Ex Parte Ellwanger et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Mar 30, 2016

12463782 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 30, 2016)

UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE
12/463,782 05/11/2009
29450 7590
BARLEY SNYDER
101 Lindenwood Drive
Suite 100
Malvern, PA 19355
04/01/2016
FIRST NAMED INVENTOR
Simon Ellwanger
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www .uspto.gov
ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
46889-907 1260
EXAMINER
GRANT, ROBERT J
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2859
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
04/01/2016 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address( es):
berwynipdocket@barley.com
hsalamone@barley.com
sanastasi@barley.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte SIMON ELLWANGER, GARY FITZERGERALD, and
JEFF ZABEL
Appeal 2014-004115
Application 12/463,782
Technology Center 2800
Before ROMULO H. DELMENDO, KAREN M. HASTINGS, and
WESLEY B. DERRICK, Administrative Patent Judges.
DELMENDO, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
The Appellants 1 seek our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) of a
decision of the Primary Examiner to reject claims 1, 2, 4-7, 10, 12-18, 21,
22, and 32-34. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM for the reasons given by the Examiner, adding the
following for emphasis.
1 The Appellants state that "Bayerische Motoren W erke Aktiengesellschaft"
is the Real Party in Interest (Appeal Brief filed September 25, 2013,
hereinafter "Appeal Br.," 4).
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Application 12/463,782
BACKGROUND
The subject matter on appeal relates to a timing apparatus and to a
method of optimizing an electrical charging procedure of a vehicle by using
a timing apparatus to denote the expected time away from a vehicle
(Specification, hereinafter "Spec.," iii! OOOland 0014). Details of the
appealed subject matter are recited in illustrative independent claims 1, 16,
32, and 33, which are reproduced from pages 34-39 of the Appeal Brief
(Claims App.) as follows:
1. A timing apparatus for a vehicle, comprising:
a menu located in the vehicle and displaying a plurality
of selectable time parameters, a single selected time parameter
being an expected time before the vehicle is restarted;
a control knob located in the vehicle and adjustable to
select one of the time parameters from a plurality of knob
positions, each knob position representing the plurality of
selectable time parameters; and
a knob position sensor connected to the control knob and
a microprocessor located in the vehicle.
16. A method to optimize an electrical charging
procedure of a vehicle, comprising the steps of:
determining an amount of vehicle idle time;
selecting the amount of time from a menu located in the
vehicle, the menu having a set of numbers corresponding to
user selectable time parameters;
positioning a control knob located in the vehicle
proximate to the operator in a position to operate the vehicle,
the control knob having a marker to a selected time parameter
reflecting an amount of time until an operator will restart the
vehicle; and
inputting the selected time parameter into a battery
charging algorithm.
32. A method to optimize an electrical charge algorithm,
comprising the steps of:
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providing to a charging module in a vehicle a quantified
amount of energy over time required to charge a vehicle battery
(KW/Hr);
providing to the charging module a maximal energy of a
connection to the vehicle (KW);
providing to the charging module an energy price over
time for charging the vehicle;
providing to the charging module an amount of time until
the vehicle will be turned on by selecting a time parameter
using a user controlled timing apparatus located in the vehicle;
calculating an optimal charging rate including
optimization of voltage, current and time through the charging
module.
3 3. A timing apparatus for by [sic] an operator in a
vehicle, comprising:
a menu located in the vehicle and displaying user
selectable time parameters, a single selected time parameter
being an expected time the vehicle is turned-off;
a control knob positioned proximate to the operator
positioned to operate the vehicle and adjustable to select an
operator selected time parameters from a plurality of knob
positions, each knob position representing a selectable time
parameters reflecting an approximate time when the operator is
expected to restart the vehicle; and
a knob position sensor connected to the control knob and
a microprocessor located in the vehicle.
