Columbia College Chicago

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Mar 24, 2016

363 NLRB No. 154 (N.L.R.B. 2016)

363 NLRB No. 154
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
bound volumes of NLRB decisions. Readers are requested to notify the Ex-
ecutive Secretary, National Labor Relations Board, Washington, D.C.
20570, of any typographical or other formal errors so that corrections can
be included in the bound volumes.
Columbia College Chicago and Part-Time Faculty
Association At Columbia College Chicago—
IEA/NEA. Cases 13–CA–073486, 13–CA–
073487, 13–CA–076794, 13–CA–078080, 13–CA–
081162, 13–CA–084369
March 24, 2016
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS MISCIMARRA, HIROZAWA,
AND MCFERRAN
On March 15, 2013, Administrative Law Judge Geof-
frey Carter issued the attached decision. The General
Counsel, the Respondent, and the Charging Party Union
each filed exceptions, a supporting brief, and an answer-
ing brief. The Respondent also filed a reply brief.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the record
in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to
affirm the judge’s rulings, findings,1 and conclusions as
modified below and to adopt the recommended Order as
modified and set forth in full below.2
We agree with the judge’s finding that the Respondent
violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by failing to
bargain with the Union from February to May 2012
about the effects of its decision to reduce the number of
credit hours awarded for certain courses and by setting
unlawful preconditions to bargaining.3 We also agree

1 The Respondent and the Union have excepted to some of the
judge’s credibility findings. The Board’s established policy is not to
overrule an administrative law judge’s credibility resolutions unless the
clear preponderance of all the relevant evidence convinces us that they
are incorrect. Standard Dry Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950),
enfd. 188 F.2d 362 (3d Cir. 1951). We have carefully examined the
record and find no basis for reversing the findings.
2 As explained below, we shall modify the judge’s recommended
Order to require the Respondent to reimburse the Union for all bargain-
ing costs it incurred due to the Respondent’s unlawful conduct. In
accordance with Don Chavas, LLC, d/b/a Tortillas Don Chavas, 361
NLRB No. 10 (2014), and AdvoServ of New Jersey, Inc., 363 NLRB
No. 143 (2016), we shall further modify the judge’s Order to require
the Respondent to compensate the discriminatees for the adverse tax
consequences, if any, of receiving a lump-sum backpay award and to
file reports with the Regional Director for Region 13 allocating the
backpay awards to the appropriate calendar quarters. We shall further
modify the judge’s recommended Order to conform to the Board’s
standard remedial language, and we shall substitute a new notice to
conform to the Order as modified and in accordance with our decision
in Durham School Services, 360 NLRB No. 85 (2014).
3 We find it unnecessary, however, to rely on his statement that the
Respondent’s bargaining proposal to add an express effects-bargaining
waiver to the contract demonstrated that the existing collective-
with the judge’s finding that the Respondent engaged in
overall bad-faith bargaining.4 In addition, in the absence
of exceptions, we adopt the judge’s findings that the Re-
spondent: (1) violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) by failing
to meet and bargain with the Union for a successor agree-
ment from February to June 2012; (2) further violated
Section 8(a)(5) and (1) by failing and refusing to provide
the Union with requested information regarding the Re-
spondent’s Early Feedback System, class assignments to
part-time faculty in the photography department, and the
investigation of Union President Diana Vallera for mis-
conduct; (3) violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) by notifying
employee Diana Vallera that disciplinary action was
forthcoming because of her protected statements about
alleged surveillance at her home and by not assigning
Vallera more than one class section for the Fall 2012
semester;5 and (4) violated Section 8(a)(1) by maintain-
ing an overbroad work rule.
Below, we address two issues in detail. First, we ex-
plain our conclusion that, contrary to the view of our
dissenting colleague, the Respondent unlawfully failed to

bargaining agreement did not contain such a waiver. We also do not
rely on his finding that the Respondent’s violations “precluded” mean-
ingful effects bargaining.
In its Brief in Support of Exceptions, the Respondent argues, briefly
and for the first time, that requiring it to bargain over course credit-hour
changes is an infringement of its First Amendment right to academic
freedom. As the Respondent did not raise this argument to the judge,
we deem it to be untimely raised and thus waived. See Smoke House
Restaurant, 347 NLRB 192, 195 (2006), enfd. 325 Fed.Appx. 577 (9th
Cir. 2009).
4 The Respondent’s only specific exception to the bad-faith bargain-
ing violation is its exception to the judge’s Conclusion of Law #9. The
Respondent, however, does not state, either in its exceptions or support-
ing brief, the grounds on which the judge’s conclusion should be over-
turned. Therefore, in accordance with Sec. 102.46(b)(2) of the Board’s
Rules and Regulations, we disregard this exception. See Holsum de
Puerto Rico, Inc., 344 NLRB 694, 694 fn. 1 (2005), enfd. 456 F.3d 265
(1st Cir. 2006).
5 We also adopt, for the reasons stated by the judge, his dismissal of
allegations that the Respondent violated Sec. 8(a)(3), (4), and (1) by
failing to assign Vallera any classes during the 2012 summer semester
and Sec. 8(a)(5) and (1) by unilaterally changing the scope of the bar-
gaining unit and repudiating the grievance procedure contained in the
collective-bargaining agreement. There are no exceptions to the
judge’s dismissal of allegations that the Respondent violated Sec.
8(a)(1) by selectively applying a work rule only against employees who
support unions; Sec. 8(a)(3), (4), and (1) by investigating Vallera for
misconduct; and Sec. 8(a)(5) and (1) by failing to bargain over the
effects of “prioritization.”
Member Hirozawa finds it unnecessary to pass on whether the Re-
spondent violated Sec. 8(a)(5) and (1) by unilaterally changing the
scope of the bargaining unit to include only those part-time faculty
members currently teaching a course. The additional violation would
not materially affect the remedy, which will require the Respondent to
bargain with the Union as the exclusive collective-bargaining repre-
sentative of the employees in the certified unit, which consists of “all
part-time faculty members who have completed teaching at least one
semester at [the Respondent].”
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD2
bargain over the effects of its credit-hour reductions.
Second, we explain why we find, in disagreement with
the judge and our dissenting colleague, that an award of
negotiation expenses to the Union is an appropriate rem-
edy for the Respondent’s bargaining-related misconduct.
I.
The Respondent operates a private college that special-
izes in arts, communication, and media in Chicago, Illi-
nois. Since 1998, the Union has served as the exclusive
collective-bargaining representative of part-time faculty
members. At all relevant times, the Union and the Re-
spondent were parties to a collective-bargaining agree-
ment (CBA).6 The CBA contained a management-rights
clause in which the Respondent retained “all [its] rights,
responsibilities, powers, duties, and authority inherent in
the management of the College.”7 Article XI of the CBA
set forth a salary schedule that “represents minimum
compensation” for instructors teaching a three credit-
hour course, and provided that compensation for courses
totaling other than three credits would be prorated ac-
cordingly.
At some point in 2010 or 2011, the Respondent decid-
ed to reduce the number of credit hours for 10 courses,
with the changes to take effect in the 2011–2012 school
year. The Union requested bargaining over the effects of
these changes, but, from February 21, 2012, until May 4,
2012, the Respondent refused to engage in such bargaining
unless the Union first provided a proposal regarding the
effects and a list of unit employees affected by the changes.
On those facts, the judge found, and we agree, that the
Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act in
two related respects: first, by failing to bargain with the
Union from February to May 2012 over the effects of its
decision to reduce credit hours for certain courses; and,
second, by setting unlawful preconditions to such bar-
gaining.8
Our dissenting colleague argues that the Respondent
had no duty to bargain over the effects of course credit-

6 The CBA’s effective dates ran from 2006 to 2010, but the parties
agreed to continue the agreement’s terms while they negotiated a succes-
sor agreement.
7 The CBA further declared that these rights and responsibilities
included:
The right to plan, establish, terminate, modify, and implement all
aspects of educational policies and practices, including curricula;
admission and graduation requirements and standards; scheduling;
academic calendar; student discipline; and the establishment,
expansion, subcontracting, reduction, modification, alteration,
combination, or transfer of any job, department, program, course,
institute, or other academic or non-academic activity and the staffing
of the activity, except as may be modified by this Agreement.
8 There is no dispute that the management-rights clause gave the
Respondent the right to unilaterally change course credit hours.
hour reductions for three reasons: (1) under Fresno Bee,
339 NLRB 1214 (2003), any effects of the Respondent’s
decision were the inevitable consequence of a permissi-
ble managerial decision; (2) the CBA between the parties
“covered” the dispute; and (3) the Union clearly and un-
mistakably waived its right to bargain over the effects of
the Respondent’s change. We reject each of these argu-
ments.
A. The Effects Were Not the Inevitable Consequence of a
Permissible Managerial Decision
In Fresno Bee, 339 NLRB 1214 (2003), the Board re-
jected the employer’s argument that it was privileged to
make unilateral changes to employees’ working condi-
tions that it claimed were the “inevitable consequences”
of a permissible managerial decision. Id. at 1214. The
Board stated that, for an employer to successfully assert
such a defense, “the employer must show not only that
the change resulted directly from that decision, but also
that there was no possibility of an alternative change in
terms of employment that would have warranted bargain-
ing.” Id. at 1214–1215, citing Holly Farms Corp. v.
NLRB, 48 F.3d 1360, 1368 (4th Cir. 1995), cert. granted
on other grounds 516 U.S. 963 (1995), affd. 517 U.S.
392 (1996); see also Good Samaritan Hospital, 335
NLRB 901, 903–904 (2001), review dismissed pursuant
to agreement 2002 WL 31016553 (D.C. Cir. 2002).9 As
the Fresno Bee Board explained, “in most situations
‘[t]here are alternatives that an employer and a union can
explore to avoid or reduce the scope of the [change at
issue] without calling into question the employer’s un-
derlying decision.’” 339 NLRB at 1214 (brackets in orig-
inal), quoting Bridon Cordage, 329 NLRB 258, 259
(1999).
Relying on Fresno Bee, our dissenting colleague ar-
gues that the “effects of the College’s lawful decision to
reduce course credit hours resulted directly from that
decision, and there was no possibility of an alternative
change because all such effects were compelled by the
CBA.” We disagree.
The Respondent bears the burden of showing that any
unilateral changes that resulted directly from a permissi-
ble managerial decision were privileged and not subject
to notice and bargaining with the Union. However, the
Respondent itself has not argued that all of the effects of
its managerial decision to change credit hours for certain
courses were the inevitable consequences of that deci-
sion. Moreover, our colleague’s reliance on this argu-

9 Notably, instead of finding that any of the changes at issue in
Fresno Bee were the inevitable consequence of a permissible manage-
rial decision, the Board found that, in fact, they “were the effects of that
decision, and as such, were mandatory subjects of bargaining.” 339
NLRB at 1215.
COLUMBIA COLLEGE CHICAGO 3
ment is misplaced because the Respondent has not estab-
lished that, even if all of the effects of the credit-hour
reductions resulted directly from its decision to make
those reductions,10 there was no possibility of alternative
changes in terms of employment that would have war-
ranted bargaining. See Fresno Bee at 1214–1215.
Specifically, we reject our dissenting colleague’s as-
sertion that all effects of the Respondent’s decision were
compelled by the CBA. For example, although Article
XI of the CBA set forth salary levels for teaching a three-
credit course (and provides that compensation for cours-
es totaling other than three credits shall be prorated ac-
cordingly), the salary levels listed represented only the
“minimum compensation.” There was nothing in Article
XI, or elsewhere in the CBA, that precluded the Re-
spondent from exploring different levels of compensation
with respect to any individual course, including the
courses affected by the Respondent’s decision to reduce
credit hours. We provide this example simply to show
that the CBA did not automatically dictate all effects of
the Respondent’s decision. There may have been other
bargainable effects and alternatives as well, perhaps even
ones that the parties themselves did not perceive imme-
diately. See Good Samaritan, above, 335 NLRB at 903
(“Uncertainty as to the possible effects of policy changes
is not unusual, particularly before the parties explore the
issue through bargaining. Moreover, the obligation to
provide the Union with notice and an opportunity to bar-
gain about effects is not conditioned on the view of the
judge or the Board as to what, if any, effects will be iden-
tified or how they will be resolved by the parties.”).11
Accordingly, the Respondent failed to fulfill its statu-
tory obligation to engage in effects bargaining. See Hol-
ly Farms Corp. v. NLRB, 48 F.3d 1360, 1368; Fresno
Bee, 339 NLRB at 1215; Good Samaritan, 335 NLRB at
904.
B. The Board Does Not Apply the “Contract Coverage”
Standard
We also reject our dissenting colleague’s argument
that the Respondent had no duty to bargain over the ef-

