Ex Parte DE HAASDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardApr 25, 201613292214 (P.T.A.B. Apr. 25, 2016) Copy Citation UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE 13/292,214 11/09/2011 65913 7590 04/27/2016 Intellectual Property and Licensing NXPB.V. 411 East Plumeria Drive, MS41 SAN JOSE, CA 95134 FIRST NAMED INVENTOR Clemens Gerhardus Johannes DE HAAS UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www .uspto.gov ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 81424555US01 3051 EXAMINER NASH, GARY A ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2838 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 04/27/2016 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address( es): ip.department.us@nxp.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte CLEMENS GERHARDUS JOHANNES DE HAAS Appeal2014-008673 Application 13/292,2141 Technology Center 2800 Before DEBRA K. STEPHENS, JASON V. MORGAN, and DAVID J. CUTITTA, Administrative Patent Judges. CUTITTA, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL This is an appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner's decision rejecting claims 1-19. We have jurisdiction over this appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b) (2015). We AFFIRM. 1 According to Appellant, the real party in interest is NXP B.V. (see Appeal Br. 3). Appeal2014-008673 Application 13/292,214 SUMMARY OF INVENTION Appellant's invention relates to a system and method for supplying power by alternately disabling and enabling a regulator and a clamp. Spec. 2, i-f 4. Claims 1 and 11 are independent. Claim 1, reproduced below, is representative of the claimed subject matter: 1. A system for supplying power, comprising: an input/ output port; a regulator, wherein the regulator supplies power to the input/ output port in a first mode, sinks current from the input/output port in a second mode when a voltage at the input/output port exceeds a threshold, and is disabled in a third mode; and a clamp, wherein the clamp is disabled in the first and second modes, and limits the voltage at the input/output port below a first value in the third mode. REFERENCES The prior art relied upon by the Examiner in rejecting the claims on appeal includes: Groom et al. Kataoka Liu et al. US 2002/0125872 Al US 2006/0186867 Al US 2008/0012542 Al REJECTIONS Sept. 12, 2002 Aug.24,2006 Jan. 17,2008 Claims 1-7 and 11-16 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Liu in view of Groom. 2 Appeal2014-008673 Application 13/292,214 Claims 8-10 and 17-19 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Liu in view of Groom and in further view of Kataoka. ANALYSIS The Examiner rejects independent claim 1 over the combination of Liu and Groom. Final Action 3--4 (citing inter alia Liu i-fi-1 31, 32, and 39 and FIG. 3). More specifically, the Examiner finds that Liu suggests all of the features of independent claim 1 except for the sinking of a current from the input/output port when a voltage at the input/output port exceeds a threshold. Advisory Action, page 2, third paragraph and Answer 4--5. Appellant argues that "the Examiner is attempting to apply the same teaching against two different claim limitations [by] ... using the same teaching to show that when over-voltage is detected, Liu's regulator: 1. Sinks the voltage, and 2. Is disabled." Appeal Br. 15-16. Appellant further argues that "simultaneous occurrence of these two conditions is technically impossible" because "[i]f the transistor 14 is a part of the regulator and if the regulator is disabled, the transistor 14 would be electrically inactive [and] therefore, the transistor 14 could not sink any voltage." Appeal Br. 16. The Examiner finds that "utilizing broadest reasonable interpretation, Liu et al does disclose these limitations simultaneously" in essence because Liu's regulator no longer performs in normal operation mode when an overvoltage is detected, as discussed at Liu paragraph 32. Answer 8-9. Appellant replies by stating " ... that the Examiner's position is internally contradictory [because a] circuit cannot both actively perform an operation and be 'inactive' at the same time." Reply Br. 4. 3 Appeal2014-008673 Application 13/292,214 We agree with and adopt as our own the Examiner's findings of facts and conclusions as set forth in the Answer and in the Action from which this appeal was taken. We have considered Appellant's arguments, but do not find them persuasive of error. We provide the following explanation primarily for emphasis. Appellant asserts that the circuit of Liu cannot sink voltage and be disabled simultaneously. Appeal Br. 16. Appellant, however, construes the term "disabled" as claimed too narrowly. The term "disabled" is not defined explicitly in Appellant's Specification. Appellant has not proffered sufficient evidence or argument to persuade us of error in the Examiner's interpretation. The Examiner finds that the claimed regulator is taught by Liu as MOSFETs (metal oxide field effect transistors) 13 and 14, driver 22, inductor 16, capacitor 17, PWM (pulse width modulated) generator 42, current sensing circuit 44, and output voltage error amplifier 