David C. Reardon

Patent Trials and Appeals BoardJul 30, 2020

14308825 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Jul. 30, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 14/308,825 06/19/2014 David C. Reardon Basic-3 1002 71741 7590 07/30/2020 DAVID REARDON 645 Autumn Oaks Dr St. Peters, MO 63376 EXAMINER OJIAKU, CHIKAODINAKA ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3696 MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE 07/30/2020 PAPER Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________ Ex parte DAVID C. REARDON ________________ Appeal 2019-000103 Application 14/308,825 Technology Center 3600 ____________ Before JASON J. CHUNG, MATTHEW J. McNEILL, and SCOTT E. BAIN, Administrative Patent Judges. McNEILL, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appellant1 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1‒20, which are all the claims pending in this application. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We affirm. 1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as the inventor, David C. Reardon. Appeal Br. 3. Appeal 2019-000103 Application 14/308,825 2 STATEMENT OF THE CASE Introduction Appellant’s application relates to compensating users for their electronic data using secured financial transactions. See Spec. ¶¶ 3‒8. In particular, the application describes administering compensation electronically to a first party following identification of the first party according to search criteria supplied by a second party. Spec. ¶ 8. Claim 1 is illustrative of the appealed subject matter and reads as follows: 1. A method of compensating users for user associated data which comprises the steps of: (a) storing in at least one memory user associated data for a plurality of user accounts associated with a plurality of users, wherein the user associated data comprises at least one of a group of data types comprising: (a) a receipt charge; (b) a maximum charge; (c) debits; (d) credits; ( e) account balance; (f) descriptive information regarding purchases made; (g) descriptive information regarding electronic data received; (h) information identifying at least one communications address from the group of communications addresses comprising: a phone number; an email address; an account identifier; a communication identifier for an electronic device associated with the user; an instant messaging address; an internet account; a postal address; Appeal 2019-000103 Application 14/308,825 3 (b) receiving at a processor in communication with the memory selection criteria other than a communications address from a first user; (c) correlating a match between the selection criteria and user associated data to identify at least one second user; (d) crediting the second user account a first amount based on a receipt charge associated with the second user account. The Examiner’s Rejection Claims 1‒20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to patent-ineligible subject matter. Final Act. 14‒17. ANALYSIS Principles of Law – Section 101 An invention is patent eligible if it claims a “new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101. However, the U.S. Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to include implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas” are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014). In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we are guided by the Court’s two-part framework, described in Mayo and Alice. Id. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with that framework, we first determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See Alice, 573 U.S. at 219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4 in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting against risk.”). Appeal 2019-000103 Application 14/308,825 4 Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible, include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611); mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). Concepts determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes, such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191 (1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 252, 267–68 (1854))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69 (citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))). In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the Court held that “a claim drawn to subject matter otherwise statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a mathematical formula.” Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187; see also id. at 191 (“We view respondents’ claims as nothing more than a process for molding rubber products and not as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Having said that, the Court also indicated that a claim “seeking patent protection for that formula in the abstract . . . is not accorded the protection of our patent laws, and this principle cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological environment.” Id. (citation omitted) (citing Benson and Flook); see, e.g., id. at 187 (“It is now commonplace that an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula to a known structure or process may well be deserving of patent protection.”). If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the Appeal 2019-000103 Application 14/308,825 5 elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent- eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (quotation marks omitted). “A claim that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77). “[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[] fail[s] to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id. Principles of Law – USPTO Section 101 Guidance In January 2019, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) published revised guidance on the application of § 101. 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“2019 Revised Guidance”).2 “All USPTO personnel are, as a matter of internal agency management, expected to follow the guidance.” Id. at 51; see also October 2019 Update at 1. Under the 2019 Revised Guidance and the October 2019 Update, we first look to whether the claim recites: (1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing human activity such as a fundamental economic practice, or mental processes) (“Step 2A, Prong One”); and 2 In response to received public comments, the Office issued further guidance on October 17, 2019, clarifying the 2019 Revised Guidance. USPTO, October 2019 Update: Subject Matter Eligibility (the “October 2019 Update”) (available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/peg_oct_2019_update.p df). Appeal 2019-000103 Application 14/308,825 6 (2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a practical application (see MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h) (9th ed. Rev. 08.2017, Jan. 2018)) (“Step 2A, Prong Two”).3 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52–55. Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then look, under Step 2B, to whether the claim: (3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or (4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception. 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52–56. Revised Guidance Step 1 Step 1 of the Revised Guidance asks whether the claimed subject matter falls within the four statutory categories of patentable subject matter identified by 35 U.S.C. § 101: process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter. See 2019 Revised Guidance. Claim 1 recites “[a] method of compensating users for user associated data.” Appellant does not argue the Examiner erred in concluding claim 1 falls within the four 3 This evaluation is performed by (a) identifying whether there are any additional elements recited in the claim beyond the judicial exception, and (b) evaluating those additional elements individually and in combination to determine whether the claim as a whole integrates the exception into a practical application. See 2019 Revised Guidance - Section III(A)(2), 84 Fed. Reg. 54–55. Appeal 2019-000103 Application 14/308,825 7 statutory categories of patentable subject matter. We agree with the Examiner’s conclusion because claim 1 falls within the process category. Revised Guidance Step 2A, Prong 1 Under Step 2A, Prong 1 of the Revised Guidance, we determine whether the claims recite any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing human activity such as a fundamental economic practice, or mental processes). See 2019 Revised Guidance. The Examiner determines claim 1 is directed to the abstract idea of administering compensation electronically to a second party following verification that the second party meets certain criteria predefined by the first. Final Act. 15‒16. The Examiner determines compensation processing is the organization and comparison of information to process a request for completing a compensation request. Id. at 16. The Examiner determines the claimed compensation processing is a mental process that could be performed in the human mind or by a human using pen and paper. Id. at 16. The Examiner also determines claim 1 is directed to financial transaction processing where there is a matching up of a request with pre- defined criteria for determination compensation to be credited in a transaction. Ans. 4. The Examiner determines this is a fundamental economic practice. Id. Appellant argues the Examiner misconstrues the claims because the claims do not recite a compensation request. Appeal Br. 9‒10. Appellant argues the recipient of compensation in the claims never requests compensation from the first user and the claimed exchange of compensation Appeal 2019-000103 Application 14/308,825 8 for data and communication access is not a commonly known, fundamental economic practice that existed prior to computerized accounting systems. Id. Under the broadest reasonable interpretation, we agree with the Examiner that claim 1 recites administering compensation electronically to a second party following verification that the second party meets certain criteria predefined by the first. In particular, claim 1 recites “storing . . . user associated data for a plurality of user accounts associated with a plurality of users.” This step characterizes storing the data related to a second party that is used to determine whether the second party meets certain criteria predefined by the first party. Claim 1 further recites “receiving . . . selection criteria other than a communications address from a first user.” This step characterizes receiving the criteria to be used in the determination. Claim 1 further recites “correlating a match between the selection criteria and the user associated data to identify at least one second user.” This step characterizes performing the correlation to identify a second user that meets the predefined criteria. Finally, claim 1 recites “crediting the second user account a first amount based on a receipt charge associated with the second user account.” This step characterizes administering compensation based on the correlation. These steps, taken collectively, recite administering compensation electronically to a second party following verification that the second party meets certain criteria predefined by the first. We further agree with the Examiner that this administration of compensation is a mental process. The Revised Guidance explains that “mental processes” include acts that people can perform in their minds or using pen and paper, even if the claim recites that a generic computer component performs the acts. See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at Appeal 2019-000103 Application 14/308,825 9 52 n.14 (“If a claim, under its broadest reasonable interpretation, covers performance in the mind but for the recitation of generic computer components, then it is still in the mental processes category unless the claim cannot practically be performed in the mind.”); see also Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Symantec Corp., 838 F.3d 1307, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“[W]ith the exception of generic computer-implemented steps, there is nothing in the claims themselves that foreclose them from being performed by a human, mentally or with pen and paper.”). But for the recitation of “at least one memory” and “a processor in communication with the memory,” the steps of claim 1 can be performed in the human mind or by a human using pen and paper. In particular, the “storing” step could be performed by a human remembering the claimed information or writing the claimed information on paper. The “receiving” step could also be performed by a human receiving information and remembering the information or writing it on paper. The “correlating” step involves evaluating or judging the gathered data and the “crediting” step produces a result of the evaluation or judgment. These evaluations or judgments may be performed in the human mind or by pen and paper. We conclude that claim 1, therefore, recites concepts performed in the human mind, which fall within the mental processes category of abstract ideas identified in the Revised Guidance. We also note that the “storing” and “receiving” steps involve data gathering, which constitutes insignificant extra-solution activity. The Federal Circuit has held that data gathering steps “cannot make an otherwise nonstatutory claim statutory.” CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2011). The Federal Circuit has also held that Appeal 2019-000103 Application 14/308,825 10 (1) presenting offers to potential customers and (2) gathering statistics concerning customer responses were “conventional data-gathering activities that d[id] not make the claims patent eligible.” OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1363–64 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Consistent with those decisions, the MPEP identifies “gathering data” as an example of insignificant extra-solution activity. MPEP § 2106.05(g). We also determine that claim 1 recites commercial or legal interactions. In particular, claim 1 recites administering compensation electronically to a user. As explained above, the “storing” and “receiving” steps recite gathering data needed to administer compensation. The “correlating” step determines whether to administer compensation and the “crediting” step administers compensation. We conclude that claim 1, therefore, also recites commercial or legal interactions, which fall within the certain methods of organizing human activity category of abstract ideas identified in the Revised Guidance. Because we conclude that claim 1 recites an abstract idea, we next turn to Revised Guidance Step 2A, Prong 2. Revised Guidance Step 2A, Prong 2 Under Step 2A, Prong 2 of the Revised Guidance, we next determine whether the claims recite additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a practical application (see MPEP §§ 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h)). The “additional elements” recited in claim 1 include “at least one memory” and “a processor in communication with the memory.” These additional elements do not “integrate the exception into a practical application.” See id. To integrate the exception into a practical application, the additional claim elements must, for example, improve the functioning of a computer or Appeal 2019-000103 Application 14/308,825 11 any other technology or technical field (see MPEP § 2106.05(a)), apply the judicial exception with a particular machine (see MPEP § 2106.05(b)), affect a transformation or reduction of a particular article to a different state or thing (see MPEP § 2106.05(c)), or apply or use the judicial exception in some other meaningful way beyond generally linking the use of the judicial exception to a particular technological environment (see MPEP § 2106.05(e)). See 2019 Revised Guidance. Appellant argues claim 1 is directed to a Summa network, which Appellant argues is a significant technical limitation that refers to a specific data structure and transaction method that integrates a compensation part and a message part into every transaction in a manner that makes completion of the transaction contingent on pre-defined criteria established by all parties in the Summa transactions. See Appeal Br. 8. According to Appellant, this technical improvement improves computer efficiency through a novel configuration of data and processing rules. See id. at 9. Appellant argues that this technical improvement does not relate to a fundamental economic practice because the claimed subject matter was specifically designed to solve problems and inefficiencies in existing computer networks. See id. at 10‒11. Appellant identifies two other ways the claims allegedly add significant activity to the conventional sequence of events. See Reply Br. 15‒16. First, Appellant argues the claims provide each user of a computer account an opportunity to set a minimum receipt charge that must be paid before user-associated data can be used by others. Id. at 16. Second, Appellant argues the claims provide a mechanism to enforce collection of compensation based on the receipt charge. Id. Appeal 2019-000103 Application 14/308,825 12 Appellant also argues claim 1 is not directed to an abstract idea because there is no pre-Internet analog. See Appeal Br. 15‒17; Reply Br. 16‒17. In particular, Appellant argues there is no routine and conventional sequence of events that is being modified by the present invention. See Appeal Br. 15. Appellant argues the claimed sequence of events shows how interactions with the Internet are manipulated to yield a desired result that overrides the routine and conventional sequence of events. See id. at 17 (citing DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com L.P., 773 F.3d 1258 (Fed. Cir. 2014)). Appellant also argues the claims describe a particular solution to a problem to be solved. See Appeal Br. 31. In particular, Appellant argues the invention allows a user to set his or her price on the access and use of data associated with the user’s account and allows searchers to set a price on how much they are willing to pay to access user data. See id. Appellant also argues the claims implement a concept in a tangible way because the claims accomplish the exchange of financial credits, which is evidenced by the tangible consumption of memory and energy in implementing this process and system. See id. at 32. Appellant argues the performance of these steps is observable and verifiable and effects a transformation or reduction of a particular article to a different state or thing. See id. at 32‒35. Appellant has not persuaded us of Examiner error. In cases involving software innovations, such as here, the inquiry as to whether the claims are directed to an abstract idea “often turns on whether the claims focus on ‘the specific asserted improvement in computer capabilities . . . or, instead, on a process that qualifies as an ‘abstract idea’ for which computers are invoked Appeal 2019-000103 Application 14/308,825 13 merely as a tool.”’ Finjan, Inc. v. Blue Coat Sys., Inc., 879 F.3d 1299, 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335–36 (Fed. Cir. 2016)). The nature of claim 1 as a whole is not to define a specific technological improvement; instead, claim 1 merely recites the steps necessary to perform the abstract idea itself. Our reviewing court has “made clear that mere automation of manual processes using generic computers does not constitute a patentable improvement in computer technology.” Credit Acceptance Corp. v. Westlake Servs., 859 F.3d 1044, 1055 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Like the claims in Credit Acceptance, the focus of claim 1 is on the abstract idea itself “and the recited generic computer elements ‘are invoked merely as a tool.’” Id. (citing Enfish, 822 F.3d 1327); see also Versata Dev. Grp., Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 1306, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (collecting cases). Appellant’s argument that the claims are directed to a Summa network and Summa transactions, which improve the functioning of a computer, is unpersuasive. The claims do not recite a Summa network or Summa transactions. The claims do recite limitations that have been defined in the Specification to relate to Summa transactions (e.g., “receipt charge,” defined in paragraph 13). However, these limitations merely relate to characteristics of the data stored in the memory, which is insufficient to integrate the claims to a particular application. “As many cases make clear, even if a process of collecting and analyzing information is ‘limited to particular content’ or a particular ‘source,’ that limitation does not make the collection and analysis other than abstract.” SAP, 898 F.3d at 1168 (citing Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom SA, 830 F.3d 1350, 1353, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2016)). While adding Summa-related data to the memory may improve the information stored in Appeal 2019-000103 Application 14/308,825 14 the memory, an improvement to the information stored by a database is not equivalent to an improvement in the database’s functionality. BSG Tech LLC v. Buyseasons, Inc., 899 F.3d 1281, 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2018). Further, instead of improving the operation of a computer, the limitations reciting Summa-related data merely tie the claims to a particular technological environment. “[L]imit[ing] the abstract idea to a particular environment . . . does not make the claims any less abstract for the step 1 analysis.” In re TLI Commc’ns LLC Patent Litig., 823 F.3d 607, 613 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Our reviewing court has held that reciting a more detailed database structure than a generic database structure constitutes providing a generic environment in which to perform a claimed method, rather than an improvement to computer technology. See BSG Tech, 899 F.3d at 1286‒87. The other alleged technical improvements identified by Appellant, including allowing users to set a receipt charge and providing a mechanism to collect compensation, also do not demonstrate integrating the abstract idea into a practical application. These are improvements to the abstract idea itself, not improvements in networking or computer functionality. None of the identified improvements “enables a computer . . . to do things it could not do before.” Finjan, 879 F.3d at 1305 (emphasis added). Claims whose focus is “not a physical-realm improvement but an improvement in wholly abstract ideas,” are not eligible for patenting. SAP Am., Inc. v. InvestPic, LLC, 898 F.3d 1161, 1168 (Fed. Cir. 2018); see also Interval Licensing LLC v. AOL, Inc., 896 F.3d 1335, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“It is well-settled that placing an abstract idea in the context of a computer does not ‘improve’ the computer or convert the idea into a patent-eligible application of that idea.”). Appeal 2019-000103 Application 14/308,825 15 Moreover, our reviewing court has made it clear that mental processes remain unpatentable even when automated to reduce the burden on the user of what once could have been done with pen and paper. CyberSource, 654 F.3d at 1375 (“That purely mental processes can be unpatentable, even when performed by a computer, was precisely the holding of the Supreme Court in Gottschalk v. Benson[, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)].”). The law is clear that programming a computer to perform what would otherwise be an abstract idea is not sufficient to impart patent eligibility. See Alice, 573 U.S. at 224. We also note that Appellant’s arguments regarding the alleged technical improvement largely focus on the disclosure in the Specification, rather than the claims. See, e.g., Appeal Br. 8‒12. However, improvements described in a specification but not claimed do not support patent eligibility. See ChargePoint, Inc. v. SemaConnect, Inc., 920 F.3d 759, 769 (Fed. Cir. 2019); Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1369–70 (Fed. Cir. 2018); Two-Way Media Ltd. v. Comcast Cable Commc’ns, LLC, 874 F.3d 1329, 1338–39 (Fed. Cir. 2017); Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Erie Indem. Co., 850 F.3d 1315, 1331–32 (Fed. Cir. 2017). In summary, administering compensation electronically to a second party following verification that the second party meets certain criteria predefined by the first, as in the claims, “does not improve the functioning of the computer, make it operate more efficiently, or solve any technological problem.” Trading Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. IBG LLC, 921 F.3d 1378, 1384–85 (Fed. Cir. 2019). Rather, the claim simply “includes instructions to implement an abstract idea on a computer” and “does no more than Appeal 2019-000103 Application 14/308,825 16 generally link the use of a judicial exception to a particular technological environment or field of use.” 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55. Notably, the only additional elements recited in claim 1 are “at least one memory” and “a processor in communication with the memory.” These additional elements are used to achieve the claimed results and are not focused on “a specific means or method that improves the relevant technology.” McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Appellant’s Specification confirms the generic, conventional nature of the claimed computer components and financial systems used in the claimed method and system. See, e.g., Spec. ¶¶ 61‒65, 68, 69, 74, 79, 81, 85‒87, 89, 90. Appellant’s Specification does not highlight any particular characteristics of the memory or processors recited in the claims. See id. The written description thus describes these components in a manner that indicates the components and the functions they perform were well known in the art. See Hybritech Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (explaining that “a patent need not teach, and preferably omits, what is well known in the art”); see also Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Erie Indem. Co., 850 F.3d 1315, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“The claimed mobile interface is so lacking in implementation details that it amounts to merely a generic component (software, hardware, or firmware) that permits the performance of the abstract idea, i.e., to retrieve the user-specific resources.”). For these reasons, Appellant has not persuaded us of Examiner error with respect to Step 2A, Prong 2 of the Revised Guidance. We, therefore, conclude the judicial exception is not integrated into a practical application under the Revised Guidance. Appeal 2019-000103 Application 14/308,825 17 Revised Guidance Step 2B Under Step 2B of the Revised Guidance, we next determine whether the claims recite an “inventive concept” that “must be significantly more than the abstract idea itself, and cannot simply be an instruction to implement or apply the abstract idea on a computer.” BASCOM Glob. Internet Servs., Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2016). There must be more than “computer functions [that] are ‘well- understood, routine, conventional activit[ies]’ previously known to the industry.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 225 (second alteration in original) (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 73). Appellant argues the claims recite significantly more than an abstract idea. See Appeal Br. 26‒30. In so arguing, Appellant provides a “plain language” description of “how the additional limitations and elements in each dependent claim modify the independent claims and produce something significantly more.” See id. at 26. However, Appellant’s arguments focus on how the abstract idea allegedly improves the prior art systems and methods related to the abstract idea itself, not how the recited additional elements produce something significantly more than the recited abstract idea. For example, Appellant argues claim 2 recites significantly more because in claim 2, “[t]he compensation is credited to the second user account in conjunction with delivering electronic content from the first user to the second user’s communication address.” See id. at 27. This improvement results from the abstract idea itself, and is not a recitation of an additional element that provides significantly more than the abstract idea. Appellant also argues the Examiner erred in finding the additional elements are well understood, routine, and conventional. See Reply Br. Appeal 2019-000103 Application 14/308,825 18 23‒24. In particular, Appellant argues that the Examiner admits the claims are novel and non-obvious and, therefore, cannot be well understood, routine, and conventional activities of the industry. See id. Appellant has not persuaded us of Examiner error. The Examiner finds the additional elements recited in the claims recite well understood, routine, and conventional activities of the industry. See Final Act. 16; Ans. 13‒15. In so finding, the Examiner relies on disclosures in the Specification. See Ans. 14 (citing Spec. ¶¶ 22, 46, 50‒54, 63). Appellant’s argument regarding the novelty and non-obviousness of the claims is unpersuasive because although the second step of the Alice framework is termed a search for an “‘inventive concept,”’ the analysis is not an evaluation of novelty or non-obviousness. Instead, the “inventive concept” analysis searches for “an element or combination of elements that is ‘sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the [ineligible concept] itself.”’ Alice Corp., 134 S. Ct. at 2355. A novel and nonobvious claim directed to a purely abstract idea is, nonetheless, patent-ineligible. See Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1304. Further, Appellant’s argument focuses on the novelty or non-obviousness of the abstract idea itself, rather than the additional elements recited in the claims. For these reasons, Appellant has not persuaded us of Examiner error with respect to Step 2B of the Revised Guidance. We, therefore, conclude claim 1 does not recite significantly more than the judicial exception under the Revised Guidance. For these reasons, we sustain the rejection of independent claim 1. We also sustain the rejection of independent claim 11 and dependent claims Appeal 2019-000103 Application 14/308,825 19 2‒10 and 12‒20, for which Appellant offers no separate argument. See Appeal Br. 7‒40; Reply Br. 2‒30. DECISION SUMMARY In summary: Claims Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Basis Affirmed Reversed 1‒20 101 Eligibility 1‒20 TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(f). AFFIRMED