Disney Enterprises, Inc.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Nov 10, 2021

2021002488 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 10, 2021)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/562,492 12/05/2014 Chris ADAMSON 45WE-213923 1006
124910 7590 11/10/2021
ESPLIN & ASSOCIATES (Disney)
c/o DISNEY ENTERPRISES, INC.
1665 S Rancho Santa Fe Road, Suite C2
San Marcos, CA 92078
EXAMINER
HSU, RYAN
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3715
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
11/10/2021 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
docketing@esplin.legal
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte CHRIS ADAMSON
____________

Appeal 2021-002488
Application 14/562,492
Technology Center 3700
____________

Before MICHAEL C. ASTORINO, BRADLEY B. BAYAT, and
AMEE A. SHAH, Administrative Patent Judges.

SHAH, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), the Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1, 3, 5, 6, 8–11, 13, 15, 16, and 18–24,
which are all of the pending claims. The Appellant’s representative
appeared via video for Oral Argument on September 28, 2021. We have
jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42. The Appellant identifies the real party in interest as
“DISNEY ENTERPRISES, INC.” Appeal Br. 2.
Appeal 2021-002488
Application 14/562,492

2
CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
The Appellant’s invention “relates to systems and methods for
automatically scoring user-generated content of a virtual space” (Spec. ¶ 1)
and “to a system for facilitating competition among users of a virtual space”
(id. ¶ 3).
Claims 1 and 11 are the independent claims. Claim 11 is illustrative
of the subject matter on appeal and is reproduced below (with some
paragraphing and added bracketing for reference):
11. A method to facilitate competition between users of a virtual
space, the method being implemented in a computer system
including one or more physical processors and storage media
storing machine-readable instructions, the method comprising:
[(a)] identifying user-generated content entered for
consideration in a competition,
the user-generated content including virtual objects
selected and arranged within a virtual space by individual
users,
the virtual space comprising a simulated space
having a topography including dimensions of the
simulated space and surface features of a surface of the
simulated space,
the competition being associated with judging
criteria that provide a basis through which expression of
the user-generated content within a virtual space is judged,
the identified user-generated content including first
user-generated content by a first user and second user-
generated content by a second user,
the first user-generated content including a first set
of virtual objects selected and arranged within a first
instance of the virtual space by a first user, and
Appeal 2021-002488
Application 14/562,492

3
the second user-generated content including a
second set of virtual objects selected and arranged within
the first instance of the virtual space by a second user;
[(b)] determining information that describes one or more
attributes of the user-generated content including the virtual
objects selected and arranged within the virtual space,
the one or more attributes including one or more of
an aspect of a process through which the user-generated
content was defined, a statistic that characterizes the user-
generated content, or user information associated with the
user-generated content,
the determined information including first
information that describes a first attribute of the first user-
generated content, and second information that describes
a second attribute of the second user-generated content;
[(c)] automatically assigning scores to the user-generated
content based on the determined information,
the scores reflecting relative value of the user-
generated content within the competition such that time
required by humans to review the user-generated content
is reduced,
the scores including a first score that is
automatically assigned to the first user-generated content
based on the first information, and a second score that is
automatically assigned to the second user-generated
content;
wherein the one or more attributes include the statistic that
characterizes the user-generated content, and
wherein the statistic that characterizes the user-
generated content includes an amount of coverage of the
virtual space, wherein the first user-generated content has
a first amount of coverage of the virtual space, and the
second user-generated content has a second amount of
coverage that is larger than the first amount of coverage,
and
Appeal 2021-002488
Application 14/562,492

4
wherein the amount coverage of the virtual space is
valued for assignment of the scores such that the
contribution of the second amount of coverage to the
second score is greater than the contribution of the first
amount of coverage to the first score thereby reflecting the
greater amount of coverage of the second user-generated
content with respect to the first user-generated content
such that the second user created a greater amount of user-
generated content than the first user; and
[(d)] effectuating presentation of a user interface, the user
interface including a recommendation of one or more winners of
the competition for a moderator to select from,
the one or more recommended winners being the
user-generated content with the scores indicating the most
value with respect to the judging criteria.
Appeal Br. 39–41 (Claims App.).
THE REJECTION
Claims 1, 3, 5, 6, 8–11, 13, 15, 16, and 18–24 stand rejected under
35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to a judicial exception without
significantly more.

OPINION
The Appellant argues the pending claims as a group. See Appeal
Br. 7, 25; Reply Br. 2. We select independent claim 11 as representative of
the group, with the remaining claims standing or falling therewith. See
37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv) (2019).
Appeal 2021-002488
Application 14/562,492

5
35 U.S.C. § 101 Framework
Section 101
An invention is patent eligible if it claims a “new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101.
However, the U.S. Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to
include implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and
abstract ideas” are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l,
573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Court’s two-part framework, described in Mayo and Alice.
Alice, 573 U.S. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus
Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with that framework,
we first determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See Alice,
573 U.S. at 219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the
concept of intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate
settlement risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010)
(“Claims 1 and 4 in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of
hedging, or protecting against risk.”).
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611);
mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and
mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). Concepts
determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes,
such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191
(1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India
Appeal 2021-002488
Application 14/562,492

6
rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S.
252, 267–68 (1854))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69
(citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).
In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the
Court held that “a claim drawn to subject matter otherwise statutory does not
become nonstatutory simply because it uses a mathematical formula.”
Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187; see also id. at 191 (“We view respondents’ claims as
nothing more than a process for molding rubber products and not as an
attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Having said that, the Court
also indicated that a claim “seeking patent protection for that formula in the
abstract . . . is not accorded the protection of our patent laws, . . . and this
principle cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use of the
formula to a particular technological environment.” Id. (citing Benson and
Flook); see, e.g., id. at 187 (“It is now commonplace that an application of a
law of nature or mathematical formula to a known structure or process may
well be deserving of patent protection.”).
If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second
step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the
elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive
concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-
eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (quotation marks omitted).
“A claim that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to
ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to
monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Mayo,
566 U.S. at 77). “[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[]
fail[s] to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id.
Appeal 2021-002488
Application 14/562,492

