Ex Parte Babiarz et alDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardApr 29, 201611530579 (P.T.A.B. Apr. 29, 2016) Copy Citation UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR 111530,579 09/11/2006 Jozef Babiarz 34845 7590 05/03/2016 Anderson Gorecki & Rouille LLP 33 NA GOG PARK ACTON, MA 01720 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www .uspto.gov ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 127-054 9911 EXAMINER DUDA,ADAMK ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2473 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 05/03/2016 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address( es): handerson@smmalaw.com officeadmin@smmalaw.com cmorrissette@smmalaw.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte JOZEF BABIARZ and BAKUL KHANNA Appeal2014-005172 Application 11/530,579 1 Technology Center 2400 Before ROBERT E. NAPPI, CARLL. SILVERMAN, and JOHN D. HAMANN, Administrative Patent Judges. HAMANN, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appellants file this appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner's Final Rejection of claims 1-19. 2 We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We affirm-in-part. 1 According to Appellants, the real party in interest is Avaya, Inc. App. Br. 2. 2 The Examiner "objected" to claims 6, 7, 9-11, 14, and 17-19 and found they "would be allowable if rewritten to overcome the [Office Action's] rejection(s) ... and to include all of the limitations of the base claim and any intervening claims." See Final Act. 1, 23; see also App. Br. 2 ("The rejections and objections of claims 1-19 are the subject of this appeal."). Claims 20-27 were cancelled. App. Br. 20-21 (Claims App'x). Appeal2014-005172 Application 11/530,579 THE CLAIMED INVENTION Appellants' claimed invention "relates generally to the field of networking and more particularly to a method and apparatus for directing traffic around congestion in a network." Spec. i-f 4. Of the claims on appeal, claim 1 is illustrative of the subject matter of the appeal and is reproduced below. 1. A computer program product, comprising a non- transitory computer usable medium having a computer readable program code embodied therein, said computer readable program code adapted to be executed to implement a method for selecting a path for a flow comprising a plurality of packets, said method comprising: performing traffic performance measurements on a primary path to determine congestion, Quality of Service (QoS) and connectivity; and selectively routing the flow to an outbound link around the primary path in response to a comparison of the congestion, Quality of Service (QoS) and connectivity of the primary path with congestion, Quality of Service (QoS) and connectivity of an alternate path. REJECTIONS ON APPEAL3 (1) The Examiner rejected claim 1, and its dependent claims (2- 19), under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, as being based on a disclosure which is not enabling. (2) The Examiner rejected claim 1, and its dependent claims (2- 19), under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, for failing to disclose the best mode contemplated by the inventor. 3 The Examiner withdrew the 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) rejection of claims 15 and 16. Ans. 15. 2 Appeal2014-005172 Application 11/530,579 (3) The Examiner rejected claims 2, 5, 6, 8, and 9, and their dependent claims (3, 4, 7, 10, and 11) under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, for failing to disclose the best mode contemplated by the inventor. (4) The Examiner rejected claim 1, and its dependent claims (2- 19), under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph, for failing to set forth the subject matter which Appellants regard as their invention. (5) The Examiner rejected claim 1, and its dependent claims (2- 19), under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph, for being indefinite with respect to the term "Quality of Service." (6) The Examiner rejected claim 9, and its dependent claims (10 and 11 ), under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph, for being indefinite with respect to the term "blackout." (7) The Examiner rejected claim 2, 5, 6, 8, and their dependent claims (3, 4, and 7), under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph, for being indefinite with respect to the term "brownout." (8) The Examiner rejected claims 1-5 and 8 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over the combination of Soumiya et al. (US 2001/0037401 Al; Nov. 1, 2001) (hereinafter "Soumiya") and Kodialam et al. (US 7,593,348 B2; Sept. 22, 2009) (hereinafter "Kodialam"), collectively referred to as the "combination." (9) The Examiner rejected claims 12 and 13 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 (a) as being unpatentable over the combination of Soumiya, Kodialam, and Weston-Dawkes (US 6,487,177 Bl; Nov. 26, 2002). 3 Appeal2014-005172 Application 11/530,579 ANALYSIS We have reviewed the Examiner's rejections in light of Appellants' contentions that the Examiner erred. In reaching our Decision, we consider all evidence presented and all arguments made by Appellants. We below address specific findings and arguments relating to each of the Examiner's rejections Appellants are appealing. (1) Enabling Specification and enablement of claim 1 Appellants contend the Specification complies with the enablement requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, including with respect to claims 1 and its dependent claims. See App. Br. 6-9; Reply Br. 4--8. Specifically, Appellants contend the Specification, and its use of the term Quality of Service ("QoS"), contains sufficient information regarding the subject matter of the claims so as to enable one skilled in the art to make and use the claimed invention. See id. As to QoS, Appellants contend it is a term that is "commonly used and well understood in the art." See App. Br. 6; Reply Br. 4. Appellants illustrate their contention by citing the following example sources: The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) standard X.902, Information technology- Open distributed processing- Reference Model, refers to QoS as "A set of quality requirements on the collective behavior of one or more objects," where QoS parameters describe the speed and reliability of data transmission, e.g., throughput, transit delay, and error rate. App. Br. 7. The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) in RFC 1946, Native ATM Support for ST2 +, states that "deterministic delivery services demand that both the source application and the network infrastructure have capabilities to request, setup, 4 Appeal2014-005172 Application 11/530,579 Id. Id. and enforce the delivery of the data ... [and these] services are referred to as bandwidth reservation and Quality of Service (QoS)." The ATM Lexicon defines QoS as "[a] term which refers to the set of ATM performance parameters that characterize the traffic over a given virtual connection," where QoS parameters include cell loss ratio, cell error rate, cell misinsertion rate, cell delay variation, cell transfer delay, and average cell transfer delay. Appellants also argue the Specification does not provide a narrower definition for QoS, contrary to what the Examiner finds, but rather provides specific examples of QoS. See App. Br. 8 ("[C]ongestion can cause poor quality of service because packets are dropped or delayed is just one example of how quality of service can be compromised.") (citing Spec. i-fi-1 8, 17). Specifically, Appellants contend the Specification does not equate QoS to "congestion," as the Examiner finds. See App. Br. 8-9 (citing Spec. i135). The Examiner finds QoS is "a common term in data networking, [but] there are many different usages and definitions for QoS, leading to confusing regarding an exact meaning in precise or quantitative terms." See Ans. 15 (quoting Jorgensen (US 6,640,248 Bl; Oct. 28, 2003), col. 11, 11. 30-33). The Examiner also finds the Specification provides a narrow definition for QoS by equating "measuring congestion" and "measuring QoS." See Ans. 15-16 (citing Spec. i1 8). In addition, the Examiner underscores that "absolutely no where does the ... [S]pecification define a 'measure of congestion' as NOT being a 'measure of Quality of Service' .... " See Ans. 16. The Examiner, thus, concludes the 5 Appeal2014-005172 Application 11/530,579 Specification provides an enabling definition for "QOS" where "[ c ]ongestion anticipates QOS" and no enabling definition for "QOS" where "[c]ongestion does not anticipate QOS." See Ans. 17 (citing Spec. i-fi-18, 17); see also Ans. 17-18 (finding ITU's definition for QoS is extremely broad and would require undue and unreasonable experimentation). We find Appellants' arguments persuasive. We agree with Appellants that QoS is a "commonly used and well understood [term] in the art," and the Specification's use of the term QoS contains sufficient information regarding the subject matter of the claims so as to enable one skilled in the art to make and use the claimed invention. See Spec. i-fi-18, 17, 35; supra ITU's and IETF's QoS definitions. We also agree with Appellants that the Examiner cited portions of the Specification provide specific examples concerning QoS rather than re-defining the term. See Spec. i-fi-1 8, 1 7. Accordingly, we do not sustain this rejection. (2) Best mode requirements for claim 1 and its dependents Appellants contend the Specification complies with the best mode requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, including with respect to claims 1 and its dependent claims. See App. Br. 10; Reply Br. 9-10. Furthermore, Appellants contend, in making a best mode rejection, the Examiner was required, but failed to (i) "[d]etermine whether, at the time the application was filed, the inventor knew of a mode of practicing the claimed invention that the inventor considered to be better than any other," and (ii) "[c]ompare what was known ... with what was disclosed." See App. Br. 10 (citing Chemcast Corp. v. Arco Indus., 913 F.2d 923 (Fed. Cir. 1990)). The Examiner finds Appellants' arguments as to the proper meaning for "congestion" and "QoS" - including that they are not equatable - are 6 Appeal2014-005172 Application 11/530,579 unsupported by the Specification. See Ans. 18 (citing App. Br. 13; Spec. i-fi-18, 17); see also Final Act. 9 (citing Appellants' Oct. 18, 2011 Remarks). The Examiner also finds the Specification supports only aspects of the invention (i.e., paragraphs 8 and 17 regarding congestion) but fails to illustrate other aspects of the invention (i.e., the alleged different scope for QoS). See Ans. 18 (citing Spec. i-fi-1 8, 17). Accordingly, the Examiner concludes "[t]his appears to be a concealment of the best mode to practice the instant invention." See Ans. 18. We find Appellants' arguments persuasive. We find the Examiner did not make a prima facie case that the inventor knew of a mode of practicing the claimed invention that the inventor considered to be better than what was disclosed in the Specification. Accordingly, we do not sustain this rejection. (3) Best mode requirements for claims 2, 5, 6, 8, 9, and dependents Appellants contend the Specification complies with the best mode requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, with respect to the claims reciting "blackout" or "brownout." See App. Br. 11-12; Reply Br. 9-10. Specifically, Appellants contend the Examiner was required, but failed to (i) "[ d]etermine whether, at the time the application was filed, the inventor knew of a mode of practicing the claimed invention that the inventor considered to be better than any other," and (ii) "[c]ompare what was known ... with what was disclosed." See App. Br. 10 (stating the same reasoning above regarding the best mode rejection as to QoS, also applies here) (citing Chemcast Corp. v. Arco Indus., 913 F.2d 923 (Fed. Cir. 1990)). The Examiner finds "evidence of concealment of the best mode is based upon the definitions for the terms 'Blackout State' and 'Brownout State' ... wherein the definitions have overlapping boundaries indicating 7 Appeal2014-005172 Application 11/530,579 that a 'Blackout State' can be called a 'Brownout State' and a 'Brownout State' can be called a 'Blackout State."' See Final Act. 10 (citing Spec. ii 35). We find Appellants' arguments persuasive. We find the Examiner did not make a prima facie case that the inventor knew of a mode of practicing the claimed invention that the inventor considered to be better than what was disclosed in the Specification. Accordingly, we do not sustain this rejection. (4) Written description (or claim 1 and its dependents Appellants contend the Specification complies with the written description requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, with respect to claim 1. See App. Br. 12; Reply Br. 2. Specifically, Appellants contend, as discussed above, that the Examiner mischaracterizes paragraphs 8 and 17 of the Specification as defining QoS, rather than providing examples of the well understood term QoS. See id. The Examiner finds, based on Appellants' prior remarks regarding prior art teachings, what Appellants regard as their invention uses a different definition for QoS than how the Specification defines QoS, and therefore, the Specification fails to evidence Appellants had possession of the scope of the invention as claimed in claim 1 at the time the Specification was filed. See Final Act. 10-11 (citing Oct. 18, 2011 Remarks; Spec. i-fi-1 8, 17 (finding the Specification provides a different definition for QoS). In accordance with our findings above, we find Appellants' arguments persuasive. We find that one of ordinary skill in the art would understand the scope of QoS to be commensurate with what is claimed, and one skilled in the art would reasonably conclude that Appellants had possession of this aspect of the claimed invention at the time the Specification was filed. See 8 Appeal2014-005172 Application 11/530,579 Jn re Gosteli, 872 F.2d 1008, 1012 (Fed. Cir. 1989); Spec. iii! 8, 17, 35. Accordingly, we do not sustain this rejection. (5) Indefiniteness of QoS Appellants contend the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 1 and its dependent claims for being indefinite. See App. Br. 5; Reply Br. 3. Specifically, as above for enablement of claim 1, Appellants argue QoS is a term that is "commonly used and well understood in the art." See App. Br. 6 (citing QoS definitions); Reply Br. 4. The Examiner finds QoS is a relative term which is extremely subjective, and renders the claim indefinite. See Final Act. 11. The Examiner also finds QoS is not defined by claim 1 and the Specification does not provide a sufficient definition. See id. The test for definiteness under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph, is whether "those skilled in the art would understand what is claimed when the claim is read in light of the specification." Orthokinetics, Inc. v. Safety Travel Chairs, Inc., 806 F.2d 1565, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (citations omitted);seealsoExparteMiyazaki, 89USPQ2d 1207, 1210-13 (BPAI 2008) (precedential) (applying the Orthokinetics standard). We agree with Appellants that one of ordinary skill in the art would understand the scope of what is being claimed in claim 1. For example, we agree that QoS is a "commonly used and well understood [term] in the art," and one of skill in the art would understand what is claimed in reading claim 1 in light of the Specification. See Spec. iii! 8, 17, 3 5; supra ITU' s and IETF' s QoS definitions. Accordingly, we do not sustain this rejection. 9 Appeal2014-005172 Application 11/530,579 (6) Indefiniteness ofblackout Appellants contend the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 9 and its dependent claims 10 and 11 for being indefinite. See App. Br. 11-12; Reply Br. 11-12. Specifically, Appellants argue claim 9 sufficiently defines the term blackout (i.e., "blackout condition indicating a failure in the primary path"). See App. Br. 11. Appellants also argue "the general population understands ... that an electrical blackout is a loss of electric power." See id. The Examiner finds "blackout" is a relative term which renders the claim indefinite. See Final Act. 11. The Examiner also finds "blackout" is not defined by the claim nor the Specification. See id. (citing Spec. i-f 35 (finding the terms "blackout" and "brownout" are defined as comprising overlapping scope, and thus, one of ordinary skill in the art would not be reasonably apprised of the scope of the invention). We agree with Appellants that one of ordinary skill in the art would understand the scope of "blackout" in claim 9. We also agree the language of claim 9 defines the proper scope for "blackout" (i.e., a failure in the primary path). Accordingly, we do not sustain this rejection. (7) Indefiniteness ofbrownout Appellants contend the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 2, 5, 6, 7, and 8 for being indefinite. See App. Br. 11-12; Reply Br. 11-12. Specifically, Appellants argue "brownout" is a well-known term, and "the general population understands . . . an electrical brownout is a sag [or] is a drop in power that can cause lights to dim and poor performance of equipment." See App. Br. 11; see also Reply Br. 10 ("Brownout state may indicate congested or QoS/performance below defined limit and connectivity 10 Appeal2014-005172 Application 11/530,579 OK.") (citing Spec. if 35 ). The Examiner finds "brownout" is a relative term which renders the claims indefinite. See Final Act. 12. The Examiner also finds "brownout" is not defined by the claims nor the Specification. See id. (citing Spec. if 35). We agree with the Examiner that "brownout" is a relative term which renders the claims indefinite. We find one of ordinary skill in the art would not understand the scope of what is claimed when read in light of the specification. For example, paragraph 35's recitation that a "[b]rownout state may indicate congested or QoS/performance below defined limit and connectivity OK," does not serve to clarify the proper scope of the term. See Spec. if 35. We also agree with the Examiner that the language of the claims do not define "brownout." See App. Br. 17-18 (Claim App'x). Accordingly, we sustain this rejection. (8) Obviousness of claims 1-5 and 8, and claims 12 and 13 Appellants contend that the combination, and Soumiya in particular, fails to teach or suggest "a comparison of the congestion, Quality of Service (QoS) and connectivity of the primary path with congestion, Quality of Service (QoS) and connectivity of an alternate path," as recited in claim 1. See App. Br. 13-14 (emphasis added). Appellants argue Soumiya instead teaches comparing, inter alia, congestion, but not QoS, in making routing decisions. See App. Br. 13 (citing Soumiya if 230). The Examiner finds Soumiya teaches or suggests making routing decisions based on a comparison of, inter alia, QoS. See Final Act. 15. Specifically, the Examiner finds (i) Soumiya teaches comparing congestion values and (ii) the Specification teaches "measured congestion indicates that a certain quality of service exists," and thus, Soumiya teaches comparing 11 Appeal2014-005172 Application 11/530,579 QoS values. See Final Act. 15-16 (citing Soumiya if 230; Spec. iii! 8, 17). We find Appellants' argument persuasive, and in accordance with our above reasoning, we find the Examiner cited portions of Soumiya fails to teach or suggest a comparison of the QoS of a primary path with the QoS of an alternate path. See Soumiya if 230 (teaching comparing congestion values rather than QoS values). Furthermore, the claim recites a comparison of both congestion and QoS, and each term should be given meaning. Accordingly, we do not sustain this rejection. Furthermore, claims 12 and 13 depend from claim 1 and incorporate this disputed limitation. The Examiner's §103(a) rejection of claims 12 and 13 relies on the cited combination for claim 1, and thus, we also do not sustain the Examiner's§ 103(a) rejection of claims 12 and 13. DECISION (1) We reverse the Examiner's rejection of claim 1, and its dependent claims, under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, as being based on a disclosure which is not enabling. (2) We reverse the Examiner's rejection of claim 1, and its dependent claims, under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, for failing to disclose the best mode contemplated by the inventor. (3) We reverse the Examiner's rejection of claims 2, 5, 6, 8, and 9, and dependent claims 3, 4, 7, 10, and 11, under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, for failing to disclose the best mode contemplated by the inventor. 12 Appeal2014-005172 Application 11/530,579 ( 4) We reverse the Examiner's rejection of claim 1, and its dependent claims, under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph, for failing to set forth the subject matter which Appellants regard as their invention. (5) We reverse the Examiner's rejection of claim 1, and its dependent claims, under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph, for being indefinite with respect to the term "Quality of Service." (6) We reverse the Examiner's rejection of claim 9, and its dependent claims 10 and 11, under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph, for being indefinite with respect to the term "blackout." (7) We affirm the Examiner rejection of claims 2, 5, 6, 8, and their dependent claims 3, 4, and 7, under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph, for being indefinite with respect to the term "brownout." (8) We reverse the Examiner's 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) rejections of claims 1-5, 8, 12, and 13. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l )(iv). AFFIRMED-IN-PART 13 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation