Ex Parte Bodrozic

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Aug 31, 2017

13212040 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 31, 2017)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/212,040 08/17/2011 John Bodrozic 374741-991101 5462
26379 7590 09/05/2017
DLA PIPER LLP (US )
2000 UNIVERSITY AVENUE
EAST PALO ALTO, CA 94303-2248
EXAMINER
LINDSEY III, JOHNATHAN J
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3629
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
09/05/2017 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
PatentDocketingU S -Palo Alto @ dlapiper. com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte JOHN BODROZIC
Appeal 2016-005887
Application 13/212,040
Technology Center 3600
Before ST. JOHN COURTENAY III, JAMES R. HUGHES, and
ALEX S. YAP, Administrative Patent Judges.
HUGHES, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant seeks our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) of the
Examiner’s non-final decision rejecting claims 1—10, 15, 16, 20, 21, 23—33,
38, 39, and 43—50. Claims 11—14, 17—19, 22, 34—37, and 40-42 have been
canceled. Non-Final Act. 1—2; App. Br. 2.1 We have jurisdiction under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.
1 We refer to Appellant’s Specification (“Spec.”) filed Aug. 17, 2011
(claiming benefit of US 61/374,543, filed Aug. 17, 2010), Appeal Brief
(“App. Br.”) filed Aug. 24, 2015, and Reply Brief (“Reply Br.”) filed May
16, 2016. We also refer to the Examiner’s Answer (“Ans.”) mailed Mar. 14,
2016, and Non-Final Office Action (Non-Final Rejection) (“Non-Final
Act.”) mailed Dec. 29, 2014.
Appeal 2016-005887
Application 13/212,040
Appellant’s Invention
The invention generally relates to home inventory systems and home
maintenance systems, in particular, property asset management systems and
methods for compiling information concerning assets associated with spaces
of a property. The system includes a store (memory) containing fixed item
assets and/or possession assets associated with spaces (locations) of a
property, an asset managing unit for assigning a maintenance checklist to the
property, a space within the property, a fixed item asset and/or a possession
asset, a project system that one of tracks property projects in one or more
spaces of the property, and an administrative system that displays the
property, the spaces of the property, the fixed item assets within the spaces,
a maintenance plan for the property (which includes the maintenance
checklists). The administrative system also transfers the information about
the property to a buyer of the property, but does not transfer the information
about the possession assets for the property. Spec. 1:7—2:16; 6:2—9:30;
Abstract.
Representative Claim
Independent claim 1, reproduced below, further illustrates the
invention:
1. An [sic] property asset system, comprising:
a store containing data about a plurality of assets
associated with a property and a plurality of spaces of the
property and each space is a physical location in one of on a piece
of land and within a house, each asset being one of a fixed item
asset and a possession asset and each asset is contained within
spaces of the property, the fixed item asset is a property asset that
is embedded into the property and the possession asset is an asset
that is removable from the property;
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an asset managing unit that assigns a maintenance
checklist to at least one of the property, a space, the fixed item
asset and the possession asset and the maintenance plan for the
property has a plurality of these maintenance checklists;
wherein the asset managing unit further comprises a
project system that one of tracks one or more property projects
in one or more spaces of the property and creates a new space on
the property, wherein each property project includes one or more
fixed assets and one of replaces an existing fixed asset in one
more spaces, creates a new fixed asset in one or more existing
spaces and creates new fixed assets in new spaces and an
administrative system that displays the property, the spaces of
the property, the fixed item assets within the spaces, the
maintenance plan, and the completed property projects of the
property to a public visitor during the marketing for a sale of the
property and copies and transfers the information about the
property, the spaces of the property, fixed item assets in the
spaces of the property, the maintenance plan for the property and
any property projects in the property that has been completed to
a buyer that buys the property and does not transfer the
information about the possession assets for the property from a
seller to the buyer during the sale of the property.
Rejections on Appeal
1. The Examiner rejects claims 1—10, 15, 16, 20, 21, 23—33, 38,
39, and 43—50 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to patent ineligible
subject matter.2
2. The Examiner rejects claims 1—9, 15, 16, 20, 21, 23—25, 28—32,
38, 39, and 43—48 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over
2 The Examiner withdrew the ineligible subject matter (§ 101) rejection and
made a new ineligible subject matter rejection in the Examiner’s Answer.
Ans. 3—6. The Examiner includes claim 42 in the statement of rejection.
Ans. 3. Claim 42 was canceled by Appellant. The ground of rejection has
been revised to correct this harmless typographical error.
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Angel et al. (US 2009/0024628 Al, published Jan. 22, 2009) (“Angel”),
Baird (US 2008/0172393 Al, published July 17, 2008), and Bove et al. (US
2003/0023610 Al, published Jan. 30, 2003) (“Bove”).
3. The Examiner rejects claims 10 and 33 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over Angel, Baird, Bove, and Hwang et al.,
An Integration Platform For Developing Digital Life Applications,
Abstract, IEEE (2007).
3. The Examiner rejects claims 26, 27, 49, and 50 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over Angel, Baird, Bove, and Official Notice.
ISSUES
Based upon our review of the record, Appellant’s contentions, and the
Examiner’s findings and conclusions, the issues before us follows:
1. Did the Examiner err in rejecting claims 1—10, 15, 16, 20, 21,
23—33, 38, 39, and 42—50 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to patent
ineligible subject matter?
2. Did the Examiner err in finding that Angel, Baird, and Bove
collectively would have taught or suggested:
[L2] a store containing data about a plurality of assets
associated with a property and a plurality of spaces of the
property and each space is a physical location in one of on a piece
of land and within a house, each asset being one of a fixed item
asset and a possession asset and each asset is contained within
spaces of the property, the fixed item asset is a property asset that
is embedded into the property and the possession asset is an asset
that is removable from the property;
[L3] an asset managing unit that assigns a maintenance
checklist to at least one of the property, a space, the fixed item
asset and the possession asset and the maintenance plan for the
property has a plurality of these maintenance checklists;
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[LI] and an administrative system that displays the property, the
spaces of the property, the fixed item assets within the spaces,
the maintenance plan, and the completed property projects of the
property to a public visitor during the marketing for a sale of the
property and copies and transfers the information about the
property, the spaces of the property, fixed item assets in the
spaces of the property, the maintenance plan for the property and
any property projects in the property that has been completed to
a buyer that buys the property and does not transfer the
information about the possession assets for the property from a
seller to the buyer during the sale of the property
within the meaning of Appellant’s claim 1 and the commensurate limitations
of Appellant’s claim 28?
ANALYSIS
The 35 U.S.C. § 101 Rejection
Appellant argues independent claims 1 and 28 together as a group
with respect to the § 101 rejection. See Reply Br. 6—9. We select
independent claim 1 as representative of Appellant’s arguments with respect
to claims 1-10, 15, 16, 20, 21, 23-33, 38, 39, and 43-50. 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(l)(iv).
The Examiner rejects the claims as being directed to non-statutory
subject matter in that the claims are directed to an abstract idea and “when
considered as a whole, the claims do not include additional elements that
qualify as significantly more than the abstract idea.” Ans. 3^4. Appellant
contends that “the examiner has not performed the proper analysis under the
Enfish case and the claims are still not directed to abstract idea under Step
2 A of the Interim Guidelines” (Reply Br. 7) and “[t]he claims are directed to
substantially more than the abstract idea” (Reply Br. 8), in that “the claims
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improve a technical field of property asset management” (Reply Br. 8) and
“the claims are implemented in a machine” (Reply Br. 9).
Under 35 U.S.C. § 101, a patent may be obtained for “any new and
useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new
and useful improvement thereof.” The Supreme Court has “Tong held that
this provision contains an important implicit exception: Laws of nature,
natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are not patentable.’” Alice Corp. Pty.
Ltd. v. CLS Bank Inti, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2354 (2014) (quoting Assn for
Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2116
(2013)).
The Supreme Court, in Alice, reiterated the two-step framework
previously set forth in Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus
Laboratories, Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 77—80 (2012), “for distinguishing patents
that claim laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas from those
that claim patent-eligible applications of those concepts.” Alice, 134 S. Ct.
at 2355. The first step in that analysis is to “determine whether the claims at
issue are directed to one of those patent-ineligible concepts” {id.), e.g., to an
abstract idea. If the claims are not directed to an abstract idea, the inquiry
ends. Otherwise, the inquiry proceeds to the second step where the elements
of the claims are considered “individually and ‘as an ordered combination’
to determine whether the additional elements ‘transform the nature of the
claim’ into a patent-eligible application.” Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355 (quoting
Mayo, 566 U.S. at 78, 79).
The Court acknowledged in Mayo, that “all inventions at some level
embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or apply laws of nature, natural phenomena,
or abstract ideas.” Mayo, 566 U.S. at 71. We, therefore, look to whether the
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claims focus on a specific means or method that improves the relevant
technology or are instead directed to a result or effect that itself is the
abstract idea and merely invoke generic processes and machinery. See
Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
Turning to the first step of the eligibility analysis, the Examiner finds
that claim 1 is directed to the abstract idea of collecting and processing
information—“a method a collecting and processing information through a
central clearinghouse” and “a method for defining and monitoring projects
(i.e., project management).” Ans. 3 (citing Dealertrack v. Huber, 674 F.3d
1315 (Fed. Cir. 2012)). Appellant contends the Examiner does not present a
proper analysis (as set forth in Enfish). We disagree. The Examiner
explains how the concept, recited in Appellant’s claim, is similar to the data
processing that occurs in the claims found patent-ineligible in Dealertrack
(Ans. 3) and amounts to organizing human activity, which is similarly
abstract (Ans. 4).
The Federal Circuit has ruled that claims covering the receipt,
analysis, and display of data were directed to abstract ideas. See, e.g., Credit
Acceptance Corp. v. Westlake Servs., 859 F.3d 1044, 1047, 1054—56 & n.6
(Fed. Cir. 2017); Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350,
1351-54 (Fed. Cir. 2016); buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350,
1351—55 (Fed. Cir. 2014); SmartGene, Inc. v. Advanced Biological Labs.,
SA, 555 F. App’x 950, 951-52, 95A-55 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
The independent claims (claims 1 and 28) are directed to a system
(system and method) for processing and displaying data. The system stores
various data items (a “store containing data about”) including a property,
spaces of (locations within) the property, fixed item assets, and possession
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assets each of which has certain predefined characteristics. The system also
associates additional information (e.g., assigning maintenance checklists) to
the stored data. The system further processes the stored and associated data
(e.g., tracking property projects, creating new spaces on the property,
replacing fixed assets, creating new fixed assets, and determining a project
has been completed) and then displays the processed data (the administrative
system displays the property, spaces, and fixed item assets, the property
maintenance plan, and completed property projects). The interface also may
transfer information to a buyer. See, e.g., claim 1; Spec. 6:2—9:30; 10:28—
23:18. That is, Appellant’s claim recites receiving and storing information
(data items), associating data items with additional information, processing
data, and displaying data. The claim consists entirely of data manipulation
utilizing undisclosed and unclaimed algorithms.
The instant claims are more akin to the claims for analyzing
information found to be abstract in Elec. Power Grp., 830 F.3d at 1353, or
the claims directed to image data processing discussed in Digitech Image
Technologies, LLCv. Electronics for Imaging, Inc., 758 F.3d 1344, 1351
(Fed. Cir. 2014) (finding “a process that employs mathematical algorithms
to manipulate [data or information] to generate additional information is
[abstract and] not patent eligible”). See Elec. Power Grp., 830 F.3d at
1353—54 (citing Digitech, 758 F.3d at 1351).
Having found Appellant’s claims are directed to an abstract concept
under Alice’s step 1 analysis, we next address whether the claims add
significantly more to the alleged abstract idea. Ans. 4. As directed by our
reviewing Court, we search for an ‘“inventive concept’ sufficient to
‘transform the nature of the claim into a patent-eligible application.’”
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McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1312 (Fed.
Cir. 2016) (quoting Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355).
Appellant contends that, similar to the claims in DDR Holdings, LLC
v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2014), “the claims
improve a technical field” (Reply Br. 8) and list a number of benefits over
existing systems. See Reply Br. 8—9. Appellant misconstrues DDR
Holdings. In DDR, the court held that a claim may amount to more than any
abstract idea recited in the claims when it addresses and solves problems
only encountered with computer technology and online transactions, e.g., by
providing (serving) a composite web page rather than adhering to the
routine, conventional functioning of Internet hyperlink protocol. See DDR
Holdings, 773 F.3d at 1257—59.
In contrast, claim 1 performs a process that modifies (manipulates)
inventory information (e.g., data in a database) utilizing a conventional
computer and user interface. See Spec. 6:2—9:30; 10:28—23:18, Figs. 3—7,
17. Data storage, modification/association, and data manipulation (in a
database) are not technical problems as discussed in DDR, they are
organization and/or efficiency problems. See Ans. 3—5 (“courts have held
certain methods of organizing human activity to be abstract” (Ans. 4)); Spec.
6:2—9:30. Manipulating data and displaying the result is a commercial
solution to the organizational problem, not a technical solution. This
commercial solution may be assisted using a general purpose computer to
compare and manipulate data concerning inventory items and maintenance
projects, but does not arise specifically in the realm of computer networking.
As explained supra, Appellant’s recited subject matter is more akin to the
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claims for analyzing information found to be abstract in Electric Power
Group.
Appellant further contends claim 1 (and independent claim 28) are
implemented in a machine that does not perform generic computer functions.
See Reply Br. 9. We find Appellant’s arguments unpersuasive of Examiner
error. Appellant’s claim 1 recites processes for manipulating data, e.g.,
utilizing database operations. Such steps — inventory and project
management (storing data, associating data items with additional data, and
processing data according to undisclosed algorithms) and displaying the
result — are all routine and conventional computer functions (i.e.,
mathematical operations) of a general processor. The Specification supports
this view in discussing the processes implemented in software which
operates on generic computers to perform the recited data manipulations
steps. See Spec. 6:2—9:30; 10:28—23:18.
Appellant contends that the claims do not merely recite conventional
or well-known processes (see Reply Br. 9), but the claim only recites broad
functional features {supra). The claims do not recite how the computer
(utilizing the recited method or software) performs the recited functionality.
Therefore, we are unpersuaded that Appellant’s claims recite the requisite
“inventive concept” necessary to transform the claims from an abstract
concept.
For at least the reasons above, we are not persuaded of Examiner error
in the rejection of claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Thus, we sustain the
Examiner’s rejection under § 101 of independent claims 1 and 28, and also
dependent claims 2—10, 15, 16, 20, 21, 23—27, 29—33, 38, 39, and 43—50,
which fall with claims 1 and 28, respectively.
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The 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) Rejections
Appellant argues independent claims 1 and 28 and dependent claims
2—9, 15, 20, 21, 23—25, 28—32, 38, and 43—48 together as a group with
respect to the § 103 rejection. See App. Br. 8—13. Appellant provides
nominal separate arguments with respect to claims 16 and 39. See App. Br.
13—14. Appellant does not provide separate arguments with respect to the
§ 103 rejections of claims 10, 26, 27, 33, 49, and 50. See App. Br. 14. We
select independent claim 1 and dependent claim 16 as representative of
Appellant’s arguments with respect to claims 1—10, 15, 16, 20, 21, 23—33,
38, 39, and 43-50. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv).
The Examiner rejects independent claim 1 as being obvious in view of
Angel, Baird, and Bove. See Non-Final Act. 3—7; Ans. 6—10. Appellant
contends Angel, Baird, and Bove do not teach the disputed features of claim
1. App. Br. 8—13; Reply Br. 10-15. Specifically, Appellant contends that
Angel, Baird, and Bove do not teach (1) an administrative system that
displays the property information and transfers the property information as
recited in claim 1 (see LI supra) (see App. Br. 10-11; Reply Br. 11—13); (2)
a store or storing inventory information as recited in claim 1 (see L2 supra)
(see App. Br. 11—13; Reply Br. 13—14); and (3) a maintenance checklist as
recited in claim 1 (see L3 supra) (see App. Br. 13; Reply Br. 14—15).
We adopt as our own (1) the findings and reasons set forth by the
Examiner in the action from which this appeal is taken (Non-Final Act. 3—7)
and (2) the reasons set forth by the Examiner in the Examiner’s Answer
(Ans. 6—10) in response to Appellant’s Appeal Brief. We concur with the
findings and conclusions reached by the Examiner, and we provide the
following for emphasis.
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With respect to LI, Appellant contends Bove merely describes “that
the data records are transferred between the owners” (App. Br. 10), Angel
merely describes “home projects and ToDo item lists” (App. Br. 10), and
Baird merely describes an MLS (multiple listing service) system (see App.
Br. 10-11). Appellant, however, does not specifically address the
Examiner’s findings and improperly attacks the references individually.
Appellant does not persuade us of error in the Examiner’s obviousness
rejection with respect to LI.
Baird describes an MLS system that displays information about a
property for sale, including descriptions of the property, a dwelling (having
rooms or spaces), and additional information. See Non-Final Act. 5—7; Ans.
6—8 (citing Baird Tflf 14, 48, 50; Figs. 6—9). Angel describes a home/property
management system including a user interface displaying home
improvement projects and “to do” lists. See discussion of L3 (infra); Non-
Final Act. 5—7; Ans. 6—8 (citing Angel 38, 46; Figs. 4, 12—14). Bove
describes a property management system including a database storing
inventory and service information (maintenance and improvement projects)
where access to data may be restricted. Data may be accessed and/or
transferred to a second owner from a first owner and other data may be
retained for access by the first owner. See discussion of L2 (infra); Non-
Final Act. 5—7; Ans. 6—8 (citing Bove Abstract; || 12, 14, 38, 39; Fig. 2).
Accordingly, we agree with the Examiner and find a preponderance of
the evidence demonstrates that the combination of Angel, Baird, and Bove
together describes or at least suggests a property management system (an
administrative system) that displays information concerning the property,
spaces therein, fixed item assets within the spaces, to do lists and
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improvement projects and the status of projects (i.e., maintenance plans, and
completed projects) when selling a property (to a public visitor during the
marketing for a sale of the property). The combination also describes
providing and/or restricting data access to a second owner (buyer) of the
property with respect to the property information (assets and
maintenance/projects) (i.e., copying and transferring the information about
the property, the maintenance plan and property projects, but does not
transfer information about possession assets).
With respect to L2, Appellant contends Bove does not disclose or
teach storing and managing information about both fixed item assets and
possession assets in conjunction with a property. See App. Br. 11—13.
Appellant, again however, does not specifically address the Examiner’s
findings and improperly attacks the references individually. Appellant does
not persuade us of error in the Examiner’s obviousness rejection with respect
to L2.
Bove describes a property management system including a database
storing inventory information — assets associated with real property (fixed
item assets) (see Abstract), as well a personal property (possession assets)
(see 1 56). See Non-Final Act. 4—7; Ans. 8—9 (citing Bove Abstract; || 12,
14, 56). Baird describes an MLS system that displays information about a
property for sale, including descriptions of the property, a dwelling (having
rooms or spaces), and additional information. See Non-Final Act. 4—7
(citing Baird Tflf 14, 48, 50; Figs. 6—9). Angel describes a home/property
management system including a user interface storing inventory information
including appliances (fixed assets or personal property (possession assets)
and fixtures (fixed item assets) and their location in/on the property. See
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Non-Final Act. 4—7; Ans. 8—9 (citing Angel Tflf 38, 40, 46-48, 50; Figs. 4, 6,
16). In particular Angel explicitly describes a user interface that stores and
displays asset inventory information associated with locations in a home.
See Angel 50, 51; Fig. 16. Angel describes various assets including
personal property (removable/possession assets) (e.g., lawn mower (| 51),
snow blower (151), microwave (Fig. 16)), appliances that may be removed
(but may also remain when sold) (e.g., oven, refrigerator, washing machine,
and dryer (Fig. 16)), and fixtures that are part of the property (e.g., furnace,
dishwasher, and garbage disposal (Fig. 16)). See Angel 151; Fig. 16.
Appellant does not address the disclosures of Angel, simply stating that
“Angel and Baird do not disclose this claim element.” App. Br. 12.
Accordingly, we agree with the Examiner and find a preponderance of
the evidence demonstrates that the combination of Angel, Baird, and Bove
together describes or at least suggests a property asset management system
having a store containing data about assets associated with a property and
spaces of the property, where the assets include fixed item assets and
possession assets (where the fixed item assets are embedded into the
property and the possession assets are removable from the property).
With respect to L3, Appellant contends Bove merely describes “a
calendaring system” (App. Br. 13) and Angel does not disclose or teach
assigning a maintenance checklist as recited in claim 1. See App. Br. 13.
Appellant, again however, does not specifically address the Examiner’s
findings and improperly attacks the references individually. Appellant does
not persuade us of error in the Examiner’s obviousness rejection with respect
to L3.
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The Examiner explains that “[ujnder the broadest reasonable
interpretation of the claim, assigning a maintenance checklist may include
creating and editing maintenance tasks for a property item. Angel provides
an interface that allows users to create a new ‘To Do’ project.” Ans. 9. We
agree with the Examiner that Appellant’s claim does not foreclose a user
interacting with the system to assign a maintenance checklist. Angel
describes a home/property management system including a user interface
displaying home improvement projects and “to do” lists, automatically
generating projects from an inspection report, and a user interacting with the
interface to create and edit “to do” lists. See Non-Final Act. 5—7; Ans. 9-10
(citing Angel 38-40, 46-48; Figs. 4—6, 12—14). In view of Angel’s
disclosure, we broadly but reasonable construe assigning a maintenance list
to read on creating and editing improvement projects and task (to do) lists as
described in Angel. Bove further describes maintenance calendars flflf 4, 22)
and creating/storing/maintaining/editing maintenance schedules for assets
associated with a property. See Ans. 9-10 (citing Bove 34, 35).
Further, Appellant’s F3 limitation (and FI and F2 limitations) recites
assigning (associating) data (a maintenance checklist, assets) with other data
(property, space, assets, maintenance lists). Appellant attempts to
distinguish the claim strictly based on the content of stored and displayed
data — the various assets and maintenance lists — and an association with
other information (data) — the various maintenance lists and assets. The
content of the data, however, does not change the functionality of the recited
management system (storing, assigning, and displaying). The recited
functionality remains the same regardless of what the data constitutes, how
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the data may be named, or the relationship among the data and such data do
not further limit the claimed invention either functionally or structurally.
The informational content of the data thus represents non-functional
descriptive material, which “does not lend patentability to an otherwise
unpatentable computer-implemented product or process.” Ex parte Nehls,
88 USPQ2d 1883, 1889 (BPAI 2008) (precedential). See Ex parte Curry, 84
USPQ2d 1272, 1274 (BPAI 2005) (informative) (Fed. Cir. Appeal No.
2006-1003), aff’d, (Rule 36) (June 12, 2006) (“wellness-related” data in
databases and communicated on distributed network did not functionally
change either the data storage system or the communication system used in
the claimed method). See also In re Ngai, 367 F.3d 1336, 1339 (Fed. Cir.
2004); Nehls, 88 USPQ2d at 1887—90 (discussing non-functional descriptive
material).
Accordingly, we agree with the Examiner and find a preponderance of
the evidence demonstrates that the combination of Angel, Baird, and Bove
together describes or at least suggests a property asset management system
including asset managing functionality that assigns improvement project or
maintenance task (to do) list (i.e., a maintenance checklist) to one of the
property, a space therein, or an asset associated therewith.
Generally, we note that Appellant does not persuasively rebut the
Examiner’s findings with respect to the combination of references and
improperly attacks the references individually instead of addressing the
combination as a whole. The cited references must be read, not in isolation,
but for what each fairly teaches in combination with the prior art as a whole.
See In re Merck & Co., 800 F.2d 1091, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (one cannot
show non-obviousness by attacking references individually where the
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rejections are based on combinations of references). Appellant’s arguments
do not take into account what the combination of Angel, Baird, and Bove
would have suggested to one of ordinary skill in the art —
The test for obviousness is not whether the features of a
secondary reference may be bodily incorporated into the
structure of the primary reference;.. . Rather, the test is what the
combined teachings of the references would have suggested to
those of ordinary skill in the art.
In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425 (CCPA 1981) (citations omitted).
Additionally, we agree with the Examiner and find that it would have
been well within the skill of one skilled in the art to combine such known
techniques of storing, managing, and creating asset inventories and
maintenance lists as taught by Angel, an storing and displaying data in an
MLS system as taught by Baird, and storing and editing asset inventories
and maintenance lists in a property management system as taught by Bove.
See KSR Inti Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 417 (2007) (“[I]f a
technique has been used to improve one device, and a person of ordinary
skill in the art would recognize that it would improve similar devices in the
same way, using the technique is obvious unless its actual application is
beyond his or her skill”). We are not persuaded that combining the
respective familiar elements of the cited references in the manner proffered
by the Examiner would have been “uniquely challenging or difficult for one
of ordinary skill in the art” at the time of Appellant’s invention. Leapfrog
Enters., Inc. v. Fisher-Price, Inc., 485 F.3d 1157, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
(citing KSR, 550 U.S. at 418).
With respect to claim 16, Appellant contends Angel and Baird do not
disclose or teach the disputed features of the claim and Bove merely
describes “that owners may share information about a plumber,” but does
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Application 13/212,040
not describe ‘“sharing a community property checklist, creating a virtual
neighborhood watch, showing a map with other users of the asset managing
unit and generating incident reports’” as recited in claim 16. App. Br. 14.
Claim 16 requires that only one of the information items be shared between
users in a “community system to share information between users” “wherein
sharing information further comprises one of sharing a community
maintenance plan[,] creating a virtual neighborhood watch, showing a map
with other users of the asset managing unit and generating incident reports.”
Claim 16. As explained with respect to claim 1, Appellant’s recited non­
functional descriptive material (the shared information) does not change the
functionality (sharing information). The recited functionality remains the
same regardless of what the data constitutes, how the data may be labeled
and such data do not further limit the claimed invention either functionally
or structurally. Further, as explained by the Examiner, Bove describes
allowing access to certain data and sharing of information (the contact
information of a service provider) between a first and second owner (e.g.,
information for a plumbing service provider). See Non-Final Act. 12 (citing
Bove H14, 38). We find Bove’s disclosure of maintenance schedules (see
supra claim 1, L3) and sharing maintenance service information would have
at least suggested sharing information between users such as sharing a
community maintenance plan. See Bove H 35, 38.
Thus, Appellant does not persuade us of error in the Examiner’s
obviousness rejection of representative claims 1 and 16. Accordingly, we
affirm the Examiner’s obviousness rejections of independent claim 1 and
dependent claim 16, as well as independent claim 28 and dependent claims
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Appeal 2016-005887
Application 13/212,040
2—10, 15, 20, 21, 23—27, 29-33, 38, 39, and 43—50, not separately argued
with particularity (supra). See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv).
CONCLUSIONS
Appellant has not shown that the Examiner erred in rejecting claims
1-10, 15, 16, 20,21,23-33, 38,39, and 43-50 under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Appellant has not shown that the Examiner erred in rejecting claims
1-10, 15, 16, 20, 21, 23-33, 38, 39, and 43-50 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
DECISION
We affirm the Examiner’s rejections of claims 1—10, 15, 16, 20, 21,
23-33, 38, 39, and 43-50.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv).
AFFIRMED
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