Comcast Cable Communications, LLC

Patent Trials and Appeals BoardNov 23, 2021

2020003871 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 23, 2021)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 15/857,869 12/29/2017 James Barkley 007412.03582\US 4159 71867 7590 11/23/2021 BANNER & WITCOFF , LTD ATTORNEYS FOR CLIENT NUMBER 007412 1100 13th STREET, N.W. SUITE 1200 WASHINGTON, DC 20005-4051 EXAMINER SHELEHEDA, JAMES R ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2424 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 11/23/2021 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): PTO-71867@bannerwitcoff.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte JAMES BARKLEY and FEI WAN Appeal 2020-003871 Application 15/857,869 Technology Center 2400 Before HUNG H. BUI, AMBER L. HAGY, and MICHAEL J. ENGLE, Administrative Patent Judges. ENGLE, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE Appellant1 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1–20, which are all of the claims pending in the application. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We affirm. 1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42(a). Appellant identifies Comcast Cable Communications, LLC as the real party in interest. Appeal Br. 3. Appeal 2020-003871 Application 15/857,869 2 TECHNOLOGY The application relates to video playback with a “trick play,” such as fast forward or rewind. Spec. ¶¶ 32–33. ILLUSTRATIVE CLAIM Claim 1 is illustrative and reproduced below with the limitations at issue emphasized: 1. A method comprising receiving, by a video playback device and during output of segmented video content, a request to start a trick play; determining, based on a playback time associated with a video frame of the segmented video content that is outputted during receipt of the request to start the trick play, a video segment of segmented trick play video content at which to begin the trick play; obtaining the segmented trick play video content at a rate at which one or more segments of the segmented video content were obtained; and causing playback of the segmented trick play video content beginning with the determined video segment. REFERENCES The Examiner relies on the following references as prior art: Name Number Date Boccon-Gibod US 6,965,724 B1 Nov. 15, 2005 Hurst US 2012/0210216 A1 Aug. 16, 2012 Major US 2005/0262257 A1 Nov. 24, 2005 REJECTIONS The Examiner makes the following rejections: Claim(s) Statute Reference(s) Final Act. 1–3, 6–11, 14–19 § 102 Hurst 3–10 4, 5, 12, 13 § 103 Hurst, Boccon-Gibod 10–14 20 § 103 Hurst, Major 14–15 Appeal 2020-003871 Application 15/857,869 3 ISSUE Did the Examiner err in finding Hurst discloses “obtaining the segmented trick play video content at a rate at which one or more segments of the segmented video content were obtained,” as recited in claim 1? ANALYSIS § 102: Claims 1–3, 6–11, and 14–19 Claim 1 recites, inter alia: “obtaining the segmented trick play video content at a rate at which one or more segments of the segmented video content were obtained.” Independent claims 8 and 15 recite commensurate limitations. Appellant argues that “the constant playback rate discussed in Hurst is not equivalent to a constant transmission rate.” Appeal Br. 7 (emphasis added and omitted). According to Appellant, when it comes to transmission rates, “Hurst discloses adjusting a transmission rate based on network conditions,” which “suggests that a constant transmission rate is not necessary for Hurst’s constant playback rate.” Id. (emphasis omitted). Instead, “the received stream is provided in a manner that is selected based upon the desired playback mode (e.g., fast/slow, forward/reverse).” Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting Hurst ¶ 56). We are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument. The Examiner finds that Hurst discloses one embodiment with “a trickplay stream to achieve ‘reverse’ playback at the normal playback speed (paragraph 23), where the reverse stream includes the same size video segments including the same number of frames at the same speed as the normal playback” just “arranged in the reverse order.” Ans. 4 (citing Hurst ¶ 23). Specifically, Hurst Appeal 2020-003871 Application 15/857,869 4 discloses “[a]n additional stream could be encoded at the same frame rate as” the original video “but in reverse frame order to facilitate effective reverse playback at the same speed as normal forward playback.” Hurst ¶ 23. Therefore, the Examiner finds, “[t]he same size trickplay segments are received at the same rate at which the normal playback stream.” Ans. 4. More generally, the Examiner finds that in Hurst, the “video segments frames are being requested, decoded and played back as they are received without requiring extra buffering.” Id. at 3–4 (citing Hurst ¶¶ 4, 6, 19, 20, 44, 45); see also Hurst ¶¶ 6 (“Ideally, such a feature would reduce or eliminate the need for additional processing resources or special buffering”), 4 (criticizing the prior art’s rewind feature having to rely on a buffer). Appellant fails to adequately address these findings of the Examiner. A person of ordinary skill would have understood that Hurst’s disclosure of receiving a normal video stream and the same video stream in the reverse direction (i.e., with the same number of frames and the same playback rate) without any extra buffer discloses “obtaining the segmented trick play video content [e.g., the reverse stream] at a rate at which one or more segments of the segmented video content [e.g., the original video] were obtained.” Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of independent claims 1, 8, and 15, and their dependent claims 2, 3, 6, 7, 9–11, 14, and 16– 19, which Appellant argues are patentable for similar reasons. See Appeal Br. 9; 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv). § 103: Claims 4, 5, 12, 13, and 20 Appellant does not argue the rejections of claims 4, 5, 12, 13, and 20 separately. Appeal Br. 9. Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejections of claims 4, 5, 12, 13, and 20. Appeal 2020-003871 Application 15/857,869 5 OUTCOME The following table summarizes the outcome of each rejection: Claim(s) Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed 1–3, 6–11, 14–19 102 Hurst 1–3, 6–11, 14–19 4, 5, 12, 13 103 Hurst, Boccon-Gibod 4, 5, 12, 13 20 103 Hurst, Major 20 Overall Outcome 1–20 TIME TO RESPOND No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R. § 1.36(a)(1)(iv). AFFIRMED