10 As the Board explained in Fresno Bee, “[a]rguably, the effect on
terms of employment of any managerial decision could be said to have
resulted ‘directly’ from that decision. To find that such an effect is
excused from the Act’s notice and bargaining requirement, simply
because it resulted directly from a nonbargainable managerial decision,
would undermine the effects bargaining requirement.” 339 NLRB at
1215 fn. 3.
11 Although the parties’ briefs identified changes to an instructor’s
compensation and to certain benefits as possible effects, it appears that
the change to course credit hours could have affected other terms and
conditions of employment, such as the maximum number of courses
instructors were allowed to teach. Again, effects bargaining would
have given the parties an opportunity to explore such possibilities.
fects of its decision to change course credit hours under
the contract-coverage test endorsed by the District of
Columbia Circuit and the Seventh Circuit. The Board
has declined to adopt the contract-coverage standard and
instead has consistently applied the “clear and unmistak-
able” waiver standard. See Provena St. Joseph Medical
Center, 350 NLRB 808 (2007); see also Columbia Col-
lege Chicago, 360 NLRB No. 122 (2014), slip op. at 2
fn. 8.
C. The Union Did Not Clearly and Unmistakably Waive
Its Right to Bargain Over the Effects of the Course
Credit-Hour Changes
Our colleague’s final argument, that the Union clearly
and unmistakably waived bargaining over the effects of
the Respondent’s decision to change course credit hours,
is premised on his view that every effect, including those
specifically identified by the Union, was controlled by
the terms of the CBA. We disagree with this premise
and decline to prejudge the results of bargaining. Good
Samaritan, above, 335 NLRB at 903. Instead, as dis-
cussed above, we find that the CBA did not inevitably
dictate the effects of the Respondent’s decision. Accord-
ingly, we reject our dissenting colleague’s assertion that
the Union clearly and unmistakably waived bargaining
over the effects of the Respondent’s decision.12
II.
We turn now to the appropriate remedy. In addition to
the Board’s traditional remedies, the General Counsel
and the Union requested a variety of measures to remedy
the effects of the Respondent’s misconduct. The judge,
however, denied all of their requests, including the Gen-
eral Counsel’s request for a bargaining schedule and the
Union’s requests for reimbursement of its negotiation
and litigation expenses and for the imposition of a broad
cease-and-desist order. The General Counsel and the
Union, respectively, now except to the judge’s denial of
those particular remedies. For the reasons discussed be-
low, we find merit in the Union’s exception regarding
reimbursement of its negotiation expenses, and we shall
provide this relief to fully remedy the Respondent’s un-
fair labor practices.13

12 In addition, we agree with the judge that the Union did not other-
wise waive its right to bargain.
13 We agree with the judge, for the reasons he stated, that reim-
bursement of the Union’s litigation expenses and a broad cease-and-
desist order are not warranted in this case. In the particular circum-
stances of this case, we also decline the General Counsel’s request that
we impose a bargaining schedule as a remedy. We note that the parties
resumed face-to-face negotiations in June 2012, and we are satisfied
that requiring the Respondent to reimburse the Union for past negotiat-
ing expenses is sufficient to ensure the Respondent’s compliance with
our bargaining order.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD4
In Frontier Hotel & Casino, 318 NLRB 857, 859
(1995), enfd. in relevant part sub nom. Unbelievable, Inc.
v. NLRB, 118 F.3d 795 (D.C. Cir. 1997), the Board held
that,
[i]n cases of unusually aggravated misconduct, . . .
where it may fairly be said that a respondent’s substan-
tial unfair labor practices have infected the core of a
bargaining process to such an extent that their “effects
cannot be eliminated by the application of traditional
remedies,” NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575,
614 (1969), citing NLRB v. Logan Packing Co., 386
F.2d 562, 570 (4th Cir. 1967), an order requiring the re-
spondent to reimburse the charging party for negotia-
tion expenses is warranted both to make the charging
party whole for the resources that were wasted because
of the unlawful conduct, and to restore the economic
strength that is necessary to ensure a return to the status
quo ante at the bargaining table. . . . [T]his approach re-
flects the direct causal relationship between the re-
spondent’s actions in bargaining and the charging par-
ty’s losses.14
Applying these principles, we find, contrary to our dissent-
ing colleague, that the Respondent’s unfair labor practices
fully warrant reimbursement of the Union’s negotiation
expenses incurred from March 31, 2011, until June 13,
2012, in connection with Case 13–CA–078080 (covering
the parties’ bargaining for a successor agreement), and from
February 21, 2012, to May 4, 2012, in connection with Case
13–CA–073487 (covering bargaining over the effects of the
course credit-hour changes). In addition to relying on the
unfair labor practices committed by the Respondent, we
base this finding on the following considerations.15
A. Without Explanation, the Respondent Reopened Bar-
gaining Issues Long Deemed “Not In Dispute”
The Respondent and the Union began negotiations for
a successor collective-bargaining agreement in January

14 Although the Board in Frontier Hotel & Casino expressed its in-
tention to “rely[] on bargaining orders to remedy the vast majority of
bad-faith bargaining violations,” 318 NLRB at 859, it did not set the
bar for an award of negotiating expenses at the level of misconduct in
that case. Nor, contrary to our colleague’s suggestion, have subsequent
cases set a threshold level of egregiousness that must be satisfied in
order to conclude that an employer’s conduct infected the core of the
bargaining process. Rather, our decisions make clear that, in determin-
ing whether to award negotiating expenses, we will consider each case
on its own merits, evaluating the effect of the violation on the wronged
party and the injury to the collective-bargaining process. See Barstow
Community Hospital, 361 NLRB No. 34, slip op. at 5 fn. 13 (2014);
Fallbrook Hospital, 360 NLRB No. 73, slip op. at 3 (2014), enfd. 785
F.3d 729 (D.C. Cir. 2015); Camelot Terrace, 357 NLRB 1934, 1937
(2011).
15 The judge relied on much of the conduct we describe below to
find that the Respondent engaged in overall bad-faith bargaining.
2010. For over a year, the parties engaged in productive
bargaining sessions, exchanging proposals and nearly
reaching agreement on numerous issues.16 On March 30,
2011, the Respondent submitted a comprehensive con-
tract proposal, which served as the basis of further bar-
gaining in sessions held over the next 6 months.
The Respondent’s posture towards the negotiations
changed, however, in the fall of 2011.17 On September
30, the Regional Director for Region 30 issued a com-
plaint against the Respondent in Case 30–CA–018888,
alleging that it had been committing various unfair labor
practices since December 2010.18 The Respondent re-
ceived a copy of the complaint on October 6. The very
next day, when the parties met for a bargaining session,
the Respondent informed the Union that it was resubmit-
ting its March 30 contract proposal, discarding all NIDs
that had been reached in the meantime unless they were
consistent with the March 30 proposal.
The Respondent offered no explanation for why it was
discarding over 6 months of productive bargaining and
forcing the Union to renegotiate language that the Re-
spondent had previously agreed was not in dispute. As
found by the judge, the Respondent simply submitted
regressive bargaining proposals in direct retaliation for
the Union engaging in protected activity.
The parties met again on October 28, but no negotia-
tions took place because the parties could not agree on
the format of future negotiations sessions. The Respond-
ent subsequently informed the Union that it was prepar-
ing a new comprehensive proposal and that it did not
“see the need to meet” until the proposal was ready and
the Union had reviewed it.
The Respondent sent its “new” comprehensive pro-
posal on December 19. This proposal, however, was
essentially the same as the Respondent’s March 30 pro-
posal, with the same regressive provisions. As found by
the judge, the proposal modified or eliminated virtually
all NIDs (see fn. 16) that were not consistent with the
Respondent’s March 30 proposal, including eliminating
the requirement that disciplinary action be based on just

16 The parties termed these issues “not in dispute” (NID), meaning
that the language was not in dispute, but that further bargaining might
occur.
17 All dates are in 2011 unless otherwise indicated.
18 The complaint alleged, among other things, that the Respondent
had failed and refused to bargain with the Union over the effects of a
change the Respondent announced and subsequently implemented
limiting the initial number of courses that bargaining-unit members
could be assigned to teach each semester, and that the Respondent had
failed to provide requested relevant information on two occasions. The
Board found those violations. See Columbia College, 360 NLRB No.
122 (2014). As we explain below, the present case chronicles a contin-
uation of the Respondent’s failures to meet its statutory bargaining
obligations.
COLUMBIA COLLEGE CHICAGO 5
cause. Again, the Respondent offered no explanation for
why it eliminated previously agreed-upon items.
By repeatedly reopening “not in dispute” issues with-
out any justification, the Respondent forced the Union to
expend resources bargaining anew on those items—
resources that could have been devoted to addressing
open items.
B. The Respondent Imposed Unlawful Preconditions to
Bargaining
On February 13, 2012, the Union requested that the
Respondent provide available dates for face-to-face bar-
gaining sessions. The Respondent answered, not by
providing dates, but by demanding that the Union either
provide the Respondent with comments about its De-
cember 19 proposal or make a counterproposal before it
would resume face-to-face negotiations. This state of
affairs continued for approximately 4 months, with the
Union requesting face-to-face bargaining sessions and
the Respondent refusing to meet unless and until the Un-
ion replied to its proposal or presented its own counter-
proposal. As found by the judge, the requirement that
the Union respond to the December 19 proposal or sub-
mit its own proposals before the Respondent would meet
face-to-face was an unlawful precondition to bargaining.
Similarly, the Respondent unlawfully conditioned bar-
gaining over the effects of the course credit-hour chang-
es. As explained in the judge’s decision, in response to
the Union’s request that the Respondent bargain over
those effects, the Respondent asserted that it did not be-
lieve it had an obligation to bargain with the Union but
that it was willing to meet to “discuss” the issue if the
Union first gave the Respondent a proposal regarding the
effects and a list of the union members affected by the
changes. The Respondent maintained this position for
several months before eventually agreeing to meet to
discuss the changes. Our decision today adopts the
judge’s finding that the Respondent’s actions with re-
spect to effects bargaining were also unlawful.19
The Respondent’s repeated imposition of unlawful pre-
conditions to bargaining forced the Union to expend time
and energy just getting the Respondent to the table. In
addition, the Respondent’s unlawful conduct plainly de-
layed bargaining for both a successor collective-
bargaining agreement and a resolution of the effects of the
course credit-hour changes. The resulting unnecessary
expenditures and delays inevitably diminished the Un-
ion’s bargaining strength with respect to both issues. Cf.

19 Similarly, as noted, the Respondent had been unlawfully asserting
since December 2010 that it had no obligation to bargain with the Un-
ion over the effects of changes to its course-scheduling process for part-
time faculty and refusing to meet to discuss those changes. See Co-
lumbia College Chicago, 360 NLRB No. 122 (2014).
Frontier Hotel & Casino, supra, 318 NLRB at 858 & 858
fn. 5.
C. The Respondent Made Proposals That Would Have
Left the Union With Less Than the Act Provides
The existing collective-bargaining agreement gave the
Respondent the right to make decisions regarding a wide
range of terms and conditions of employment. The Re-
spondent, however, sought to obtain an even broader
waiver during negotiations for the successor agreement,
insisting throughout negotiations that the Union agree to
contract language that would also waive the Union’s
right to bargain over the effects of the Respondent’s deci-
sions, despite the Union’s consistent opposition. Absent
a contract, the Act itself would require the Respondent to
notify and bargain with the Union about the effects of
any changes that it wished to make to the terms and con-
ditions of employment of bargaining unit members. The
Respondent thus was insisting on a waiver that would
have granted it unfettered control and left bargaining-unit
employees with fewer rights and less protection than they
would have under the Act without a contract. Such con-
duct shows that the Respondent was trying to frustrate
the collective-bargaining process and undermine the Un-
ion’s representative role as envisioned by the statute.20
See A-1 King Size Sandwiches, 265 NLRB 850, 859–861
(1982), enfd. 732 F.2d 872, 877 (11th Cir. 1984).
D. The Respondent’s Misconduct at the Table was Exac-
erbated by Its Conduct Away from the Table
In addition to its bad-faith conduct at the negotiating
table, the Respondent committed other violations that
also served to dissipate the Union’s strength and re-
sources. Thus, the Respondent unlawfully failed to pro-
vide the Union with requested information on three occa-
sions and retaliated against Union President Diana
Vallera for her aggressive union advocacy. These unfair
labor practices tainted the parties’ relationship and pre-
dictably undermined both the Union’s leverage in bar-
gaining and its support among employees.
. . .
In sum, the Respondent engaged in “unusually aggra-
vated misconduct . . . where it may fairly be said that . . .
substantial unfair labor practices have infected the core
of a bargaining process to such an extent that their ‘ef-
fects cannot be eliminated by the application of tradition-

20 We do not find that the Respondent’s proposal of an effects-
bargaining waiver was itself unlawful or otherwise pass on the merits
of the Respondent’s bargaining proposals, as our dissenting colleague
suggests. Rather, considered in the context of the parties’ negotiations
as a whole, including the Respondent’s unfair labor practices, the pro-
posal supports our conclusion that the Respondent deliberately acted to
prevent any meaningful progress during bargaining.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD6
al remedies.’” Frontier Hotel, supra, 318 NLRB at 859.
In these circumstances, we find that only by ordering the
reimbursement of the Union’s negotiating expenses21 can
we reasonably restore the Union’s previous financial
strength and consequent ability to carry out effectively its
responsibilities as the employees’ representative.
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board orders that the
Respondent, Columbia College Chicago, Chicago, Illi-
nois, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Failing and refusing to bargain with the Part-Time
Faculty Association at Columbia (the Union) as the ex-
clusive collective-bargaining representative of employees
in the bargaining unit.
(b) Setting unlawful preconditions that the Union
must satisfy before it will engage in face-to-face bargain-
ing or effects bargaining.
(c) Failing and refusing to bargain with the Union
about the effects of its decision to reduce the number of
credit hours awarded for the following 10 courses: Ac-
counting; Screenwriting Workshop; Adaptation in LA;
Acquiring Intellectual Property/LA; Theory, Harmony &
Analysis I; Theory, Harmony & Analysis II; Directing I;
Pro Survival & How to Audition; Local Government
Politics Seminar; and State and National Government
Politics Seminar.
(d) Refusing to bargain collectively with the Union by
failing and refusing to furnish it, or unreasonably delay-
ing in furnishing it, with requested information that is
relevant and necessary to the Union’s performance of its
functions as the collective-bargaining representative of
the Respondent’s unit employees.
(e) Maintaining Rule 5.1 in its Network and Computer
Use Policy.
(f) Notifying employees that they face forthcoming
disciplinary action because they engaged in protected
activity.
(g) Discriminating against employees in teaching as-
signments because they engaged in protected activity.

