Ex Parte Baughman et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Apr 27, 2016

12951548 (P.T.A.B. Apr. 27, 2016)

UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR
12/951,548 11/22/2010 Aaron K. BAUGHMAN
46583 7590 04/29/2016
ROBERTS MLOTKOWSKI SAFRAN & COLE, P,C
Intellectual Property Department
P.O. Box 10064
MCLEAN, VA 22102-8064
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www .uspto.gov
ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
END920100120US1 9955
EXAMINER
ORTIZ ROMAN, DENISSE Y
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3627
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
04/29/2016 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address( es):
docketing@rmsclaw.com
lgallaugher@rmsclaw.com
dbeltran@rmsclaw.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte AARON K. BAUGHMAN, BARRY M. GRAHAM,
RICK A. HAMILTON II, and BRIAN M. O'CONNELL
Appeal2014-000379
Application 12/951,548 1
Technology Center 3600
Before HUBERT C. LORIN, BIBHU R. MOHANTY, and
BRADLEY B. BAY AT, Administrative Patent Judges.
LORIN, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Appellants seek our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134 of the final
rejections of claims 1-10, 15-18, 23, 24, and 28. We have jurisdiction
under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b) (2002).
SUMMARY OF DECISION
We AFFIRM-IN-PART.
1 The Appellants identify International Business Machines Corporation as
the real party in interest. App. Br. 2.
Appeal2014-000379
Application 12/951,548
THE INVENTION
Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of the subject matter on
appeal.
1. A parking management method implemented in a computer
infrastructure having computer executable code tangibly
embodied on a computer readable storage medium having
programming instructions operable to:
associate a payment source with a vehicle identifier;
receive a message indicating initiation of a parking event
at a parking location, wherein the message includes an
identification of at least one of the payment source and the
vehicle identifier;
update a parking database to indicate that a vehicle having
the vehicle identifier is parked at the parking location;
further comprising:
determining the vehicle has left the parking
location;
updating the parking database to reflect that the
vehicle is no longer parked at the parking location;
determining when the vehicle left the parking
location;
comparing an actual time parked at the parking
location to a paid-for parking time, based on when the
vehicle left the parking location; and
performing one of: refunding the payment source
when the paid-for parking time exceeds the actual parking
time, and charging the payment source when the actual
parking time exceeds the paid for parking time.
2
Appeal2014-000379
Application 12/951,548
THE REJECTIONS
The Examiner relies upon the following as evidence of
unpatentability:
Nix
Dutt
Handler
US 2007 /0267479 Al
US 2010/0117863 Al
US 2011/0035261 Al
The following rejections are before us for review:
Nov. 22, 2007
May 13, 2010
Feb. 10, 2011
1. Claims 1-10, 15-18, 23, and 28 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over Handler, Dutt, and Nix.
2. Claim 24 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Handler and Dutt.
ISSUES
Did the Examiner err in rejecting claims 1-10, 15-18, 23, and 28
under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Handler, Dutt, and
Nix?
Did the Examiner err in rejecting claim 24 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
as being unpatentable over Handler and Dutt?
FINDINGS OF FACT
We rely on the Examiner's factual findings stated in the Final Office
Action and Examiner's Answer. Additional findings of fact may appear in
the Analysis below.
3
Appeal2014-000379
Application 12/951,548
ANALYSIS
The rejection of claims 1-10, 15-18, 23, and 28 under 35U.S.C.§103(a) as
being unpatentable over Handler, Dutt, and Nix.
Claim 1
We will sustain the rejection of claim 1.
The Appellants argue that the rejection of claim 1 is improper because
"Dutt does not mention a database in paragraphs 0032 and 0049---0058, and
does not mention a parking database anywhere in the document, much less
two steps of updating a parking database as recited in claim 1." App. Br. 6.
In response, the Examiner cites paragraphs 22, 31, 32, and 49-58 of
Dutt and determines that "[i]t is made obvious that in order to monitor
parking spaces and display customer actual availability there is a database
that is constantly updated to maintain current data." Ans. 2.
The Appellants respond that "Appellants' argument is not simply that
Dutt fails to disclose a database." Reply Br. 2. According to the Appellants;
Dutt does not render obvious the two updating steps of claim 1; that is,
updating the database to indicate that a vehicle is parked and no longer
parked at the parking location. Id. at 2--4. We do not agree.
Dutt discloses a parking system 10 that manages parking and ensures
payment compliance for use of parking spaces, the system includes multiple
kiosks 14 in various locations and a plurality of sensors 20 that detect
vehicle presence. See, e.g., Dutt, Fig. 1, i-fi-122-24. The Examiner cited,
inter alia, paragraph 32 that discloses that the system can display
information such as "how long each parking space has been occupied" and
paragraph 58 that discloses that the system can "monitor how long a vehicle
has been parked." We also note that Dutt discloses that "[t]he entire system
4
Appeal2014-000379
Application 12/951,548
may be controlled and operated via a Back-End Office Server located in the
Network Operations Center (NOC) 11." Id. at i-f 24. Given these
disclosures, one of ordinary skill in the art would be led to update current
information about a parking location with information indicative of whether
a vehicle is parked or not parked at that location. This necessarily follows
because absent said indications one of ordinary skill would be unable to
determine "how long each parking space has been occupied" (Dutt i-f 32). Cf
In re Preda, 401F.2d825, 826 (CCPA 1968) ("[I]n considering the
disclosure of a reference, it is proper to take into account not only specific
teachings of the reference but also the inferences which one skilled in the art
would reasonably be expected to draw therefrom.")
The question that remains is whether it would have been obvious to
use a database to perform the updating of the current information about a
parking space with the information indicative of whether a vehicle is parked
or not parked at that location. In that regard, databases and their use for
storing and updating stored information are notoriously well known in the
art. See, e.g., Handler, element 118. Notwithstanding that the term
"database" is not expressly recited in Dutt, it would have been obvious to
one of ordinary skill in the art to employ a database for the purpose of
updating the current information about a parking space with information
indicative of whether a vehicle is parked or not parked at that location, as
claimed.
Furthermore, the mere existence of a difference between the prior art
and the claim does not establish nonobviousness. Dann v. Johnston, 425
U.S. 219, 230, (1976). The issue is "whether the difference between the
5
Appeal2014-000379
Application 12/951,548
prior art and the subject matter in question 'is a difference sufficient to
render the claimed subject matter unobvious to one skilled in the applicable
art."' Dann, 425 U.S. at 228 (citation omitted) (finding system for automatic
record keeping of bank checks and deposits obvious in view of nature of
extensive use of data processing systems in banking industry and "closely
analogous" patent for an automatic data processing system used in a large
business organization for keeping and updating system transaction files for
each department of the organization). To be nonobvious, an improvement
must be "more than the predictable use of prior art elements according to
their established functions." KSR Int'! v. Teleflex, 550 US 398, 417 (2007).
Furthermore, "[a] person of ordinary skill is also a person of ordinary
creativity, not an automaton." KSR at 421. In our view, the addition of a
database to the Dutt system yields, as predicted, a database with current
information about a parking space, updated depending on whether a vehicle
is parked or not parked at that location.
The Appellants further argue, regarding claim 1, that "the Examiner
has not provided the requisite articulated reasoning to explain how Nix
teaches 'comparing an actual time parked at the parking location to a paid-
for parking time, based on when the vehicle left the parking location."' App.
Br. 8. According to the Appellants, the refund calculation in Nix is based on
a different time than when the vehicle actually left the parking spot. Id. at
8-9; Reply Br. 4--6.
The Appellants' argument does not apprise us of error in the
Examiner's rejection. The Examiner relies on Dutt, and not Nix, for the
claim 1 limitation of "determining when the vehicle left the parking
6
Appeal2014-000379
Application 12/951,548
location." See Final Act. 3. As discussed above, Dutt discloses a system for
monitoring parking activity using sensors. The Examiner has determined
that it would have been obvious to combine the parking space monitoring
features of Dutt with the payment calculation features of Nix. Therefore, the
Appellants' arguments are not responsive to the actual rejection.
For the above reasons we are not persuaded of error in the Examiner's
rejection of claim 1.
