Ex Parte Bhogal et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Apr 25, 2016

11858986 (P.T.A.B. Apr. 25, 2016)

UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR
111858,986 09/21/2007 Kulvir Singh Bhogal
52837 7590 04/27/2016
The Brevetto Law Group, PLLC
P.O. Box 808
Quincy, IL 62306-0808
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www .uspto.gov
ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
AUS920070190US l..IBM-0121 3758
EXAMINER
VETTER, DANIEL
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3628
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
04/27/2016 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address( es):
docket@patent-counsel.com
scr@patent-counsel.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte KULVIR SINGH BHOGAL and ROBERT ROSS PETERSON
Appeal2013-008314
Application 11/858,986
Technology Center 3600
Before HUBERT C. LORIN, BIBHU R. MOHANTY, and
BRADLEY B. BAY AT, Administrative Patent Judges.
MOHANTY, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner's
Final rejection of claims 1-5 and 7-22, which are all the claims pending in
the application. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
SUMMARY OF THE DECISION
We AFFIRM.
Appeal2013-008314
Application 11/858,986
CLAHvIED TI'-JVENTION
The claimed invention relates to automated systems, methods and
computer products for scheduling meetings (Spec. para. 1 ). Claims 1, 9, and
15 are independent and recite substantially similar subject matter (see App.
Br. 12-14). Claim 1 is reproduced below with the numbering in brackets
added and illustrative of the subject matter on appeal.
1. A computer implemented method of setting up a meeting
schedule comprising steps of:
[ 1] retrieving meeting coordinator application software
stored on a non-transitory machine-readable storage medium,
said meeting coordinator application software being configured
for setting up the meeting schedule on said computer;
[2] sending, from the computer, a meeting invitation email
to each of a plurality of invitees including sending a first meeting
invitation email to a first information handling device of a first
invitee and sending a second meeting invitation email to a second
information handling device of a second invitee, wherein
attendance of the first invitee is initially indicated to be
,..l • t. . . . . ·1 ~ t. . manuatory m tue meetmg mv1tat1on ema11 1or tue meetmg
schedule to continue, and wherein said meeting is contingent
upon a dependency rule specified by the first invitee and
associated with the second invitee's attendance;
[3] providing the first invitee with an option in the meeting
invitation email to create the dependency rule associated with the
second invitee' s attendance;
[ 4] receiving, at the computer, responses from at least
some of the plurality of invitees including a positive response
from the second invitee; and
[5] continuing with the setting up of the meeting based
upon the positive response from the second invitee which meets
the conditions of said dependency rule;
[ 6] wherein the first invitee sets up the dependency rule
associated with the second invitee' s attendance; and
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Application 11/858,986
L / J wherein the first information hana11ng device is
configured to send and receive emails but does not have access
to said meeting coordinator application software, and the second
information handling device is configured to send and receive
emails but does not have access to said meeting coordinator
application software.
REJECTIONS
The following rejections are before us for review:
Claims 1-5 and 7-22 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first
paragraph, as failing to comply with the written description requirement in
conveying to one of ordinary skill in the art that at the time of the invention
that the inventors had possession of the invention.
Claims 1, 2, 4, 5, 7-10, 12-16, and 18-22 are rejected under 35
U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Cragun (US 2003/0149605 Al,
pub. Aug. 7, 2003) and Zhang (US 6,016,478, iss. Jan. 18, 2000).
Claims 3, 11, and 17 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Cragun, Zhang, and Griffin (US 5,303,145, iss. Apr. 12,
1994).
FINDINGS OF FACT
We have determined that the findings of fact in the Analysis section
below are supported at least by a preponderance of the evidence. 1
1 See Ethicon, Inc. v. Quigg, 849 F.2d 1422, 1427 (Fed. Cir. 1988)
(explaining the general evidentiary standard for proceedings before the
Patent Office).
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Appeal2013-008314
Application 11/858,986
ANALYSIS
Written Description
The Examiner rejected independent claims 1-5 and 7-22 under 35
U.S.C. § 112 as failing to comply with the written description requirement.
The Examiner found that two limitations in independent claims 1, 9, and 15
are not supported by the Specification, namely the limitation that the first
and second information handling devices do "not have access to said
meeting coordinator application software" and the limitation for "an option
in the meeting invitation email to create the dependency rule" (Final Act. 2-
3).