THE REJECTIONS
The Examiner rejected the claims as follows:
I. Claim 32 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable
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T"""'I • ., ' ., /l'.l'.T"""'I • ., .... .,,_,., ., r"I. 1. over !'mcnam et al. ~--!'mcnam--r ana :sims;~
II. Claim 32 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable
over Fincham and Pryor;4
III. Claims 1, 2, 4, 5, 10, 12-17, 21, 22, 33, and 34 under 35
U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Fincham, Yeh
et al. ("Y eh")5 and Sims; and
IV. Claims 6, 7 and 18 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Fincham, Yeh, Sims and Levin et al.
("Levin"). 6
(Examiner's Answer, entered November 7, 2013, hereafter "Ans.," 3; Final
Office Action entered November 30, 2012, hereinafter "Final Act.," 5-9. 7)
DISCUSSION
I
Initially, the Appellants contend that the subject matter relied upon by
the Examiner is not prior art as it is not supported by Fincham' s Provisional
Patent Application ("Fincham Provisional Patent Application") (Appeal Br.
13). The Appellants contend that "[i]n order to properly cite Fincham as
2 US 2010/0017249 Al, published January 21, 2010 (based on Application
12/502,041 filed July 13, 2009, claiming priority to Provisional Application
61/134,646 filed July 11, 2008).
3 US 5,467,006, issued November 14, 1995.
4 US 2008/0007202 Al, published January 10, 2008.
5 US 2008/0143686 Al, published June 19, 2008.
6 US 6,154,201, issued November 28, 2000.
7 In the Final Action, the heading for Rejection III misidentified claims 11
and 23, which are withdrawn from consideration, as rejected and
inadvertently omitted claim 22 (Final Act. 7).
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prior art, the Examiner must rely on Fincham's claim of priority to a
Provisional Patent Application" and the Appellants maintain that the subject
matter relied upon is not disclosed in the Fincham Provisional Patent
Application "in compliance with 35 U.S.C. § 112, 1st paragraph" (id. at 13-
14). Thus, the Appellants contend that the Examiner's reliance on Fincham
is in error because the subject matter relied upon by the Examiner is not
properly citable as prior art (id. at 14-15).
In support, the Appellants contend that the Fincham Provisional
Patent Application does not include a "discussion of entering variable data
into the vehicle at the spot moment when the operator determines how long
that operator will be away from the vehicle and expects to tum the car back
on, which is being performed in the vehicle." (Id. at 16). Based on the
belief that the provisional application lacks this description, the Appellants
contend that the Fincham should not be afforded the filing date of the
Fincham Provisional Patent Application with respect to "providing to the
charging module an amount of time until the vehicle will be turned on by
selecting a time parameter using a user controlled timing apparatus located
in the vehicle" as required by the claim (id. at 15).
As found by the Examiner (Final Act. at 5), Fincham discloses
providing to the charging module an amount of time until the vehicle will be
turned on by selecting a time parameter using a user controlled timing
apparatus located in the vehicle (Fig. 7, item 722). We note that the
Appellants do not appear to argue Fincham does not disclose this feature, but
merely that this feature should not be afforded the Fincham Provisional
Patent Application's earlier filing date. Therefore, the critical question
remains whether this disclosure of Fincham should be afforded the filing
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date of the earlier filed provisional application. For the reasons set forth in
more detail below, we find that it does.
As Appellants contend (Appeal Br. 15), in order for a nonprovisional
application to be entitled to the filing date of an earlier filed provisional
application under 35 U.S.C. § l 19(e), the written description of the
provisional application must adequately support and enable the subject
matter disclosed in the nonprovisional application that claims the benefit of
the provisional application. See New Railhead Mfg., L.L. C. v. Vermeer Mfg.
Co., 298 F.3d 1290, 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (holding that for a nonprovisional
application to be afforded the priority date of the provisional application,
"the specification of the provisional must 'contain a written description of
the invention and the manner and process of making and using it, in such
full, clear, concise, and exact terms,' 35 U.S.C. § 112 iJ 1, to enable an
ordinarily skilled artisan to practice the invention claimed in the non-
provisional application"). Thus, in order for a nonprovisional application to
be entitled to the benefit of the filing date of the provisional application, the
disclosure of the provisional application must adequately provide ( 1) a
written description of the subject matter at issue in the later filed
nonprovisional application and (2) an enabling disclosure to permit one of
ordinary skill in the art to make and use the subject matter without undue
experimentation.