7
USPTO Section 101 Guidance
We are also guided by U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”)
guidance, as set forth in the 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“Guidance”) and the October
2019 Update: Subject Matter Eligibility (“October 2019 Update”),
incorporated into the MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE
§§ 2104–06, Rev. 10.2019 (“MPEP”) in June 2020. “The guidance sets out
agency policy with respect to the USPTO’s interpretation of the subject
matter eligibility requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 101 in view of decisions by
the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit.” Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 51.
Although “[a]ll USPTO personnel are, as a matter of internal agency
management, expected to follow the guidance,” the guidance “does not
create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable by any
party against the USPTO.” Id. The Guidance, by its terms, applies to all
applications, and to all patents resulting from applications, filed before, on,
or after January 7, 2019. Id. at 50.
Under USPTO guidance, we first look to whether the claim recites:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including laws of nature, natural phenomena,
and products of nature (see MPEP § 2106.04(II)(A)(1), 2106.04(b))
(“Step 2A, Prong One”); and (2) additional elements that integrate the
judicial exception into a practical application (see id. § 2106.04(II)(A)(2),
2106.04(d)) (“Step 2A, Prong Two”).2

2 This evaluation is performed by (a) identifying whether there are any
additional elements recited in the claim beyond the judicial exception, and
(b) evaluating those additional elements individually and in combination to
determine whether the claim as a whole integrates the exception into a
Appeal 2021-002488
Application 14/562,492

8
Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not
integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then look, under
Step 2B, to whether the additional elements, individually or in combination,
provide an inventive concept. See MPEP § 2106(III), 2106.05. “An
inventive concept ‘cannot be furnished by the unpatentable law of nature (or
natural phenomenon or abstract idea) itself.’” Id. § 2106.05 (quoting
Genetic Techs. Ltd. v. Merial LLC, 818 F.3d 1369, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2016)).
Among the considerations in determining whether the additional elements,
individually or in combination, amount to significantly more than the
exception itself, we look to whether they add a specific limitation beyond the
judicial exception that is not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the
field or simply append well-understood, routine, conventional activities
previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to
the judicial exception. MPEP § 2106.05(II); Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56.
Preliminary Matters
We first address the Appellant’s argument that the Examiner provides
insufficient reasoning and thus “the Office Action falls short of the prima
facie requirements under [Guidance] Prong One of Revised Step 2A”
(Appeal Br. 12–13) and “the Office Action fails to establish a reasoned
conclusion otherwise in accordance with the guidance provided by the
USPTO to its examiners” (id. at 14).

practical application. “A claim that integrates a judicial exception into a
practical application will apply, rely on, or use the judicial exception in a
manner that imposes a meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that
the claim is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the judicial
exception.” See Guidance — Section III(A)(2), 84 Fed. Reg. at 54–55;
MPEP § 2106.04(d).
Appeal 2021-002488
Application 14/562,492

9
The USPTO makes clear that any guidance issued “does not constitute
substantive rulemaking and does not have the force and effect of law.” 2019
Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 51; see also May 2016 Subject Matter
Eligibility Update, 81 Fed. Reg. 27381, 27382 (May 6, 2016). In particular,
the Guidance “does not create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural,
enforceable by any party against the USPTO,” and although USPTO
personnel are “expected to follow the guidance,” failure to do so “is not, in
itself, a proper basis for either an appeal or a petition.” 84 Fed. Reg. at 51;
81 Fed. Reg. at 27382.
Here, the Examiner applies the Supreme Court’s two-step framework,
described in Mayo and Alice, and considers USPTO guidance in that
application. See Final Act. 2–5, 7–9. Specifically, the Examiner notifies the
Appellant that “[t]he claims recites at least one of a grouping abstract ideas,
specifically mental processes and certain method of organizing human
activity (e.g., a competition between users of a virtual space).” Final Act. 7;
see also Ans. 4. The Examiner considers the limitations in making this
determination. See Final Act. 8; Ans. 4–9; cf. Appeal Br. 12–13 (arguing the
Examiner does not identify specific limitations to support that
determination). The Examiner further considers the additional elements
beyond the abstract idea and finds that they do not integrate the abstract idea
into a practical integration. See Final Act. 4–5, 9. Finally, the Examiner
considers the additional elements and notifies the Appellant that they, alone
or in combination, “do[] not include additional elements that are sufficient to
amount to significantly more than the judicial exception.” Final Act. 5, 9;
Ans. 16–17 (providing reasons for this determination).
Appeal 2021-002488
Application 14/562,492

10
Thus, the Examiner performed a proper analysis in accordance with
Alice and USPTO guidance. Further, there is no indication that the
Appellant was not put on notice of the Examiner’s rejection regarding the
claims. As such, the Examiner has notified the Appellant of the reasons for
the rejection in a sufficiently articulate and informative manner as to meet
the notice requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 132. See In re Jung, 637 F.3d 1356,
1362 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
Regarding the Appellant’s contention that the Examiner errs in not
performing a streamlined analysis (Reply Br. 9–10), we note that this
argument was not raised in the Appeal Brief, is not responsive to an
argument in the Examiner’s Answer, and good cause has not been shown for
making this new argument. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.41(b)(2). Thus, we do not
consider the argument, but do note that as set forth in USPTO guidance, the
streamlined analysis is an optional tool for Examiners to use at the
Examiner’s discretion. See MPEP § 2106.06 (“[E]xaminers may use a
streamlined eligibility analysis.”) (Emphasis added). “However, if there is
doubt as to whether the applicant is effectively seeking coverage for a
judicial exception itself, the full eligibility analysis (the Alice/Mayo test
described in MPEP § 2106, subsection III) should be conducted.” Id. Here,
the Examiner’s decision to perform a full § 101 analysis is not an error.
Step One of the Mayo/Alice Framework
Under the first step of the Mayo/Alice framework and Step 2A, Prong
One of USPTO guidance, the Examiner determines that independent
claim 11 “recites at least one of a grouping abstract ideas, specifically
mental processes and certain method of organizing human activity (e.g., a
competition between users of a virtual space)” (Final Act. 7) in that the
Appeal 2021-002488
Application 14/562,492

11
combination of elements recite “a certain method of organizing human
activity such as facilitate a competition between users of a virtual space,”
and taken individually, “each of the steps to facilitate the competition
amount to mental processes of a moderator/judge to recommend winners of
the competition be mere observation, evaluation, judgment, and/ or opinion”
(Ans. 4). Under Step 2A, Prong Two of USPTO guidance, the Examiner
determines
[t]his judicial exception is not integrated into a practical
application because the remaining limitations merely recite “one
or more physical processors configured by computer-readable
instructions” which under the broadest reasonable interpretation,
may include steps performed by a human or in the mind but for
the recitation of general purpose computer components.
Final Act. 9.
The Appellant disagrees and contends that under Prong One, claim 11
does not recite a mental process nor a certain method of organizing human
activity. See Appeal Br. 9–12. Under Prong Two, the Appellant contends
the Examiner “fails to consider the specificity of what is actually recited in
the claims, and is at most only evaluating certain limitations in a vacuum”
(id. at 15); the claim reflects “an improvement to a technology or technical
field” (id. at 15–17; Reply Br. 3–6); and the claim “recite[s] sufficient detail
of applying or using an alleged judicial exception in some meaningful way
beyond generally linking the use of the judicial exception to a particular
technological environment” (Appeal Br. 17–18; Reply Br. 6–7).
The Federal Circuit has explained that “the ‘directed to’ inquiry
applies a stage-one filter to claims, considered in light of the specification,
based on whether ‘their character as a whole is directed to excluded subject
matter.’” Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335 (Fed. Cir.
Appeal 2021-002488
Application 14/562,492

12
2016) (quoting Internet Patents Corp. v. Active Network, Inc., 790 F.3d
1343, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2015)). It asks whether the focus of the claim is on a
specific improvement in relevant technology or on a process that itself
qualifies as an “abstract idea” for which computers are invoked merely as a
tool. See id. at 1335–36. Here, it is clear from the Specification, including
the claim language, that claim 11 focuses on an abstract idea, and not on any
improvement to technology and/or a technical field.
The Specification provides evidence as to what the claimed invention
is directed. The Specification provides for “AUTOMATED SELECTIVE
SCORING OF USER-GENERATED CONTENT.” Spec., Title (emphasis
omitted). Similarly, in the “FIELD OF THE DISCLOSURE” section, the
Specification discusses that the “disclosure relates to systems and methods
for automatically scoring user-generated content of a virtual space.” Id. ¶ 1.
The “BACKGROUND” section provides that “[u]sers may access virtual
spaces via computing platforms . . . [and] may participate in the virtual space
by creating user-generated content” (hereafter also referred to as “content”).
Id. ¶ 2. As “SUMMARY,” the Specification provides “[o]ne or more aspects
of the disclosure relate to a system for facilitating competition among users
of a virtual space,” whereby “user-generated content submitted by users for
entry into a competition may be instantly evaluated and assigned a score.”
Id. ¶ 3. High-scoring content may be presented to the virtual space provider,
competition moderator, and/or an entity associated with the virtual space to
determine a winner; low-scoring content may be discarded. Id. This
presentation of high-scoring content and discarding of low-scoring content
“may not only reduce the amount of time required by human participants to
review the submissions, but may improve the efficiency by which the
Appeal 2021-002488
Application 14/562,492

13
processor(s) included in the computing system handling the submissions.”
Id. “For example, the scoring may be based on information . . . such that
retrieval of the information that defines the user-generated content . . . may
not be needed until rendering of user-generated content for presentation to a
moderator may be desired,” and “the processing loads associated with
retrieving the user-generated content, rendering the user-generated content,
and/or otherwise handling the user-generated content may be reduced.” Id.
Consistent with the disclosure, claim 11 recites “[a] method to
facilitate competition between users of a virtual space, the method being
implemented in a computer system including one or more physical
processors and storage media storing machine-readable instructions, the
method comprising”: (1) identifying data, i.e., limitation (a) of identifying
content; (2) analyzing data, i.e., limitation (b) of determining information
describing attributes of content including an aspect, a statistic, and/or user
information and limitation (c) of assigning scores to the content based on the
determined information; and (3) displaying the results of the analyses, i.e.,
limitation (d) of effectuating presentation of a recommendation of winner(s).
We consider claim 11 as a whole3 giving it the broadest reasonable
construction4 as one of ordinary skill in the art would have interpreted it in
light of the Specification5 at the time of filing.