The Appellants contend that the Examiner erred because the
Specification "discloses that the invitees who receive meeting invitations do
not need to have the application software loaded onto their information
handling device" (App. Br. 11 ). However, the Appellants have not
addressed the substance of the Examiner's rejection, namely that there is a
difference between having software loaded onto a device (as described in the
Specification) and having "access" to said software as recited in the claims.
We further note that the Specification teaches that the application software
may be "received as an email attachment" which indicates that the software
is accessible to any device that can receive email (Spec. i-f 14). Regarding
the second limitation, "an option in the meeting invitation email to create the
dependency rule for "the Appellants contend that this limitation finds
support in paragraph 26 of the Specification (Reply Br. 12-13).2 We have
2 For the sake of efficiency, we choose to consider Appellants' arguments
presented for the first time in the Reply Brief in this regard, but we note that
arguments which Appellant could have made but chose not to make in the
Briefs are deemed to be waived. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(vii).
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Appeal2013-008314
Application 11/858,986
reviewed this portion of the Specification and do not see any description of
an option to create a dependency rule being provided "in the meeting
invitation email," as required by claim 1. So, again, the Appellants have not
addressed the substance of the Examiner's rejection.
In view of the foregoing, we sustain the rejection of claims 1-5 and 7-
22 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, as failing to comply with the
written description requirement.
Obviousness over Cragun and Zhang
The Appellants argue claims 1, 2, 4, 5, 7-10, 12-16, and 18-22 as a
group (App. Br. 11-14). We select claim 1 as representative, and thus,
claims 2, 4, 5, 7-10, 12-16, and 18-22 stand or fall with claim 1 (37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(l)(iv)).
The Appellants contend that the combined teachings of Cragun and
Zhang do not render obvious limitations [3] and [7] of claim 1 because
Zhang does not disclose these limitations (App. Br. 11-14; see also Reply
Br. 14--17).
In contrast, the Examiner finds this limitation in Zhang's forwarding
of invitations to delegates (see Final Act. 4; see also Ans. 6---7).
The Appellants contend that Zhang discloses two distinct
embodiments: (1) an "SK client" that is loaded with proprietary scheduling
software, and (2) a "non-SK client" that uses email (App. Br. 12-13). The
Appellants assert that "these non-SK clients do not have the capability to
understand the proprietary scheduling format of the SK system" (id.). Thus,
the Appellants' contention is that the non-SK clients in Zhang are not
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Appeal2013-008314
Application 11/858,986
capable of providing "an option in the meeting invitation email" as recited in
claim 1 (id. at 13).
In response, the Examiner finds that the non-SK clients in Zhang are,
in fact, capable of providing an option in the meeting invitation email to
create the dependency rule, as required by claim 1 (Ans. 6-7). For example,
the Examiner finds that in Zhang "[t]he replies of email-only invitees are
sent th[r]ough a message parser so that the meeting software can determine
their responses" that "include reschedul[ing] and delegating" (Ans. 7).
According to the Examiner:
Zhang provides an exemplary email invitation beginning at
column 36. This message would be used for an email-only user
(see lines 62-72 of the message). Beginning at line 100 it
contains code for facilitation of processing an email reply by
the meeting software, which includes code for recognizing a
delegation/forwarding of the message by an email-only user
(lines 246, 268, 309-311) (Id.).
The Appellants do not specifically address these findings by the
Examiner regarding non-SK clients (Reply Br. 16-17). Therefore, we are
not persuaded of reversible error by the Appellants' arguments.
In view of the foregoing, we sustain the rejection of independent
claim 1, and claims 2, 4, 5, 7-10, 12-16, and 18-22 which fall with claim 1.
Obviousness over Cragun, Zhang, and Griffin
The Appellants do not separately argue the patentability of claims 3,
11, and 17 apart from claim 1 (App. Br. 6). Accordingly, we sustain the
rejection of claims 3, 11, and 17 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) for the reasons
stated above.
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Application 11/858,986
DECISION
The Examiner's decision to reject claims 1-5 and 7-22 is affirmed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(l )(iv).
AFFIRMED
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