We have fully reviewed the Appellants' proffered analysis of the
Fincham Provisional Patent Application; however, we agree with the
Examiner's well-reasoned analysis (Ans. at 3-5 and Final Act. at 3--4),
which we adopt as our own, that the subject matter relied upon by the
Examiner was disclosed in the Fincham Provisional Patent Application in
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compliance with 35 U.S.C. § 112, 1st paragraph and thus the subject matter
relied upon by the Examiner is available as prior art.
As found by the Examiner (Final Act. 3), the Fincham Provisional
Patent Application discloses sending information from the automobile to the
charging module, including "information regarding parameters defining how
the automobile is to be charged ... [and that] such information might specify
a time by which the car is to be a certain percent charged" (Fincham
Provisional Application 2). The Fincham Provisional Patent Application
further discloses "the information may be ... entered into the automobile
such as via a dashboard based interface" (id. at 3). Finally, as found by the
Examiner (Final Act. 3), the Fincham Provisional Patent Application
explicitly discloses "[t]he driver knows that his car will sit in the space all
work day, hence the chosen charging duration of eight hours" (p. 3). We
note Fincham non-provisional application includes verbatim the above
disclosures c,-i,-i 0097-0099).
Taking these disclosures, we agree with the Examiner (Final Act. 4),
and hold that the disclosed dashboard interface for entering charging
parameters in combination with the explicit disclosure of choosing the
charging duration supports and enables the subject matter as disclosed in
Fincham and relied on by the Examiner. In view of this determination, we
hold that the Fincham Provisional Patent Application adequately supports
and enables the subject matter disclosed in the nonprovisional application,
and thus we hold that Fincham is afforded the filing date of the provisional
patent application with respect to those features so disclosed.
Since we have held that Fincham is afforded the filing date of the
earlier filed provision application, we now consider the merits of the
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rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). The Examiner found that Fincham
describes, or would have suggested to one of ordinary skill in the art,
optimizing an electrical charge algorithm including every limitation of claim
32, including describing a charging module, except for "the charging module
being located in a vehicle" in the manner as recited by the claim (Final Act.
5). The Examiner further found that Sims discloses a charging module
"located in the vehicle to optimize an electrical charge of a battery in a
vehicle" and concluded that "[i]t would have been obvious to one of
ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention was made to modify the
method of Fincham to have the charging module in the vehicle, according to
the teachings of Sims, to provide the user with the capability of increasing
the efficiency of the charging schedule of the battery ... , and since
rearranging parts of an invention involves only routine skill in the art" (id.).
In response to the obviousness rejection, the Appellants contend the
Examiner has failed to establish a prima facie case of obviousness because
the "Examiner never articulates how the Fincham's external power delivery
management for multiple vehicles, and Sims' internal, automatic charging
module could be combined to yield a user controlled timing apparatus as a
predictable result, be obvious to try with a reasonable expectation of success,
or that there is some teaching, suggestion, or motivation to combine them to
arrive at the claimed invention" (Appeal Br. 19). Additionally, the
Appellants contend Sims discloses a "charging module that automatically
optimizes a vehicle's charging method when it detects an external power
source" and thus teaches away from "a user controlled timing apparatus" (id.
at 18). Therefore, the Appellants argue "[t]here is no basis in the art for
modifying Fincham with Sims to arrive at the claimed invention, nor has the
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Examiner articulated a rational reason to support the legal conclusion of
obviousness by combination thereof' (id. at 21 ).
