Ex Parte Challener et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Apr 15, 2016

11861597 (P.T.A.B. Apr. 15, 2016)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
11/861,597 09/26/2007 David Carroll Challener RPS920071010US1
(710.194)
8640
58127 7590 04/15/2016
FERENCE & ASSOCIATES LLC
409 BROAD STREET
PITTSBURGH, PA 15143
EXAMINER
KINSEY, BRANDON MICHAEL
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2116
MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE
04/15/2016 PAPER
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________________

Ex parte DAVID CARROLL CHALLENER, DARYL CROMER,
HOWARD LOCKER, and RANDALL SCOTT SPRINGFIELD
____________________

Appeal 2014–001290
Application 11/861,597
Technology Center 2100
____________________

Before DAVID M. KOHUT, JOHNNY A. KUMAR, and
MELISSA A. HAAPALA, Administrative Patent Judges.

KOHUT, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
This is a decision on appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) of the Final
Rejection of claims 1, 2, 4–10, 12–14 and 22–28.1,2 We have jurisdiction
under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm the Examiner’s rejection of these claims.

1 Our decision makes reference to Appellants’ Appeal Brief (“App. Br.,”
filed July 15, 2013), and the Examiner’s Answer (“Ans.,” mailed Aug. 29,
2013) and Final Office Action (“Final Act.,” mailed Feb. 15, 2013).
2 Claims 3, 11, and 1521 were cancelled in an Amendment After Non-Final
Rejection on October 29, 2012.
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INVENTION
Appellants’ proposed invention consists of a method, apparatus, and
device for remotely placing a computer into a safe and secure state in
situations where the user cannot physically access the computer. Spec. ¶ 3.
An understanding of the invention can be derived from a reading of
exemplary claim 1, which is reproduced below:
1. A method comprising:
preparing a message, at a network client system that has a
unique code associated therewith, said network client system
comprising a network interface card that has an address, said
message comprising a free text portion comprising said unique
code, a preamble, said address of said network interface card, and
data specifying desired command action;
establishing a communications link between said network
client system and a remote command device, said remote
command device comprising a personal communication device
having cellular telephone communication capability;
uploading said message to said remote command device;
receiving a remotely transmitted message from the remote
command device by way of a network at said network client
system;
determining if a free text portion of said remotely
transmitted message includes said unique code associated with
said client system; and
locking–down said network client system if said free text
portion of said remotely transmitted message comprises said
unique code associated with said client system.
App. Br. 19.

REFERENCES
The Examiner relies on the following prior art:
Connery
Harrison
Ostergaard
US 6,311,276 B1
US 2002/0097876 A1
US 2003/0145090 A1
Aug. 25, 1998
Dec. 21, 2001
Jan. 30, 2002
Chiu US 2003/0088633 A1 Oct. 28, 2002
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Chandley US 2005/0073389 A1 Oct. 1, 2003

REJECTIONS AT ISSUE
Claims 1, 2, 4, 10, 22, and 28 stand rejected under U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over Chandley, Ostergaard, and Harrison. Final Act. 2–
9.
Claims 5, 6, 23, and 24 stand rejected under U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Chandley, Ostergaard, Harrison, and Connery. Final Act.
9–11.
Claims 7–9, 12–14, and 25–27 stand rejected under U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over Chandley, Ostergaard, Harrison, and Chiu. Final
Act. 11–13.

ISSUES

Did the Examiner err in finding that the combination of Chandley,
Ostergaard, and Harrison teaches or suggests all of the limitations of
independent claims 1, 10, and 22?
Did the Examiner err in finding that the combination of Chandley,
Ostergaard, Harrison, and Connery teaches or suggests “wherein said
locking–down is a transition from a SO (operating system running) state to a
state chosen from a group consisting of S4 (hibernate) state and S5 (off)
state,” as recited in claim 5 and similarly required by claim 23?
Did the Examiner err in finding that the combination of Chandley,
Ostergaard, Harrison, and Chiu teaches or suggests “where said security
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policy requires use of security password to restart said client network
system,” as recited in claim 8 and similarly required by claims 13 and 26?