41 of Figure 4. Advisory Action, 2. The Examiner also finds that the regulator is disabled in the third mode (i.e., when over voltage monitoring circuit 43 generates an overvoltage fault signal) because "[ w] ith the regulator drive signals not toggling on and off the MOSFET switches 13 and 14, as well as not receiving a voltage at input node 11, one of ordinary skill in the art would understand the regulator to be disabled." Answer 9. The Examiner further finds "a clamp," as claimed, is taught by Liu as "over-voltage monitoring circuit 43, over-voltage protection circuit 62, and switch 23." Advisory Action, pg. 2. Liu further indicates that when over- voltage is detected on node 18, the overvoltage protection circuit 62 removes the charge on the conduction control terminal of input power switch 23 so 4 Appeal2014-008673 Application 13/292,214 that the switch 23 ceases to conduct and voltage is removed from node 11, thus, allowing switch 14 to be closed. Id. (citing Liu i-f 32). Therefore, because switch 14 is both asserted by the Examiner to be part of the regulator and to be closed when overvoltage is detected (third mode) and because the regulator is asserted by the Examiner to be disabled during the third mode as claimed, Appellant contends that the Examiner's rationale is contradictory. We are not persuaded by Appellant's argument because Appellant incorrectly asserts that all components of the regulator must be electrically inactive if the regulator is disabled. Rather, as noted by the Examiner, when the regulator is disabled in Liu, MOSFETS 13 and 14 are no longer alternatively turned on and off based on a pulse width modulated signal PWM and no longer receiving a voltage at input node 11, thereby disabling the voltage of the output node 18 from being varied and controlled by the width of the pulses output by PWM Generator 42. Answer 9 (citing Liu ,-r 32 and FIG. 4). Thus, the Examiner correctly determines that Liu's regulator is disabled upon receiving an overvoltage signal from over-voltage monitoring circuit 43 because a switched voltage (e.g., as shown at FIG. 2, item 55) is no longer output at node 15. Accordingly, Appellant fails to demonstrate that the Examiner's findings are in error. Appellant further asserts that "[t]he Examiner then attempts to use the teachings of Groom to show the second mode ... " and argues that "the Examiner fails to provide an articulated reasoning as to why a person skilled in the art would modify Liu with the teachings of Groom, especially 5 Appeal2014-008673 Application 13/292,214 considering the fact the Liu does teach a mechanism to handle over-voltage conditions." Appeal Br. 14. We disregard these arguments because they are predicated on the assertion that the Examiner relies on Groom to suggest the second mode as claimed in its entirety. The Examiner clearly indicates however that he instead relies on Groom only "to teach ... take an output voltage, compare it with a threshold voltage, and if said output voltage is higher than the threshold voltage, sink the current." Answer 5. Accordingly, Appellant's argument is irrelevant and moot as the argument does not address the Examiner's last position in rejecting the claims. Appellant further argues that: assuming that Liu's teachings are modified by Groom's teachings, the combination will no longer teach the third mode in which the regular is disabled because Liu teaches disabling the regulator when over-voltage is detected [and] once this teaching is modified by Groom's teachings; Liu will no longer teach disabling of the regulator. Appeal Br. 15. We again find Appellant's argument to be unpersuasive because the Examiner does not rely on Groom to suggest the entire second mode as claimed, as asserted by Appellant, but instead relies on Groom "to teach ... take an output voltage, compare it with a threshold voltage, and if said output voltage is higher than the threshold voltage, sink the current." Answer 5. Appellant's argument, thus, fails to address persuasively the Examiner's findings. 6 Appeal2014-008673 Application 13/292,214 Appellant further argues that the Examiner fails to provide any reasoning as to why a person skilled in the art would combine Groom's teaching regarding the word threshold with Liu's teachings. Appeal Br. 15. We note, however, that the Examiner indicates that Groom's threshold would have been introduced by one of ordinary skill in the art "to improve the over-voltage protection by assisting to protect against minor transient spikes and voltages in the output voltage." Answer 5---6. Appellant's argument, therefore, lacks merit because the Examiner does articulate a reason why a person skilled the art would have combined Groom's teaching regarding the word threshold with Liu's teachings and Appellant provides no evidence to indicate this reason is erroneous. Appellant further argues that Liu already discloses over-voltage protection, so there is no reason one of ordinary skill in the art would additionally look to the teachings of Groom. Reply Br. 3. We are not persuaded by Appellant; s reasoning because, as noted above, the Examiner does not propose incorporating all of Groom's