We have considered fully the Appellants' analysis of the Fincham and
Sims disclosures; however, we find that the Appellants' argument based on
that analysis fails to reveal any reversible error in the Examiner's factual
findings, analysis, and conclusions of obviousness. The test of obviousness
is not whether an express suggestion of the claimed invention is present in
any or all references but rather what the references taken collectively would
have suggested to those of ordinary skill in the art presumed to be familiar
with them. In re Rosselet, 347 F.2d 847, 851(CCPA1965); In re Hedges,
783 F.2d 1038, 1041 (Fed. Cir. 1986). Additionally, a reference may be
relied upon for all that it would have reasonably suggested to one having
ordinary skill in the art. Merck & Co. v. Biocraft Labs., Inc., 874 F.2d 804,
807 (Fed. Cir. 1989) ("the mere absence from the prior art of a teaching or a
limitation recited in the patent at issue is insufficient for a conclusion of
no no bviousness").
In response to the Appellants' arguments, we find the Examiner has
made extensive factual findings with respect to Fincham and Sims (Final
Act. 5), which we adopt as our own, and the Appellants have proffered
insufficient articulated arguments to the contrary to reveal reversible error in
the conclusion of obviousness. The relevant inquiry is whether the claimed
subject matter would have been obvious to those ordinary skill in the art in
light of the combined teachings of those references. See In re Keller, 642
F.2d 413, 425 (CCPA 1981). Additionally, the Examiner has found the
limitations are disclosed or suggested in the prior art references, and the
Appellants' mere assertions to the contrary are insufficient to identify a
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reversible error. See Ex parte Belinne, No 2009-004693, 2009 WL 2477843
(BP AI 2009) (informative) ("[W]e find that the Examiner has made
extensive specific fact finding ... with respect to each of the argued claims.
Appellants' argument ... repeatedly restates elements of the claim language
and simply argues that the elements are missing from the reference.
However, Appellants do not present any arguments to explain why the
Examiner's explicit fact finding is in error"). See also 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.3 7 ( c )( 1 )(vii) (nothing that an argument that merely points out what a
claim recites is unpersuasive).
Fincham has been discussed supra. Additionally, as found by the
Examiner (Final Act. 5), Fincham discloses a charging module, external to
the vehicle, for optimizing the charging of a vehicle battery c,-i,-i 0051-0055).
Also, as found by the Examiner (Final Act. 5), Sims discloses an energy
transfer device onboard an electric vehicle, i.e. charging module located in
the vehicle, and discloses a charging algorithm to optimize an electrical
charge of an individual battery in the vehicle (Sims col. 2, 11. 50-66).
Taking these teachings collectively, we hold that it is reasonable to conclude
that it would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art to
modify Fincham's external charging module by providing a charging
module in the vehicle to increase efficiency by specifically tailoring the
charging module with the individual battery being charged. The mere fact
that Fincham discloses an external charging module does not foreclose the
obviousness of a charging module in a vehicle as such is a known method
for charging a battery as established by Sims. See KSR Int 'l Co. v. Teleflex
Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 416--417 (2007) ("The combination of familiar elements
according to known method is likely to be obvious when it does no more
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than yield predictable results"). We also find that the Appellants do not
direct us to any factual evidence to rebut this reasonable conclusion and thus
find the factual evidence of record supports the conclusion of obviousness.
Additionally, Sims discloses the controller "may be overridden ...
and receive user desired settings such as the time or length of the next
anticipated use through user controller" (Sims col. 3, 11. 4-8). In view of this
disclosure, we reject the Appellants' argument that Sims teaches away from
using "a user controlled timing apparatus." Additionally, we reject this
position because, as we found supra, Fincham discloses a user controlled
timing apparatus. One cannot show nonobviousness by attacking references
individually when the rejection is based on a combination of reference. See
Keller, 642 F.2d at 425.
II
In arguing for the reversal of Rejection II, the Appellants again
present arguments with respect to the Fincham Prov1s10nal Patent
Application. We reject this line of arguments for the same reasons as set
forth above and hold, as we did supra, that the Fincham Provisional Patent
Application adequately supports and enables the subject matter disclosed in
the nonprovisional application and thus we find Fincham is properly
afforded the filing date of the provisional patent application with respect to
those features so disclosed.
Turning to the obviousness rejection, again the Examiner finds
Fincham describes, or would have suggested to one of ordinary skill in the
art, optimizing an electrical charge algorithm including every limitation of
claim 32, including describing a charging module, except for "the charging
module being located in a vehicle" in the manner as recited by the claim
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(Final Act. 6). The Examiner further found that Pryor discloses a charging
module "located in vehicle [] for optimizing grid charging of a battery [] in
the vehicle [] and receiving inputs to perform this method" and concluded
that "[i]t would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the
time of the invention was made to modify the method of Fincham, according
to the teachings of Pryor, to provide the user with the capability of
determining an optimal time period during which the battery should be
charged and effectuating charging during the determined time period ... and
since rearranging parts of an invention involves only routine skill in the art"
(id.).
In response to the obviousness rejection, in addition to similar
arguments as set forth previously which we reject here for substantially the
same reasons as set forth above, the Appellants contend "Pryor does not
disclose a user controlled timing apparatus located in a vehicle" (Appeal Br.
25). We find this argument unpersuasive because, as we have articulated in
detail supra, this feature is disclosed by Fincham. One cannot show
nonobviousness by attacking references individually when the rejection is
based on a combination of reference. See Keller, 642 F.2d at 425.
The Appellants contend the Examiner has failed to establish a prima
facie case of obviousness because the "Examiner has not articulated how the
combination of Fincham's external power delivery management for multiple
vehicles, and Pryor's predetermined charge initiation time would yield a
user controlled timing apparatus as a predictable result, be obvious to try
with a reasonable expectation of success, or that the references contain some
teaching, suggestion, or motivation to modify or combine them to arrive at
the claimed invention" (Appeal Br. 25). We are unpersuaded by these
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arguments because the Examiner did in fact articulate a sufficient reason
with some rational underpinning to support the obviousness conclusion.
We have considered fully the Appellants' analysis of Fincham and
Pryor; however, we find that Appellants' analysis fails to reveal any
reversible error in the Examiner's factual findings, analysis, and conclusions
of obviousness. The test of obviousness is not whether an express
suggestion of the claimed invention is present in any or all references but
rather what the references taken collectively would have suggested to those
of ordinary skill in the art presumed to be familiar with them. Rosselet, 347
F.2d at 851; Hedges, 783 F.2d at 1041.
Again, we find the Examiner has made extensive factual findings with
respect to Fincham and Pryor (Final Act. 6), which we adopt as our own, and
the Appellants have proffered insufficient articulated arguments to the
contrary to reveal reversible error in the Examiner's findings, analysis, and
conclusion of obviousness. In this case, the Examiner has found the
limitations are disclosed or suggested in the prior art reference, and the
Appellants' mere assertions to the contrary are insufficient to identify a
reversible error.
III
In arguing for the reversal of Rejection III, the Appellants argue
claims 1, 2, 4, 5, 10-17, 21, 22, 33, and 34 together, focusing on
independent claims 1 and 33 together and provide additional arguments for
independent claims 16 (Appeal Br. 26-32). Therefore, we confined our
discussion to claim 1, which we select as representative pursuant 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(l)(iv) and thereafter address claims 16, 17, 21 and 22 to the
extent that they have been argued separately in accordance with the rule.
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The Examiner found that Fincham describes, or would have suggested
to one of ordinary skill in the art, a timing apparatus including every
limitation of claim 1, except for Fincham "does not explicitly teach the use
of a control knob" and does not disclose "a microprocessor being located in
a vehicle" in a manner as recited by the claim (Final Act. 7-8).
With respect to the control knob, the Examiner further found that
Fincham discloses means for adjusting the time parameter by using an input
device that "can comprise any number of devices, including point of sale
terminals, variable function input devices, button, keys, etc." and the
Examiner found that Yeh discloses "a means for inputting a time for
charging comprising a control knob adjustable to select one of the time
parameters from a plurality of knob positions" as required by claim 1 (id. at
7). Therefore, the Examiner concluded that "[i]t would have been obvious
to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention was made to
modify the invention of Fincham by incorporat[ ing] the knob of Yeh into the
charging apparatus of Fincham based on the suggestion of Fincham that any
of a number of devices can be used for the input, and because the input
devices of Fincham and the knob of Yeh are known equivalents for
providing inputs in a vehicle" (Final Act. 7).
With respect to the microprocessor, the Examiner argues Sims
discloses a microprocessor "located in the vehicle for performing a method
to optimize an electrical charge of a battery in a vehicle" and concluded that
"[i]t would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time
of the invention was made to modify the method of Fincham to have the
processor in the vehicle, according to the teachings of Sims, to provide the
user with the capability of increasing the efficiency of the charging schedule
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of the battery ... , and since rearranging parts of an invention involves only
routine skill in the art" (id. at 8).
In addition to similar arguments as set forth previously which we find
unpersuasive here for substantially the same reasons as set forth above, the
Appellants argue various features of the instant claims are not specifically
disclosed by each of the references individually (Appeal Br. 25). In
response to these arguments, we find the Examiner has made extensive
factual findings with respect to Fincham, Yeh, and Sims (Final Act. 5),
which we adopt as our own, and the Appellants have proffered insufficient
articulated arguments to the contrary to reveal reversible error in the
conclusion of obviousness. Again, the relevant inquiry is whether the
claimed subject matter would have been obvious to those ordinary skill in
the art in light of the combined teachings of those references. See Keller,
642 F.2d at 425. Additionally, the Examiner has found each and every
limitation of the claims at issue were disclosed or suggested in the prior art
references, and the Appellants mere assertions to the contrary are
insufficient to identify a reversible error. See Belinne, supra.
As we found above, Fincham discloses a user controlled apparatus for
inputting time into the control system (Fig. 7). Additionally, as found by the
Examiner (Ans. 7), Yeh discloses using a control knob to allow the user to
input data into a vehicle control system (iJ 0002). Taken these teachings, we
find it reasonable to conclude that it would have been obvious to use a
known control knob, as taught by Yeh, to enter the control data, including
the time data, as outlined by Fincham. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 416--417 (The
combination of familiar elements according to known method is likely to be
obvious when it does no more than yield predictable results). We also find
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that the Appellants do not direct us to any factual evidence to rebut this
reasonable conclusion.
In addition to the above, the Appellants argue "[t]he Fincham system
relies on an external electrical charging system, including the central server"
and therefore the modification to apply the principles to a single vehicle as
argued by the Examiner "would frustrate the purpose of the system
discussed [by Fincham]" (Appeal Br. 29). The Appellants do not direct us to
any factual evidence to support the assertion that providing a charging
module in the vehicle as suggested by Sims would be inoperable or would
not function as intended.
Fincham discloses receiving control data to a microprocessor for
optimizing the charging of a vehicle battery (Fig. 3). Additionally, Sims
discloses optimizing the charging of a specific battery by including an
energy transfer device "located onboard an electric vehicle," where the
electric transfer device includes a microprocessor (Sims Fig. 1; col. 2, 11. 65-
68). Again, for similar reasons as set forth supra, we find that it is
reasonable to conclude that it would have been obvious to modify Fincham's
to provide a charge control module microprocessor in the vehicle to receive
the inputs from the user to increase efficiency by specifically tailoring the
charging schedule with the individual battery being charged. The mere fact
that Fincham discloses an external charging module does not foreclose the
obviousness of a charging module in a vehicle as such is a known method
for charging a battery as established by Sims. See KSR at 416--417 ("The
combination of familiar elements according to known method is likely to be
obvious when it does no more than yield predictable results").
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The Appellants argue independent claim 16 separately; however
present no additional arguments and, therefore, we maintain this rejection
for substantially the same reasons as set forth above.
IV
In arguing for the reversal of Rejection IV, the Appellants present no
additional arguments and, therefore, we sustain this rejection for
substantially the same reasons as set forth above.
SUMMARY
For these reasons and those set forth in the answer, Rejections I, II,
III, and IV are affirmed. Therefore, the Examiner's final decision to reject
claims 1, 2, 4-7, 10, 12-18, 21, 22, and 32-34 is affirmed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 3 7 C.F .R. § 1.13 6( a )(1 ).
AFFIRMED
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