3 “In determining the eligibility of respondents’ claimed process for patent
protection under § 101, their claims must be considered as a whole.” Diehr,
450 U.S. at 188.
4 Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52 n.14 (“If a claim, under its broadest
reasonable interpretation . . . .”) (Emphasis added).
5 “First, it is always important to look at the actual language of the
claims. . . . Second, in considering the roles played by individual limitations,
Appeal 2021-002488
Application 14/562,492

14
The limitations are recited broadly and functionally without details on
how, technologically or by what algorithm, they are performed. Nothing in
the figures or text of the Specification, including the claims, “provides any
details regarding the manner in which the invention accomplishes the recited
functions.” Affinity Labs of Texas, LLC v. DIRECTV, LLC, 838 F.3d 1253,
1260 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
For limitation (a) of identifying content entered in a competition, the
Specification provides: (1) “[t]he submission component may be configured
to identify user-generated content entered for consideration in a
competition” (Spec. ¶ 7); (2) the user profile including identifying
information (id. ¶ 34); (3) “the submission component 114 may be
configured to receive submissions of user-generated content for entry into a
competition by the users[ and] . . . may be configured to identify the user-
generated content, the user who created the user-generated content, and/or
other information” (id. ¶ 55); (4) “the submission component 114 may be
configured to receive a first submission 130[ that] . . . may identify the first
user-generated content 128 for submission in a first competition 136” (id.
¶ 57); and (5) “at an operation 502, user-generated content entered for
consideration in a competition may be identified[, and i]n some
implementations, operation 502 may be performed by a submission
component the same as or similar to submission component 114” (id. ¶ 87).
The details as to the type and elements of the content, element of the virtual

it is important to read the claims ‘in light of the specification.’” Smart Sys.
Innovations, LLC v. Chicago Transit Authority, 873 F.3d 1364, 1378 (Fed.
Cir. 2017) (J. Linn, dissenting in part and concurring in part) (citing Enfish,
822 F.3d at 1335, among others).
Appeal 2021-002488
Application 14/562,492

15
space, and the judging criteria for the competition do not define or further
limit how the identifying content is performed. As such, the identifying
comprises selecting and analyzing information, which comprise a mental
process and an abstract idea. See Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830
F.3d 1350, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“[W]e have treated analyzing information
by steps people go through in their minds, or by mathematical algorithms,
without more, as essentially mental processes”).
Similarly, for limitation (b) of determining information describing one
or more attributes, the Specification provides: (1) “[t]he metadata
component may be configured to obtain the information that describes one
or more attributes of the user-generated content” (Spec. ¶ 8); (2)“the space
component 106 may be configured to implement an instance of the virtual
space executed by the computer components to determine state of the virtual
space” (id. ¶ 25); (3) “[t]he user-generated content component 112 may be
configured to measure, track, collect, and/or otherwise manage metadata
associated with the user-generated content[, and t]he metadata may include
information that describes one or more attributes of the user-generated
content, and/or other information,” the attributes including an aspect, a
statistic, user information, a name, a description, audio, and/or other
information (id. ¶ 44); (4) “the user-generated content component 112 may
be configured to provide access to the metadata associated with user-
generated content by the metadata component 115 and/or other components”
(id.); and (5) “[a]t an operation 504, information that describes one or more
attributes of the user-generated content may be obtained[, and i]n some
implementations, operation 504 may be performed by a metadata component
the same as or similar to metadata component 115” (id. ¶ 88). The types of
Appeal 2021-002488
Application 14/562,492

16
attributes and description of the information, as recited in limitation (b) and
in the wherein clauses, do not define or further limit how the determining of
information is performed. As such, the determining of information
comprises analyses of data, a mental process and an abstract idea. See Elec.
Power Grp., 830 F.3d at 1354.
For limitation (c) of automatically assigning score, the Specification
provides: (1) “[t]he scoring component may be configured to automatically
assign scores to the user-generated content based on the obtained
information” (Spec. ¶ 9); (2) “[t]he scoring component 116 may be
configured to automatically assign scores to the user-generated content
based on the obtained information (e.g., describing the one or more
attributes of the user-generated content) and the judging criteria, and/or other
considerations” (id. ¶ 70); (3) “[t]he automatically assigned scores may
reflect relative standings of the users with respect to the judging criteria,
and/or other considerations” (id. ¶ 71); (4) “the scoring component 116 may
be configured to automatically assign a first score 140 to the first user-
generated content,” the first score assigned in accordance with submission to
the competition, determined based on attributes, and associated with a value
(id. ¶ 74); and (5) “[a]t an operation 506, scores may be automatically
assigned to the user-generated content based on the obtained information
and judging criteria[, and i]n some implementations, operation 506 may be
performed by a scoring component the same as or similar to scoring
component 116” (id. ¶ 89). The description of the score, i.e., “reflecting
relative value . . . such that time required by humans to review the user-
generated content is reduced,” the first and second scores, and the value of
coverage, as recited in limitation (c) and in the wherein clauses, do not
Appeal 2021-002488
Application 14/562,492

17
define or further limit how the assigning information is performed, but
merely what type of information is used in assigning a score. As such, the
assigning of a score comprises analyses of data, a mental process and an
abstract idea. See Elec. Power Grp., 830 F.3d at 1354.
The Specification provides no further detail on how limitation (d) of
effectuating presentation of a user interface including a recommendation
based on the score is performed, but simply provides “[t]he recommendation
component may be configured to effectuate presentation of a user interface
including a recommendation of one or more winners of the competition.”
Spec. ¶ 10; see also id. ¶¶ 75, 77. As such, the effectuating presenting can
comprise filtering content, which is an abstract idea (see, e.g., BASCOM
Glob. Internet Servs., Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341, 1348
(Fed. Cir. 2016)) and displaying the results of the analyses which is “abstract
as an ancillary part of such collection and analysis” (Elec. Power Grp., 830
F.3d at 1354).
The computer system to implement the method is a generic computer
system. See Spec. ¶¶ 18, 22–24, 78–84, 86, Figs. 1, 2.
When considered collectively and under the broadest reasonable
interpretation, the limitations of claim 11 recite a way of using a generic
computer system to facilitate and judge a competition between users by
analyzing data and presenting the results based on the analyses.6 This is an
abstract idea of a “[c]ertain method[] of organizing human activity—. . .

6 We note that “[a]n abstract idea can generally be described at different
levels of abstraction.” Apple, Inc. v. Ameranth, Inc., 842 F.3d 1229, 1240
(Fed. Cir. 2016). The Board’s “slight revision of its abstract idea analysis
does not impact the patentability analysis.” Id. at 1241.
Appeal 2021-002488
Application 14/562,492

18
fundamental managing personal behavior or relationships or interactions
between people (including social activities, teaching, and following rules or
instructions)” comprising “[m]ental processes—concepts performed in the
human mind (including an observation, evaluation, judgment, opinion).”
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52; MPEP § 2106.04(a)(2)(II), 2106.04(a)(2)(III).
Our reviewing court has held similar concepts to be abstract. For
example, the court has held abstract “claims[] describing a set of rules for a
game” in In re Smith, 815 F.3d 816, 819 (Fed. Cir. 2016), “managing a game
of Bingo” in Planet Bingo, LLC v. VKGS LLC, 576 F. App’x 1005, 1008
(Fed. Cir. 2014), “updating game parameters based on prior results to
maintain user enjoyment” in Bot M8 LLC v. Sony Corp. of Am., 465 F. Supp.
3d 1013, 1024 (N.D. Cal. 2020), aff’d, 4 F.4th 1342, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2021)
“creating and applying templates to a game space to simplify game play”
and “automation of the conventional game of chess” in GREE, Inc. v.
Supercell Oy, 834 F. App’x 583, 588 (Fed. Cir. 2020), “selecting the highest
ranked station” in Cisco Sys., Inc. v. Uniloc 2017 LLC, 813 F. App’x 495,
497 (Fed. Cir. 2020), and “collecting information, analyzing it, and
displaying certain results of the collection and analysis” in Elec. Power
Grp., 830 F.3d at 1353. As such, we are unpersuaded of error by the
Appellant’s argument that claim 11 does not recite a certain method of
organizing human activity. See Appeal Br. 11–12.
We are similarly unpersuaded of Examiner error by the Appellant’s
arguments that claim 11 does not fall within USPTO guidance’s categories
of abstract ideas. See Appeal Br. 9–12. With regards to the Appellant’s
argument that claim 11 is similar to those of hypothetical Example 37 of
USPTO’s “Subject Matter Eligibility Examples: Abstract Ideas” (Jan. 7,
Appeal 2021-002488
Application 14/562,492

19
2019) (“Examples”) (Appeal Br. 9–10), we disagree. Claim 11 recites
nothing similar to Example 37’s claim 2’s recitation of “tracking how much
memory has been allocated to each application associated with each icon
over a predetermined period of time . . . [that] requires a processor accessing
computer memory indicative of application usage.” Examples 3. We note
that claim 11 does not require “a processor accessing computer memory
storing information defining the user-generated content entered for
consideration in the contest” nor observing source code or other data.
Appeal Br. 10. Rather, claim 11 here requires a determination of
information describing attributes by any method. That the information may
comprise use of metadata does not make the claim any less abstract. See In
re Gale, 856 F. App’x 887, 889 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (“The recitation of certain
timing-related metadata fields in the claims does not make the claims any
less abstract.”).
As to the Appellant’s arguments that “[a] human mind is not equipped
to observe and/or evaluate electronically submitted source code and/or
metadata” to identify, determine, and automatically assign scores and “to
perform observation, evaluation, judgement, and/or opinion on user-
generated content submitted for competition which has yet to be visually
rendered (e.g., via the source code)” (Appeal Br. 10–11), we disagree. A
human mind can determine information based on received or accessed data,
such as dimensions, features, and coverage amount. See Elec. Power Grp.,
830 F.3d at 1354. And, the claim does not require observation. Further, the
“automatically” assigning of scores simply limits the abstract idea to a
particular technological environment — in this case user-generated content
Appeal 2021-002488
Application 14/562,492

20
on a computer. See GREE, 834 F. App’x at 588; Affinity Labs, 838 F.3d
at 1258–59.
To the extent the Appellant argues that the claim cannot recite a
method of organizing human activity or a mental process because it requires
“a processor-executed function configured to facilitate the actual carrying
out of the competition and which specifically and explicitly subverts human
activity” (Appeal Br. 12; see also Reply Br. 4 (“It is a process that requires a
computer such that any automation thereof necessarily requires a
computer”)), we note that “[c]ourts have examined claims that required the
use of a computer and still found that the underlying, patent-ineligible
invention could be performed via pen and paper or in a person’s mind.”
Versata Dev. Group, Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 1306, 1335 (Fed. Cir.
2015). We further emphasize that claim 11 recites using a generic computer
system to perform the functions of identifying content, determining
information, and automatically assigning a score based on determined data
for the purpose of determining a winner of a competition. See Ans. 10–12.
We next consider, under USPTO guidance Step 2A, Prong Two,
whether claim 11 recites additional elements that integrate the judicial
exception into a practical application. Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54; MPEP
§ 2106.04(II), 2106.04(d). To do so, we look to whether the claim
“appl[ies], rel[ies] on, or use[s] the judicial exception in a manner that
imposes a meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that the claim is
more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the judicial exception,”
i.e., “integrates a judicial exception into a practical application.” Guidance,
84 Fed. Reg. at 54; see also MPEP § 2106.04(d). We agree with and adopt
the Examiner’s findings and conclusion that claim 11 as a whole does not
Appeal 2021-002488
Application 14/562,492

21
integrate the abstract idea into a practical application, as the term is used in
USPTO guidance. See Final Act. 4–5, 9; Ans. 13–15. We add the following
for emphasis.
Here, the additional elements recited in claim 11 beyond the abstract
idea are the “computer system including one or more physical processors
and storage media storing machine-readable instructions,” “virtual objects,”
“virtual space,” and “user interface.” The computer system is described in
the Specification at a high level of generality as a generic computer system
with generic components. See Spec., e.g., ¶¶ 18 (“The computing platforms
126 may include, for example, a cellular telephone, a smartphone, a laptop, a
tablet computer, a desktop computer, a television set-top box, smart TV, a
gaming console, a client device, and/or other device suitable for the intended
purpose(s) presented herein, and/or other considerations”), 22 (“A host
server 102 may include one or more processors 104 configured to execute
one or more computer components for implementing an instance of a virtual
space to facilitate user participation in the virtual space”), Fig. 1. The virtual
objects are data, i.e., “virtual items and/or virtual goods that may be usable
within the virtual space and/or otherwise may be expressed within the virtual
space,” such as buildings, clothing, furnishings, decoration, etc. Id. ¶ 19.
The virtual space is data created by user-generated content. Id. ¶¶ 2, 3, 5,
16, 26 (“An instance of the virtual space may comprise a simulated space
that is accessible by users via clients (e.g., computing platforms 126) that
present the views of the virtual space to a user.”). The user interface is a
generic user interface to display and receive data. Id. ¶¶ 41, 64, 68, 76,
Figs. 3, 4. Further, the Specification provides “the technology is not limited
to the disclosed implementations, but, on the contrary, is intended to cover
Appeal 2021-002488
Application 14/562,492

22
modifications and equivalent arrangements that are within the spirit and
scope of the appended claims.” Id. ¶ 90.
We find no indication in the Specification, nor does the Appellant
direct us to any indication, that the operations recited in the claim require
any specialized computer hardware or other inventive computer components,
i.e., a particular machine, invoke any asserted inventive programming, or
that the claimed invention is implemented using other than generic computer
components to perform generic computer functions. See DDR Holdings,
LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“[A]fter
Alice, there can remain no doubt: recitation of generic computer limitations
does not make an otherwise ineligible claim patent-eligible.”).
We disagree with the Appellant’s contention that claim 11 “as a
whole, reflect[s] and specifically recite[s] an improvement to a technology
or technical field of online competitions based on user submission of user-
generated content and the moderation thereof to determine a winner based
on attributes including, among others, an amount of coverage of the virtual
space.” Appeal Br. 15; see also Reply Br. 3–5, 7 (“the independent claims
sufficiently limit the use of any alleged abstract idea to particular
technological environment of computer-based competition between users of
a virtual space, and/or specific and tangible method to carry out the same”).
We note that “online competitions” is not a technical field; rather, it is the
abstract idea of competitions, such as artwork competitions, limited to a
particular technological environment — here, an environment with
computer, i.e., “online,” — that does not render it any less abstract. See
Alice, 573 U.S. at 223 (holding that attempting to limit the use of an abstract
idea to a particular technological environment does not make a claim patent
Appeal 2021-002488
Application 14/562,492

23
eligible) (quoting Bilski, 561 U.S. at 610–11). Affinity Labs, 838 F.3d
at 1259 (“[M]erely limiting the field of use of the abstract idea to a particular
existing technological environment does not render the claim[] any less
abstract”). Further, the purported improvement of reducing the amount of
time required by humans reviewing the content (Appeal Br. 16–17) is not a
technical improvement to the computer system itself. See also Ans. 14–15.
Any improvement lies in the process of analyzing and filtering data, i.e., to
the abstract idea itself and not to any computer technology or technical field.
The Appellant further contends that claim 11 recites a technical
improvement in providing for the possibility of “improv[ing] the efficiency
by which the processor(s) 104 handles the submissions” by assigning scores
based on the information such that “the rendering of the user-generated
content itself may not be needed until a human participant decides to review
the top-scoring user-generated content at their discretion, if at all.” Appeal
Br. 16–17 (quoting Spec. ¶¶ 69, 72); see also Reply Br. 3. We disagree.
The Specification, including the claim, is not clear that assigning scores
would necessarily lead to less processing or more efficiency. Rather, any
efficiency is in the process itself that makes evaluating submissions for
competitions faster and/or more efficient. “‘[C]laiming the improved speed
or efficiency inherent with applying the abstract idea on a computer’ [is]
insufficient to render the claims patent eligible.” Customedia Techs., LLC v.
Dish Network Corp., 951 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (quoting
Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363,
1367, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2015)).
Moreover, “[t]he advance is only at the abstract level of
computerization because claim [11] fails to set forth specific techniques for
Appeal 2021-002488
Application 14/562,492

24
processing the data, instead reciting known computer techniques for
automation of known processes.” Enco Sys., Inc. v. DaVincia, LLC, 845 F.
App’x 953, 957 (Fed. Cir. 2021); see also Univ. of Fla. Res. Found., Inc. v.
Gen. Elec. Co., 916 F.3d 1363, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (determining that in
claims reciting only functional language, the “mere function of converting is
not a ‘specific improvement to the way computers operate’”) (citation
omitted); Apple, 842 F.3d at 1241 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“The patents claim
systems including menus with particular features. They do not claim a
particular way of programming or designing the software to create menus
that have these features, but instead merely claim the resulting systems.”).
Further, “[t]he fact that an abstract idea may have beneficial uses does
not mean that claims embodying the abstract idea are rendered patent
eligible.” In re Mohapatra, 842 F. App’x 635, 638 (Fed. Cir. 2021). The
benefits that may flow from assigning scores automatically in potentially
reducing the amount of processing in not rendering content do not render the
abstract idea patentable subject matter because the potential benefits “flow
from performing an abstract idea in conjunction with a well-known
[processor].” BSG Tech LLC v. BuySeasons, Inc., 899 F.3d 1281, 1287–88
(Fed. Cir. 2018). The claim’s focus is “not a physical-realm improvement
but an improvement in [a] wholly abstract idea[],” i.e., to reduce the amount
of time required by humans to review and evaluate content submissions for a
competition (see Spec. ¶¶ 3, 72), that is not eligible for patenting. SAP Am.
Inc. v. InvestPic, LLC, 898 F.3d 1161, 1168 (Fed. Cir. 2018); see also BSG
Tech, 899 F.3d 1281 at 1287–88.
The Appellant argues “the claims recite a way to facilitate competition
between users of a virtual space with such specificity such that the claims as
Appeal 2021-002488
Application 14/562,492

25
a whole are clearly more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize an
exception.” Appeal Br. 18; see also id. at 17; Reply Br. 6–7, 9. Although
the Supreme Court has described “the concern that drives this exclusionary
principle [i.e., the exclusion of abstract ideas from patent-eligible subject
matter,] as one of pre-emption” (see Alice, 573 U.S. at 216), characterizing
preemption as a driving concern for patent eligibility is not the same as
characterizing preemption as the sole test for patent eligibility. “The
Supreme Court has made clear that the principle of preemption is the basis
for the judicial exceptions to patentability” and “[f]or this reason, questions
on preemption are inherent in and resolved by the § 101 analysis.” Ariosa
Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2015)
(citing Alice, 573 U.S. at 216). As the Examiner notes (Ans. 15), although
“preemption may signal patent ineligible subject matter, the absence of
complete preemption does not demonstrate patent eligibility.” Id.
We disagree with the Appellant’s contention that claim 11 does not
merely use a computer as a tool to perform an abstract idea because it
“recite[s] a specially programmed machine (e.g., processor(s))” (Reply
Br. 5–6). We note that the Specification does not provide for a special
purpose computer or a specially programmed computer. Rather, as
discussed above, the computer system comprising a processor to perform the
steps is a generic computer with generic computer components. See
Dealertrack, Inc. v. Huber, 674 F.3d 1315, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (finding
claims abstract because the patent did “not specify how the computer
hardware and database are specially programmed to perform the steps
claimed in the patent”). As discussed above, the claimed system comprises
generic components recited at a high level of generality. The claims are not
Appeal 2021-002488
Application 14/562,492

26
tied to a novel apparatus or system, but to a generic existing one. See
Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 717–18 (Fed. Cir. 2014);
Alice, 573 U.S. at 222 (applying an abstract idea, such as an algorithm, on a
general purpose computer is not enough to transform a patent-ineligible
abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention); EON Corp. IP Holdings LLC
v. AT & T Mobility LLC, 785 F.3d 616, 623 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“A general
purpose computer is flexible—it can do anything it is programmed to do.”).
And, even if the processor recited in claim 11 was more specific than a
generic computer component that would not make claim 11 patent eligible.
See BSG Tech, 899 F.3d at 1286 (“We have consistently held, however, that
claims are not saved from abstraction merely because they recite
components more specific than a generic computer.”).
We thus agree with the Examiner that claim 11 recites an abstract idea
and that the elements of the claim, individually and as a combination, do not
integrate the judicial exception into a practical application, as the term is
used in USPTO guidance. Therefore, we are not persuaded of error in the
Examiner’s determination that claim 11 is directed to an abstract idea.
Step Two of the Mayo/Alice Framework
Under the second step in the Mayo/Alice framework (corresponding to
Step 2B of the USTPO guidance), we find supported the Examiner’s
determination that claim 11’s limitations, taken individually or as an ordered
combination, do not amount to significantly more than the judicial
exception. See Final Act. 5, 9; Ans. 16–17. We add the following for
emphasis.
Under Step 2B we look to whether the additional elements beyond the
abstract idea, individually or in combination, provide an inventive concept.
Appeal 2021-002488
Application 14/562,492

27
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56; MPEP § 2106.05(I). Alice is clear, as
described above, that under step two of the Mayo/Alice framework, the
elements of each claim are considered both individually and “as an ordered
combination” to determine whether the additional elements, i.e., the
elements other than the abstract idea itself, “transform the nature of the
claim” into a patent-eligible application. Alice, 573 U.S. at 217; see also
Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72–73 (requiring that “a process that focuses upon the use
of a natural law also contain other elements or a combination of elements,
sometimes referred to as an ‘inventive concept,’ sufficient to ensure that the
patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the
natural law itself”). In other words, the inventive concept under step two of
the Mayo/Alice framework cannot be the abstract idea itself: “It is clear from
Mayo that the ‘inventive concept’ cannot be the abstract idea itself, and
Berkheimer [v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“Berkheimer”)] . . .
leave[s] untouched the numerous cases from this court which have held
claims ineligible because the only alleged ‘inventive concept’ is the abstract
idea.” Berkheimer v. HP, Inc., 890 F.3d 1369, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (Order,
On Petition for rehearing en banc, May 31, 2018) (Moore, J., concurring)
(Berkheimer II); see also BSG Tech, 899 F.3d at 1290 (“It has been clear
since Alice that a claimed invention’s use of the ineligible concept to which
it is directed cannot supply the inventive concept that renders the invention
‘significantly more’ than that ineligible concept.”).
We are not persuaded of Examiner error by the Appellant’s argument
that claim 11 “recites a technological solution to a technological problem.”
Appeal Br. 20; see also id. at 21–22; Reply Br. 3–4. We do not see from the
claim, how the limitations claim a technological solution to a computer-
Appeal 2021-002488
Application 14/562,492

28
based problem, i.e., a solution “necessarily rooted in computer technology in
order to overcome a problem specifically arising in the realm of computer
networks.” DDR Holdings, 773 F.3d at 1257; see also Ans. 14.
The court in DDR noted that “not all claims purporting to address
Internet-centric challenges are eligible for patent.” DDR Holdings, 773 F.3d
at 1258. The Specification does not discuss any particular problems the
invention aims to address, but provides some benefits of the invention, as
discussed above. See Spec. ¶ 3. The Appellant asserts that the problem
being addressed is “how to evaluate the submissions in a manner which
reduces the amount of time required by human participants to review the
submissions.” Appeal Br. 20 (citing Spec. ¶ 3). This problem existed prior
to the Internet, such as in an essay-writing, art, or beauty competitions. This
is not a problem specifically arising in the realm of computer networks, but
simply an existing problem applied to computer-based virtual submissions.
Further, the purported solution of using a generic computer system to
identify user-generated content entered in a competition, determine
information describing attributes of that content, automatically assigning
scores to the content based on the information, and presenting a
recommendation of a winner is not rooted in computer technology. This
purported solution requires the use of a generic server operating in its
ordinary capacity to perform analyses and present the result of the analyses.
See supra; see also Alice, 573 U.S. at 224–26. The Appellant does not, and
cannot, claim to have invented the general use of a system comprising
processors and storage media. The “focus” of the claim is not “on the
specific asserted improvement in computer capabilities” (Enfish, 822 F.3d
Appeal 2021-002488
Application 14/562,492

29
at 1336), but rather on using the computer as a tool to implement the abstract
idea in the particular field of a virtual space competition.
For the reasons discussed above with reference to USPTO guidance
step 2A, Prong Two, we disagree with the Appellant’s contention that
claim 11 “does not recite computer elements used in their ordinary capacity.
Instead, claim [11] recites a specially programmed machine (e.g.,
processor(s)). The processor(s) are configured by machine-readable
instructions to carry out a detailed set of steps to facilitate competition
between users of a virtual space.” Appeal Br. 22; see also id. at 23; Reply
Br. 5–6. We note that the Specification does not provide for a “specially
programmed machine.” Rather, the Specification clearly supports the
Examiner’s conclusion (see Final Act. 9) by indisputably showing that the
claimed computer elements were conventional at the time of filing. See
supra; Spec. ¶¶ 18, 22–26, 78–84, 86, Fig. 1 (describing generic computer
components). Accordingly, based on the Appellant’s description, we find
these components to be well understood, routine, or conventional.
The generic computer system comprising a processor performs well-
known, routine, and conventional functions of performing analyses and
presenting the results of the analyses. See, e.g., Elec. Power Grp., 830 F.3d
at 1355 (gathering, sending, monitoring, analyzing, selecting, and presenting
information does not transform the abstract process into a patent-eligible
invention); Alice, 573 U.S. at 226 (“Nearly every computer will include a
‘communications controller’ and ‘data storage unit’ capable of performing
the basic calculation, storage, and transmission functions required by the
method claims.”). Computers “have become the substrate of our daily
lives—the ‘basic tool[ ],’ Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 . . . (1972),
Appeal 2021-002488
Application 14/562,492

30
of a great many of our social and economic interactions—generic computer
functions, such as storing, analyzing, organizing, and communicating
information, carry no weight in the eligibility analysis. See Alice, 134 S. Ct.
at 2357.” In re Marco Guldenaar Holding B.V., 911 F.3d 1157, 1165 (Fed.
Cir. 2018) (Mayer concurring). Thus, we are also not persuaded of
Examiner error by the Appellant’s argument that “[a]ccordingly, even if the
computer components are generic (which Appellant does not concede), this
alone does not preclude eligibility because the Office Action has not
established that the functions themselves are generic. The claimed functions
are not generic.” Appeal Br. 24; see also Reply Br. 2.
Further, as discussed above with respect to step one of the Mayo/Alice
framework, the claimed system comprises generic components recited at a
high level of generality performing steps that are functionally recited with
details on how they are performed. The claim “provides only a result-
oriented solution[] with insufficient detail for how a computer accomplishes
it. Our law demands more.” Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Fin.
Corp., 850 F.3d 1332, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2017); see also Mohapatra, 842
F. App’x 635, 638 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (“[T]his court has frequently looked to
whether the claims are sufficiently concrete or specific to be directed to a
patent-eligible process rather than a patent-ineligible result.”).
The Appellant argues that “[t]he specifically and particularly recited
claimed features clearly confine the alleged judicial exception of ‘a
competition between users of a virtual space’ to a particular, practical
application” in “confin[ing] the competition to particular submissions (e.g.,
user-generated content including virtual objects selected and arranged in
virtual space) and particular scoring criteria (e.g., amount of coverage of the
Appeal 2021-002488
Application 14/562,492

31
virtual space).” Appeal Br. 23. However, as discussed above, this merely
limits the invention to a particular field of use, i.e., a virtual space. See
Alice, 573 U.S. at 223; Affinity Labs, 838 F.3d at 1259; GREE, 834 F. App’x
at 589 (“[T]he claims merely invoke generic computer components
performing their standard functions to limit the use of the abstract idea itself
to the technological environment of a game space on a computer.”).
The Appellant’s contention that “The Claim Limitations Amount To
‘Significantly More’ Than Any Alleged Judicial Exception Because The
Claims Reflect An Improvement To A Technology Or Technical Field”
(Appeal Br. 24; see also Reply Br. 8) is unpersuasive for the reasons
provided above with respect to USPTO guidance Step 2A, Prong Two.
Thus, we are not persuaded of error in the Examiner’s determination
that the limitations of claim 11 do not transform the claim into significantly
more than the abstract idea.
For at least the reasons above, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection
under 35 U.S.C. § 101 of claim 11 and thus also of claims 1, 3, 5, 6, 8–10,
13, 15, 16, and 18–24, which fall with claim 11. See 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(1)(iv) (2019).

CONCLUSION
The Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1, 3, 5, 6, 8–11, 13, 15, 16,
and 18–24 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 is affirmed.
Appeal 2021-002488
Application 14/562,492

32

In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35
U.S.C. §
Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1, 3, 5, 6,
8–11, 13, 15,
16, 18–24
101 Eligibility 1, 3, 5, 6,
8–11, 13, 15,
16, 18–24

TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(l)(iv).

AFFIRMED