21 As discussed above, the Respondent discarded over 6 months of
productive bargaining by reneging on the parties’ tentative agreements
without any justification and resubmitting its March 30, 2011 contract
proposal on October 7, 2011. As in Barstow Community Hospital, the
Respondent “directly caused the Union to waste its resources in futile
bargaining.” 361 NLRB No. 34, slip op. at 4. In order to make the
Union whole for the resources that were lost as a result of the Respond-
ent’s conduct, we shall order reimbursement of expenses in connection
with case 13–CA–078080 from March 31, 2011, to June 13, 2012, the
date the Respondent agreed to continue bargaining with the Union. In
connection with case 13–CA–073487, we order reimbursement for the
time period during which the Respondent failed to bargain: February
21, 2012, to May 4, 2012.
(h) In any like or related manner interfering with, re-
straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) On request, bargain with the Union as the exclu-
sive collective-bargaining representative of the employ-
ees in the following appropriate unit concerning terms
and conditions of employment and, if an understanding is
reached, embody the understanding in a signed agree-
ment:
[A]ll part-time faculty members who have completed
teaching at least one semester at Columbia College
Chicago, excluding all other employees, full-time fac-
ulty, artists-in-residence, and Columbia College Chica-
go graduate students, part-time faculty members teach-
ing only continuing education, music lessons to indi-
vidual students or book and paper making classes, Co-
lumbia College Chicago full-time staff members,
teachers employed by Erickson Institute, the YMCA or
Adler Planetarium, and other individuals not appearing
on the Columbia College Chicago payroll, managers
and confidential employees, guards, and supervisors as
defined in the Act.
(b) On request, bargain with the Union as the exclu-
sive collective-bargaining representative of the employ-
ees in the bargaining unit concerning the effects of the
Respondent’s decision to reduce the number of credit
hours awarded for the following 10 courses: Accounting;
Screenwriting Workshop; Adaptation in LA; Acquiring
Intellectual Property/LA; Theory, Harmony & Analysis
I; Theory, Harmony & Analysis II; Directing I; Pro Sur-
vival & How to Audition; Local Government Politics
Seminar; and State and National Government Politics
Seminar.
(c) Make any unit members who taught the 10 courses
listed above whole for any loss of earnings and other
benefits suffered as a result of the Respondent’s failure
to engage in effects bargaining, in the manner set forth in
the remedy section of the judge’s decision as amended in
this decision.
(d) Make Diana Vallera whole for any loss of earnings
and other benefits suffered as a result of the discrimina-
tion against her, in the manner set forth in the remedy
section of the judge’s decision as amended in this deci-
sion.
(e) Within 14 days from the date of this Order, re-
move from its files any reference to the notification to
Diana Vallera that the Respondent was contemplating
disciplining her for engaging in protected activity, and
within 3 days thereafter, notify her in writing that this
COLUMBIA COLLEGE CHICAGO 7
has been done and that the notification will not be used
against her in any way.
(f) Compensate affected employees for the adverse tax
consequences, if any, of receiving lump-sum backpay
awards, and file a report with the Regional Director of
Region 13, within 21 days of the date the amount of
backpay is fixed, either by agreement or Board order, a
report allocating the backpay awards to the appropriate
calendar years for each employee.
(g) To the extent it has not already done so, furnish to
the Union in a timely manner the information requested
in the following information requests: December 20,
2011 (Early Feedback System); May 13, 2012 (Fall 2012
faculty class assignments); and May 17, 2012 (investiga-
tion of Diana Vallera for misconduct).
(h) Within 14 days of the Board’s Order, rescind Rule
5.1 in its Network and Computer Use Policy.
(i) Furnish all current employees with written notice
that Rule 5.1 in the Network and Computer Use Policy
has been rescinded or with a revised policy that does not
contain the unlawful rule or that provides a lawfully
worded rule.
(j) Reimburse the Union for all costs and expenses,
including salaries, incurred in collective-bargaining ne-
gotiations from March 31, 2011, to June 13, 2012, in
connection with case 13–CA–078080 and from February
21, 2012, to May 4, 2012, in connection with Case 13–
CA–073487.
(k) Preserve and, within 14 days of a request, or such
additional time as the Regional Director may allow for
good cause shown, provide at a reasonable place desig-
nated by the Board or its agents, all payroll records, so-
cial security payment records, timecards, personnel rec-
ords and reports, and all other records, including an elec-
tronic copy of such records if stored in electronic form,
necessary to analyze the amount of backpay due under
the terms of this Order.
(l) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at
its facility in Chicago, Illinois, copies of the attached
notice marked “Appendix.”22 Copies of the notice, on
forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 13,
after being signed by the Respondent’s authorized repre-
sentative, shall be posted by the Respondent and main-
tained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places,
including all places where notices to employees are cus-
tomarily posted. In addition to physical posting of paper
notices, notices shall be distributed electronically, such

22 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of the United States court
of appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a
Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of
the National Labor Relations Board.”
as by email, posting on an intranet or an internet site,
and/or other electronic means, if the Respondent custom-
arily communicates with its employees by such means.
Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to
ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or cov-
ered by any other material. If the Respondent has gone
out of business or closed the facility involved in these
proceedings, the Respondent shall duplicate and mail, at
its own expense, a copy of the notice to all current em-
ployees and former employees employed by the Re-
spondent at any time since October 1, 2011.
(m) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file
with the Regional Director for Region 13 a sworn certifi-
cation of a responsible official on a form provided by the
Region attesting to the steps that the Respondent has
taken to comply.
Dated, Washington, D.C. March 24, 2016
______________________________________
Kent Y. Hirozawa, Member
______________________________________
Lauren McFerran, Member
(SEAL) NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
MEMBER MISCIMARRA, dissenting.
Columbia College Chicago (the College) is a private
college focusing on media, communications, and the arts.
The Part-Time Faculty Association at Columbia College
Chicago, IEA–NEA (the Union) is the bargaining repre-
sentative of the College’s part-time faculty members. At
all times relevant to this proceeding, the College and the
Union were parties to a collective-bargaining agreement
(“CBA”).1 Effective fall semester 2011, the College de-
cided to reduce the number of credit hours for 12 cours-
es.2 It is undisputed that the management-rights clause
of the CBA granted the College the right to decide to
change the number of credit hours carried by a course
without bargaining with the Union.3
The main question presented here is whether the Col-
lege was obligated to give the Union notice and oppor-

1 By its terms the CBA was effective from 2006 through 2010, but
the parties mutually agreed to extend it while they engaged in negotia-
tions for a successor agreement.
2 In the same semester, the College also increased the number of
credit hours for 11 courses.
3 The judge found that the CBA “allowed the College to retain its
right to make decisions about its educational, fiscal and employment
policies.” There are no exceptions to this finding.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD8
tunity to bargain concerning the effects of the credit-hour
reductions. As I explain below, I believe the correct an-
swer to this question is no, and I would arrive at that an-
swer under any of three distinct rationales.
First, under Fresno Bee, 339 NLRB 1214 (2003), I be-
lieve the College had no duty to bargain over the effects
of course credit-hour reductions because any effects were
the inevitable consequences of a permissible managerial
decision.
Second, under the “contract coverage” standard ap-
plied by the D.C. and Seventh Circuits, I believe the Col-
lege had no duty to bargain over the decision to reduce
course credit hours or the effects of that decision because
the parties’ CBA “covered” the matter in dispute. I be-
lieve the language in the CBA—specifically, Article II,
“Management Rights”—demonstrates that the parties
had already bargained and had agreed that the College
had the right to make the decision at issue here, and nei-
ther the CBA nor the parties’ bargaining history evidenc-
es that the College and the Union intended to treat the
effects of such a decision separately from the decision
itself.
Third, even applying the Board’s “clear and unmistak-
able waiver” standard, I believe the College had no duty
to bargain over the effects of its decision to change
course credit hours. The Union clearly waived bargain-
ing over the effects of that decision, since every effect
the Union has identified as an issue about which it sought
bargaining was controlled by the terms of the CBA. For
example, the Union identifies the impact of course cred-
it-hour reductions on salary as an effect about which it
wished to bargain. However, the CBA expressly linked
credit hours to salary and thus created the very effect
over which the Union claimed it wanted to bargain. A
similar analysis applies regarding the effects of the Col-
lege’s decision on a variety of benefits as well. The Un-
ion waived bargaining over the effects of the College’s
decision to reduce course credit hours by fixing those
effects in the CBA. The Union claimed it wanted to bar-
gain over effects, but since it had already contractually
agreed to those very effects, in reality it wanted the Col-
lege to modify the CBA. Under settled law, the College
was entitled to withhold its consent to a modification,
and it was not obligated to bargain over this.
Two other issues in this case require resolution by the
Board. In my view, because the College had no duty to
bargain regarding the effects of its course credit-hour
reductions, the College did not violate the Act based on
an alleged “precondition” relating to effects bargaining.
Finally, even assuming the Respondent committed an
effects-bargaining violation, I believe it is inconsistent
with Board precedent to require the College defray the
Union’s bargaining costs. The College’s conduct can
hardly be said to have “infected the core of a bargaining
process to such an extent” as to warrant that extraordi-
nary remedy.4 Accordingly, as to these issues, I respect-
fully dissent.5
BACKGROUND
The parties’ collective-bargaining agreement: Article
II of the CBA, “Management Rights,” provides in rele-
vant part that the College retains the right, in its “sole
discretion,”
to plan, establish, terminate, modify, and implement all
aspects of educational policies and practices, including
curricula; admission and graduation requirements and
standards; scheduling; academic calendar; student dis-
cipline; and the establishment, expansion, subcontract-
ing, reduction, modification, alteration, combination, or
transfer of any job, department, program, course, insti-
tute, or other academic or non-academic activity and
the staffing of the activity, except as may be modified
by this Agreement.
No party disputes that Article II of the CBA grants the Col-
lege the right, in its “sole discretion,” to decide to reduce
course credit hours without giving the Union prior notice
and an opportunity to bargain concerning the decision.
Under the CBA, unit employees’ salary is based on
two variables: the number of credit hours a course car-
ries, and the total number of credit hours the employee
teaching that course has previously taught. Regarding
the first variable, article XI, “Salary,” sets forth a salary
schedule “for a three (3) credit hour course,” and pro-
vides that “[c]ompensation for courses totaling other than
three credits shall be prorated” accordingly. Regarding
the second variable, article XI provides for salary in-
creases based on the cumulative number of credit hours
taught. Thus, for example, a unit employee who had
taught 21 or fewer credit hours at the College would have
earned $3756 for teaching a three credit hour course dur-
ing the 2009–2010 academic year; a unit employee who
had taught between 22 and 45 credit hours would have
earned $3947; between 46 and 72 credit hours, $4175;

4 Frontier Hotel & Casino, 318 NLRB 857, 859 (1995), enfd. in rel-
evant part sub nom. Unbelievable, Inc. v. NLRB, 118 F.3d 795 (D.C.
Cir. 1997).
5 The College did not except to the judge’s findings that it violated
(i) Sec. 8(a)(5) by failing to meet and bargain with the Union for sever-
al months in 2012 and failing to furnish the Union requested relevant
information, (ii) Sec. 8(a)(3) by certain conduct toward Union President
Diana Vallera, and (iii) Sec. 8(a)(1) by maintaining an overbroad work
rule. Because there are no exceptions to these findings, they are not
before the Board for our review, and the portions of the judge’s deci-
sion addressing those issues are not precedential. See, e.g., Watsonville
Register-Pajaronian, 327 NLRB 957, 959 & fn. 4 (1999).
COLUMBIA COLLEGE CHICAGO 9
between 73 and 111 credit hours, $4330; between 112
and 139 credit hours, $4618; and a unit employee who
had taught more than 140 credit hours at the College
would have earned $4770 for teaching a three credit hour
course.
Other articles of the CBA similarly link various bene-
fits to number of credit hours taught. Under Article VII,
“Appointment/Reappointment,” a unit employee who has
“taught a minimum of 51 credit hours at the College”
(and meets other specified criteria) and who loses an
assigned course due to certain stated causes has the right
to bump a unit employee who “has taught fewer than 21
credit hours.” Article VII also accords other benefits to
unit employees who have taught either a minimum of 51
credit hours (e.g., the opportunity to remedy deficiencies
before being denied reemployment because of unsatisfac-
tory teaching performance) or more than 51 credit hours
(the possibility of an appointment for a full academic
year).6
Article XIV, “Entire Agreement,” states as follows:
The parties acknowledge that during the negotiations
which resulted in this Agreement, each had the right
and opportunity to make demands and proposals on
any subject or matter not removed by law from the area
of collective bargaining and that the understandings
and agreements arrived at by the parties after the exer-
cise of that right and opportunity are set forth in this,
the sole Agreement between the parties regarding wag-
es, hours, and other terms and conditions of employ-
ment. . . .
Article XV, “Review of Contract Provisions,” lists
several provisions of the CBA that “will be subject to
review and, if required, revision of procedures necessary
to implement them.” The only CBA provisions dis-
cussed above listed in article XV are those in article VII
according certain benefits to unit employees who have
taught at least 51 credit hours (not including the provi-
sion dealing with bumping rights). However, those pro-
visions were not subject to review and revision at the
time relevant to this case. Article XV provides for po-
tential review and revision “at 18 and 36 months follow-
ing the beginning of this agreement,” i.e., mid-2007 and
early 2009. The credit-hour reductions at issue here were
implemented in the fall semester of 2011.

6 Language in the CBA suggesting a distinction between unit em-
ployees who have taught at least 51 credit hours and those who have
taught more than 51 credit hours may have been unintended. Thus, art.
VII(2) begins by referring to benefits for “unit members who have
taught 51 or more credit hours” but subsequently refers to those same
benefits as afforded “to unit members with over 51 credit hours of
service to the College” (emphasis added).
The parties’ relevant bargaining history: The record
evidence shows that before the Union requested bargain-
ing over the effects of the fall 2011 course credit-hour
reductions, the College had repeatedly exercised its con-
tractual right under Article II to make curricular changes,
including changes to course credit hours, without bar-
gaining with the Union over those decisions or their ef-
fects, and without the Union requesting either decision or
effects bargaining. William Frederking, associate dean
in charge of curriculum for the College’s School of Fine
& Performing Arts (SFPA) from 2008 to 2012, testified
concerning such changes. According to Frederking, over
200 changes to existing courses offered in SFPA were
approved for spring semester 2009, including several
requests for credit-hour changes, and comparable num-
bers of changes were made in other semesters. Moreo-
ver, Frederking led a comprehensive review of SFPA’s
curriculum, which resulted in significant reductions in
credit-hour requirements for degrees in a number of de-
partments.7 When that happened, some courses that had
been required became electives and fewer sections of
those courses were offered, resulting in fewer teaching
opportunities. Separately, in the School of Media Arts,
credit hours were changed for some courses offered in
the Journalism Department. The Union never requested
bargaining—including effects bargaining—over any of
these changes. The Union did request bargaining regard-
ing the effects of credit-hour reductions in Photography
Department courses. The College refused to bargain but
ultimately agreed to do so in settlement of an unfair labor
practice charge. That settlement was reached on October
22, 2010. Five days later, on October 27, the College
proposed modifying the management-rights clause to add
an express effects-bargaining waiver.8
The precondition placed by the College on effects bar-
gaining: On December 20, 2011, Union President
Vallera asked the College for a list of all courses that had
their credit hours reduced in the past 12 months and re-
quested bargaining over the effects of those reductions.
On February 21, 2012, the College furnished the list of
courses. The same day, the College notified Vallera that
it did not believe it had an obligation to bargain about
course credit-hour reductions, but it was willing to meet

7 The number of credit hours required for degrees in the following
departments were reduced as follows: Art & Design, from 51 to 42;
Arts, Entertainment & Media Management, from 58 to 42; Dance, from
57 to 42; Fashion Studies, from 58 to 48; Fiction Writing, from 54 to
36; Music, from 54–78 to 45; Photography, from 54 to 42; and Theatre,
from 51–60 to 44–46.
8 The proposed language read: “All the rights and responsibilities
of [the College], including the effects or impact of their decision to
exercise such rights and responsibilities, shall be retained and exercised
in [its] sole discretion” (emphasis added).
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD10
and discuss the issue if the Union first gave the College a
proposal regarding effects and a list of union members
affected by the reductions. On March 23, Vallera repeat-
ed her bargaining request, and on April 16, the College
reiterated its position that it had no duty to bargain and
that it would not do so “unless and until the Union . . .
specif[ies] what it wants to bargain and who it believes
was affected.”
ANALYSIS
A. The College Had No Duty to Engage in Effects
Bargaining
1. The College had no duty to bargain over the effects of
course credit-hour reductions because any effects were
the inevitable consequences of a permissible managerial
decision.
An employer has no duty to bargain regarding changes
that are “the inevitable consequences of a permissible . . .
managerial decision”—that is, where those changes “re-
sult directly” from a permissible managerial decision,
and where “there [is] no possibility of an alternative
change in terms of employment that would have warrant-
ed bargaining.” Fresno Bee, 339 NLRB at 1214–1215.
That was precisely the situation here. Reducing course
credit hours was a permissible managerial decision. This
is undisputed. The effects of the College’s lawful deci-
sion to reduce course credit hours resulted directly from
that decision, and there was no possibility of an alterna-
tive change because all such effects were compelled by
the CBA.
As the foregoing review of the parties’ CBA demon-
strates, reducing the number of credit hours carried by a
course had an effect on salary and benefits. Under article
XI, unit employees were paid by the course, and how
much they were paid was based on course credit hours,
in two respects. First, article XI set forth salary levels
for teaching a three-credit course and provided that
“[c]ompensation for courses totaling other than three
credits shall be prorated” accordingly. Thus, a credit-
hour reduction necessarily reduced the salary a unit em-
ployee received for teaching the course. Second, the
salary a unit employee received for teaching a course
depended on the number of credit hours that employee
had previously taught. The more credit hours taught, the
higher the salary. Thus, when the College reduced the
number of credit hours carried by a course, the unit em-
ployee assigned the course was paid less for the course
itself, and the course added fewer credit hours to his or
her cumulative total, affecting future compensation. In
addition, under article VII, various benefits—e.g., bump-
ing rights, the opportunity to remedy shortcomings be-
fore being denied reemployment based on unsatisfactory
teaching performance, the possibility of receiving an
appointment for a full academic year instead of a semes-
ter—were reserved for unit employees who had taught at
least 51 credit hours. For unit employees who had taught
fewer than 51 credit hours, the College’s decision to re-
duce course credit hours may have delayed eligibility for
these benefits. In addition, because bumping rights were
exercised at the expense of unit employees with fewer
than 21 credit hours, the course credit-hour reduction
may have lengthened the time during which some unit
employees were vulnerable to being bumped. However,
all these effects on salary and benefits have one thing in
common: they were all compelled by the terms of the
parties’ CBA, which the parties agreed to extend while
they negotiated a successor agreement, and which re-
mained in effect at all times relevant to this case. More-
over, neither the General Counsel nor the Union has
identified a single effect of reducing course credit hours
that was not compelled by the parties’ CBA. All these
effects were the contractually inevitable consequences of
reducing course credit hours, a decision undisputedly
within the College’s sole discretion to make. And Board
precedent is clear that there is no duty to bargain over
“the inevitable consequences of a permissible . . . mana-
gerial decision.” Fresno Bee, supra.
2. The parties’ collective-bargaining agreement “cov-
ered” the matter in dispute and granted the College the
unilateral right to decide to change course credit hours,
and neither contract language nor bargaining history evi-
denced an intention to treat the effects of such a decision
separately from the decision itself.
Under its “clear and unmistakable waiver” standard,
the Board asks whether the “bargaining partners . . .
[have] unequivocally and specifically express[ed] their
mutual intention to permit unilateral employer action
with respect to a particular employment term, notwith-
standing the statutory duty to bargain that would other-
wise apply.” Provena St. Joseph Medical Center, 350
NLRB 808, 811 (2007). However, some courts of ap-
peals disagree with the Board’s use of a waiver analysis
when the collective-bargaining agreement contains lan-
guage covering the matter in dispute that reveals the par-
ties have already bargained over it. As the D.C. Circuit
reasoned in Department of Navy v. FLRA, 962 F.2d 48,
57 (D.C. Cir. 1992), “[a] waiver occurs when a union
knowingly and voluntarily relinquishes its right to bar-
gain about a matter; but where the matter is covered by
the collective bargaining agreement, the union has exer-
cised its bargaining right and the question of waiver is
irrelevant” (emphasis in original). See also NLRB v.
United States Postal Service, 8 F.3d 832 (D.C. Cir. 1993)
(same); Chicago Tribune Co. v. NLRB, 974 F.2d 933,
COLUMBIA COLLEGE CHICAGO 11
936–937 (7th Cir. 1992) (“[W]e wonder what the exact
force of the ‘clear and unmistakable’ principle can be
when the parties have an express written contract and the
issue is what it means. . . .”). This approach is often re-
ferred to as a “contract coverage” analysis. In addition,
and specifically regarding effects bargaining, the D.C.
Circuit has held that when a collective-bargaining
agreement “grant[s] an employer the unilateral right to
make a particular decision,” it would be “rather unusual”
to find that the parties intended to reserve to the union
the “right to bargain over the effects of that decision”
unless “some language or bargaining history . . . sup-
port[s] the proposition that the parties intended to treat
the issues separately.” Enloe Medical Center v. NLRB,
433 F.3d 834, 839 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
As explained above, the College had no duty to bar-
gain over the effects of its decision to reduce course
credit hours because those effects were the inevitable
consequences of a permissible management decision.
But even assuming otherwise, I would still conclude that
the College had no duty to bargain over its decision to
reduce course credit hours or the effects of that decision
under a “contract coverage” analysis.
Regarding the decision itself, under Article II of the
CBA the College retained “sole discretion,” among other
things, to “modify . . . all aspects of educational policies
and practices,” including the “modification” or “altera-
tion” of “any . . . course.” Reducing the number of credit
hours a course is worth constitutes a “modification” or
“alteration” of that “course,” and no party disputes that
the CBA gave the College the right to make this decision
unilaterally.
Regarding the effects of the decision, the CBA con-
tains no language, and the record evidence discloses no
bargaining history, supporting the proposition that the
College and the Union intended to treat the effects of a
decision to reduce course credit hours separately from
the decision itself. See Enloe Medical Center, supra.
Indeed, far from reserving to the Union a right to bargain
over the effects of a decision to change course credit
hours, the language of the CBA demonstrates that the
Union had already “exercised its bargaining right” con-
cerning those very effects. Department of Navy v. FLRA,
962 F.2d at 57. As explained above, Article II of the
CBA based the salary for teaching a course on (i) the
number of credit hours the course carries, and (ii) the
total number of credit hours taught by the unit employee
teaching the course. The CBA also linked various bene-
fits—e.g., bumping rights, the opportunity to remedy
teaching deficiencies before being denied reemployment,
the possibility of an academic-year appointment—to the
total number of credit hours a unit employee had taught.
Thus, when the College exercised its right to increase or
decrease the number of credit hours a course carries, the
effects were felt in unit employees’ salary and benefits as
the Union bargained and agreed they would be.
As to bargaining history, again, the record discloses no
intention on the part of the Union and the College to treat
effects bargaining separately from decision bargaining.
Indeed, it discloses a contrary intention. Prior to the bar-
gaining demand at issue here, the College refused the
Union’s one request to engage in effects bargaining (re-
garding course credit-hour reductions in the Photography
Department). In settlement of a Board charge, the Col-
lege agreed to bargain—but just five days later, in nego-
tiations for a successor to the 2006–2010 CBA, it pro-
posed adding an express waiver of effects bargaining to
the management-rights clause. The judge deemed this
proposal evidence that the parties previously regarded
effects as separately bargainable. I disagree. The Col-
lege had refused the Union’s one and only effects-
bargaining request. I believe its waiver proposal was an
attempt to formalize what had been the College’s under-
standing all along. Moreover, the College had made
hundreds of changes to the curriculum, including chang-
ing the number of credit hours carried by certain courses
or required for certain majors, without bargaining over
the effects of these changes, and without the Union re-
questing bargaining. In sum, there is no evidence in the
parties’ bargaining history of a shared intent to treat de-
cision and effects bargaining separately.
3. The Union clearly and unmistakably waived any right
to engage in effects bargaining regarding the course
credit-hour reductions.
I would reach the same conclusion—that the College
had no obligation to bargain concerning the effects of its
decision to reduce course credit hours—under the
Board’s “clear and unmistakable waiver” standard.
Again, under this standard, the Board asks whether the
“bargaining partners . . . [have] unequivocally and specif-
ically express[ed] their mutual intention to permit unilat-
eral employer action with respect to a particular em-
ployment term, notwithstanding the statutory duty to
bargain that would otherwise apply.” Provena St. Joseph
Medical Center, 350 NLRB at 811.9 Here, the Union

9 A waiver of bargaining rights may also be inferred from the par-
ties’ past practice or from a combination of the express provisions of
the collective-bargaining agreement and the parties’ past practice.
American Diamond Tool, Inc., 306 NLRB 570, 570 (1992). Addition-
ally, a bargaining waiver may result from a union’s failure to request
bargaining after receiving notice or learning of a particular change or
proposal. See, e.g., Finch, Pruyn & Co., 349 NLRB 270 (2007) (find-
ing that union waived its right to bargain by failing to request bargain-
ing over post-strike continuation of subcontracting), enfd. mem. 296
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD12
entered into a CBA that undisputedly granted the College
the right to “alter[] . . . any . . . course,” including by
altering the number of credit hours a course carries, and
it further agreed, in the same CBA, to multiple provi-
sions linking salary and benefits to course credit hours.
In other words, the Union contractually agreed to the
very effects about which it subsequently demanded bar-
gaining during the term of that agreement. To change
those effects would have required modifying the CBA—
a request the College was entitled to reject out of hand.
See, e.g., Kellogg Co., 362 NLRB No. 86, slip op. at 5
(2015) (“[W]hen a collective-bargaining agreement is in
effect, a party is under no obligation to consent to, or
even discuss, proposed midterm modifications of a con-
tractual term, unless the agreement contains a reopener
provision.”).10
For proof that the Union sought to modify the CBA ra-
ther than to bargain over effects, consider the Union’s
own brief to the Board in this case. In its “Brief in Op-
position to Exceptions filed by Respondent” (Union’s
answering brief), the Union repeatedly points to the fol-
lowing effects, and only the following effects, of a course
credit-hour reduction: (i) an immediate decrease in sala-
ry, since “adjunct faculty are paid by the credit hour”
(Union’s answering brief at 3); (ii) an impact on future
salary “because compensation depends in part on how
many credit hours they have previously taught” (id. at
12); and (iii) an impact on work assignments, i.e., bump-
ing rights (“Pursuant to Article VII of the parties’ CBA,
the College will assign a [unit employee] who loses a
course to teach a course previously taught by a different
faculty member, but only if the unit member has taught
more than 51 credit hours. This change in assignment
can only occur when the faculty member to be removed
from the teaching assignment has taught less than 21
credit hours” (id. at 10–11).). The Union might have
added that course credit-hour reductions also affected if
and when a unit employee became entitled to an oppor-

Fed. Appx. 83 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (per curiam); AT&T Corp., 337 NLRB
689, 692–693 (2002) (finding that union waived bargaining over clo-
sure of employer’s Tucson facility, despite initially discussing closure
with employer, when it “‘dropped the ball’ by failing to pursue the
matter”). A bargaining waiver may also result, in some cases, from
bargaining conduct itself. See U.S. Lingerie Corp., 170 NLRB 750,
751–752 (1968) (finding that union waived bargaining over shutdown
of New York plant when it insisted on holding employer to results of
multiemployer bargaining then underway, where employer had lawfully
withdrawn from multiemployer association).
10 As stated above, the CBA did contain a reopener provision (art.
XV), which applied to some of the benefits provided under article VII.
But the CBA could only be reopened “at 18 and 36 months following
the beginning of this agreement,” i.e., mid-2007 and early 2009. The
credit-hour reductions at issue here were implemented fall semester
2011.
tunity to remedy subpar performance and to eligibility
for an academic-year appointment. All these effects have
one thing in common: they were compelled by the terms
of the parties’ CBA. They could not be altered during
the term of the CBA without modifying the CBA itself,
which is not bargainable but requires the parties’ con-
sent. Under these circumstances, I believe the only rea-
sonable conclusion is that the Union clearly and unmis-
takably waived its right to bargain concerning every sin-
gle effect the Union itself has identified as an issue about
which it sought bargaining.11
B. The College Did Not Violate the Act by Setting a Pre-
condition on Effects Bargaining Because It Had No Duty
to Engage in Such Bargaining to Begin With
The judge found, and my colleagues agree, that the
College violated Section 8(a)(5) by setting a precondition
on bargaining. I agree that, generally speaking, setting a
precondition on bargaining violates the Act. Under Sec-
tion 8(d), employers and unions under a duty to bargain
collectively must fulfill their “mutual obligation . . . to
meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with
respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions
of employment,” and neither party may impose a pre-
condition on its fulfillment of that obligation. See, e.g.,
Riverside Cement Co., 305 NLRB 815, 818–819 (1991)
(employer violated Section 8(a)(5) by conditioning its
willingness to meet and bargain with union on the pres-
ence of a federal mediator), enfd. mem. 976 F.2d 731
(5th Cir. 1992). However, Section 8(d)’s definition of
the duty to bargain collectively does not apply to parties
that are not under that duty, and for the reasons explained
above, the College had no duty to bargain collectively

11 Because I would reach the same result under either the Board’s
“clear and unmistakable waiver” standard or the “contract coverage”
standard embraced by the D.C. and Seventh Circuits, I find it unneces-
sary in this case to pass on whether the Board should adopt the “con-
tract coverage” standard.
My colleagues disagree that the effects of the course credit hour
changes were the inevitable consequences of a permissible managerial
decision, or alternatively that the Union waived bargaining over the
effects of the course credit hour changes. They point to the fact that
article XI of the CBA states that the salary schedule set forth therein
represents “minimum compensation” for a three credit hour course.
Based on those words, they say that the CBA did not dictate the effects
of the changes in course credit hours. The General Counsel and the
Union view the matter differently. According to the General Counsel,
“the parties at Columbia College negotiated a definition of course credit
hours and then used it to define experience, workload and salary struc-
ture” (GC’s answering brief at 6) (emphasis added). According to the
Union, “a decrease in the number of credit hours assigned a course
necessarily decreases the pay received” (Union’s answering brief at 3),
and “the number of credit hours determines compensation to part time
adjunct faculty” (id. at 6). In finding that the College had no duty to
engage in effects bargaining, I have adopted the General Counsel’s and
the Union’s own view of the effects necessarily entailed by the CBA.
COLUMBIA COLLEGE CHICAGO 13
regarding the effects of its decision to reduce course
credit hours. On this basis, I would find the College did
not violate the Act by conditioning its willingness to
meet on the Union first specifying “what it wants to bar-
gain [about] and who it believes was affected” by the
course credit-hour reductions.
C. The Majority’s Bargaining-Costs Remedy Is
Unwarranted
The Board’s standard remedies for an unlawful failure
to bargain are an order to cease and desist, to bargain,
and to post an appropriate notice. These are the remedies
the Board applies “[i]n most circumstances.” Frontier
Hotel & Casino, supra, 318 NLRB at 859. In rare cases,
the Board may impose the extraordinary remedy of re-
quiring the respondent to reimburse the charging party
for its negotiation expenses. However, this remedy is
warranted only “[i]n cases of unusually aggravated mis-
conduct, . . . where it may fairly be said that a respond-
ent’s substantial unfair labor practices have infected the
core of a bargaining process to such an extent that their
effects cannot be eliminated by the application of tradi-
tional remedies.” Id. (internal quotations omitted).
Near the end of his exceedingly detailed, thorough de-
cision, the judge considered the Union’s request for a
bargaining-expenses remedy and concluded that “Re-
spondent’s misconduct, while serious, falls short of the
aggravated level required to justify an award of bargain-
ing expenses.” “I cannot find,” the judge wrote, “that
Respondent’s misconduct was so aggravated as to infect
the bargaining process to the point where traditional
remedies would not be effective” (emphasis added). The
judge went on to say that cases in which the Board has
awarded bargaining costs involved “misconduct well
beyond that which the Respondent engaged in here”
(emphasis added). My colleagues reverse the judge’s
decision and impose a bargaining-costs remedy on the
College. I am not persuaded by their reasons for doing
so, contrary to the judge’s well-supported decision.
First, my colleagues rely on the fact that the College
proposed changes in items that had been designated
“NID,” or “not in dispute.” My colleagues say that by
doing so, the College “forced the Union to expend re-
sources bargaining anew on those items—resources that
could have been devoted to addressing open items.” But
items designated “NID” were open items. As the judge
found, “the parties and the Federal mediator came up
with the term NID precisely because NIDs were not
meant to rise to the level of tentative agreements,” and
the College “consistently maintained that all NIDs re-
main open for further negotiation.” There are no excep-
tions to these findings.
Second, my colleagues rely on two instances in which
the College imposed a precondition on meeting with the
Union for collective bargaining. I have found one of
these two instances lawful on the basis that the College
had no duty to bargain in the first place. But even as-
suming the College violated the Act both times, this does
not rise to the level of “unusually aggravated miscon-
duct” warranting the extraordinary remedy of reimburs-
ing the Union for its bargaining expenses.
Third, my colleagues impose a bargaining-costs reme-
dy because the College proposed that the Union waive its
effects-bargaining rights. There is nothing unlawful in
such a proposal. The complaint did not allege, and the
judge did not find, that the College violated the Act by
making this proposal. My colleagues object to it be-
cause, if accepted, it “would have left bargaining-unit
employees with fewer rights and less protection than they
would have under the Act without a contract.” But em-
ployers are not prohibited from proposing a contract term
that would have such an effect. Indeed, precedent
demonstrates to the contrary. A Board majority believes
that unrepresented employees have a right under the Act
never to accept employment under the condition that they
agree to arbitrate employment-related disputes individu-
ally—even if they have the right to opt out of the agree-
ment, On Assignment Staffing Services, 362 NLRB No.
189 (2015), and even if no such condition is imposed at
all and employees are merely invited to opt in to an arbi-
tration agreement, Bristol Farms, 363 NLRB No. 45
(2015). But the Supreme Court has expressly upheld
language in a collective-bargaining agreement requiring
the bargaining-unit employees to submit claims of em-
ployment discrimination to binding arbitration. 14 Penn
Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247 (2009). If a collective-
bargaining agreement may lawfully contain such lan-
guage, it cannot be unlawful to propose it, even though
such a proposal, in my colleagues’ view, would leave
employees with fewer rights than unrepresented employ-
ees have. The College has not crossed any impermissible
line by proposing a waiver of effects-bargaining rights.
Rather, the Board majority in this case has crossed such a
line by passing on the merits of the College’s lawful bar-
gaining proposals. It is well established that the Board
lacks authority to dictate the substance of collective bar-
gaining negotiations in this fashion. See NLRB v. Ameri-
can National Insurance Co., 343 U.S. 395, 404 (1952)
(“[T]he Board may not, either directly or indirectly,
compel concessions or otherwise sit in judgment upon
the substantive terms of collective bargaining agree-
ments.”); H. K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 107–
108 (1970) (“It is implicit in the entire structure of the
Act that the Board acts to oversee and referee the process
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD14
of collective bargaining, leaving the results of the contest
to the bargaining strengths of the parties.”).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, I respectfully dissent.
Dated, Washington, D.C. March 24, 2016
______________________________________
Philip A. Miscimarra, Member
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we
violated Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and
obey this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on
your behalf
Act together with other employees for your bene-
fit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected
activities.
WE WILL NOT fail and refuse to bargain with the Part-
Time Faculty Association at Columbia (the Union) as the
exclusive collective-bargaining representative of our
employees in the bargaining unit.
WE WILL NOT set unlawful preconditions that the Un-
ion must satisfy before we will engage in face-to-face
bargaining or effects bargaining.
WE WILL NOT fail and refuse to bargain with the Union
about the effects of our decision to reduce the number of
credit hours awarded for the following 10 courses: Ac-
counting; Screenwriting Workshop; Adaptation in LA;
Acquiring Intellectual Property/LA; Theory, Harmony &
Analysis I; Theory, Harmony & Analysis II; Directing I;
Pro Survival & How to Audition; Local Government
Politics Seminar; and State and National Government
Politics Seminar.
WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain collectively with the
Union by refusing to furnish it, or unreasonably delaying
in furnishing it, with requested information that is rele-
vant and necessary to the Union’s performance of its
function as the collective-bargaining representative of
our unit employees.
WE WILL NOT maintain Rule 5.1 in our Network and
Computer Use Policy.
WE WILL NOT notify you that you face forthcoming
disciplinary action because you engaged in protected
activity.
WE WILL NOT discriminate against you in teaching as-
signments because you engaged in protected activity.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights
listed above.
WE WILL, on request, bargain with the Union as the
exclusive collective-bargaining representative of our
employees in the following appropriate unit concerning
terms and conditions of employment; and if an under-
standing is reached, embody the understanding in a
signed agreement:
[A]ll part-time faculty members who have completed
teaching at least one semester at Columbia College
Chicago, excluding all other employees, full-time fac-
ulty, artists-in-residence, and Columbia College Chica-
go graduate students, part-time faculty members teach-
ing only continuing education, music lessons to indi-
vidual students or book and paper making classes, Co-
lumbia College Chicago full-time staff members,
teachers employed by Erickson Institute, the YMCA or
Adler Planetarium, and other individuals not appearing
on the Columbia College Chicago payroll, managers
and confidential employees, guards, and supervisors as
defined in the Act.
WE WILL, on request, bargain with the Union as the
exclusive collective-bargaining representative of our
employees in the bargaining unit concerning the effects
of our decision to reduce the number of credit hours
awarded for the following 10 courses: Accounting;
Screenwriting Workshop; Adaptation in LA; Acquiring
Intellectual Property/LA; Theory, Harmony & Analysis
I; Theory, Harmony & Analysis II; Directing I; Pro Sur-
vival & How to Audition; Local Government Politics
Seminar; and State and National Government Politics
Seminar.
WE WILL make any unit members who taught the 10
courses listed above whole for any loss of earnings and
other benefits suffered as a result of our failure to engage
in effects bargaining.
WE WILL make Diana Vallera whole for any loss of
earnings or other benefits suffered as a result of the dis-
crimination against her.
WE WILL, within 14 days from the date of the Board’s
Order, remove from our files any reference to our notifi-
COLUMBIA COLLEGE CHICAGO 15
cation to Diana Vallera that we were contemplating dis-
ciplining her for engaging in protected activity and WE
WILL, within 3 days thereafter, notify her in writing that
this has been done and that the notification will not be
used against her in any way.
WE WILL compensate affected employees for the ad-
verse tax consequences, if any, of receiving lump-sum
backpay awards, and WE WILL file with the Regional Di-
rector for Region 13, within 21 days of the date the
amount of backpay is fixed, either by agreement or
Board order, a report allocating the backpay awards to
the appropriate calendar years for each employee.
WE WILL, to the extent that we have not yet done so,
furnish to the Union in a timely manner the information
requested in the following information requests: Decem-
ber 20, 2011 (Early Feedback System); May 13, 2012
(Fall 2012 faculty class assignments); and May 17, 2012
(investigation of Diana Vallera for misconduct).
WE WILL rescind Rule 5.1 in our Network and Com-
puter Use Policy.
WE WILL furnish all current employees with written
notice that Rule 5.1 in the Network and Computer Use
Policy has been rescinded or with a revised policy that
does not contain the unlawful rule or that provides a law-
fully worded rule.
WE WILL reimburse the Union for all costs and expens-
es, including salaries, incurred in collective-bargaining
negotiations from March 31, 2011, to June 13, 2012, in
connection with case 13–CA–078080 and from February
21, 2012, to May 4, 2012, in connection with Case 13–
CA–073487.
COLUMBIA COLLEGE CHICAGO
The Board’s decision can be found at
www.nlrb.gov/case/13-CA-073486 or by using the QR code
below. Alternatively, you can obtain a copy of the decision
from the Executive Secretary, National Labor Relations
Board, 1015 Half Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20570, or
by calling (202) 273–1940.
Daniel Murphy, Esq., for the Acting General Counsel.
Lisa McGarrity and Abizer Zanzi, Esqs., for the Respondent.
Laurie Burgess, Esq., for the Charging Party.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
GEOFFREY CARTER, Administrative Law Judge. This case
was tried in Chicago, Illinois, on October 22–26 and November
27–28, 2012. The Part-Time Faculty Association at Columbia
College Chicago (PFAC) filed the charges in this matter on the
following dates:
Case 13–CA–073486: Charge filed on January 30, 2012,
and amended on February 10,
2012;
Case 13–CA–073487: Charge filed on January 30, 2012;
Case 13–CA–076794: Charge filed on March 16, 2012,
and amended on April 26, 2012;
Case 13–CA–078080: Charge filed on April 4, 2012;
Case 13–CA–081162: Charge filed on May 16, 2012; and
Case 13–CA–084369: Charge filed on July 3, 2012, and
amended on August 6, 2012.
The Acting General Counsel issued a complaint covering Case
13–CA–073486 on April 17, 2012, and subsequently issued
consolidated complaints on April 17 (adding Case 13–CA–
073487), June 29 (adding Case 13–CA–076794),1 July 31 (add-
ing Cases 13–CA–078080 and 13–CA–081162), and August
28, 2012 (adding Case 13–CA–084369).2
The consolidated complaint alleges that Respondent Colum-
bia College Chicago (Respondent or the College) violated Sec-
tion 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act (the Act) by
maintaining an unlawful Network and Computer Use Policy,
and by selectively and disparately applying that policy only
against employees who voice their support for unions.
The consolidated complaint also alleges that Respondent vio-
lated Section 8(a)(3), (4), and (1) of the Act by: failing and
refusing to assign classes to PFAC President and Part-Time
Faculty Member Diana Vallera for the summer 2012 semester;
failing and refusing to assign more than one class section to
Vallera for the fall 2012 semester; beginning an investigation of
Vallera in April or May 2012 for alleged misconduct in April or
May 2012; and issuing a notice of “Complaint of Misconduct”
to Vallera on or about May 14, 2012.

1 The June 29 consolidated complaint was amended on July 10,
2012.
2 On September 7, 2012, the Respondent filed a motion for a bill of
particulars. In an order dated September 14, 2012, Deputy Chief Ad-
ministrative Law Judge Arthur Amchan granted the motion in part, and
directed the Acting General Counsel to identify the agents of Respond-
ent to whom PFAC requested bargaining about the impact and effects
of Respondent’s implementation of its decision to reduce course credit
hours in several departments. The allegation that Judge Amchan ad-
dressed in his order first appeared in the consolidated complaint that the
Acting General Counsel filed on April 27, 2012. (See GC Exh. 1(o),
par.VI,(a).)
On September 21, 2012, the Acting General Counsel complied with
Judge Amchan’s order and filed an amendment to par. IX,(a) of the
August 28, 2012 consolidated complaint. The amendment specified
that Dr. Louise Love was the agent who received the requests to bar-
gain about course credit hours. No new complaint allegations were
added.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD16
Further, the consolidated complaint alleges that Respondent
violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by: failing and refus-
ing to provide PFAC with information that PFAC requested in
separate requests dated December 20, 2011, and May 13 and
17, 2012; failing and refusing, since February 21, 2012, to bar-
gain collectively about the impact and effects of Respondent’s
decision to reduce the number of credit hours awarded for cer-
tain courses; failing and refusing, since May 8, 2012, to bargain
collectively about the impact and effects of Respondent’s im-
plementation of its prioritization plan to restructure operations;
failing and refusing, since February 16, 2012, to meet and bar-
gain with PFAC to negotiate a successor collective-bargaining
agreement; and failing and refusing, by its overall conduct, to
bargain in good faith with PFAC as the exclusive collective-
bargaining representative of the bargaining unit.
And, the consolidated complaint alleges that Respondent
violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) and failed to bargain collective-
ly and in good faith with PFAC within the meaning of Section
8(d) of the Act by, on or about March 23, 2012: unilaterally
changing the scope of the bargaining unit by only applying the
terms of the collective-bargaining agreement to individuals
currently teaching a course; and repudiating the grievance pro-
cedure contained in the parties’ collective-bargaining agree-
ment.
Respondent filed a timely answer denying each allegation in
the consolidated complaint. On the entire record,3 including my
observation of the demeanor of the witnesses, and after consid-
ering the briefs filed by the Acting General Counsel, the Charg-
ing Party, and the Respondent, I make the following
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
The Respondent, a not-for-profit corporation, operates a pri-
vate college at its facility in Chicago, Illinois, where it annually
derives gross revenues available for operating expenses in ex-
cess of $1 million, and purchases and receives goods and mate-
rials valued in excess of $5000 directly from points outside of
the State of Illinois. The Respondent admits, and I find, that it
is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act, and that PFAC is a labor
organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
II. ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES—BACKGROUND FACTS
This case combines a mixture of distinct, but related allega-
tions that arose from the somewhat contentious relationship
between Columbia College Chicago and PFAC (and PFAC

3 I note that although I have included several citations to the record
to highlight particular testimony or exhibits, I emphasize that my find-
ings and conclusions are not based solely on those specific record cita-
tions, but rather are based on my review and consideration of the entire
record for this case.
I also make the following corrections to the record: (a) R. Exh. 83
was included in the exhibit files in error, and erroneously indicates that
the exhibit was identified and received into evidence, but later with-
drawn. The record shall reflect that R. Exh. 83 was identified, but was
not received, and subsequently was withdrawn (see Tr. 859–862, 871);
and (b) CP Exh. 5 was rejected during trial (see Tr. 998–999), and thus
should not have been included in the exhibit file.
President Diana Vallera). Broadly speaking, the Acting Gen-
eral Counsel and PFAC allege that Columbia College unlawful-
ly:
(a) maintained an overbroad Network and Computer use
policy, and disparately applied that policy against em-
ployees who expressed support for unions;
(b) failed to bargain in good faith with PFAC as demon-
strated by its overall conduct, and specifically about a
successor collective-bargaining agreement, and the ef-
fects of changes that the College planned to make (or
did, in fact, make) to the number of credits awarded for
certain courses and the overall organization of the Col-
lege (under the College’s prioritization plan);
(c) made unilateral changes to the scope of the bargaining
unit and unilaterally repudiated the grievance procedure
set forth in the collective-bargaining agreement;
(d) discriminated against Vallera when it made class as-
signments for summer and fall 2012, and when it decid-
ed to investigate Vallera in May 2012 for alleged mis-
conduct; and
(e) failed and refused to respond to three information re-
quests that PFAC submitted.
Since the allegations in the case are distinct, I only provide my
background findings of fact in this section. My specific find-
ings of fact for each complaint allegation are set forth in section
IV of this decision.
A. Columbia College Chicago—Overview
Columbia College Chicago is a private, independent college
that specializes in arts, communication, and media. The Col-
lege serves a total of 10,000–12,000 students in its undergradu-
ate and graduate programs, and offers courses during fall,
spring, and summer semesters.4 (Tr. 452–453, 457.)
In terms of its organizational structure, Columbia College is
divided up into the following schools, each of which is headed
by a dean: Fine and Performing Arts; Liberal Arts and Scienc-
es, and Media Arts. Each school is composed of departments
that are headed by department chairs, who in turn manage co-
ordinators that lead various areas of concentration within the
department. The College has 23 departments overall, and em-
ploys approximately 360 full-time faculty members and 1250
part-time faculty members. Part-time faculty members teach
approximately 75 percent of the courses offered at Columbia
College. (Tr. 25–26, 453–455, 645–646.)
B. PFAC—Overview
1. PFAC and the bargaining unit
Since 1998, PFAC has served as the exclusive collective-
bargaining representative of the following bargaining unit at the
College:
[A]ll part-time faculty members who have completed teach-
ing at least one semester at Columbia College Chicago, ex-

4 The college also offers classes during its winter break in January
(the J term). (Tr. 453.)
COLUMBIA COLLEGE CHICAGO 17
cluding all other employees, full-time faculty, artists-in-
residence, and Columbia College Chicago graduate students,
part-time faculty members teaching only continuing educa-
tion, music lessons to individual students or book and paper
making classes, Columbia College Chicago full-time staff
members, teachers employed by Erickson Institute, the
YMCA or Adler Planetarium, and other individuals not ap-
pearing on the Columbia College Chicago payroll, managers
and confidential employees, guards, and supervisors as de-
fined in the Act.
(Respondent (R.) Exh. 1, p. 1.; see also GC Exh. 2(a) (Certifi-
cation of Representative, dated February 26, 1998).) The par-
ties agree that the PFAC bargaining unit is an appropriate unit
for collective-bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of
the Act. (GC Exh. 1,(ll), par. 7(a).) During the relevant time
period, the bargaining unit included approximately 1200 part-
time faculty members. (Tr. 29–30, 770, 1179.)
PFAC and the College are parties to a collective-bargaining
agreement that was intended to be in effect from 2006 to 2010.
(R. Exh. 1.) By the parties’ mutual agreement, the terms of the
2006–2010 agreement have remained in effect while the parties
have attempted to negotiate a successor collective-bargaining
agreement. (Tr. 33–34, 455, 1004.)
2. PFAC President Diana Vallera
In fall 2005, Diana Vallera began working for the College as
a part-time faculty member in the photography department.
(Tr. 24–25.) At the time of her hire, Bob Thall was the photog-
raphy department chair, and Elizabeth Ernst was one of the
coordinators in the photography department. (Tr. 26.) Con-
sistent with the College’s preference for hiring working profes-
sionals, Vallera had a background in fine arts that included
painting and mixed media work, and also had commercial ex-
perience by virtue of her studies with Hedrich-Blessing, an
architectural and photography firm. (Tr. 243–244; GC Exh.
96.)
In 2008, Vallera became a steward for PFAC in the photog-
raphy department. Vallera later joined PFAC’s executive
committee, and in 2010 became PFAC’s president. (Tr. 29.)
III. CREDIBILITY FINDINGS
A credibility determination may rely on a variety of factors,
including the context of the witness’ testimony, the witness’
demeanor, the weight of the respective evidence, established or
admitted facts, inherent probabilities, and reasonable inferences
that may be drawn from the record as a whole. Double D Con-
struction Group, 339 NLRB 303, 305 (2003); Daikichi Sushi,
335 NLRB 622, 623 (2001) (citing Shen Automotive Dealership
Group, 321 NLRB 586, 589 (1996)), enfd. 56 Fed. Appx. 516
(D.C. Cir. 2003); see also Roosevelt Memorial Medical Center,
348 NLRB 1016, 1022 (2006) (noting that an administrative
law judge may draw an adverse inference from a party’s failure
to call a witness who may reasonably be assumed to be favora-
bly disposed to a party, and who could reasonably be expected
to corroborate its version of events, particularly when the wit-
ness is the party’s agent). Credibility findings need not be all-
or-nothing propositions—indeed, nothing is more common in
all kinds of judicial decisions than to believe some, but not all,
of a witness’ testimony. Daikichi Sushi, 335 NLRB at 622.
My credibility findings are stated in the findings of fact that
are set forth in section IV of this decision. I note, however, that
the witnesses that both the Acting General Counsel and the
Respondent presented were generally credible, save for some
specific instances that I describe more fully in the findings of
fact below. Many of the probative facts were established by
email communications and other documentation that, for the
most part, were not disputed by any of the parties.
IV. FINDINGS OF FACT, DISCUSSION, AND ANALYSIS
A. Bargaining for a Successor Collective-
Bargaining Agreement
1. Complaint allegations
The complaint alleges that since on or about February 16,
2012, Respondent has failed and refused to meet and bargain
with PFAC (the exclusive collective-bargaining representative
of the bargaining unit) regarding a successor collective-
bargaining agreement. (GC Exh. 1(ff), par. XI(c) (alleging
violation of Sec. 8(a)(5) and (1)).)
2. Findings of fact
a. The College and PFAC begin negotiations
for a successor collective-bargaining agreement
As previously noted, PFAC and the College are parties to a
collective-bargaining agreement that was intended to be in
effect from 2006 to August 31, 2010. (R. Exh. 1.) In January
2010, PFAC and the College began negotiations for a successor
collective-bargaining agreement, with PFAC President Diana
Vallera leading PFAC’s bargaining team, and Louise Love
leading the College’s bargaining team. (Tr. 36–37, 457–458.)
By the parties’ mutual consent, the terms of the 2006–2010
collective-bargaining agreement have remained in effect while
the parties have attempted to negotiate a successor contract.
(Tr. 33–34, 455, 1004.)
Initially, the parties met every Friday for negotiations, unless
a scheduling conflict precluded their weekly meeting. Javier
Ramirez from the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service
served as the facilitator/mediator for negotiations. (Tr. 52,
458.) The parties were able to reach a tentative agreement
about contract language for academic freedom.5 (Tr. 460–461;
see also R. Exh. 1, art. V.) The College, however, was not
willing to make tentative agreements on any other parts of the
contract, because it wished to retain the option to negotiate
about the contract as a whole once a working draft was estab-
lished. (Tr. 461–462; R. Exh. 86, p. 4; R. Exh. 87, p. 4.) Ac-
cordingly, to keep track of contract language or clauses where
the parties were at or near agreement (but where further negoti-
ation might still occur), the parties kept a list of contract items
that were not in dispute (NIDs). (Tr. 59–61, 461–462; see also
GC Exh. 9 (PFAC changed from using tentative agreement on

5 The academic freedom clause states as follows: “The College
hereby reaffirms that all members of the College faculty, regardless of
their employment status, are entitled to academic freedom, as currently
defined in the Faculty Handbook or as may be revised from time to
time in consultation with [PFAC].” (R. Exh. 1, art. V.)
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD18
April 20, 2011, to using the term NID on April 22, 2011, on its
list of contract clauses where the parties had found common
ground).)6
b. The College proposes that PFAC waive its
right to effects bargaining
On October 27, 2010, the College sent PFAC a contract pro-
posal that included a modified management-rights clause. (GC
Exh. 5, art. II.) The 2006–2010 contract included a manage-
ment-rights clause that, generally speaking, allowed the College
to retain its right to make decisions about its educational, fiscal
and employment policies. Specifically, the existing manage-
ment-rights clause states as follows:
Columbia College Chicago and its Board of Trustees retain all
their rights . . . inherent in the management of the College . . .
except as specifically modified by this Agreement during its
term. All the rights and responsibilities of [the College] shall
be retained and exercised in their sole discretion including by
way of example and not in any way limited to:
A. The right to plan, establish, terminate, modify and im-
plement all aspects of educational policies and practices,
including curricula; admission and graduation require-
ments and standards; . . . and the establishment, expan-
sion, subcontracting, reduction, modification . . . or
transfer of any job, department, program, course, insti-
tute or other academic or non-academic activity and the
staffing of the activity, except as may be modified by
this Agreement.
B. The right to manage the College and direct the College’s
property, including fiscal and budgetary policy . . . ex-
cept as may be modified by this Agreement.
C. The right to hire, direct, transfer, assign, terminate, lay
off, discipline, appoint, reappoint, and evaluate its em-
ployees and to establish, modify, and discontinue rules
and regulations of procedure, conduct, policies, stand-
ards, and practices relating to the performance of work,
including workload, scheduling of work and its location
and criteria and qualifications for appointment, retention,
and promotion of employees, except as may be modified
by this Agreement.
(R. Exh. 1, art. II (noting that the enumeration of management’s
rights was not all-inclusive, and did not exclude management
rights not specifically listed).) The October 27 proposal in-
cluded a similar management-rights clause, but added language
indicating that the management-rights clause extended to the
effects or impact of any management decisions that the College

6 I do not credit Vallera’s testimony that the parties agreed that ten-
tative agreements were the same thing as NIDs. (See Tr. 1270.) The
evidentiary record, including portions of PFAC’s bargaining notes,
establishes that the College repeatedly maintained that NIDs were
different from tentative agreements in that NIDs were more subject to
future negotiation (particularly once the parties developed a working
draft of an entire contract).
might make in the designated areas.7 (Tr. 43–44, 148; GC Exh.
5, art. II.)
On October 29, 2010, the bargaining teams met for one of
their regularly scheduled sessions. At that session, Vallera
expressed concern about the new management-rights clause
that the College proposed. Vallera explained that PFAC ob-
jected to the proposal because it seemed regressive and sought
a waiver of effects bargaining, and because the parties had just
settled (on October 22, 2010) a case in which PFAC alleged
that the College failed and refused to bargain with PFAC about
the effects of changes that the College made to course credit
hours in the photography department. (Tr. 49; GC Exh. 4.)
When Vallera asked why the College was making such a pro-
posal, general counsel Annice Kelly cited the parties’ dispute
about course credit hours that led to the settlement, and asserted
that the College did not want to have a dispute with effects
bargaining arise in the future. PFAC did not agree to the Col-
lege’s proposal; the College, however, retained its manage-
ment-rights clause proposal as negotiations proceeded. (Tr.
49–50, 148–149; GC Exhs. 6(a), p. 1, 6(b), pp. 1-3; see also GC
Exh. 8, art. II (March 30, 2011 proposal that included the same
version of the management-rights clause that the College pro-
posed in October 2010).)
c. Initial progress towards an agreement
Notwithstanding their disagreements on certain issues, from
April to mid-September 2011, the parties were able to identify
and set aside NIDs for several aspects of the contract. (Tr. 64;
GC Exh. 9.) For example, as of June 9, 2011, the parties had
identified NIDs for the following areas: college/[PFAC] rela-
tionship (art. IV of the contract); governance (art. VI); and
grievance procedures (art. XII). Similarly, as of September 23,
2011, the parties determined that the policy statement regarding
performance evaluations for PFAC members was a NID.8 (GC
Exh. 9.) At the September 23, 2011 bargaining session, how-
ever, Love reiterated the College’s position that all NIDs would
still be open for negotiation when the College reviewed the
proposed new collective-bargaining agreement as a whole. (R.
Exh. 85.)
d. Summer 2011—changes to the bargaining process
and the College’s bargaining team
With the arrival of late summer/early fall 2011 came certain
changes to the bargaining process. First, the parties switched
from a traditional to a “small group” bargaining format. (Tr.
52–53, 364, 458–459.) With small group bargaining (a/k/a
“sidebar” negotiations), the parties sent only one or two repre-

7 The new language appeared in the first paragraph of the manage-
ment-rights clause, and stated: “All the rights and responsibilities of
[the College], including the effects or impact of their decision to exer-
cise such rights and responsibilities, shall be retained and exercised in
their sole discretion . . .” (GC Exh. 5, art. II (emphasis added).)
8 Although it did not reach the status of being a NID, on July 22,
2011, the College presented a draft proposal for contract language
about instructional continuity. In general, the draft instructional conti-
nuity language outlined special procedures that the College would
follow to assist with ensuring that part-time faculty members who have
taught 51 or more credit hours at the College are assigned classes to
teach in the fall and spring semesters. (Tr. 112–113; GC Exh. 34.)
COLUMBIA COLLEGE CHICAGO 19
sentatives to bargaining sessions, instead of the entire bargain-
ing team. To facilitate open discussion and exchange of infor-
mation, small group bargaining sessions did not include attor-
neys or human resources office representatives. Discussions in
the small group sessions were viewed as off the record, and
thus were not meant to be memorialized by any bargaining
notes. (Tr. 459–460, 1011–1012, 1181.)
Second, Love began phasing out her role as a member of the
College’s bargaining team, and Leonard Strazewski joined the
College’s bargaining team in late summer 2011 to take Love’s
place. (Tr. 458, 479, 481, 1003–1004.) Since Strazewski was
not familiar with status of bargaining (or the term NID) when
he joined the process, both he and Love served together on the
bargaining team for a while, and the College’s bargaining team
jointly helped Strazewski get up to speed. (Tr. 479, 1006,
1011, 1115–1116.) Strazewski was not briefed, however, on
what specific NIDs the parties identified before he joined the
College’s bargaining team. (Tr. 1120.)
e. The College resubmits its March 30, 2011 contract
proposal, and disputes arise about the status
and progress of negotiations
On September 30, the General Counsel issued the complaint
in Case 30–CA–018888. (GC Exh. 10(a).) Respondent re-
ceived a copy of the complaint on October 6. (GC Exh. 10(b).)
The next day, on October 7, the College and PFAC met for a
small group collective-bargaining session. At that meeting,
PFAC made a proposal regarding instructional continuity. In
response, Strazewski rejected the instructional continuity pro-
posal in its entirety, and advised PFAC that the College was
resubmitting its March 30 contract proposal. When the media-
tor and Vallera asked Strazewski whether he was aware of the
various proposals (including NIDs) that the parties had ex-
changed since March 30, Strazewski replied that he was not
aware of that history, and was simply following the instructions
of the College’s office of general counsel to submit the March
30 proposal. The meeting then ended, but not before Vallera
questioned whether Strazewski had sufficient authority to bar-
gain on behalf of the College. (Tr. 66–69, 1016–1017.)
On October 21,9 Vallera sent an email to Love to express
PFAC’s concern that the College was engaging in regressive
bargaining.10 First, Vallera expressed concern about the Col-
lege’s decision to return to its March 30 contract proposal, not-
ing that in doing so, the College would eliminate a number of
proposals that the parties discussed and/or agreed were not in
dispute. Second, Vallera questioned the timing of the College’s
decision, which in her view came “on the heels of the decision
by the National Labor Relations Board to issue a complaint
against the College” in Case 30–CA–018888. In light of those
concerns, Vallera asked Love to clarify the College’s position

9 The parties did not meet for bargaining on October 14 because
Vallera had a scheduling conflict and canceled the meeting. (GC Exh.
11.) The parties did meet for a small group bargaining session on Oc-
tober 21, but Vallera was not present in the bargaining room when she
sent her email. (Tr. 1015–1016.)
10 Vallera emailed Love because she still questioned Strazewski’s
authority to bargain for the College, and Love was Strazewski’s prede-
cessor as the leader of the College’s bargaining team. (Tr. 75.)
as to the status of contract negotiations. (Tr. 75, 1016; GC Exh.
13.)
Love replied to Vallera’s email on October 25. Instead of
addressing Vallera’s concerns directly, Love asserted that
through her email, Vallera broke the ground rules that the par-
ties set for small group (sidebar) negotiations. Specifically,
Love stated:
It is unfortunate that once again you have decided to breach
the guidelines that both sides agreed upon when we entered
into the “side bar” form of negotiations. You will recall that
both sides agreed that everything would be “off the record”
and there would not be any actual or threatened grievances or
[unfair labor practices (ULPs)] filed as a result of what was
stated in the side bar. Your e-mail of October 21, 2011 vio-
lates both the spirit of the side bar negotiations and the letter
of it.
As a result, Columbia requires that P-Fac reaffirm its position
that conversations that take place in the side bar are off the
record and will not be used as grounds for a ULP or griev-
ance. Without this confirmation from P-Fac, which Columbia
views as necessary to have any sort of trust that P-Fac can be
taken at its word, Columbia will have to rethink whether the
side bar is the best format for it to negotiate.
(GC Exh. 14.)
The College and PFAC convened for bargaining on October
28, but sat in different rooms so the mediator could speak with
each party separately about whether they would continue with
small group bargaining (PFAC’s preference), or proceed using
a different format (the College’s preference). (Tr. 80, 1021; see
also R. Exh. 51.) Once it became clear that the parties could
not agree on a process to use for negotiations, the mediator
notified the parties that he was withdrawing because he was not
adding anything to the process. (Tr. 80; R. Exh. 51.)
f. November 2011—the College decides to suspend
negotiations until it prepares and submits a
new contract proposal for PFAC to review
Because of some miscommunication and confusion between
the parties about when they would next meet for bargaining, the
parties did not meet on November 4 (the customary Friday
morning meeting). (Tr. 81; GC Exhs. 16–17; R. Exh. 51.)
However, the point became moot on November 10, when the
College decided that it wanted to prepare and submit a new
contract proposal for PFAC to review before the parties re-
sumed face to face negotiations.11 As Love explained to
Vallera via email:
Diana: Based on our small group discussions and as a way to
move forward, the College is preparing another comprehen-
sive contract proposal. Until this proposal is ready and you
have reviewed it, we do not see the need to meet. We hope to

11 Strazewski explained that he recommended that the College do a
new contract proposal because the March 30 proposal contained some
ambiguous language that he believed was creating some problems in
understanding what was being negotiated. Strazewski also maintained
that in the College’s view, it would be beneficial for the parties to re-
turn to discussing specific, concrete proposals. (Tr. 1024–1025, 1060.)
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD20
have this proposal completed by the middle of December and
will forward to you and the P-Fac team. We propose that
your team then take time to review the proposal and get back
to us sometime in January.
(GC Exh. 18.) Vallera opposed the College’s plan to prepare a
new contract proposal and expressed PFAC’s preference to
resume small group bargaining sessions, but Love responded
that the College would send PFAC a new contract proposal in
December as planned. (GC Exhs. 19–20.)
g. December 2011—the Colleges sends PFAC a
new contract proposal
On December 19, the College sent PFAC its new contract
proposal for review.12 In its December contract proposal, the
College deleted the “instructional continuity” language from
the contract, such that it would no longer be obligated to make
an effort to find replacement class assignments for certain expe-
rienced part-time faculty members whose usual classes were
canceled or dropped from the schedule. (Tr. 89–90, 1026–
1027, 1126, 1157–1159; GC Exh. 21(b), art. VIII; compare R.
Exh. 1, art. VII, sec. 2 and GC Exh. 34 (July 2011 instructional
continuity proposal prepared by the College).) The College
also modified contract language about disciplinary procedures
to eliminate the requirement that disciplinary action be based
on “just cause,” and modified the language about the scope of
the contract to state that the contract constituted the entire
agreement between PFAC and the College, such that the Col-
lege had no obligation to bargain about any matters (including
any past practices) while the contract was in effect. (GC Exh.
21(b), arts. X and XVI; compare R. Exh. 1, arts. X and XIV.)
Regarding the NIDs, the College stood firm on its rejection
of virtually all NIDs unless they were consistent with the Col-
lege’s March 30 proposal. Specifically, the College handled
the NIDs as follows:
Existing (2006-
2010) Contract
Section
NID Reached
(date of NID)
Incorporated in
the College’s De-
cember 2011 Con-
tract Proposal?
Article IV, Sec-
tion 1–President–
Association Meet-
ings
NID reached–
accept language
in March 30
contract pro-
posal (April 20,
2011)
Yes
Article IV, Sec-
tion 2–Bulletin
Boards/Website
NID reached–
maintain exist-
ing contract
language (April
22, 2011)
No. College re-
turned to its March
30 proposal, which
was limited to
bulletin board
access.
Article IV, Sec-
tion 3(A)–
notification of
NID reached–
accept language
in April 22
No. College re-
turned to its March
30 proposal (with