ANALYSIS
Rejection of claims 1, 2, 4, 6, 7, 9, 10, 1214, and 2228
First, Appellants contend that the Examiner erred in finding that the
combination of Chandley, Ostergaard, and Harrison teaches the step from
claim 1 that recites “preparing a message, at a network client system that has
a unique code associated therewith, said network client system comprising a
network interface card that has an address, said message comprising a free
text portion comprising said unique code, a preamble, said address of said
network interface card, and data specifying desired command action.” App.
Br. 13–14. Specifically, Appellants contend that Ostergaard makes no
mention of the type of message specified in the claim. App. Br. 1314.
Instead, Appellants argue that Ostergaard merely “teaches a scheme by
which a computer’s changing IP address may be used to determine if it has
been positioned to connect to a network in an undesired or authorized
location.” App. Br. 1314.
The Examiner finds that Ostergaard teaches message formats that
contain the content required by the claim. Ans. 4. In particular, the
Examiner finds that Ostergaard teaches a message that contains free text, a
unique ID for a device, an address for a network interface card for a
computer, and an alarm action. Ans. 4 (citing Ostergaard Fig. 5 and ¶¶ 12,
13, 33, and 48).
Appellants do not make any arguments toward the Examiner’s finding
regarding Ostergaard’s message content. As a result, Appellants do not
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point out how the content of Ostergaard’s messages differs from the content
of the messages of the Appellants’ claimed invention. Instead, Appellants
merely argue that Ostergaard does not teach the limitation. App. Br. 1314.
Thus, Appellants have failed to show error in the Examiner’s findings.
Next, Appellants contend that the Examiner erred in finding that the
combination of Chandley, Ostergaard, and Harrison teaches the steps from
claim 1 that requires “uploading said message to said remote command
device, said remote command device comprising a personal communication
device having cellular telephone communication capability.”3 App. Br. 13.
Specifically, Appellants contend that Ostergaard does not teach uploading
the message to the remote command device and Harrison fails to teach the
claimed message type. App. Br. 14.
Appellants’ arguments amount to an attack on the references
individually when the rejection is based on the combination of references.
“Non-obviousness cannot be established by attacking references individually
where the rejection is based upon the teachings of a combination of
references.” See In re Merck & Co., 800 F.2d 1091, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1986)
(citing In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425 (CCPA 1981) (citation omitted).
The Examiner finds, as indicated above in regard to Appellants’
previous argument, that Ostergaard teaches the type of message required by
the claim. Ans. 5. Additionally, the Examiner finds that Chandley teaches
that the messages sent can include a command that locks down a networked
computer device. Ans. 5. Lastly, the Examiner finds that Harrison teaches

3 We note that the actual claim language states “said remote command
device comprising a personal communication device having cellular
telephone communication capability; uploading said message to said remote
command device.” See claim 1.
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that messages can be communicated to cellular telephones from a networked
computer device. Ans. 5. Thus, it is the combination of all three references
that teach the disputed limitation. Ans. 5. We agree with the Examiner’s
findings and, because Appellants’ arguments are misplaced, Appellants have
not shown that the Examiner erred.
Third, Appellants contend that the Examiner erred in finding that the
combination of Chandley, Ostergaard, and Harrison teaches the step from
claim 1 that requires “receiving a remotely transmitted message from the
remote command device by way of a network at said network client system.”
App. Br. 14–15. Specifically, Appellants contend that the references fail to
teach receipt of a message by the network client system from the remote
command device, wherein the message received was prepared by the
network client system. App. Br. 15. We disagree with Appellants.
Appellants’ arguments are not commensurate with the scope of the
claim. There is nothing in the claim that requires the system receiving the
message to be the same system that prepared the message. As such, the
Examiner’s finding (Final Act. 3) that Chandley teaches receiving a message
in the form of a signal at the device to be shut down from a remote device
reads on the disputed limitation. Additionally, Appellants have not
addressed this specific finding by the Examiner. Therefore, we are not
persuaded that the Examiner erred in this regard.
Fourth, Appellants contend that the Examiner erred in finding that the
combination of Chandley, Ostergaard, and Harrison teaches the step from
claim 1 that requires “locking–down said network client system if said free
text portion of said remotely transmitted message comprises said unique
code associated with said client system.” App. Br. 13, 15. Specifically,
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Appellants contend that the Examiner fails to explain how disabling a
device, as taught by Chandley, is the same as locking-down a client system,
as claimed. App. Br. 15.
The Examiner notes that Appellants have not provided a specific
definition of the term “locking-down.” Ans. 6. As such, the Examiner
interprets the term broadly to mean putting a “device in a state where the
user data is safe and secure from being accessed by inhibiting the normal
functioning of the device.” Ans. 6. We find that the Examiner’s
interpretation of the term is reasonable and consistent with Appellants’
Specification. See Spec. ¶ 2 (wherein it states that “[u]sers of computers
normally lock-down their computers to a safe and secure state.”)(emphasis
added).
Additionally, the Examiner finds that when a computer is “disabled,”
it is also put into a situation where data is inaccessible and the computer
cannot perform normal functioning. As a result, the Examiner finds that
“disabling” and “locking-down” have the same meaning. We agree with the
Examiner’s reasoning and do not find Appellants’ arguments persuasive.
Appellants also argue that the Examiner fails to show how the “receipt
of [a]signal containing [a] unique identifier causes device 300 to become
disabled” reads on the limitation requiring the device to be locked-down
using a free text portion with a unique code. App. Br. 15. However, in the
Examiner’s Answer, on page 5, the Examiner explains that Chandley teaches
that a text is sent in order to disable/lock-down a device, wherein the text
includes a unique identifier. Appellants have not addressed the Examiner’s
specific findings. Therefore, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred
in this regard.
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Therefore, for all the reasons states supra, we sustain the Examiner’s
rejection of independent claim 1, independent claims 10 and 22 that were not
argued separately, and claims 2, 4, 6, 7, 9, 1214, and 2328 that are
dependent upon one of the independent claims and also not argued
separately.

Rejection of claim 5
Appellants contend that the Examiner erred in finding that the
combination of Chandley, Ostergaard, Harrison, and Connery teaches the
step from claim 5 that requires “wherein said locking–down is a transition
from a SO (operating system running) state to a state chosen from a group
consisting of S4 (hibernate) state and S5 (off) state.” App. Br. 16.
Specifically, Appellants contend that Connery focuses on remote wake up
functions and only tangentially mentions other functions. App. Br. 16.
The Examiner finds that Connery teaches remote power control which
is a method used to lock down a computer system. Ans. 8. Additionally, the
Examiner finds that the remote power control of Connery includes not only
power down but also remote wake up control. Ans. 8.
We agree with the Examiner. A person of ordinary skill in the art
would recognize Connery’s remote power down function as a transition
from an operation system running state to an off state. See Connery 2:5–11.
As a result, Appellants have not shown that the Examiner erred.
Therefore, for all the reasons states supra, we sustain the Examiner’s
rejection of claim 5.

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Rejection of claim 8
Appellants contend that the Examiner erred in finding that the
combination of Chandley, Ostergaard, Harrison, and Chiu teaches the step
from claim 8 that requires “where said security policy requires use of
security password to restart said client network system.” App. Br. 17.
Specifically, Appellants contend that “Chui teaches that, in the rather
different context of controlling data replication on devices, a user may lock a
device with a password, but nowhere does Chui actually teach the above
quoted claim language.” App. Br. 17.
The Examiner finds that Chui teaches remotely locking down a
networked computer device. Ans. 9. Additionally, the Examiner finds that
Chui teaches requiring a password in order to later access the locked
computer. Thus, the Examiner finds that it would have been obvious to
include a password anytime the computer is powered on. Ans. 9.
We agree with the Examiner’s finding. Additionally, Appellants have
not indicated why the Examiner’s reasoning is wrong other than to contend
that the reference does not teach the claim language.
Therefore, for all the reasons states supra, we sustain the Examiner’s
rejection of claim 8.

CONCLUSION
The Examiner did not err in finding that the combination of Chandley,
Ostergaard, and Harrison teaches or suggests all of the limitations of
independent claims 1, 10, and 22.
The Examiner did not err in finding that the combination of Chandley,
Ostergaard, Harrison, and Connery teaches or suggests “wherein said
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locking–down is a transition from a SO (operating system running) state to a
state chosen from a group consisting of S4 (hibernate) state and S5 (off)
state,” as recited in claim 5 and similarly required by claim 23.
The Examiner did not err in finding that the combination of Chandley,
Ostergaard, Harrison, and Chiu teaches or suggests “where said security
policy requires use of security password to restart said client network
system,” as recited in claim 8 and similarly required by claims 13 and 26.

SUMMARY
The Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1, 2, 4–10, 12–14 and 22–28
is affirmed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED