Dixie Highway Express, Inc

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jul 2, 1965

153 N.L.R.B. 1224 (N.L.R.B. 1965)

1224 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Dixie Highway Express, Inc. and Teamsters , Chauffeurs, Ware-
housemen & Helpers, Local Union No. 891, affiliated with In-
ternational Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs , Warehouse-
men & Helpers of America . Case No. 15-CA-2494. July 2,
1965
DECISION AND ORDER
On March 21, 1965, Trial Examiner George A. Downing issued his
Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respondent
had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices and
recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain
affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Deci-
sion. The Trial Examiner also found that the Respondent had not
engaged in certain other unfair labor practices alleged in the com-
plaint, and recommended that these allegations be dismissed., There-
after, the Respondent filed exceptions to the Trial Examiner's Decision
and a supporting brief .2
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has
delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-member
panel [Members Fanning, Brown, and Jenkins].
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at
the hearing, and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The
rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial
Examiner's Decision, the exceptions and brief, and the entire record
in this proceeding, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and
recommendations of the Trial Examiner.
IIn the absence of exceptions thereto , the Board adopts , pro forma, the Trial Ex-
aminer's finding that Respondent did not violate Section 8 ( a)(3) and (1) of the Act
In discharging Evelyn Ingram.
2 Respondent requests that the Board take official notice that a decision of the Inter-
state Commerce Commission , dated October 6, 1964, and docketed as Case No MC-F 8373,
approved the purchase of Dixie Highway Express, Inc ., by the Jack Cole Company, Inc.
The Respondent contends that since the time of the unfair labor practices there has been
this change in ownership as well as a change in the management and/or supervisory per-
sonnel , and that such changes should be considered by the Board In determining whether
the Trial Examiner's Recommended Order, which included an order for the Respondent
to bargain with the Union , is now appropriate.
The mere fact that management or supervisory personnel have been replaced does not
render the violations they committed moot, since this remedial order runs against the
corporate entity and Its agents and not against individuals as such. Accordingly, a
remedial order Is still proper. With respect to the bargaining order, the designation of
the Union by a majority of the employees in the appropriate unit is still effective regard-
less of the fact that the actual ownership of the stock of Dixie Highway Express has
changed hands . Cf. Rohlik, Inc., 145 NLRB 1236, 1240, and cases cited therein at foot-
note 11 ; and Johnson Ready Mix Co., 142 NLRB 437, 442. We conclude , therefore, that
the Order recommended by the Trial Examiner, including his recommendation that the
Respondent be ordered to bargain with the Union upon request , is proper.
153 NLRB No. 112.
DIXIE HIGHWAY EXPRESS, INC. 1225,
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10 (c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as
amended, the National Labor Relations Board hereby adopts as its,
Order the Order recommended by the Trial Examiner, and orders that
the Respondent, Dixie Highway Express, Inc., Jackson, Mississippi, its
officers, agents, successors and assigns, shall take the action set forth
in the Trial Examiner's Recommended Order.3
3 The telephone number for Region 15, appearing at the bottom of the Appendix at-
tached to the Trial Examiner 's Decision , is amended to read: Telephone No. 527-6391.
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This proceeding under Section 10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as
amended, was heard before Trial Examiner George A. Downing at Jackson, Mis
sissippi , on November 4 through 6, 1964, and , after reopening , on January 5 and 6,
1965, pursuant to due notice . The complaint , issued on August 31 , 1964, and based
on charges dated May 27 and July 10, 1964, alleged in substance that Respondent
engaged in unfair labor practices proscribed by Section 8(a)(1), (3 ), and (5) of
the Act by: ( a) various specified acts of interference , restraint , and coercion; (b)
discriminatorily discharging Evelyn Ingram; and ( c) refusing to bargain with the
Charging Union as the majority representative of its office clerical employees at the
Jackson terminal , an appropriate unit within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act.
Respondent answered , denying the allegations of unfair labor practices.
Upon the entire record in the case, and from my observation of the witnesses, I
make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. JURISDICTIONAL FINDINGS
Respondent , an Alabama corporation, is a common carrier for hire operating
under certificates of convenience and necessity issued by the Interstate Commerce
Commission and the various regulatory bodies of the States in which it operates. It
maintains terminals and offices within the States of Louisiana , Mississippi, Ala-
bama, Georgia , Tennessee , Kentucky , and Missouri . During the last year Respond-
ent received approximately $10 million for its services in connection with the trans-
portation of goods and materials in interstate commerce and is therefore engaged
in commerce within the meaning of Section 2 ( 6) and (7) of the Act.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
The Charging Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5),
of the Act.
IH. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Introduction and issues
This proceeding arose from efforts of the office clerical staff of Respondent's
Jackson terminal to obtain union representation . Five of the seven employees signed
authorization cards with the Charging Union on February 10, 1964, demand was
made for recognition by letter dated February 11, and a representation petition was
forwarded simultaneously for filing in the Regional Office under Case No. 15-RC-
2864. Recognition was refused on the ground of doubt of majority, and there fol-
lowed a course of conduct of alleged interference, restraint , and coercion and later
the discharge of Evelyn Ingram on March 25.
The discharge of Ingram was defended on the ground of cause; i e., insubordina-
tion or refusal to perform an order and the refusal of reinstatement on the ground
of her mishandling of Respondent 's funds, discovered after her discharge The
issues on the refusal to bargain were whether Respondent questioned the Union's
majority in good faith and whether it engaged in unfair labor practices for the pur-
1226 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
pose of undermining that majority . The latter conduct included, in addition to
Ingram's discharge , allegations of interrogations , coercive statements , threats of
reprisal , and promises of benefits attributed to various officers and supervisors; it
also included the granting of wage increases and the assigning of new office employ-
ees to the Jackson terminal with the alleged intent of dissipating the Union 's majority.
Admitting both the wage increases and the addition of personnel , Respondent denied
that the wage increases were made with intent to get the employees to forsake the
Union and pleaded that the assignment of personnel was made pursuant to a reorgani-
zation plan which was formulated prior to February 11 and in the exercise of mana-
gerial discretion based on business judgment and economic justification.
B. The status of Thad M. Jones
A chief witness to much of the Section 8 (a) (1) conduct was Thad M . Jones, who
was claimed by Respondent to be a supervisor in the representation proceeding but
who was found by the Regional Director to be an employee within the unit. Though
the issue was not directly relitigated herein and though Respondent does not
suggest that I should attempt a redetermination ,' further evidence concern-
ing Jones' status was developed incidentally to some of the 8 ( a)(1) conduct as
well as in connection with Respondent 's contention that in any event it regarded
Jones as a supervisor and that the coercive effect of the statements made to him
should be viewed in that light. It is therefore both necessary and appropriate that
Jones' status be further considered , and we begin properly with the Regional Direc-
tor's determination which I find to be fully supported both by the evidence at the
representation hearing (officially noted by stipulation ) and by the supplemental evi-
dence in the present record:
Employer contends that Thad Jones is the office manager , and should be
excluded from the unit ....
Jones, who had been classified as terminal claims agent , began performing
the duties of rating , the preparation of costs reports , and took custody of per-
sonnel records upon the termination of employment of the office manager in
July 1963, all of which duties had formerly been performed by her. He also
does tracing work and files tariffs. Employer states that he became , in effect,
the acting office manager ; he testified that he was the rate clerk . No announce-
ment was made that he had become office manager, he received no pay increase
at that time ; and a subsequent pay increase , given to the entire office force,
gave him the same hourly rate as that of the cashier. The office manager had
been salaried and had the authority to hire and fire. Employer contended that
Jones had the authority effectively to recommend hiring and firing The termi-
nal manager stated that he would have fired certain employees on the recom-
mendation of Jones, but that he would not have fired three named employees on
Jones' recommendation . Jones was never told that he had the authority to
make recommendations affecting the employment status of employees The
terminal manager granted employees time off, and neither praised nor repri-
manded Jones for the work of others The assistant cashier testified that she
was instructed in her work both by Jones and the cashier . The rate clerk testi-
fied that he was instructed in his work by the interline clerk , and that he, the
rate clerk , trained the billing clerk in his duties . There is no evidence that
Jones exercised any indicia of supervisory status. I find that Jones was not a
supervisor. There is evidence that on March 6, 1964 , Jones was offered the
position of office manager , and declined . The record indicates that his refusal
of the position was accepted since the terminal manager told him to leave his
1 The representation proceeding in Case No. 15-RC-2864 was one which was conducted
by the Regional Director pursuant to delegation of authority by the Board under Section
3(b) of the Act and under Section 102 . 67, Rules and Regulations, Series 8, as amended.
Subsection ( f) of that section precludes the parties from relitigating in any related sub-
sequent unfair labor practice proceeding any issue which was , or could have been , raised
in the representation proceeding , either where there is a failure to request review by
the Board , or where a request for review is denied The effect of that regulation is to
clothe the Regional Director ' s decision with the same status and degree of finality as were
possessed by Board Decisions prior to the delegation The Mountain States Telephone
and Telegraph Company, 136 NLRB 1612 , 1615 ; Northwestern Publishing Company, 144
NLRB 1069, 1070 , 1077. And the prior law was, of course, long since settled by such
familiar cases as Pittsburgh Plate Glass Company v N.L R B ., 313 U . S. 146, 158, 161,
162; Allis - Chalmers Manufacturing Company v N .L R.B., 162 F. 2d 435, 440-441 (C.A. 7) ;
N L.R B. v. Worcester Woolen Mills Corporation , 170 F. 2d 13 (CA 1)
DIXIE HIGHWAY EXPRESS, INC. 1227
classification on the payroll blank, and Employer's operations manager testified
that the time had not yet come to appoint Jones office manager. That Jones is
not functioning as office manager was demonstrated by the testimony of an
employee that Jones did not give her instructions on her work, and the failure
of Employer to consult with Jones on the two terminations, one transfer, and
the four new hires in the unit. I find, on the record as a whole, that Jones is
not a supervisor and include him in the unit.
Evidence in the present record establishes that Jones was held in high regard by
Respondent as a trusted employee with whom it conferred and consulted freely con-
cerning matters affecting the operation of the Jackson terminal. It showed similarly,
however, that Respondent made no attempt to bestow supervisory status upon Jones
or to convert his position to a supervisory one until after the Union sought recogni-
tion (see testimony summarized in sections C, 2 and 3, infra). Jones refused Re-
spondent's offers, including his conversion from an hourly rate to a salary and an
increase in his monthly car allowance, the latter of which was explained by Office
Terminal Supervisor Bryce W. Miller on the basis that Jones' proposed job as office
manager would require an increase in his car allowance and that "[W]e were talk-
ing to him as an office manager, and he would have had quite a lot of running around
town to do."
Miller testified further that he ceased to regard Jones as office manager early in
February, after he learned that Jones had signed a union card and did not want the
office manager's job, and that he understood further that Jones was declining to
serve as office manager when Jones declined the offer of a salary and the increased
car allowance.
The evidence showed further that there was no change in Jones' duties before or
after the Regional Director's decision issued on May 19, until August 10, with the
rehiring as office manager of Connie Campbell, who had been terminated a year
earlier. Despite Jones' rejection of the job in February and again in March, and
despite the Regional Director's determination of employee status on May 19, Ter-
minal Manager Ray Huffman testified that it was not until August that he felt the
need for someone to help him in the office and made the request for help which led
to the reemployment of Campbell.
I conclude and find that though Respondent placed great trust in Jones as an
employee, it did not regard him as a supervisor at any time either prior to or after
the organization of the office employees. Though in the prior period there were
certain respects in which Jones may have been regarded as "acting as" office man-
ager, they were minor and routine ones, and Respondent abstained from conferring
upon him any of the prerequisites (e.g., salary) of the position or authority respon-
sibly to direct employees And when Respondent attempted to convert Jones' job to
a supervisory one after discovering his attachment to the Union, Jones consistently
refused Respondent's offers. Significantly, though no change was being proposed in
Jones' duties, Jones was not considered to be a supervisor according to Miller at any
time after he rejected the salary offer and declined to serve as office manager.
C. The evidence
1. The office staff is organized; the request and the refusal to bargain
On February 10, five of Respondent's office employees (Don T. Smith, Thad M.
Jones, Eloise B. Roberts, Willie Earl McKenzie, and Martha Evelyn Ingram) signed
authorization cards in the Charging Union. Bill McDuff and Wendell Hodges were
the only other office clericals at the time. On February 11, L. M. Hoover, business
representative of the Union, wrote Dan Patterson, Respondent's vice president and
general manager, that the Union represented a majority of the office workers at the
Jackson terminal and requested a meeting to negotiate a contract. Patterson received
the letter on the morning of February 12, and promptly called Hoover on the tele-
phone 2 Patterson stated he did not believe the Union represented a majority in
the unit and that he wanted an NLRB election. Hoover informed Patterson he had
petitioned the Board for an election and that he did have the employees signed up.
Hoover made no offer to produce the cards, however, nor did Patterson suggest that
he do so. In fact, Hoover mailed the cards to the Board's Regional Office on the
11th, along with his representation petition which was received and filed by the
Board on the 12th under Case No. 15-RC-2864.
2 Though the receipt for certified mail purports to reflect delivery of the letter on the
13th, other evidence established that the telephone call and other incidents which followed
receipt of the letter occurred on the 12th.
1228 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
2. Respondent 's reaction ; Patterson 's visit and Miller's activities
Respondent reacted instantaneously to the organization of the office employees.
On February 12 Patterson called Operations Manager W. R. Allen, who happened
to be in Jackson, informed Allen there was some trouble, specifically union activity,
in the Jackson office, and directed Allen to find out what the problem was. Allen
called Jones from his motel and invited Jones to have lunch, stating he wished to
talk with Jones privately.3
Jones testified that Allen asked him if he knew of the petition, that he volunteered
the fact he had signed a union card , and also made some statement to the effect that
his ears were burning or he had caught his hand in the cookie jar. Thereupon they
proceeded to discuss the pros and cons of the Union . Allen informed Jones that his
rating with the Company would drop, his advancement would stop, and that he was
making a big mistake. Allen also offered to put Jones on a salary though no amount
was discussed . Jones declined, informing Allen he thought the employees had a
right to an election and that it was their minds to be made up.
Allen's testimony was not in serious conflict though he denied in general terms
the making of any threat , directly or indirectly , concerning Jones' situation . He tes-
tified that Jones commented at the outset that he assumed Allen knew "about our
situation," and went on to inform Allen that the office employees, including himself,
had joined the Union and explained why they had done so. Allen testified he had
no reason to doubt or to question what Jones told him and that he reported the
conversation back to Patterson by telephone that afternoon. Allen admitted inform-
ing Jones the Company was thinking about putting him on a salary.
Around February 25, Patterson came to Jackson, called a meeting of the office
personnel, read a statement in which he expressed concern over the petition, and
invited the employees to come of their own free will to his motel room to discuss
the matter further with him individually. None of the employees complied, and after
2 days Terminal Manager Ray Huffman and Office Terminal Supervisor Miller began
to round up employees to go to see Patterson. Huffman urged Jones to go, express-
ing embarrassment because the president of the Company had been at the motel for
2 days and none of the employees would go to see him. When Jones still refused,
Patterson returned to the office, called Jones aside, and, though commenting he
understood Jones had no desire to talk with him, asked Jones to take a ride with him
the next morning under the pretext of going to the hank.
Jones testified that during the course of the ride the next day Patterson told him
he was making a mistake, that the Company thought well of him, that it had plans
for him, and that his progress with Dixie would cease Patterson asked what the
problem was, and stated he would bring the salaries at Jackson in line with those at
other terminals and would put his offer in writing . Patterson also promised that no
one would be wrongfully fired, and he requested Jones to help him get up a petition
to withdraw the representation petition, stating that if Patterson did not keep his
word the employees could file again, but that if an election were held and the Union
lost, the petition could not be filed for a year. Patterson concluded by telling Jones
to think about the matter and that "we were not going to have this Union."
Wendell Hodges and Willie Earl McKenzie were taken separately to Patterson's
motel by Miller. Hodges testified that Patterson asked him how he felt about the
Union, stated he did not want the Union in the Jackson office and did not feel the
Union could help the employees, and asked Hodges what the complaints were, add-
ing that so far as money was concerned they were all going to get a raise. Patterson
also asked Hodges what the Union meant to him, and Hodges replied the only thing
he knew was security. Patterson commented, regarding security, that a union
employee could also be fired, and Miller spoke up and said, "Yes, I have fired sev-
eral." Patterson inquired who started the union talk and after a pause added he
did not want to know and that the only ones who would favor by it would be Thad
Jones and Evelyn Ingram. Miller commented that the Teamsters Union was no
good and showed Hodges a newspaper with a headline concerning Hoffa's convic-
tion. Patterson stated that if the employees were going to choose a union , it looked
as if they could have chosen a local, and he finally concluded in a remark to Miller,
"I think he understands Would you take him back to the office?" Patterson also
inquired of Miller about "the other guy" and Miller replied he would bring him
back. When Miller returned Hodges to the office, he took Don Smith away with him.
8 Allen fixed the luncheon date on the 12th , Jones on the 14th , and Huffman on the 13th
I accept Allen 's testimony on the point for he was able to relate the date to an occasion
on the preceding day.
DIXIE HIGHWAY EXPRESS, INC. 1229
McKenzie testified that Patterson started with an inquiry about who started the
mess but that he continued, without awaiting an answer , with a statement that he
thought he knew the older employees were the only ones who would benefit from the
Union. Patterson told McKenzie he should not be influenced by the older employees
but should make up his own mind . When McKenzie made some statement wonder-
ing how long it would be before the hearing, Patterson said it might be 2 years but
then laughed and said he really did not know. After taking McKenzie to lunch,
Patterson told him to give careful thought to what had been said.
McKenzie testified further that as Miller drove him back to the office Miller told
him the Union was not any good and that McKenzie should abandon the idea,
otherwise the stigma of the Union would go with him if ever left Dixie's employ-
ment and it would be almost impossible to get another job. Miller cited as an exam-
ple a girl in Nashville whom he would not hire because she once belonged to a union,
and he told McKenzie that if any of McKenzie's future employers were to contact
him or Dixie for a reference , he would tell them that McKenzie did a good job but
there was one thing wrong with him, that he carried a union card in his pocket.
Miller's testimony contained no denial of any of the foregoing , and Patterson
admitted or failed to deny a substantial part of the testimony of Jones, McKenzie,
and Hodges. Thus he admitted his visit to the office, his discussion of the Union
with the employees, his invitation to them to come to his motel room for individual
discussions , and the fact of his discussions with Jones, McKenzie, and Hodges.
In Jones' case, Patterson admitted stating that the Company was going to adjust
the wages of all the office employees (because wage adjustments were being made
throughout the system) and that he questioned Jones about why the employees
wanted a union and what it could offer them. He denied threatening that Jones'
progress would be stopped, and though admitting he "might have" told Jones he was
not going to have a union, he denied asking Jones to get up a petition to withdraw
from the Union.
In McKenzie's case, Patterson admitted that he asked what the problem was and
why McKenzie had to have the Union to represent him, that he told McKenzie he
did not think McKenzie needed the Union and that the Company would adjust their
wages, and he admitted further that he "could have" asked McKenzie who started
the mess. Patterson testified, however, that he assured McKenzie there would be
no retaliation if he did join the Union and that the proposed increase was not condi-
tioned on any union activity or nonactivity by the employees.
Patterson testified he had practically the same conversation with Hodges as with
McKenzie. Though he testified he did not know whether he told Hodges he would
not have a union, Patterson agreed he might certainly have said that "we would do
everything we can to keep from having a union."
Hodges testified further that following his talks with Patterson and Miller, Miller
pressed him repeatedly and almost daily concerning how he felt about the Union,
whether he had made up his mind, and whether he was going to vote for it or against
it Miller did not stop those interrogations until a group of the office employees went
into Huffman's office on March 11 and protested Miller's conduct.
Eloise Roberts testified similarly that around the first of March, Miller questioned
her about whether she had made up her mind how she was going to vote and that she
replied she was taking everything into consideration. Miller continued that he knew
there were a couple in the office who were trying to tell Roberts how to vote, but she
should make up her own mind and that when she did so, he would like to know.
Miller later questioned her again whether she had made up her mind, and she told
him she had not. Miller continued that even if the Union should come in at Jackson,
Roberts was not to think that the employees could not be fired, because the only
thing he would have to do was to write three letters, and then they could be fired.
Questioned on cross-examination concerning an interview with Respondent' s coun-
sel prior to the hearing, Roberts testified that she was asked then whether she had
been threatened by Patterson, Huffman, Miller, or Allen and that she reported that
on the day the employees got their raises Miller told her that "if we decided to go
Union and the Union did not go in that we would never be able to get another job
around here." She admitted that in that interview she did not mention Miller's com-
ment concerning the writing of three letters.
Miller made no denial of the testimony of Hodges and Roberts.
3 The raises; Randall's visit
Jones testified that he was called to the Holiday Inn on March 2 by Miller and
Huffman, that Miller showed him a yellow pad on which each employee was listed
with a raise, and that Miller stated, "We have been working on raises for the office."
1230 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Miller explained that the figures had been arrived at by averaging the past 6 weeks'
earnings of the different employees. Jones was listed with a salary of $140 a week,
plus $40 a month car allowance . Jones expressed concern at being listed as a salaried
employee and stated he would rather be hourly rated . Miller informed him of the
benefits a salaried employee would receive and urged him to accept the salary, but
Jones declined.
Huffman inquired whether Jones would accept $150 a week and a $50-a-month
car allowance . When Jones still declined, Miller continued that Jones was at the
crossroads , that his future would depend on which road he took, and that the Com-
pany was going to disqualify Jones as being the office manager in the representation
hearing scheduled for the following week, and that would put Jones in a precarious
situation . Jones replied that he had considered the matter and if he were found to be
disqualified and should lose his job, he intended to move to Memphis to seek employ-
ment. Miller responded that Jones ' record would follow him, that it would be hard
for him to account for 11 years of his life with Dixie, and that the stigma of the Union
would be with him wherever he went. Jones informed Miller his mind was made up,
but Miller requested that he think it over.
Jones testified further that on March 5 he was called into the office by Huffman and
Miller. Miller inquired whether Jones had made up his mind concerning the previous
conversation and repeated the offer of $140 a week plus a $40 car allowance. Jones
rejected the offer, and Miller again informed him he was making a mistake , that his
future would be in jeopardy , that he could not understand Jones going through "with
this thing ," and that he wanted to save Jones from that. Huffman stated that if
Jones would not accept the salary offer, he would be given a rate of $3 an hour, and
allowed 4 hours a week overtime , which would amount to approximately $140 a
week. Miller renewed his comment about the mistake Jones was making and cited
the example of a girl who had worked for him in Nashville, an excellent worker, who
had made the mistake of joining a union and carrying a union card . Miller continued
that he would still like to hire the girl, but because she had carried a union card he
could not use her, and that the same thing would happen to the Jackson employees.
Miller concluded by calling Jones "a hardheaded Mississippian " and told him that
before the matter was over with , Jones would call him "a son of a bitch."
Huffman requested Jones to issue the payroll change notices and gave him a list
of salary increases for the office personnel , which were to be made retroactive to
March 2. Jones asked what he should put down as his own classification since they
had made previous reference to his job as office manager . Huffman told Jones to use
his own discretion and if he did not want to put down office manager to leave it blank.
Jones testified that he left it blank because he never was office manager and that all
of the office employees received a raise at the time except McDuff, who was in the
hospital at the time.
Hodges, McKenzie , and Ingram also testified to conversations with Miller and'
Huffman concerning their respective raises. Hodges , who was raised from $2 10 to,
$2.64 an hour , formerly worked from 40 to 50 hours a week, but after the raise he
worked almost strictly an 8-hour day . Hodges testified that Huffman stated he knew
the employees were underpaid and the raise was to equalize the wages with those at
other terminals . Though Huffman did not explain the basis on which the new rate
was calculated , he stated that Hodges should keep his hours down to a minimum of
8 if possible.
McKenzie , who was raised from $2 . 20 to $2.64 an hour, testified that Miller
explained the new rate would approximate the average weekly pay McKenzie had
received for the past 6 or 8 weeks and that his hours were reduced from approximately
50 to 40 , though if necessary he could put in 44 hours.
Ingram testified that Huffman and Miller told her she was to get a raise , that she
should work 40 hours and should not exceed 45 , but that even if she did exceed 45
hours on occasion they would understand . Ingram replied that she would like to
refuse the raise because she did not feel the Company should offer her one because
she had signed a union card , that she would vote for the Union, and that she would
rather wait and see what happened after the Union went in and would accept a raise
then if they wanted to give her one Huffman and Miller spoke discouragingly con-
cerning the Union , with Miller telling Ingram that if she left Dixie 's employment
they would say (in recommendation ) that she was a good and efficient worker, but
because she favored the Union they would recommend she would not make a good
employee.
The testimony of Miller and Huffman concerning the foregoing interviews with
Jones and the other employees is summarized in section 7, infra, along with Respond-
ent's other evidence concerning the wage increases and the sending in of new
employees.
DIXIE HIGHWAY EXPRESS, INC. 1231
Jones testified further that in the late afternoon of March 5, Lowry Randall, a
supervisor at the home office in Meridian, came into the Jackson office and requested
Jones to have dinner with him. Jones agreed, and discovered that Randall was driv-
ing Patterson's car. Randall explained that he flew in from Meridian and had bor-
rowed the car from Patterson, who was at the Holiday Inn.
Randall informed Jones he had heard through the grapevine about Jones joining
the Union and stated he could not grasp the idea of Jones doing such a thing; that he
had informed Patterson and his own superior that if given an opportunity he felt sure
he could talk Jones out of it; and that they agreed to give Randall a chance to do so.
Randall continued that Jones was well thought of throughout the Dixie system, but
that his advancement with the Company would stop if he proceeded on the course he
was going; that Jones might expect advancements if he stayed with management,
whereas if he stayed with the Union there would be no promotion and he would
always be on the same track. Jones refused, and expressed resentment that Randall
should interfere with what Jones considered to be his own business. Randall apolo-
gized and said he did not think he could change Jones' mind and would so report to
Patterson.
Randall did not testify. Patterson admitted that he knew the purpose of Randall's
trip to Jackson, with which he was in full accord, and that he authorized the trip and
lent his car to Randall.
4. The protest of Miller's activities; Huffman tallies union sentiment
On March 11 six of the office employees (the five who had signed cards plus
Wendell Hodges) discussed among themselves what they considered to be the unwar-
ranted intrusion by Miller into their organization rights, and five of them (all except
Don Smith) sought out Huffman in his office for a private conference. McKenzie,
Hodges, and Jones testified that the group protested Miller's activities among them in
repeatedly questioning them concerning their union sentiments and their voting inten-
tions and informed Huffman their minds were made up (to vote for the Union) and
would not be changed. Jones testified that Huffman agreed, stating that he thought
"we all know how each other stands without all of this," and he promised to speak
to management about getting Miller to desist from his tactics. The group also
expressed to Huffman resentment about the new employees who were being brought
into the office to intimidate them. Huffman commented he knew nothing about them
with the exception of Sarah Berry, but stated, "For God's sake they are there; let's
give them something to do."
Jones testified further that as the group filed out, Huffman spoke to him asking
how he thought "it's going to come out?" and commented that not all the office
employees had come into his office. Huffman then drew two columns on a sheet of
paper, one headed "For" and one "Against." On the "For" side he listed the names
of Eloise Roberts, Wendell Hodges, Evelyn Ingram, Willie McKenzie, and Thad
Jones. On the "Against" side he listed the names of new employees Sara Berry,
James McLaurin, R. T. Haverson, and Ed Chavarri, and old employee Don Smith.
Huffman stated he felt that both Jones and Haverson would be disqualified at the
hearing and, scratching out both names, said, "That makes it four to four, and a tie
goes to the Company."
Jones told Huffman that though Don Smith had not identified himself with the
group by coming back into the office, Smith had stated that he was 100 percent
behind the group but did not think they were using the right tactics by going into the
office. Jones informed Huffman that Smith was going to vote for the Union, and he
picked up the pencil, scratched Smith's name out on the "Against" side, wrote it on
the "For" side, and told Huffman that would make it five to three in favor of the
Union even if Jones and Haverson 4 were disqualified. Huffman asked whether
Jones really thought Smith was going to be "with you all," and Jones replied that he
did.
Huffman admitted that the group protested to him Miller's questioning of them
concerning their union sentiments, informed him they were all for the Union, and
sought his help in putting an end to Miller's activities. Huffman also admitted having
a further conversation with Jones as the group left the office but claimed that Jones
had initiated it. Huffman admitted that he commented on the fact that Don Smith
had not come in with the group and that Jones informed him that Smith had signed
a card and was on their side but did not approve of the way the group was handling
+Haverson was excluded from the unit by the Regional Director on two grounds: first,
that he was a supervisor, and second, that his substantial interests lay in common with
the warehousemen and drivers.
1232 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
the matter. Huffman made no specific denial of Jones' testimony concerning his
listing of employee names in "For" and "Against" columns, of their discussions of
some of the individual listings, and of his own prediction that a tie would result from
Jones' disqualification. He testified that he did comment that he considered Jones to
be "management" and as "office manager" but that he did not know how the question
would be resolved.
5. Sarah Berry is hired; Evelyn Ingram is discharged
Though three new office employees reported on March 6, we shall consider first
only Sarah Berry, who was hired by Huffman and whose employment later led to the
situation out of which Ingram's discharge was a direct outgrowth. The evidence is
not in dispute that Berry was hired at least in part as a replacement for Bill McDuff, a
part-time employee who was in the hospital at the time and who was carried under
the classification of assistant cashier. As early as December 13, Operations Manager
Allen had made a written recommendation to then Terminal Manager Lucey in
reviewing his audit of office personnel at Jackson that Lucey not carry McDuff
through the light season of the year. (See section 7, infra.)
Though no action was taken to terminate McDuff until March 6, the evidence is
undisputed that Ingram was repeatedly informed that Respondent intended to procure
help for her. Thus Ingram admitted that Lucey told her before he was relieved in
February that he had tried unsuccessfully to get help for her; that Allen also indicated
to her in February that he was trying to do something to relieve her workload; and
that Miller informed her on March 5 (in the conversation concerning her raise) that
a new girl was being brought in to learn her work so as to substitute for Ingram when
she was ill or on vacation. Huffman testified similarly that he also promised Ingram
in February to get someone to help her, and that he hired Sarah Berry as a full-time
employee to replace McDuff and to help Ingram with her work. Huffman also testi-
fied, and Ingram did not deny, that he directed Ingram to give Berry work to do and
to show her how to do it.
It soon became evident that Ingram and Berry were not getting along together and
that part of the difficulty lay in Ingram's resistance to Berry's efforts to learn Ingram's
job. Huffman testified that he admonished the two of them and told them they were
to get along with each other and work together; and Ingram admitted that Huffman
told her that Berry was there to stay and to learn the job, that Ingram was to train her,
and that unless Ingram could get along with Berry it would be better if Ingram
resigned. Despite that, there was no improvement in the relationship.
Though Ingram testified she promised Huffman to teach Berry whatever he wanted
her to, it was apparent from the entire evidence that she made no bona fide effort to
comply. Indeed, Ingram admitted that after Huffman's admonition she did nothing
in the week of her discharge to train Berry and that on Tuesday afternoon Huffman
appealed to Miller about three times to take a hand at dividing up Ingram's work.
Though the testimony is somewhat in conflict as to the events which followed and
which led immediately to Ingram's discharge, I credit the mutually corroborative
testimony of Miller, Berry, and Huffman for reasons later to be adverted to.
Miller directed Ingram to give Berry certain work to do and when Berry asked
Ingram to show her how to do it, Ingram replied that she was a cashier, not an
instructor (or supervisor), and refused to show Berry. Ingram then handed the work
to Miller and told Miller that he should show Berry how to do the work. Disclaiming
knowledge of the Jackson office procedures, Miller directed Ingram to show Berry
how to do it. Ingram replied that she was not going to show anyone her job. When
Miller asked if she was refusing, Ingram denied that she was, but repeated that she
was not going to show anyone her job and that she was a cashier, not an instructor.5
Miller immediately reported the incident to Huffman, who called Ingram into the
office. Ingram reiterated her refusal to teach Berry her job, stating she had a feeling
that Berry was going to take her job. Despite Huffman's assurances that he wished
to train Berry to handle the job during Ingram's absences on vacations or illness,
Ingram insisted that she was not going to teach Berry her job. Huffman thereupon
discharged Ingram; he testified that her refusal to obey the order to train Berry was
all that caused the discharge.
Jones testified that after Ingram left he asked Huffman in Miller's presence whether
Ingram had been discharged and that Huffman affirmed that she was and that she was
insubordinate. When Jones undertook to defend Ingram's actions, Miller spoke up
and said, "I told you that you'd call me a son-of-a-bitch before this was over with."
Relevant to the issue of reinstatement and remedy, as well as to the credibility
conflicts surrounding the discharge incident, was certain evidence of Ingram's mis-
5 Testimony by Eloise Roberts, Thad Jones , and Willie McKenzie was not in substantial
conflict concerning that final exchange between Miller and Ingram.
DIXIE HIGHWAY EXPRESS, INC. 1233
conduct which was not discovered until after her discharge . In brief, the evidence
shows that on or about February 28, 1964, Ingram surreptitiously deposited in
Respondent's bank account her personal check for some $1,683, covering it by a
false entry . Questioned near the end of the first hearing, Ingram confessed that the
sum represented the amount of the shortage in company funds which she had con-
cealed over many months by the device of making daily false reports to reflect that
collections were in balance . Ingram testified that the shortage consisted both of
amounts which she had taken for her personal use and other amounts which she had
lent to other employees (from company funds ) and which they had not fully repaid
her. Ingram testified that she ceased her lending practices around July 1962, after a
change of ownership in the Company , because she feared detection and discharge,
and at that time she sought to collect from other employees the amounts which they
still owed.
Evidence taken at the reopened hearing established that Thad Jones then paid
Ingram his full debt of $ 400 and that William H. Perry paid her either $300 or $400.
Although Ingram replaced Perry's payment in the company funds she retained the
$400 which Jones paid her and did not make good the amount which she personally
owed at the time . As the latter evidence fully exposes the real nature of Ingram's
misconduct , it is unnecessary in this proceeding to resolve conflicts between her
testimony and that of Perry and A. C. McElroy concerning whether they fully repaid
Ingram, for it is unnecessary for present purposes to establish either the exact
amounts of such indebtedness or the exact amount which Ingram owed the Company.
Also beside the point were the General Counsel's claims of extenuation arising from
the fact that the scheme which Ingram followed in the daily concealment of the
shortage was one which originated under former Terminal Manager Walter M. (Mac)
Hunter III, who used it for years to cover temporary deficiencies in his allowable
petty cash fund (which was limited to $75 ), for the evidence showed that Ingram
extended the scheme to cover unauthorized and unknown "loans" to herself and to
fellow employees in the face of an established loan practice under which the Company
made loans directly to its employees.
Though the foregoing evidence has no bearings on discriminatory motive as such,
it does bear on the question of credibility , for it furnishes the explanation and the
reason for Ingram's resistance to, and final refusal of, the order to train Berry.
Indeed, Ingram admitted that she made up the shortage when she did because she
believed her accounts would be audited after the union activities began and knew
she would be discharged when she was caught. Plainly teaching another employee
how her job was done might lead the sooner to detection of the scheme which she
had used for so long, and plainly to delay exposure would benefit Ingram through
retention of her job. Even now Ingram stands to benefit handsomely from her suc-
cess in delaying detection if the General Counsel's contentions are upheld, for he
insists to the end that the usual backpay remedy should be applied, with interest as
usual, to the date of detection , if Ingram be found to be discriminatorily discharged.6
Under all the circumstances , and to the extent that conflicts exist, I therefore credit
the testimony of Respondent 's witnesses Miller, Huffman, and Berry concerning the.
relationship between Ingram and Berry and concerning the final discharge incident.
6. The other new employees
James McLaurin and Ed Chavarri were two other new employees who reported
on March 6, shortly after Berry. While Jones was still showing Berry around the
office, he was called back by Huffman and introduced to McLaurin as the new rate
clerk Huffman commented , "We are full of surprises today, aren 't we?" and he
asked Jones to show McLaurin around the office and to give him something to do.
Shortly thereafter Ed Chavarri from the Atlanta terminal arrived and informed
Jones (whom he knew ) that he was to take over the OS&D (overage, shortage, and
damage ) position . After further introductions by Huffman , Chavarri followed Jones
around and asked what he should do . Jones replied he did not know what Chavarri
was to do. Huffman who heard the conversation called Jones into his office and told
him that whether he liked it or not, Patterson had told Huffman that Jones was to
be the office manager and that McLaurin was to be the rate clerk . At that time,
Wendell Hodges was the OS & D clerk, and thereafter Hodges and Chavarri shared
the same duties, with Chavarri coming on during the nighttime hours.
I The latter contention called forth from Respondent 's counsel the apt observation that
the General Counsel ' s view would seem to be that Ingram ' s derelictions as an employee
consisted not of embezzlement but in getting caught.
79 6-02 7-6 6-v o f 15 3-7 9
1234 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
It was part of Jones' job to prepare the payrolls and to see to it that new employees
were added to the IBM list. As Jones was unaware of the wages to be paid the new
employees, he checked with Huffman (in Miller's presence) on March 6 as to what
rate should be inserted on the payroll for McLaurin. Huffman informed Jones the
rate was $2 an hour, but Jones inquired whether Huffman had not made a mistake
as normally the rate clerk is the highest paid employee in any office and supposedly
the more skilled. Miller thereupon picked up the piece of paper on which the $2
rate was noted, scratched through it, and said, "Let's make it $2.30," and Huffman
added, "Yes, or he might vote for the Union." Neither Huffman nor Miller denied
Jones' testimony concerning the foregoing incident.
Between March 20 and April 27 four other new employees were brought into the
Jackson office, as follows:
1. Bill Greer came in on March 25, replacing Don Smith, billing clerk, who was
transferred at his own request to Hattiesburg.
2. Ken Adams came in on March 26, acted as cashier for some 4 weeks, trained
Berry for the job, and then returned to Meridian.
3. George Burnett was hired on April 27 as assistant cashier to help Berry, who
became cashier after Adams had trained her.
4. Neil Adamson was hired as night OS & D clerk on April 1, after Chavarri
returned to Atlanta. Adamson left in July, and his duties were taken back by Wen-
dell Hodges, who had handled the whole OS & D job before Chavarri arrived.
Respondent defends both the wage increases and the addition of personnel on the
ground of economic and business justification. As the same body of evidence applies
commonly to both, it will be summarized together in the following section.
7. Respondent's evidence of economic and business justification
Respondent offered considerable background evidence in support of its defense
that economic and business considerations justified both the wage increases and the
assignment of additional personnel to the Jackson office.
In June 1963 Dan Patterson became general manager of the Company and for the
first month or two did not give much time or attention to the Jackson terminal. In
the meantime Patterson hired W. R. Allen as his operations manager, and in the late
summer they began to notice that the Jackson payrolls were out of line with those
at other terminals, particularly as concerned the amount of overtime worked by
office employees. Patterson talked with Terminal Manager Buck Lucey several times
but was unable to get Lucey to follow instructions. Patterson discussed the situation
with Allen and sent Allen to Jackson to find out what was wrong and to report back.
Following Allen's first report in September, Patterson decided that Lucey should
have a further chance to correct the situation. Allen made further trips to Jackson
to follow through with Lucey, but in December Patterson decided (in consultation
with Allen) that Lucey was incapable of operating a terminal and that a replace-
ment should be sought.
Allen testified similarly that on his first visit to Jackson and after discussion with
Lucey (who called in Jones), he reported back to Patterson he could not understand
the reason for the excessive overtime, that top management at Jackson was extremely
weak, and that he did not believe efficiency would be achieved until a new manager
was put in. A decision was deferred, however, and Allen returned in late November
and talked with Lucey and Jones, and also with Ingram, whose overtime was most
excessive. In part Allen suggested to Ingram that Eloise Roberts or Jones might
help her with some of her work. Allen reported to Patterson that if the Company
were ever to attain efficiency at Jackson, there would have to be a change at the top.
Patterson concurred, but suggested that the change be deferred until after the
approaching holiday season.
After completing his survey of the situation at Jackson, Allen prepared under date
of December 13 a personal and confidential memorandum to Lucey on the subject
"Office Personnel" and sent a copy to Patterson. The body of that memorandum was
as follows:
In reviewing the recent audit made of the office in Jackson as to personnel,
I definitely feel we have adequate experience among practically all of the per-
sonnel. While it is true, two (2) of these individuals have only been with us
a short time, their background does indicate heavy trucking experience.
I believe you indicated some week or 10 days ago Bill McDuff, who is work-
ing 4-5 hours per day will be on vacation for 2 weeks in December. I believe
this would be a wonderful time to test the revamping of the office routine to
make sure of top-flight efficiency. While he is a regular employee at Campbell,
P
DIXIE HIGHWAY EXPRESS, INC . 1235
I definitely do not believe we have any strong obligation to carry him through
the light season of the year.
I am confident we have the nucleus of a strong work force in the office at
Jackson , but it needs the guidance of management in keeping the hours in line
with our discussion.
During the Christmas holidays Allen began negotiations with Ray Huffman, then
terminal manager of Thurston Motor Lines in Greensboro , North Carolina , during
the course of which both Allen and Patterson discussed with Huffman the problems
at Jackson , and Huffman also made a visit to look over the terminal . Immediately
prior to Huffman 's actual installation on February 6, Allen and Miller came to Jack-
son and had dinner with Huffman and with Thad Jones, who was called in to meet
Huffman , for Jones was regarded as a key employee and they were desirous of making
a smooth changeover of managers.
Huffman took over on February 6, with Allen stressing that Huffman should begin
by seeking the confidence of the employees and getting a working knowledge of the
situation as regarded inefficiency and that he should not start out by "swinging the
ax." Allen also informed Huffman that office overtime was extremely high but that
Huffman should make his own observations and take corrective actions in due time.
Patterson also discussed the overtime situation with Huffman , particularly the over-
time hours being worked by the cashier and the matter of thefts of interstate freight
on the dock , and suggested that Huffman should look into the situation very
cautiously.
Huffman testified that he went over the payroll with Jones on February 10 and
commented on the excessive overtime . Jones informed him that the Company had
okayed the working of overtime up to a certain amount but did not state what the
limit was. Huffman inquired whether the employees would prefer higher pay for
fewer hours instead of overtime at a lower rate , and Jones agreed that they would.
Huffman also discussed overtime with Ingram , who stated she needed help and could
not get out all her work in the allotted time.
Patterson , Miller, and Huffman testified concerning the wage increases which were
later given to the office employees . Patterson testified that on February 1, the
renewal of Teamsters ' contracts had resulted in increases for the office employees
in the three terminals where those employees were organized and that "right after
February a lot of the non-union clerical employees were adjusted ." Miller testified
that he had come to Jackson with instructions to get the wage scale into line with
the rest of the terminals , that the Jackson terminal was considered out of line, par-
ticularly in the matter of excessive overtime, but that the wage rates were below
others elsewhere . After discussing the matter ( in late February or early March)
Miller and Huffman decided that in an effort to reduce the amount of overtime, the
weekly take-home pay should be averaged and that the employees should be put on
a 40- to 44-hour workweek for the same amount of take-home pay; i .e., the employees
would receive the same pay for working fewer hours.
Miller testified that this would involve bringing in additional employees and would
also involve increasing the total cost "to a certain extent," despite the fact that the
Jackson terminal was considered a little above average in total cost at the time.
Huffman testified that they also discussed the matter with Patterson , who agreed the
increase should be made, but that it was he and Miller who decided the amounts to
be given and that they worked out the rates by averaging the total weekly pay of the
individual employees for the past 6 months and dividing by a median 42 hours to
reach the hourly rates.
After arriving at the amounts , Huffman and Miller called Jones to the motel and
discussed the increases with him. Huffman explained to Jones that overtime had to
be cut out , that he did not want to cut salaries because he was coming in new, that
he thought the employees were underpaid and were working too many hours, and
that the proposed increase was the best way to solve it. Miller explained to Jones
the basis of the proposed salary in his case; i e., $140 a week plus $40 a month for
car allowance . Jones commented that although it looked good , he did not think he
deserved it , that he was going to a hearing next week , and that he thought it would
hurt his chances of being qualified ( as an employee ). Huffman inquired if he would
take $150 a week and $50 a month allowance, and Jones rejected that also, stating
that he just wanted to be a clerk . Though there was also discussion of an adjust-
ment in Jones ' hourly rate , no decision was made at the time.
Miller testified among other things that the increase in Jones' car allowance was
due to the fact that his proposed job as office manager would require an increase in
his running around time and that Jones ' total earnings would have been slightly
higher than his earnings in the past . When Jones declined the salary offer, Miller
1236 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
understood he was declining to serve as office manager and the increased car allow-
ance was therefore eliminated because Jones would not have to do the extra running
around as office manager. Miller made no denial of Jones' testimony that he warned
Jones concerning his future and concerning the union stigma to follow him if he
should seek employment elsewhere. Huffman denied that he himself made such
statements to Jones.
Huffman testified that later in the week he informed each of the employees indi-
vidually, in Miller's presence, how the increased rates were arrived at and that they
were to hold their hours down to between 40 and 45 if at all possible. In Ingram's
case he informed her they had figured her rate for a week of from 40 to 44 hours
which would yield approximately the amount she formerly made for working from
50 to 60 hours. Neither Huffman nor Miller denied Ingram's testimony (see sec-
tion 3, supra) that Miller threatened at the time that if she left Dixie's employ they
would not recommend her as a good employee because she favored the Union.
Huffman testified that Jones was informed he was "down for 40 hours a week at
$3 an hour," and that no mention was made at the time of a salary or car allowance.
His testimony accorded with Jones' concerning leaving Jones' classification blank on
the payroll. Again, neither Miller nor Huffman denied Jones' testimony ( see sec-
tion 3, supra) concerning Miller's repetition of his prior warning that Jones was
jeopardizing his future or the example which Miller cited of the girl in Nashville
whom Miller would not employ because she carried a union card.
Reaching now the matter of new personnel, Respondent's evidence concerning
James McLaurin, Ed Chavarri, and Neil Adamson 7 was to the following effect:
Huffman testified that around March 4 or 5 he called Patterson, reported the hiring
of Berry to replace McDuff and to help Ingram, and informed Patterson he felt more
help was needed if overtime was to be wholly eliminated. Patterson agreed, and
stated he would send over a couple of men. One of them was James McLaurin, rate
clerk at Meridian, who became (and remained) rate clerk at Jackson. Huffman
testified that he had nothing to do with Chavarri's employment.
Patterson testified that a part of the problem at Jackson involved the theft of
interstate freight from the dock, a matter the FBI was investigating, and that when
Huffman suggested to him after taking over at Jackson that he might need a night
OS & D clerk, Patterson agreed to see what he could do. At that time Ed Chavarri,
a salesman at Atlanta, was having some problems with his boss, and Patterson
decided, since Chavarri had formerly been an excellent OS & D clerk, to send him
to Jackson to find out what was going on. After some 2 or 3 weeks Chavarri "got
the place cleaned up" and was sent back to Atlanta.
Huffman testified that thereafter freight began piling up again and that, hearing
there was a man (Neil Adamson) available in Atlanta, he had Adamson come to
Jackson as night OS & D clerk. Adamson became dissatisfied with his job and went
back to Atlanta in July. Thereupon all the OS & D work was done by Wendell
Hodges.
Huffman made no denial of Jones' testimony concerning their conversations fol-
lowing the introduction of McLaurin and Chavarri (section 6, supra), concerning
McLaurin's rate of pay (section 6, supra), or concerning his comment during the
meeting with the office employees on March 11 that he knew nothing about the new
employees except for Berry (section 4, supra).
Huffman testified further concerning the amount of overtime worked both by
Ingram and by the office force during certain months in 1963 and 1964 and concern-
ing his analysis and comparison of office costs in October 1963 and October 1964.
The following tabulations summarize that testimony:
ANALYSIS OF OFFICE COST
October 1963 October 1964
Total pounds of freight-------------------------------------------------- 16, 746, 891
16, 448,174
Total (terminal) cost per ton-------------------------------------------- $2 53 $2 50
Number of bills processed----------------------------------------------- 20, 060 17, 745
Number of office employees ---------------------------------------------- 7 9
Total office payroll----------------- -------------------------- $3, 528 25 $4, 078 73
Cost per bill------------------------------------------------------------- $ 18
$ 23
4 The hiring of Sarah Berry is fully covered in section 5, supra, and the summary in
section 6 covers adequately the cases of Bill Greer, Ken Adams, and George Burnett
DIXIE HIGHWAY EXPRESS, INC.
SUMMARY OF OVERTIME HOURS
1237
Office total Ingram
October 1963 ------------------------------------------------------------- 355 0 65 8
November 1963---------------------------------------------------------- 441 1 70 9
December 1963--------------------------------------------------------- 224 2 26 7
January 1964------------------------------------------------------------ 250 8 32 6
February 1964----------------------------------------------------------- 404 8 57 1
March 1964-------------------------------------------------------------- 212 2 24 0
October 1964------------------------------------------------------------- 00 0.0
D. Concluding findings
1. Interference, restraint, and coercion
a. Interrogation and coercive statements
The testimony of the General Counsel's witnesses established, if credited, that
immediately upon receipt of the Union's request for recognition, Respondent's offi-
cials embarked upon a common course of action which was designed to coerce the
employees into forsaking the Union and to defeat it if a representation election were
held. And contrary to the usual case of this type there were few sharp credibility
conflicts, for much that the employees testified to was not denied and Respondent's
officers admitted engaging in some of the other conduct with which they were charged.
Indeed, Respondent's brief concedes that "the evidence of record would ordinarily
support a finding that improper statements were made by supervisory personnel of
the Respondent, such statements being of the type generally held to constitute viola-
tions of Section 8(a)(1)."
Though Respondent argues that the significance of such statements was completely
dissipated because of surrounding circumstances and because most of them were
made to Thad Jones at a time when it regarded him as a supervisor, that contention
is rejected on the basis of the findings made in section B, supra, as well as on the
following grounds:
1. Coercive statements made to an employee do not become less coercive because
an employer may-mistakenly or otherwise-have regarded the employee as a-
supervisor.
2. The statements to Jones were continued until after the time when Miller admit-
tedly no longer regarded Jones as a supervisor.
3. The statements made to Jones did not differ in kind from those which were
being made contemporaneously to other employees.
It is for the latter reason that, even if Jones were assumed karguendo to be a super-
visor, his testimony would strongly corroborate-because of the similarity of the
statements and the common course of conduct in which Respondent's officers were
engaged-the testimony of the other employees. Indeed, the mutual corroboration
afforded by the latter circumstances rendered ineffective Respondent's general attack
on the credibility of Ingram, and later of Jones, based on Ingram's mishandling of
funds discovered after Ingram's discharge and on Jones' failure to make known what
he knew concerning Ingram's prior practices.8 Though I have credited Respondent's
witnesses in their version of the events leading to that discharge for reasons which
are stated in section C, 5, supra, there is no reasonable basis for discrediting the
testimony of either Ingram or Jones concerning earlier coercive statements in view
of the corroboration afforded by the testimony of the other employees and by the
admissions of Respondent's officers and their failure to deny much of the coercive
conduct.
Under all the circumstances, I credit the testimony of Ingram, Jones, Roberts,
McKenzie, and Hodges concerning the conversations and incidents which are sum-
marized in section C, 2, 3, and 4, supra, and I find that Respondent's officers made
8 Jones and William H. Perry were both discharged by Respondent around December 2,
1964, following disclosures that they had participated in the borrowing of company funds
through Ingram as set forth in section C, 5, 8upra. Jones was not questioned during the
first hearing herein, or by Respondent prior to that hearing, concerning his knowledge
of Ingram's practices. I hereby correct an error in the transcript by inserting the word
"not" at the end of line 1, page 763.
1238 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
the statements and engaged in the conduct which were attributed to them. Further-
more, it should be noted that Miller's undenied statements and activities and other
conduct which was admitted or not denied by Respondent's other officers (e.g., Randall
and Patterson) would alone establish a substantial portion of the Section 8(a)(1)
allegations of the complaint.
I therefore conclude and find that by the following conduct, Respondent inter-
fered with, restrained, and coerced employees in the exercise of employee rights
guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act:
1. Statements by Allen, Patterson, and Randall that Jones' progress or advance-
ment would stop if Jones continued his adherence to the Union and Miller's state-
ments that Jones was jeopardizing his future by such adherence.
2. The threatening of employees by Miller with blacklisting and with the loss of
future employment through the union stigma.
3. The offers to put Jones on a salary and to increase his car allowance and the
offers by Patterson to raise all the office employees as an inducement to cease their
organizational activities.
4. The interrogation of employees by Allen, Patterson, Miller, and Huffman con-
cerning the union sentiments, activities, and voting intentions of themselves and of
other employees (Clark Printing Company, Inc., 146 NLRB 121). The interroga-
tions here were not only persistent and unremitting, but they were enmeshed with a
prolonged course of other coercive conduct. They were plainly without legitimate
purpose, for Allen confirmed through Jones at the outset the genuineness of Hoover's
claim that he had the office employees signed up.
5. The solicitation by Patterson of Jones' assistance in preparing a petition to
withdraw the Union's representation petition and Patterson's statements that he did
not want and would not have the Union.
b. The wage increases and the additional personnel
Because Respondent's evidence of business and economic justification applies com-
monly to the issues concerning the wage increases and the assignment of new per-
sonnel, those two subjects will be considered together. And since the burden was on
the General Counsel to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Respond-
ent's actions constituted unfair labor practices, we consider first the question whether
the evidence which the General Counsel submitted was sufficient to make out a prima
facie case.
The evidence which is summarized in section C, 2, 3, and 4, and the findings made
in section D, 1, a, supra, make it plain that the wage increase were "one part of an
overall program of interference and restraint by the employer." N.L.R.B. v.
Exchange Parts Company, 304 F. 2d 368, 372 (C.A. 5). Aside from that it was
apparent-indeed, well nigh explicit-from the context of the wage offers as made
by Allen and Patterson that the increases were for the purpose of inducing the
employees to abandon the Union.
Thus Allen's offer of a salary to Jones was made after Jones was warned that his
advancement would stop if he continued his adherence to the Union. Patterson sim-
ilarly prefaced his offer to bring the Jackson salaries into line with his inquiry as to
what the problem was and with the warning that Jones' progress would cease, and
he followed by soliciting Jones' help in withdrawing the Union's representation peti-
tion. Again in Hodges' case Patterson expressly informed Hodges that insofar as the
employee complaints concerned money, they were all going to get a raise. Finally,
when Ingram informed Huffman and Miller that she would prefer to refuse the raise
until the Union came in, Miller not only spoke discouragingly concerning the Union
but threatened, because Ingram favored the Union, not to give her a good recom-
mendation if she left the Company.
The same course of unlawful conduct also made out a prima facie case concern-
ing the assignment of the new employees on March 6 (except Berry-see section C, 5,
supra), particularly in the light of the following circumstances:
The sudden and unannounced appearance of McLaurin and Chavarri.9
Huffman's revealing comment to Jones upon McLaurin's arrival that, "We are full
of surprises today, aren't we?"
Miller's offhand raising of McLaurin's rate from $2 to $2.30, and Huffman's state-
ment in acquiescence, "Yes, or he might vote for the Union."
0 Respondent ' s claims concerning Jones' supervisory status were further exposed, of
course, by its failure to consult with Jones, or even to inform him in advance that the new
employees were reporting.
DIXIE HIGHWAY EXPRESS, INC. 1239
The protest to Huffman by the group of employees on March 11 that the new
employees were being sent in to intimidate them and Huffman's disclaimer of knowl-
edge of what they were doing there (except Berry) and his urgent exhortations to the
employees to give them something to do.
Huffman's action a few minutes later in confidently listing the new employees
among those who would vote against the Union and his prediction, based thereon, of
an outcome favorable to the Company.
We thus reach the question whether Respondent's evidence is sufficient to over-
come the General Counsel's case and to establish that it acted for legitimate business
and economic motives. Insofar as the wage increases were concerned, the testimony
of Patterson, Miller, and Huffman showed that a reasonable basis existed for making
adjustments in the wage rates at Jackson. The question remains whether Respond-
ent's motive in timing the raises when it did was to induce the employees to abandon
the Union. On that issue Respondent's evidence does not overcome the credited testi-
mony concerning the context of the offers as made by Patterson and Allen or the
force of Respondent's other unfair labor practices by which it sought to procure
withdrawals from the Union. Further demonstrative of Respondent's true motive
was the fact that, with knowledge of the Union's representative status (confirmed by
Jones on February 12), Respondent deliberately bypassed the Union and made its
offers directly to the employees in attempted satisfaction of so much of their com-
plaints as concerned money.
Furthermore, it is to be noted that Respondent took no steps in the direction of
making adjustments and had nothing definite under consideration on February 12.
Indeed it was not until late February or early March that Huffman and Miller came
up with a solution which would at one time make good on Respondent's promises of
a raise and would lay an ostensible basis for adding new employees.
I therefore conclude and find, on the entire evidence, that Respondent granted the
wage increases on March 5 as part of its overall program of interference and restraint
and to induce the employees to abandon or to withdraw from the Union.io
Respondent rests its contentions concerning the assignment of new personnel on
the twin objectives of reducing overtime and of increasing efficiency, arguing that
Huffman was hired for the express purpose of putting the Jackson terminal on an
efficient operating basis and that the next logical move thereafter was to employ addi-
tional personnel in order to accomplish the objective of cutting down overtime.
Unfortunately for Respondent's position, much of the evidence which it submitted
tended strongly to discredit its alleged justifications.
Thus in December, Allen, after making a lengthy investigation of the Jackson
terminal and office, reported his findings on his "audit" of office personnel in a con-
fidential memorandum to Lucey, with a copy to Patterson. Endorsing there the
adequacy and efficiency of the staff, Allen recommended as a means "to make sure
of top-flight efficiency" that Lucey drop one employee.ii Thus only 2 short months
before the employees organized, Allen found that the efficiency of office operations
would be improved by cutting the employees to six. Furthermore, that recommenda-
tion was made despite the great concern which Respondent professed about overtime
work and despite the normal tendency of reductions in force to increase the hours
worked by the remaining employees.
Allen's only other recommendation for improvement was "the guidance of manage-
ment" in keeping down overtime hours. What the evidence showed on that score
was that Allen's (and Patterson's) repeated exhortations of Lucey were bearing fruit,
for, as shown by the tabulation of overtime hours (section C, 7, supra), Lucey suc-
ceeded in December and January in reducing the November total of overtime by
nearly 50 percent (i.e., from 441 hours down to 224 and 250, respectively).
"Aside from the foregoing and were it assumed arguendo that Respondent was simply
implementing a course of action it had decided upon before the advent of the Union, it
was nonetheless obligated to submit its wage offers through the Union as the statutory
representative of the employees and to bargain with the Union concerning the proposed
increases. See section 3, infra. To act unilaterally in such a matter and to deal directly
with the employees, bypassing the Union whose majority status it had confirmed, plainly
constituted interference and restraint of the employees in their right to bargain collec-
tively through the representative whom they had chosen. Mello Photo Supply Corpora-
tion v. N.L.R.B., 321 U.S. 678; cf. N.L.R.B. v. Benno Katz, etc., d/b/a Williamsburg Steel
Products Co., 369 U.S. 736, 747.
"Though Huffman belatedly effectuated that recommendation by discharging McDuff a
month after he took over at Jackson, that action coincided with the bringing in of three
additional employees.
1240 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
But with the arrival of February and the advent of the Union, Respondent's ideas
of attaining efficiency underwent an abrupt reversal. Now instead of a six-man
staff to attain "top-flight efficiency" as Allen recommended, Respondent suddenly
increased the staff to nine, or 50 percent more than the number which Allen con-
sidered necessary to insure peak efficiency. And again Respondent's evidence tended
to refute its stated objective of increasing efficiency. For an analysis of office costs
based on Huffman's testimony (section C, 7, supra) showed that with tonnage remain-
ing approximately the same in October 1963 and October 1964, a staff of 2 less
persons processed in 1963 some 2,300 more bills (11.5 percent more) at a cost of
5 cents less per bill (27.7 percent less) and at a total payroll cost of $550 less
(15.8 percent less).
Thus efficiency and economy went out of the window, and all that Respondent had
to show in return (save for an inflated bargaining unit) was a sterile zero in overtime
hours. And there, too, the results ran against the grain of normal experience, for
ordinarily a reduction in overtime work will result in the lessening of labor costs
through elimination of the overtime penalty at time-and-a-half for hours beyond 40
and in obtaining greater efficiencies by eliminating abnormally long worktime. Or
as Respondent's brief puts it, "The excessive hours on duty mean less efficiency
per hour."
Upon analysis Respondent's evidence therefore tended not to support but to
discredit its defense of economic and business justification. This is not to say that
economic justifications which an employer advances must be economically sound,
but rather to say that such economic considerations must be honestly invoked, and
that an employer may not attempt to disguise an antiunion motive by speaking the
language of economic necessity. N.L.R.B. v. Savoy Laundry, Inc., 327 F. 2d 370,
372 (C.A. 2). Here Respondent's evidence itself furnished part of "reasonable cause
for believing that the ground put forward by [it] was not the true one and the ground
was because of union activity." N.L.R B. v. Texas Bolt Company, 313 F. 2d 761,
763 (C.A. 5). By the same token it strengthened the conclusion, warranted by the
General Counsel's case (including the immediate background of a continuing course
of unfair labor practices), that Respondent assigned new employees McLaurin and
Chavarri to the Jackson office on March 6, and later replaced Chavarri with Neil
Adamson, with the intent of dissipating the Union's majority representation in the
unit. I so find.12
2. The discharge of Ingram
There is no question under the findings made in section C, 5, supra, that Ingram
persisted in refusing to teach Berry her job and that such refusal was the ground
upon which Huffman based the discharge. What is in issue is whether that was the
motivating cause or whether, as the General Counsel contends, Respondent seized
on Ingram's disobedience as a pretext to screen its true motive of ridding itself of a
staunch union adherent. And, of course, the burden was on the General Counsel
to establish discriminatory motivation by a preponderance of the evidence on the
entire record.
Considering the case first, as postured in the light of the General Counsel's evidence
alone, a prima facie case was plainly made out, for an inference of discriminatory
motivation would be justified by the prolonged course of coercive conduct found in
the preceding section. But when the whole story of Ingram's overtime work became
known, along with Respondent's efforts to procure help for her, it was plain that no
reasonable basis existed for Ingram's resistance to orders to teach Berry her job.13
And though that fact also is not determinative of Respondent's motivation, the evi-
dence supports the genuineness of Huffman's claim that Ingram's disobedience was
the real cause of her discharge.
12 I find the hiring of Berry to be justified on the basis of the facts found in section C, 5,
supra. The evidence similarly justified the assignment of Bill Greer, Ken Adams, and
George Burnett. Thus Greer was a replacement for old employee Don Smith ; Adams'
assignment was a temporary one to train Berry for the cashier's job; and Burnett succeeded
to Berry's post of assistant cashier upon Berry's advancement to cashier.
v It is the fact of Ingram's refusal, of course, and not the reason for it which is relevant
to the issue of discriminatory motivation ; and the evidence concerning Ingram's mishandling
of funds (discovered after her discharge) was given weight to resolve credibility issues,
particularly as concerned the degree of force and firmness with which Ingram resisted the
order. Though the evidence also suggests that Ingram's resistance may have been sparked
in part by fears that Berry was being brought in to take her job, that, too, would not
have justified her refusal to train Berry and that, too, is without bearing on the issue
of discriminatory motivation.
DIXIE HIGHWAY EXPRESS, INC. 1241
Thus Huffman's testimony concerning the final interview (not denied by Ingram)
showed that he resorted to considerable persuasion and to a detailed explanation of
the reasons for training Berry in attempting to prevail upon Ingram to comply with
the order but that Ingram persisted in her refusal. If Huffman were seeking a pre-
text, he could easily have discharged Ingram summarily upon her acknowledgment
that she refused to comply with Miller's order. To the contrary, Huffman reasoned
with Ingram at length in an effort to persuade her to change her mind, and it was
only after she persisted in her refusal that he informed her the only alternative was
discharge. Whether Huffman welcomed the opportunity or not, he was not required
to countenance her stubborn disobedience, for her known adherence to the Union
could not insulate her from discharge.
I therefore conclude and find that the General Counsel did not establish by a
preponderance of the evidence on the entire record that Respondent was discrim-
inatorily motivated in discharging Ingram and that her discharge was not, therefore,
an unfair labor practice as alleged.
3. The refusal to bargain
The complaint alleged and Respondent's answer admitted that all office clericals
at the Jackson terminal, excluding watchmen, guards, and supervisors, constitute
an appropriate unit within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act. Hoover's letter
of February 11 requested Respondent to bargain with it for the office workers at
the Jackson terminal. In rejecting that request Patterson raised only the question
of majority; he did not question the unit or indicate any uncertainty concerning the
group for whom the Union was asserting representative status. Cf. Gotham Shoe
Manufacturing Co., Inc., 149 NLRB 862. Indeed it was stipulated at the repre-
sentation hearing that Respondent had contracts with Teamsters' organizations cover-
ing office clerical units at three of its other terminals, and the hearing officer allowed,
without objection from Respondent's counsel, an amendment by the Union to con-
form its unit claim accordingly to all office clerical workers.
It is apparent from the foregoing circumstances that Respondent could not have
been confused concerning the group which the Union was seeking to represent.
Furthermore the variance, cured by the amendment, was plainly a minor and insub-
stantial one which was subject to modification. The Hamilton Plastic Molding
Company, 135 NLRB 371, 373; Mrs. Homer E. Ash and Bill H. B. Williams, A
Copartnership doing business as Ash Market and Gasoline, 130 NLRB 641, 642;
Delight Bakery, Inc., 145 NLRB 893, 908.
Certainly there was no question of the Union's actual majority for it represented
five out of the seven employees in the unit. Furthermore, Allen promptly confirmed
through Jones on the 12th the genuineness of the Union's representation claims and
Allen, not questioning or doubting what Jones told him, reported the conversation
back to Patterson on the same afternoon.14
As Respondent thus promptly verified the Union's representative status under
Section 9(a), it is difficult to understand the basis on which it has continued to
profess doubt of the Union's majority. Certainly such professions could not have
been advanced in good faith for the evidence is overwhelming that Respondent
resorted immediately to a prolonged and extensive course of flagrant unfair labor
practices which were designed to undermine employee support and to dissipate the
Union's majority.