over- voltage protection structure (see Groom FIG. lB and i-f 26), but instead merely relies on Groom to suggest sinking current according to a threshold. Appellant further argues that "Groom does not disclose merely an obvious modification of Liu, but a significantly different system" because "Liu discloses a DC-DC converter while Groom also generates an AC ripple component [and] [c]onsequently, Groom's output signal would have both AC and DC components" (citing i-f 41 of Groom). Reply Br. 4. We disagree. "The test for obviousness is not whether the features of a secondary reference may be bodily incorporated into the structure of the primary reference. . . . Rather, the test is what the combined teachings of the 7 Appeal2014-008673 Application 13/292,214 references would have suggested to those of ordinary skill in the art." In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425 (CCPA 1981). See also In re Sneed, 710 F.2d 1544, 1550 (Fed. Cir. 1983) ("[I]t is not necessary that the inventions of the references be physically combinable to render obvious the invention under review."); and In re Nievelt, 482 F.2d 965, 968 (CCPA 1973) ("Combining the teachings of references does not involve an ability to combine their specific structures."). Rather, "if a technique has been used to improve one device, and a person of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that it would improve similar devices in the same way, using the technique is obvious unless its actual application is beyond his or her skill." KSR Int'! Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 417 (2007). Thus, because the Examiner relies upon Groom only to suggest a threshold and indicates that Groom's threshold would have been introduced by one of ordinary skill in the art "to improve the over-voltage protection by assisting to protect against minor transient spikes and voltages in the output voltage" and because Appellant fails to provide sufficient reasons to persuade us otherwise, other than a general statement that the references are significantly different, we agree with the Examiner's findings. Appellant provides a list of other reasons why the Examiner's obviousness rationale was erroneous, including that the Examiner is inappropriately "breaking the claims into bits and pieces" and that "the Examiner is using a hindsight analysis." Appeal Br. 15. We are not persuaded by any of these reasons particularly because they have been presented in a conclusory manner without sufficient explanation to persuade us why the rejection violates the principles listed. 8 Appeal2014-008673 Application 13/292,214 Appellant further argues that "the Examiner does not accurately describe Liu's operation because Liu clamps voltage instead of sinking current from the input/output port" as claimed. Appeal Br. 14 and Reply Br. 4. This argument is not persuasive because Appellant fails to demonstrate that Liu cannot clamp and sink voltage at the same time. Appellant argues for the first time in the Reply Brief that Liu is silent regarding sinking current from the input/output port as claimed because Liu does not have an input/output port. Reply Br. 2. That argument is untimely and will not be considered in the absence of any good faith showing why it could not have been timely presented in Appellant's Appeal Brief. 37 C.F.R. § 41.41(b)(2) (2013); see also In re Hyatt, 211F.3d1367, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (noting that an argument not first raised in the brief to the Board is waived on appeal); Ex parte Atsuhisa Nakashima, 93 USPQ2d 1834, 1840-41 (BP AI 2010) (informative) (explaining that arguments and evidence not timely presented in the principal Brief will not be considered when filed in a Reply Brief, absent a showing of good cause explaining why the argument could not have been presented in the Principal Brief); Ex parte Borden, 93 USPQ2d 1473, 1477 (BPAI 2010) (informative) ("Properly interpreted, the Rules do not require the Board to take up a belated argument that has not been addressed by the Examiner, absent a showing of good cause."). Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, we sustain the Examiner's rejection of independent claim 1 as being obvious over Liu and Groom. With respect to the rejection of claim 11, Appellant relies on the arguments presented above in response to the rejection of claim 1. Appeal Br. 11. Accordingly, for the same reasons as discussed above, we also 9 Appeal2014-008673 Application 13/292,214 sustain the rejection of independent claim 11under35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being obvious over Liu and Groom. Appellant does not make any other persuasive substantive argument regarding the rejection of dependent claims 2-10 or 12-19. See Appeal Br. 16-17. Therefore, we likewise sustain the rejections of dependent claims 2- 10 and 12-19. DECISION The Examiner's decision to reject claims 1-19 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) is affirmed. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal maybe extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv) (2015). AFFIRMED 10 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation