District Lodge No. 94, Lodge No. 311, IAM

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Aug 20, 1965

154 N.L.R.B. 634 (N.L.R.B. 1965)

634 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
loss of earnings they may have suffered by reason of the discrimination against
them, by paying each a sum of money equal to the amount that each would normally
have earned as wages from the date of the discrimination to the date of offer of
reinstatement less his net earnings.34 The backpay shall include interest at 6 percent
to be computed in the manner set forth in Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138
NLRB 716.
The above discharges strike at the heart of rights guaranteed employees by the
Act and are closely related to other conduct abridging rights guaranteed employees
by Section 7 of the Act. There is reasonable ground to anticipate Respondent will
infringe upon other rights guaranteed employees in the future, unless appropriately
restrained. I shall therefore recommend an order requiring Respondent to cease
and desist from infringing in any manner upon the rights guaranteed employees by
Section 7 of the Act.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, and upon the entire record in the
case, I make the following.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of the
Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization with the meaning of the Act.
3. By discriminatorily discharging Osterhoudt, Swann, and Foster, as found above,
Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the
meaning of Section 8(a) (3) of the Act.
4. By interfering with, restraining, and coercing employees in exercising the rights
guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act, including the discharges of the above-
named employees and of Supervisor Dillin, for engaging in union activities, and
interrogations and threats, Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor
practices within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act.
5. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting com-
merce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
[Recommended Order omitted from publication.]
84 F. W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289.
District Lodge No. 94, Lodge No. 311, International Association of
Machinists , AFL-CIO (Parker Aircraft Co.) and Colin Shep-
hard Sinclair. Case No. 31-CB-11 (formerly P21-CB-2450).
August 20,1965
DECISION AND ORDER
On April 30, 1965, Trial Examiner Louis S. Penfield issued his
Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that Respondent
had engaged in certain unfair labor practices and recommending
that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action,
as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Decision. Thereafter,
Respondent filed exceptions to the Trial Examiner's Decision accom-
panied by a brief in support thereof.
The National Labor Relations Board has reviewed the rulings
made by the Trial Examiner at the hearing and finds that no prej-
udicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The
Board has considered the Trial Examiner's Decision, the exceptions
154 NLRB No. 50.
DISTRICT LODGE NO. 94, LODGE NO. 311, IAM 635
thereto, the Respondent 's brief in support thereof , and the entire
record in this case , and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and
recommendations of the Trial Examiner.'
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act,
as amended, the National Labor Relations Board hereby adopts as
its Order the Recommended Order of Trial Examiner, as modified
herein, and orders that Respondent, District Lodge No. 94, Lodge
No. 311, International Association of Machinists, AFL-CIO, its
officers, agents, and representatives, shall take the action set forth
in the Trial Examiner's Recommended Order, as so modified : 2
1. Amend paragraph 2 (a) to read as follows :
"(a) Upon the request of Colin Shephard Sinclair, terminate
his membership in Respondent, and restore to him all sums of money
paid by him as reinstatement fees, dues, or other levies resulting
from his having reinstated his membership, in the manner provided
in the section entitled `The remedy.' "
2. In the second indented paragraph of the Appendix attached to
the Trial Examiner's Decision, first line, after the word "Sinclair"
insert a comma followed by the words, "at his request,".
1 The Company and the Union are parties to an agreement which contains a maintenance-
of-membership clause applicable to employees who are or become members in good stand-
ing of the Union. Article I, section 15 of the constitution of the International Associa-
tion of Machinists provides that membership in good standing is lost as a result of, among
other reasons, delinquency for 3 months in the payment of dues or special levies. Colin
Sinclair, whose employment with the Company had terminated, was "dropped" from
union membership after 3 months for nonpayment of dues Inasmuch as Sinclair was not
a member in good standing of the Union at the time he was reemployed by the Company,
the maintenance-of-membership provision was not applicable to him at that time ; and
he was not, therefore, required to be a member of the Union when beginning anew his
work with the Company Accordingly, and in agreement with the Trial Examiner, we
find that Respondent's efforts to cause the Company to discharge Sinclair because he was
not a member of the Union violated Section 8(b) (2) and (1) (A) of the Act. Our con-
clusion in this respect is based solely on our construction of the contract under considera-
tion. We do not, therefore, rely upon Yellow Cab Company, 148 NLRB 620, or otherwise
find it necessary to reach the question whether Sinclair's discharge could have been
effected lawfully under a contract which by its terms clearly applies to a rehire situa-
tion. Cf NLR.B. V. International Association of Machinists, Lodge No. 113, etc. (Con-
vair, a Division of General Dynamics Corp.), 241 F. 2d 695, 696-697 (C.A. 9).