Under the foregoing circumstances, the fact that the Union filed a representation
petition contemporaneously with requesting Respondent to bargain, is not a matter
upon which Respondent can rely. Galloway Manufacturing Corporation, 136 NLRB
405, 409; Permacold Industries, Inc., 147 NLRB 885; Heick Moving & Storage, Inc.,
150 NLRB 1124; Irving Air Chute Company, Inc., Marathon Division, 149
NLRB 627. For it is well established that while an employer may, in good faith,
14 Though a physical majority of union adherents also presented themselves to Huffman
on March 11 (the eve of the representation hearing) protesting Miller's activities, Re-
spondent's counsel reiterated at the hearing the next day Respondent's refusal to recognize
the Union.
Additions to the unit and discharges subsequently made would not, of course, affect the
Union's representative status at the time Respondent refused to bargain on February 12.
Furthermore, "such turnover is no evidence of loss of majority status by the Union."
N.L R.B. v. John S. Swift Company, Inc., 302 F. 2d 342, 345 (C.A. 7). See N.L.R B. V.
Sam'l Bingham's Son Mfg. Company, 227 F. 2d 751, 752 (C A 6) ; Motor Valve & Manu-
facluring Company v. N.L.R.B., 149 F. 2d 247, 250 (C.A 6).
1242 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
insist upon a Board election as proof of a union 's majority, it unlawfully refuses to
bargain if its insistence on such an election is motivated not by any bona fide doubt
as to the Union's majority but rather by a rejection of the collective -bargaining prin-
ciple or by a desire to gain time within which to undermine the Union and to avoid
its statutory bargaining obligation . Joy Silk Mills, Inc., 85 NLRB 1263, 1264-1265,
enfd. 185 F. 2d 732, 741-742 (C.A.D.C.); Frank C. Varney Co., Inc., 151 NLRB
280; Overnite Transportation Company, 129 NLRB 1026, 1033-1034, enfd. 308 F.
2d 279, 283 (C.A. 4); Boot-Ster Manufacturing Company, Inc., 149 NLRB 933.
Here Respondent not only sought for time within which to dissipate the Union's
majority status but by its course of unlawful conduct it made impossible the holding
of an impartial election . Cf. Aero Corporation, 149 NLRB 1283.
I therefore conclude and find that Respondent did not question the Union's majority
in good faith and that it refused on February 12, 1964, to bargain with the Union
within the meaning of Section 8(a) (5) of the Act.
W. THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent engaged in certain unfair labor practices , I shall
recommend that it cease and desist therefrom and that it take certain affirmative
action of the type which is conventionally ordered in such cases as provided in the
Recommended Order below, which I find to be necessary to remedy and to remove
the effects of the unfair labor practices and to effectuate the policies of the Act.
Because of the wide scope and the flagrant nature of the unfair labor practices , I shall
recommend a broad cease-and -desist order.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact , and upon the entire record in
the case, I make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. By interfering with, restraining , and coercing its employees in the exercise of
rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, Respondent engaged in unfair labor prac-
tices within the meaning of Section 8(a) (1) of the Act.
2. All office clericals at Respondent 's Jackson , Mississippi , terminal , excluding
watchmen , guards, and supervisors as defined in the Act, constitute a unit appro-
priate for the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b)
of the Act.
3. The Union has been at all times since February 11, and now is, the repre-
sentative for the purposes of collective bargaining of a majority of the employees
in the unit described in the foregoing paragraph and has been and is the exclusive
representative of said employees for the purposes of collective bargaining with
respect to rates of pay, wages , hours of employment , and other terms and condi-
tions of employment.
4. By refusing to recognize and to bargain with the Union on February 12, 1964,
and at all times thereafter , Respondent engaged in unfair labor practices proscribed
by Section 8(a) (5) and (1) of the Act.
5. By unilaterally granting wage increases on March 5, 1964, to the employees in
said unit without consultation or bargaining with the Union , Respondent refused to
bargain with the Union and engaged in unfair labor practices proscribed by Section
8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.
6. The aforesaid unfair labor practices affect commerce within the meaning of
Section 2 ( 6) and (7) of the Act.
7. Respondent did not engage in unfair labor practices by discharging Evelyn
Ingram.
RECOMMENDED ORDER
Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law and the entire record,
and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended,
I hereby recommend that the Respondent, Dixie Highway Express, Inc., its officers,
agents, successors , and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Refusing to bargain with the Union by unilaterally granting wage increases
to the employees in the appropriate unit found herein without prior consultation or
bargaining with the Union.
DIXIE HIGHWAY EXPRESS, INC. 1243
(b) Refusing to bargain with the Union as the exclusive representative of its
employees in the appropriate unit herein found with respect to wages, hours, and
other terms and conditions of employment.
(c) Interrogating coercively its employees concerning the union sentiments, activ-
ities, and voting intentions of themselves and of other employees and informing
employees that it will not have a union.
(d) Threatening employees with blacklisting and with the loss of future employ-
ment through the union stigma.
(e) Warning employees that their advancement will stop and that they are
jeopardizing their future because of their adherence to the Union.
(f) Promising and granting wage increases and other benefits to employees as an
inducement to withdraw from the Union or to cease their organizational activities.
(g) Soliciting employee assistance in preparing a petition to withdraw from the
Union or to withdraw the Union's representation petition.
(h) Assigning new employees to the appropriate unit for the purpose of dissipat-
ing the Union's majority representation in said unit.
(i) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing its employees
in the exercise of their rights to self-organization, to form, join, or assist said Team-
sters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers, Local Union No. 891, affiliated with
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of
America, or any other labor organization, to bargain collectively through repre-
sentatives of their own choosing, or to engage in other concerted activities for the
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, or to refrain from
any or all such activities.
2. Take the following affirmative action:
(a) Bargain with the Union, upon request, as the exclusive representative of its
employees in the appropriate unit herein found with respect to wages, hours, and
other terms and conditions of employment.
(b) Post in its offices and terminal at Jackson, Mississippi, copies of the attached
notice marked "Appendix A." 15 Copies of said notice, to be furnished by the
Regional Director for Region 15, shall, after being signed by Respondent's repre-
sentative, be posted by Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof, and be main-
tained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all
places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall
be taken to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other
material.
(c) Notify the Regional Director for Region 15, in writing, within 20 days from
the date of the receipt of this Decision, what steps Respondent has taken to comply
herewith.l°
It is further recommended that the complaint be dismissed insofar as it alleges that
Respondent engaged in an unfair labor practice within the meaning of Section
8(a)(3) of the Act.
15 If this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board , the words "a Decision and Order"
shall be substituted for the words "the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner" in the
notice If the Board's Order is enforced by a decree of a United States Court of Appeals,
the notice will be further amended by the substitution of the words "a Decree of the United
States Court of Appeals, Enforcing an Order" for the words "a Decision and Order".
11 If this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, this provision shall be modified
to read* "Notify the Regional Director for Region 15, in writing, within 10 days from the
date of this Order, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith."
APPENDIX A
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor
Relations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act, as amended, we hereby notify you that:
WE WILL NOT unilaterally grant wage increases to the employees in the
appropriate unit noted below without prior consultation and bargaining with
Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers, Local Union No. 891, affil-
iated with International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen
& Helpers of America.
WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain with said Union as the exclusive representative
of our employees in the appropriate unit noted below with respect to wages,
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment.
1244 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
WE WILL NOT interrogate coercively our employees concerning the union
sentiment, activities, and voting intentions of themselves or of other employees,
or inform our employees that we will not have a union.
WE WILL NOT threaten employees with blacklisting or with the loss of future
employment through the union stigma.
WE WILL NOT warn employees that their advancement will stop or that they
are jeopardizing their futures because of their adherence to the Union.
WE WILL NOT promise or grant wage increases or other benefits to employees
as an inducement to withdraw from the Union or to cease their organizational
activities.
WE WILL NOT solicit employee assistance in preparing a petition to withdraw
from the Union or to withdraw the Union's representation petition.
WE WILL NOT assign new employees to the appropriate unit for the purpose
of dissipating the Union's majority representation in said unit.
WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce our
employees in the exercise of their rights to self-organization, to form, join, or
assist said Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers, Local Union No.
891, affiliated with International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Ware-
housemen & Helpers of America, or any other labor organization, to bargain
collectively through representatives of their own choosing, or to engage in other
concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid
or protection, or to refrain from any or all such activities.
WE WILL bargain, upon request, with the Union as the exclusive representa-
tive of our employees in the appropriate unit noted below with respect to wages,
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment.
The appropriate unit is:
All office clericals at our Jackson, Mississippi, terminal, excluding watch-
men, guards, and supervisors as defined in the Act.
.All our employees are free to become or remain, or to refrain from becoming or
remaining, members of the above-named or any other labor organization.
DIXIE HIGHWAY EXPRESS, INC.,
Employer.
Dated------------------- By-------------------------------------------
(Representative) (Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting,
and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
Employees may communicate directly with the Board's Regional Office, T6024
Federal Building (Loyola), 701 Loyola Avenue, New Orleans, Louisiana, Telephone
No. 529-2411, Extension 6396, if they have any question concerning this notice or
compliance with its provisions.
Socony Mobil Oil Company, Inc. and Socony Vacuum Tanker
Men's Association . Case No. 3-CA-9906. July 2, 1965
DECISION AND ORDER
On February 1, 1965, Trial Examiner William Seagle issued his
Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that Respondent
had not engaged in unfair labor practices as alleged in the complaint
.and recommending that the.complaint be dismissed in its entirety, as
set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Decision. Thereafter, the
General Counsel and the Charging Party filed exceptions to the Trial
Examiner's Decision and supporting briefs. The Respondent filed a
brief in support of the Trial Examiner's Decision.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has
`153 NLRB No. 97.