the claimed start time
from the start time of Lemer as modified by Hirakata, this Reply Brief
argument newly contends that Lemer and Hirakata do not teach determining
a maximum allowable start time “and then providing a maximum
compressor speed and airflow necessary so that a maximum start time is not
exceeded” (id.). As previously indicated, the Appeal Brief does not contest
the Examiner’s conclusion that, in view of either Chikugo or Oomori, it
would have been obvious to provide Lemer with a step and means for
determining a maximum compressor speed and airflow as required by the
independent claims. Under these circumstances, and because Appellants
have not shown good cause, we will not consider this new argument for
purposes of the present appeal. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.41(b)(2) (2015).
For the above-stated reasons, Appellants fail to reveal error in the
Examiner’s obviousness conclusion concerning representative independent
claim 1.
Regarding dependent claim 4, Appellants “point[] out that claim 4
recites, inter alia, ‘using a stand-by-to-mn transition when a fast start is not
requested’ [and argue that] [s]imply using a stand-by-to-mn transition,
without considering whether a fast start has (or has not) been requested, fails
to teach or suggest all of Appellants’] claim 4” (App. Br. 12).
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In response, the Examiner explains that “there is no claim limitation
that requires to consider whether a fast start has or has not been requested”
and that “the claim limitation for ‘using a stand-by-to-run transition when a
fast start is not requested’ then is taken to only claim a normal operation
[i.e., a stand-by-to-run transition] of the fuel cell” (Ans. 5).
We find persuasive merit in the Examiner’s explanation. Moreover,
we emphasize that Appellants’ Reply Brief does not address, and therefore
does not reveal error in, this explanation. Based on the record before us, we
agree with the Examiner that the claim 4 limitation under review is satisfied
by the undisputed fact that the prior art uses a stand-by-to-run transition.
In light of the foregoing, we sustain each of the Examiner’s § 103
rejections of the appealed claims.
The decision of the Examiner is affirmed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a).
AFFIRMED
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