Claims 2--4, 6--10, and 15-18
The Appellants rely on the same arguments used to challenge the
rejection of claim 1. See App. Br. 10. For the same reasons we found those
arguments unpersuasive as to error in the rejection of claim 1, we find them
equally unpersuasive as to error in the rejection of claims 2--4, 6-10, and 15-
18.
Claim 23
The Appellants rely principally on the arguments made in challenging
the rejection of claim 1 to challenge the rejection of claim 23. App. Br. 12-
15. For the same reasons, we find those arguments unpersuasive as to error
in the rejection of claim 23.
Appellants further argue that the Examiner "ignores the context" of
claim 23 and has failed to address the claimed invention "as a whole." Id. at
13-14. We do not agree. We first note that the "context" argued by the
Appellants is merely storing data indicating various pieces of information in
a database. As we have already explained, we agree with the Examiner that
7
Appeal2014-000379
Application 12/951,548
it would have been obvious to combine the teachings of the parking space
monitoring system of Dutt with the payment calculation features of Nix in
order to improve, inter alia, customer's satisfaction. See Final Act. 9. In
this regard, we note that Dutt provides for advance payment for parking
(See, e.g., Dutt i-f 34) and Nix discloses that "[c]onsumers also want the
benefits of only paying for what they use .... when using pay up-front
systems, like minutes on a parking meter" (Nix i-f 11 ). Therefore, we agree
with the Examiner that the subject matter of claim 23, as a whole, would
have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art.
Claim 5
The Examiner finds the limitation of claim 5 in Handler. Final Act. 5.
The Appellants argue that the rejection of claim 5 is improper. App. Br. 10-
11. The Examiner does not respond to the Appellants' arguments in the
Answer. We agree with the Appellants. Handler does not disclose all of the
limitations of claim 5. Therefore, we do not sustain the rejection of claim 5.
Claim 28
The Appellants argue that the rejection of claim 28 is improper
because "Handler makes no mention of obtaining information using
equipment at a point of entry into a parking facility." Appeal Br. 11. The
Examiner cites paragraph 0045 of Handler as disclosing this limitation.
According to Appellants, "[p ]aragraph 0045 describes obtaining information
at departure of the vehicle from the parking area, not using equipment at a
point of entry into the parking facility." Id. at 12.
8
Appeal2014-000379
Application 12/951,548
The Appellants' sole argument for claim 28 is directed to the location
of the RFID equipment in the prior art. We find the argument unpersuasive
as to error in the rejection.
The Appellants do not argue that the claimed RFID equipment is
functionally different from the prior art RFID equipment, or that the
placement of the RFID equipment at the point of entry yields any
unexpected results. Rather, the Appellants suggest there is a patentable
significance in locating RFID equipment at a point of entry rather than an
exit (as in Handler). Setting aside the fact that there is inadequate evidence
on the record showing an unexpected result from locating RFID equipment
at a point of entry rather than an exit, the subject matter as claimed does not
preclude the point of entry and the exit being one and the same location.
The rejection of claim 24 under 35 U.S. C. § 103 (a) as being unpatentable
over _lfandler and Dutt.
Claim 24 recites a computer program product operable to "receive a
message indicating initiation of a parking event at a parking location." The
Examiner finds this limitation in Handler at paragraphs 22, 27, 28, 41, and
62. Final Act. 10. According to the Examiner, "[ c ]harging a vehicle has
been broadly interpreted as a parking event because the vehicle is located in
the parking area during the charging activity." Advisory Action mailed
March 11, 2013.
Appellants first argue that the Examiner's interpretation for "initiation
of a parking event at a parking location" is overly broad and that this
limitation is not disclosed in Handler because "in Handler, a user must first
park their vehicle, then establish a power connection" and thus "the charging
9
Appeal2014-000379
Application 12/951,548
starts at a different (later) time than the initiation of parking." App. Br. 16-
17.
The Specification does not provide an express definition for
"initiation of a parking event at a parking location." The Appellants do not
offer any alternative interpretation for this limitation, nor do the Appellants
provide any citation to the Specification that is indicative of error in the
Examiner's interpretation.
Regarding Appellants' argument that the charging disclosed in
Handler starts at a different time than parking, we note that the computer
program product of claim 24 does not require "parking a vehicle." Thus,
Appellants' arguments regarding the time at which a vehicle is parked in
Handler are not commensurate in scope with what is claimed.
In this regard, Figure 2 of the Specification shows two separate steps:
step 220 "[i]nitiate parking event using the payment source" and step 250
"[p ]ark the vehicle." Thus, in light of the Specification, "initiation of a
parking event" is distinct from parking a vehicle.
In view of the forgoing, the claim phrase "receive a message
indicating initiation of a parking event at a parking location" is reasonably
broadly construed to cover the receipt of the payment account identifier
disclosed in Handler. Therefore, the Appellants' arguments do not persuade
us of error in the Examiner's finding that Handler discloses this limitation.
The Appellants next argue that "Handler does not disclose the
message includes an identification of at least one of the payment source and
the vehicle identifier and the message indicates a specified duration of the
parking event" as required by claim 24. App. Br. 17-18. According to the
10
Appeal2014-000379
Application 12/951,548
Appellants, Handler discloses a message indicating charge duration, but does
not disclose that the message indicates a specified duration of the parking
event because "Handler does not equate these charging durations and times
to parking duration." Id.
The Examiner finds that Handler discloses "the message indicates a
specified duration of the parking event" in, inter alia, paragraph 39. Final
Act. 10. Paragraph 39 of Handler discloses that a "charge request may
include a payment amount, charge duration, charge start time, charge finish
time, voltage, or the like."
We first note that claim 24 does not recite "parking duration." Thus,
Appellants' arguments in this regard are not commensurate in scope with
what is claimed.
The Specification does not provide an express definition for "a
specified duration of the parking event." As noted above, Figure 2 of the
Specification indicates that the initiation of a parking event occurs in a
separate step from parking the vehicle.
In view of the forgoing, the claim phrase "the message indicates a
specified duration of the parking event" is reasonably broadly construed to
cover the receipt of the charge request including charge duration disclosed in
Handler. Therefore, the Appellants' arguments do not persuade us of error
in the Examiner's finding that Handler discloses this limitation.
Appellants next argue that "Handler does not teach or suggest the
updating the parking database comprises updating the parking database to
reflect the specified duration of the parking event." App. Br. 18. According
to Appellants, Handler discloses a database 118, but "[t]here is no mention
11
Appeal2014-000379
Application 12/951,548
of updating the database 118 to reflect a specified duration of the charging
event." Id.
The Examiner finds that Handler discloses "updating the parking
database comprises updating the parking database to reflect the specified
duration of the parking event" in the charge request of paragraph 39. Final
Act. 10. Recalling that we earlier reasonably broadly construed "parking
event" to cover Handler's charging of the vehicle, we note that paragraph 52
of Handler further discloses that the value of an energy account is stored in
database 118 and then adjusted based on the charge request, which includes
the "charge duration" (see paragraph 39). Therefore, the claim phrase
"updating the parking database comprises updating the parking database to
reflect the specified duration of the parking event" reasonably broadly
covers updating the database to reflect a duration of the charging of the
vehicle, that is, via the adjustment of the account value as disclosed in
Handler. The resulting post-adjustment account value in database 118 does
indeed reflect the charge duration. Accordingly, the Appellants' arguments
to the contrary do not persuade us of error in the Examiner's finding that
Handler discloses said limitation.
For the above reasons, we are not persuaded as to error in the
Examiner's rejection of claim 24.
CONCLUSIONS
The rejection of claims 1--4, 6-10, 15-18, 23, and 28 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over Handler, Dutt, and Nix is sustained.
12
Appeal2014-000379
Application 12/951,548
The rejection of claim 24 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Handler and Dutt is sustained.
The rejection of claim 5 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Handler, Dutt, and Nix is not sustained.
DECISION
The decision of the Examiner to reject claims 1--4, 6-10, 15-18, 23,
24, and 28 is affirmed, and to reject claim 5 is reversed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a).
AFFIRMED-IN-PART
13