2 The address and telephone number for Region 31 are. Seventeenth Floor, U S. Post
Office and Court House, 312 North Spring Street, Los Angeles, California, Telephone
No. 688-5850.
TRIAL EXAMINER 'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This proceeding, with all parties represented , was heard before Trial Examiner
Louis S. Penfield in Los Angeles, California , on March 16 , 1965, upon a complaint
of the General Counsel and answer of District Lodge No. 94 , Lodge No. 311 , Inter-
national Association of Machinists , AFL-CIO, herein called Respondent.' The
' The complaint issued on January 12, 1965, and is based upon a charge filed on
December 3, 1964. Copies of the complaint and the charge have been duly served upon
Respondent.
636 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
issues litigated were whether Respondent violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) and (2) of
the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, herein called the Act. Upon the
entire record, including consideration of briefs filed by the parties,2 and upon my
observation of the witnesses, I hereby make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. THE BUSINESS OF THE EMPLOYER
Parker Aircraft Co., herein called Parker, is a division of Parker-Hannifan Corp.
and has a plant located in Los Angeles, California, where it is engaged in the design
and manufacture of fluid control devices for the aircraft and aerospace industries.
Parker annually purchases goods valued in excess of $50,000 which are shipped
directly to its place of business in Los Angeles, California, from points located
outside the State of California. Parker annually sells and ships from its Los
Angeles plant goods valued in excess of $50,000 directly to firms located outside the
State of California. I find that Parker is now, and has been at all times material to
this proceeding, an employer engaged in a business affecting commerce within the
meaning of the Act, and that the assertion of jurisdiction is warranted.
H. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
Respondent is, and at all times material to this proceeding has been, a labor
organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
The General Counsel claims that Respondent unlawfully threatened Colin Sinclair
with loss of his employment at Parker if he did not join Respondent, and unlawfully
demanded of Parker his discharge unless he became a member of Respondent.
Respondent admits that it attempted to terminate Sinclair's employment at Parker
because he was not a member in good standing, but defends its action by insisting
that this was a lawful attempt under the terms of an existing contract.
The collective-bargaining agreement between Parker, and Respondent was executed
on April 29, 1962, with a termination date of April 30, 1965. Article III, section 1,
of this contract reads as follows:
All employees who are members of the Union in good standing under its
constitution and by-laws as of the date of the execution of this agreement, and
all employees who become members in good standing after said date, shall, as
a condition of continued employment, remain members of the Union in good
standing for the duration of this Agreement; notwithstanding anything in the
Union constitution or by-laws to the contrary, no employee will be considered
to be a member of the Union required to maintain his membership hereunder
who notifies the Company in writing within the period April 15, 1964, to
April 30, 1964, both dates inclusive, that he resigns or withdraws from the
Union or is not a member therein, unless he thereafter voluntarily rejoins the
Union.
The Agreement also provides that Respondent may enforce this maintenance-of-
membership provision by requesting. in writing, the discharge of any member
employee who fails to maintain his membership.
Colin Sinclair was first employed by Parker on July 2, 1956. Thereafter his
employment terminated on April 6, 1960. He returned to work at Parker on
January 18, 1961. Following his return he continued working at Parker until
January 19, 1963, at which time he voluntarily quit his job to take employment
elsewhere. On October 12, 1964. Sinclair again returned to work for Parker, and
was still employed there at the time of the hearing. It is undisputed that at all
times he held jobs which placed him within the bargaining unit covered by
Respondent's contract. It also stands undisputed that following his voluntary termi-
nation in January 1963 Sinclair lost all seniority and related rights under the
existing collective-bargaining agreement, and that for seniority purposes he com-
menced work for Parker in October 1964 as a new employee.
Sinclair first joined Respondent on November 20, 1956, and was still a member
when his first employment terminated in 1960. Subsequent to this first termination
his membership lapsed , but upon resuming employment in January of 1961 he paid
2A brief was filed by Respondent, but no briefs were received from either the General
Counsel or the Charging Party.
DISTRICT LODGE NO. 94, LODGE NO. 311, IAM 637
a reinstatement fee and again became a member in good standing . He continued
his membership with his dues paid up until his employment terminated for the
second time in January of 1963. Following this termination he ceased paying dues
to Respondent altogether, and the Union records show that as of April 30, 1963,
his membership is noted as "dropped ." This action was taken in accordance with
article I, section 15 of the constitution of the International Association of Machinists
which reads as follows:
Delinquency for three months in the payment of dues or special levies, or
delinquency arising from application of Section 4, Article C, shall automatically
cancel membership and all rights, privileges and benefits incident thereto.
The period of good standing membership of members whose membership has
been canceled for delinquency or other cause shall date from their last rein-
statement, as shown by the G.L. records, and their rights, privileges and
benefits under the provisions of this Constitution shall attach and date from
their last reinstatement, as though they had never before held membership
in the I.A.M.
It is conceded that Sinclair made no effort to avail himself of the escape period set
forth in article III, section 1, quoted above, and that he understook no other step
which might have been available to him as a member to prolong his membership,
such as obtaining a withdrawal card or a waiver of dues as an unemployed member.
When Sinclair resumed work for Parker again in October 1964, he was first told
by Parker's personnel manager that he would not be required to join Respondent
pursuant to the union-security clause. Shortly thereafter, however, he had a con-
versation with Lucille Cygan, union steward on his shift , who told him that inasmuch
as he had formerly been a member of Respondent during the contract term he must
regain good standing by paying the customary reinstatement fee if he were to retain
his employment. A few days later he discussed this matter with R. W. Supernaugh,
director of industrial relations for Parker . At this time Supernaugh expressed the
view to Sinclair that the contract did not require that he join. On November 18,
1964, however, Parker received a letter from Respondent which read as follows:
We are hereby requesting the termination of Colin Sinclair for his failure to
become a member of the Union pursuant to the provisions of our collective
bargaining agreement . We thank you for your cooperation in this regard.
Thereafter Supernaugh again met with Sinclair, and at this time advised him that,
after taking up the matter with Parker's attorney, it was now his view that Sinclair
must, reinstate his membership with Respondent if he were to retain his job. Upon
such representation Sinclair proceeded to Respondent 's office, filled out a member-
ship application form, and paid the $40 reinstatement fee customarily required of
lapsed or dropped members. He noted on the card that he was taking this action
under protest. The action, however, resulted in restoring him to membership in
good standing, and, as noted above, at the time of the hearing he was still employed
by Parker.
Discussion of the Issues and Concluding Findings
The facts as set forth above stand undisputed. The issue may be stated as
follows: Where an employee has voluntarily become a union member while work-
ing for an employer, then terminates his employment and lets his union membership
lapse, then is reemployed following such lapse during the term of the same collec-
tive-bargaining agreement, may the Union require his reinstatement to membership
in good standing pursuant to the terms of a valid maintenance-of-membership clause,
or must he be treated on reemployment as any other new employee for whom
membership could not be required under the contract?
The General Counsel argues that Sinclair's status after the lapse is that of a new
employee. Respondent would concede that if he is to be treated as an altogether
new employee it could not require his membership. It argues, however, that
Sinclair's former status as a member during the term of the contract places him in
a different category, and that, in effect, he never really ceased being a member after
his termination in 1963, but continued thereafter to occupy some sort of special
status as a dropped member, which entitled it to demand his reinstatement to
membership in good standing upon his reemployment during the contract term.
The General Counsel places his principal reliance upon a recent Board Decision in
Yellow Cab Company, 148 NLRB 620, claiming that the facts in the instant case
are similar, and the Board's rationale in Yellow Cab to be controlling. Respondent
urges that the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in N.L.R.B. v.
International Association of Machinists, Lodge No. 113, etc. (Convair, a Division
638 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
of General Dynamics Corp.), 241 F. 2d 695, supports its claim that with a valid
maintenance-of-membership clause, and no showing of disparate treatment, it can
require membership from a dropped member upon his reemployment. Respondent
would distinguish Yellow Cab, apparently on the ground that it involved a union
shop, rather than a maintenance-of-membership clause.
In Yellow Cab, the Board upheld, without comment, the findings of the Trial
Examiner that it was unlawful for a union with a valid union-shop contract to
require, before the expiration of the 30-day grace period, immediate reinstatement
of a former member who had terminated his earlier employment during the con-
tract term, and during the interim before reemployment had let his union member-
ship lapse. The Trial Examiner in Yellow Cab supports this conclusion with the
following rationale:
The position taken by the Respondents in essence is predicated on the theory
that Fields' obligation to maintain his union membership in good standing, as
a condition of employment, continued after he quit his job on October 22, 1962.
A similar situation presented itself in Idarado Mining Co., 77 NLRB 392,
where the Board considered the lawfulness of the termination of employment
of one Miller under the terms of a maintenance-of-membership contract
between the employer and the Mine Production Workers. Miller had joined
the Mine Production Workers and was a member in good standing on Octo-
ber 6, 1944. On November 20, 1944, he voluntarily quit his employment. On
November 17, 1945, Miller applied for work and was hired by the employer
though at a different job than the one he had formerly held. Thereafter, the
union demanded that Miller place himself in good standing as a condition of
employment and when he failed to do so the employer discharged him at the
union's request. In holding that the discharge was unlawful, the Board stated:
When Miller severed his employment relationship with the respondent,
his obligation to remain a member in good standing of the Mine Produc-
tion Workers ended at the same time. The obligation was not merely
suspended, ready to be imposed at any time in the future that Miller
might be again employed by the respondent. On his reemployment by
the respondent, in a new position and as a new employee, approximately
a year after he had voluntarily resigned from the respondent's employ,
Miller's status was like that of any other new employee; he was required
to remain a member in good standing of the Mine Production Workers
only if he voluntarily rejoined that organization after his reemployment.
The status of Fields in this case is the same as was that of the employee in the
Idarado case. In both instances, the obligation to remain a union member in
good standing, as a condition of employment, "was not merely suspended" but
ended when the employee quit his job.
In this case, as was true in the Idarado case, the right of the employee to
return and continue to work for his employer is to be determined as though
he had never worked for such an employer on a previous occasion. The gov-
erning contract in each instance is the measure of the employee's responsibility.
In the Idarado case, the maintenance-of-membership contract in effect permitted
the employee to determine whether or not he wished to rejoin the union. In
the present case, the union-shop contract required Fields to become a member
in good standing in the Respondent Union "not later than the thirty-first (31st)
day following the beginning of employment." In terms of his union mem-
bership, apart from the question of his right to secure and hold a job, Fields'
obligation to remain in good standing, absent his securing a withdrawal card,
may or may not have continued from the time he quit his employment until
the time he returned to work for Respondent Yellow Cab. But his obligation
to place himself in good standing with Respondent Union in order to continue
working for Respondent Yellow Cab could not be imposed upon him until the
31-day period provided for in the contract then existing had expired.
Except for the fact that in the instant case we have a maintenance-of-membership
contract rather than a union-shop contract, the issue which confronts us is identical.
Moreover, the Idarado case quoted by the Trial Examiner did involve a main-
tenance-of-membership contract, and the Trial Examiner's reasoning, with which
I am in accord, indicates no difference in the principle to be applied, but only a
difference in the effect. Thus in a maintenance-of-membership contract the union
can never require membership if the reemployed member is regarded to hold the
same status as a new employee, while in a union-shop contract it can do so but not
before the expiration of the 30-day grace period.
DISTRICT LODGE NO. 94, LODGE NO. 311, TAM 639
In Yellow Cab, as does Respondent in the instant case, the union also urged that
under the rationale of N.L.R.B. v. International Association of Machinists, etc.
supra, it should be permitted to require membership upon reemployment of a
former member who after an earlier termination had let his membership lapse, and
had failed to avail himself of the union withdrawal procedure. The Trial Examiner
in Yellow Cab regarded the Machinists case as distinguishable, and reliance upon
it as misplaced, stating:
I do not regard as apposite the case of N.L.R.B. v. International Asso-
ciation of Machinists, Lodge No. 113, Guided Missile Lodge 1254 (Convair,
a Division of General Dynamics Corp.), 241 F. 2d 695 (C.A. 9), cited by
Respondent Union as support for its position. In the Machinists case, the
contract, which contained a maintenance-of-membership clause, provided that
an employee who was separated from the bargaining unit covered by the agree-
ment, at a time when he was a member of the union, would be required to
resume paying union dues immediately upon being reemployed within the unit.
In the instant case, no such contractual provision exists nor does the record
show the existence of any requirement that, as a condition of employment, an
employee, upon quitting his job in the bargaining unit, be required to secure
a withdrawal from Respondent Union. Moreover, as noted in the Board decision
in the Machinists case (Convair, a Division of General Dynamics Corporation,
111 NLRB 1055, 1057), the provision in question was not applied by the union
there involved to situations where an employee had quit.
As in Yellow Cab the contract before us in the instant case has no provisions
requiring separated employees to resume dues upon reemployment, nor any
requirement that an employee quitting his job be required to secure a withdrawal.
In view of this I am not called upon to decide whether such provisions could be
validly applied to an employee who had quit altogether and let his membership
lapse. I find therefore that the situation in the instant case parallels that in Yellow
Cab, and for the reasons set forth in the excerpt quoted above, I find the Machinists
case inapposite as applied to it.
I am of the opinion that the governing principle as applied to the facts before me
is the same as that approved by the Board in Yellow Cab, and I adopt the reasoning
of the Trial Examiner in that case as set forth in the above-quoted excerpts.
Respondent sought Sinclair's discharge under a claim that it had a right to
require his membership under the contract. He paid the reinstatement fee and
became a member only under protest to enable him to retain his job. Since
Respondent had no right to require his membership at that time, despite his earlier
employment and membership, it follows that Respondent's efforts constituted an
attempt to cause Parker to discriminate in violation of Section 8(a)(3), and I find
that by such conduct Respondent engaged in a violation of Section 8(b)(2) of the
Act. I also find that by the same conduct, and by threatening Sinclair that it would
seek his discharge, Respondent restrained and coerced employees in the exercise of
the rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act in violation of Section 8(b) (1) (A)
of the Act.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE
The activities of Respondent as set forth in section III, above, occurring in con-
nection with the operations of Parker as described in section I, above, have a close,
intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several
States, and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce
and the free flow of commerce.
V. THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has engaged in certain unfair labor practices, I
shall recommend that it cease and desist therefrom, and take certain affirmative
action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act.
Having found that Respondent unlawfully attempted to cause Parker to terminate
the employment of Colin Sinclair unless he was reinstated as a member, and having
found that Sinclair reinstated his membership to enable him to retain his employ-
ment at Parker, I shall recommend that Respondent terminate Sinclair's membership,
and pay to him all sums collected as reinstatement fees, dues, or other levies result-
ing from such reinstatement, together with interest thereon at the rate of 6 percent
per annum.
640 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and upon the entire record in
this proceeding, I make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent is, and at all times material to this proceeding has been, a labor
organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
2. Parker Aircraft Company is, and at all times material to this proceeding has
been , an employer engaged in a business affecting commerce within the meaning
of Section 2(2) and (7) of the Act.
3. By attempting to cause Parker Aircraft Company to discriminate in regard to
the hire and tenure of employment of Colin Sinclair in violation of Section 8(a)(3),
Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section
8(b) (2) of the Act.
4. By threatening the discharge of Colin Sinclair, thus restraining and coercing
employees of Parker Aircraft Company in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them
in Section 7 of the Act, Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices within
the meaning of Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act.
5. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting com-
merce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
RECOMMENDED ORDER
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law and upon
the entire record in this case, I recommend that Respondent, District Lodge No. 94,
Lodge No. 311, International Association of Machinists, AFL-CIO, its officers,
agents, and representatives , shall:
1. Cease and desist from causing or attempting to cause Parker Aircraft Com-
pany, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, to terminate the employment of
Colin Sinclair, or any other employee similarly reemployed, or restraining and
coercing employees by threatening Colin Sinclair or any other employee similarly
reemployed, with termination of his employment with Parker Aircraft Company
unless he becomes or remains a member in good standing of Respondent, except to
the extent that such may become lawfully required under the terms of some new
collective-bargaining agreement requiring membership as a condition of employ-
ment as authorized in Section 8(a)(3) of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action which I find will effectuate the policies
of the Act:
(a) Terminate the membership of Colin Sinclair in Respondent, and restore to
him all sums of money paid by him as reinstatement fees, dues, or other levies
resulting from his having reinstated his membership in the manner provided in the
section entitled "The Remedy."
(b) Post, in conspicuous places, at its offices and meeting halls including all
places where notices to members are customarily posted, copies of the attached
notice marked "Appendix A." 3 Copies of said notice to be furnished by the
Regional Director for Region 21, shall, after being duly signed by Respondent's
authorized representative, be posted by Respondent immediately upon receipt there-
of, and be maintained by it for a period of 60 consecutive days. Reasonable steps
shall be taken by Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or
covered by any other material.
(c) Sign and mail copies of said notice to the Regional Director of Region 21
for posting by Parker, that Company willing, at all locations where notices to their
employees are customarily posted.
(d) Notify the Regional Director for Region 21, in writing, within 20 days from
the date of receipt of this Decision, what steps Respondent has taken to comply
therewith .4
8 In the event this Recommended Order Is adopted by the Board, the words "a Decision
and Order" shall be substituted for the words "the Recommended Order of a Trial
Examiner" in the notice In the further event that the Board's Order is enforced by a
decree of a United States Court of Appeals, the words "a Decree of the United States
Court of Appeals, Enforcing an Order" shall be substituted for the words "a Decision
and Order".
4 In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board , this provision
shall be modified to read "Notify the said Regional Director, in writing, within 10 days
from the date of this Order, what steps have been taken to comply therewith "
DUBIN-HASKELL LINING CORP. 641
It is finally recommended that unless on or before 20 days from the date of receipt
of this Trial Examiner 's Decision , Respondent notify the Regional Director, in
writing, that it will comply with the foregoing recommendations , the National Labor
Relations Board issue an order requiring Respondent to take the action aforesaid.
APPENDIX A
NOTICE TO ALL MEMBERS OF DISTRICT LODGE No. 94, LODGE No. 311, INTERNA-
TIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MACHINISTS , AFL-CIO
Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner of the National
Labor , Relations Board , and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, we hereby notify you that:
WE WILL NOT cause or attempt to cause Parker Aircraft Company to
terminate the employment of Colin Sinclair, or any other employee similarly
reemployed, or restrain or coerce employees by threatening Colin Sinclair or
any other employee similarly reemployed, with termination of his employment
at Parker unless he becomes or remains a member in good standing of District
Lodge No. 94, Lodge No. 311, International Association of Machinists, AFL-
CIO, except to the extent such may become lawfully required under the terms
of some new collective-bargaining agreement requiring membership as a condi-
tion of employment as authorized in Section 8(a) (3) of the Act.
WE WILL terminate the union membership of Colin Sinclair and pay back
to him any money collected from him as reinstatement fees, dues, or other
levies resulting from his reinstatement following his reemployment at Parker.
DISTRICT LODGE No. 94, LODGE No. 311 , INTERNATIONAL
ASSOCIATION OF MACHINISTS, AFL-CIO,
Labor Organization.
Dated------------------- By----------------- --------------------------
(Representative ) ( Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting,
and must not be altered, defaced , or covered by any other material.
If members have any question concerning this notice or compliance with its
provisions , they may communicate directly with the Board 's Regional Office, 849
South Broadway, Los Angeles , California , Telephone No. 688-5204.
Dubin-Haskell Lining Corp . and Fred A. Cox. Case No. 26-CA-
1882. August 20,1965
DECISION AND ORDER
On May 12, 1965, Trial Examiner Jerry B. Stone issued his
Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respond-
ent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor prac-
tices within the meaning of the National Labor Relations Act, as
amended, and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and
take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Trial
Examiner's Decision. Thereafter, the Respondent filed exceptions
to the Decision and a supporting brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3 (b) of the Act, the National
Labor Relations Board has delegated its powers in connection with
this case to a three-member panel [Members Fanning, Brown, and
Jenkins].
154 NLRB No. 42.
20646-66-vol. 154-42