12 Strazewski made recommendations about what language the De-
cember proposal should include, but Annice Kelly ultimately drafted
the proposal for the College. (Tr. 1121–1122.)
Existing (2006-
2010) Contract
Section
NID Reached
(date of NID)
Incorporated in
the College’s De-
cember 2011 Con-
tract Proposal?
full-time positions proposal (April
22, 2011)
minor language
modifications).
Article IV, Sec-
tion 3(B)–
application pro-
cessing for full-
time positions
NID reached–
accept language
in March 30
contract pro-
posal (April 20,
2011)
Yes
Article IV, Sec-
tions 4, 5 & 7–
office space, copy
machine, meeting
space
NID reached–
maintain exist-
ing contract
language, which
was identical to
the language in
the March 30
contract pro-
posal (April 20,
2011)
Yes
Article IV, Sec-
tion 6–campus
mail
NID reached
(June 9, 2011)
No. College re-
turned to its March
30 proposal.
Article IV, Sec-
tion 8–personnel
file
NID reached
(June 9, 2011)
No. College re-
turned to its March
30 proposal (with
minor language
modifications).
Article IV, Sec-
tion 9–evaluation
NID to move
this section to
another part of
the contract.
(April 20, 2011)
NID reached re:
performance
evaluation poli-
cy statement
(September 23,
2011)
No. The College
retained the evalu-
ation section in the
same part of the
contract, and pro-
posed new contract
language re: evalu-
ations.
The College did
not comment on
the status of the
performance eval-
uation policy
statement.
Article IV, Sec-
tion 10–
bargaining unit
eligibility list
NID reached–
accept language
in March 30
contract pro-
posal (April 20,
2011)
Yes.
Article IV, Sec-
tion 12–copy of
agreement
NID reached
(June 9, 2011)
No. Consistent
with its March 30
proposal, the Col-
lege deleted this
clause.
Article VI, Sec-
tion 1–department
NID reached–
remove “direc-
No. College re-
turned to its March
COLUMBIA COLLEGE CHICAGO 21
Existing (2006-
2010) Contract
Section
NID Reached
(date of NID)
Incorporated in
the College’s De-
cember 2011 Con-
tract Proposal?
meetings tors” from
meeting list, but
otherwise main-
tain existing
contract lan-
guage (April 20,
2011)
30 proposal.
Article VI, Sec-
tion 2–joint meet-
ing of full and
part-time faculty
NID reached re:
meeting proce-
dure (April 20,
2011)
No. College re-
turned to its March
30 proposal (with
minor language
modifications).
However, the NID
was similar in
nature and content
to the March 30
proposal.
Article VI, Sec-
tion 4-7–search
committees for
college admin-
istration
NID reached -
accept language
in March 30
contract pro-
posal (April 20,
2011)
Yes, with minor
language modifica-
tions.
Article VI, Sec-
tion 8–Payment
for committee
work
NID reached.
Move to Sec-
tion 9. (April
20, 2011)
Yes, in Section 8.
NID language was
similar to language
in the March 30
contract proposal.
Article VI (new
sections)
NIDs reached
re: curricular
committee (to
become Section
8), Board of
Trustee faculty
representation
and training
programs (see
June 9, 2011)
Curricular commit-
tee–yes, in Section
7. NID language
was similar to
language in the
March 30 contract
proposal (Section
8).
Training pro-
grams–yes, in
Section 9. NID
language was simi-
lar to language in
the March 30 con-
tract proposal
(Section 10).
Board of Trustee
faculty representa-
tion–no (clause
deleted).
Article IX, Sec-
tion 2–grievance
informal resolu-
tion
NID reached
(May 6, 2011)
No. College re-
turned to its March
30 proposal.
Article IX, Sec- NID reached– No. The College
Existing (2006-
2010) Contract
Section
NID Reached
(date of NID)
Incorporated in
the College’s De-
cember 2011 Con-
tract Proposal?
tion 3–grievance
step 2
accept language
in March 30
proposal (May
6, 2011)
modified its March
30 proposal to
limit the number of
PFAC representa-
tives that may
attend the step 2
grievance meeting.
Article IX, Sec-
tion 4–grievance
time limits
NID reached
(May 2, 2011)
Yes. NID lan-
guage was identi-
cal to language in
the March 30 pro-
posal.
Article XII, Sec-
tion 1–contract
administration
NID reached
(April 22, 2011)
No. College re-
turned to its March
30 proposal. (See
December 2011
proposal, Article
XIII, Section 1.)
Article XII, Sec-
tion 4–union leave
NID reached -
maintain exist-
ing contract
language, but
move to a dif-
ferent part of
the contract
(April 20, 2011)
Yes. (See Decem-
ber 2011 Proposal,
Article XIV, Sec-
tion 4.)
(GC Exhs. 8–9, 21(b); R. Exh. 1.)
Last, the College modified the management-rights clause to
strengthen the effects bargaining waiver that it sought from
PFAC. Specifically, the December 2011 proposal set forth the
following proposed management-rights clause:
Columbia College Chicago and its Board of Trustees (the
“College”) retain the sole and exclusive right to determine and
manage the College’s operations, except as may be limited by
a specific, express provision of this Agreement. The College
shall not be required to bargain over matters of inherent man-
agerial policy or other managerial rights, including as set forth
herein. Similarly, the College shall not be required to bargain
over the effects or impact of its decisions regarding such mat-
ters on unit members. Managerial rights over which the Col-
lege is not required to bargain include but are in no way lim-
ited to:
A. The right to plan, establish, terminate, modify and im-
plement all aspects of educational policies and practices,
including curricula; admission and graduation require-
ments and standards; . . . and the establishment, expan-
sion, subcontracting, reduction, modification, alteration,
combination, or transfer of any job, department, pro-
gram, course, institute or other academic or non-
academic activity and the staffing of the activity, except
as may be modified by this Agreement.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD22
B. The right to manage the College and direct the College’s
property, including fiscal and budgetary policy and their
implementation . . . except as may be modified by this
Agreement.
C. The right to hire, direct, transfer, assign, terminate,
layoff, discipline, appoint, reappoint, and evaluate its
employees and to establish, modify, and discontinue
rules and regulations of procedure, conduct, policies,
standards, and practices relating to the performance of
work, including workload, scheduling of work and its
location and criteria and qualifications for appointment,
retention, and promotion of employees, except as may
be expressly modified by this Agreement.
This enumeration of managerial rights is not all-
inclusive but rather illustrates the type of matters which
belong to and are inherent in management and shall not
be deemed to exclude managerial rights not specifically
listed. This provision is intended to constitute a clear
and unmistakable waiver of any rights [PFAC] might
otherwise have to bargain over managerial rights and/or
the effects or impact on unit members of the College’s
decisions with respect to such rights.
(GC Exh. 21(b), art. II (emphasis added).) The College invited
PFAC to notify Strazewski when it was ready to resume Friday
morning negotiations. (Tr. 462–463; GC Exh. 21(a).)
h. February 2012—the College declines PFAC’s
requests for face to face negotiations until PFAC
responds to the College’s December 2011
contract proposal
On February 13, 2012, Vallera emailed Love to express con-
cern that the parties had not held a face to face bargaining ses-
sion since October 2011, and to ask for dates that the College
would be available to resume face to face negotiations. Vallera
asserted that PFAC intended to pick up negotiations from
where the parties stood in October 2011, and essentially disre-
gard the College’s December 2011 contract proposal because
PFAC believed it to be regressive and in violation of the law.
(GC Exh. 24.)
On February 16, Strazewski replied to Vallera. Strazewski
reminded Vallera that Love was no longer part of the College’s
bargaining team, and accordingly asked Vallera to direct future
communications about bargaining to him. Strazewski then
asserted that PFAC’s own actions led to the current bargaining
process of exchanging proposals, and asked PFAC to either
provide the College with comments about the College’s De-
cember 2011 contract proposal, or alternatively make a coun-
terproposal. (GC Exh. 25.)
After Strazewski’s February 16 email, the parties came to a
stalemate, with PFAC periodically asking the College to re-
sume face to face bargaining sessions that picked up from
where the parties left off in October 2011, and with the College
responding that bargaining was taking place in writing, and that
PFAC needed to respond to the College’s December 2011 con-
tract proposal to move bargaining forward. (GC Exhs. 26–31;
see also Tr. 1034, 1036, 1154 (explaining the College’s posi-
tion that it was engaging in bargaining by presenting its De-
cember 2011 contract proposal to PFAC for review and re-
sponse).) However, on April 24, PFAC changed its position
slightly when renewed its request that the College propose
some dates to meet for bargaining, but stated that it would re-
spond to the College’s December 2011 proposal at the request-
ed face-to-face negotiation session. (Tr. 109; GC Exh. 32.)
i. June 2012—the College agrees to resume face-
to-face negotiations
On June 13, 2012, Strazewski contacted Vallera to schedule
a bargaining session on a variety of issues, including bargaining
for a successor collective-bargaining agreement. (Tr. 1041; R.
Exh. 61.) The parties thereafter resumed face-to-face negotia-
tions, with the first session after the standoff occurring on June
25, 2012. (R. Exh. 60.)
3. Discussion and analysis
The Board has recognized that the obligation to meet for
bargaining is of central importance. As the Board has stated,
the obligation to bargain “encompasses the affirmative duty to
make expeditious and prompt arrangements, within reason, for
meeting and conferring. Agreement is stifled at its source if
opportunity is not accorded for discussion or so delayed as to
invite or prolong unrest or suspicion. It is not unreasonable to
expect of a party to collective-bargaining that he display a de-
gree of diligence and promptness in arranging for collective-
bargaining sessions when they are requested, and in the elimi-
nation of obstacles thereto, comparable to that which he would
display in his other business affairs of importance.” J. H.
Rutter-Rex Mfg. Co., 86 NLRB 470, 506 (1949); see also Car-
ibe Staple Co., 313 NLRB 877, 893 (1994) (noting that “con-
siderations of personal convenience, including geographic or
professional conflicts, do not take the precedence over the stat-
utory demand that the bargaining process take place with expe-
dition and regularity”). In light of the importance of the obliga-
tion to meet for bargaining, the Board has held that a party that
limits, delays or refuses meetings for bargaining violates Sec-
tion 8(a)(5) of the Act. Lancaster Nissan, 344 NLRB 225, 227
(2005), enfd. 233 Fed. Appx. 100 (3d Cir. 2007).
In this case, the Acting General Counsel alleges that starting
on February 16, 2012, the College unlawfully refused to meet
and bargain with PFAC about a successor collective-bargaining
agreement. The relevant facts regarding that allegation are not
in dispute. After receiving and reviewing the College’s De-
cember 2011 contract proposal, PFAC contacted the College on
February 13, 2012, to schedule dates to resume face-to-face
negotiations. In the same communication, PFAC rejected the
College’s December 2011 contract proposal as regressive and
unlawful, and asserted that the parties should pick up negotia-
tions from where they stood in October 2011. Instead of pro-
posing dates for a face to face meeting as PFAC requested, on
February 16, 2012, the College set a precondition that PFAC
either respond to its December 2011 contract proposal or make
a counterproposal before the parties resumed face-to-face nego-
tiations.13 The College did not abandon its precondition until
June 13, 2012. (FOF, secs. h–i, supra.)

13 I am not persuaded by the College’s argument that it was not set-
ting a precondition to face-to-face negotiations, but rather was attempt-
COLUMBIA COLLEGE CHICAGO 23
The College’s decision to set a precondition for PFAC to sat-
isfy before the College would resume face-to-face negotiations
was unlawful. Under Section 8(d) of the Act, employers and
unions alike have a mutual obligation to meet at reasonable
times and confer in good faith about mandatory subjects of
bargaining such as wages, hours, and terms and conditions of
employment. Riverside Cement Co., 305 NLRB 815, 818
(1991) (discussing Sec. 8(d)), enfd. 976 F.2d 731 (5th Cir.
1992). Since the parties’ negotiations for a successor collec-
tive-bargaining agreement implicated a variety of mandatory
subjects of bargaining, the College was obligated to meet with
PFAC at a reasonable time for contract negotiations without
preconditions. Id. at 818–819 (finding that it was unlawful for
an employer to precondition bargaining on the presence of a
Federal mediator); see also Vanguard Fire & Security Systems,
345 NLRB 1016, 1017 (2005) (finding that it was unlawful for
the employer to precondition bargaining on the union providing
a detailed proposal and agenda), enfd. 468 F.3d 952 (6th Cir.
2006); Beverly Farm Foundation, 323 NLRB 787, 793 (1997)
(noting that an employer that responds to a bargaining invita-
tion by insisting on “negotiating by mail or demanding that a
union submit its proposals in writing has unlawfully refused to
bargain”), enfd. 144 F.3d 1048 (7th Cir. 1998). The College
failed to fulfill its obligation to meet and bargain with PFAC
from February 16 to June 13, 2012 (at a minimum),14 and I
therefore find that the College violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1)
of the Act as alleged in paragraph XI(c) of the complaint.
B. Bargaining Over the Impact and Effects of
Course Credit Hour Changes
1. Complaint allegations
The complaint alleges that since on or about February 21,
2012, Respondent has failed and refused to bargain with PFAC
about the impact and effects of Respondent’s implementation
of its decision to reduce course credit hours in several depart-
ments. (GC Exh. 1(ff), par. IX(b) (alleging violation of Sec.
8(a)(5) and (1).)
2. Findings of fact
a. Overview of course credit hours
Under the collective-bargaining agreement, part-time faculty
members are paid wages for each course that they teach, with
the wage rate depending on the number of credit hours that the
course requires, and the total number of credit hours that the
faculty member has taught at the College (with more experi-
enced faculty earning a higher wage). By way of example, in
the 2009–2010 academic year, the College paid part-time facul-
ty between $3756 and $4700 for each three-credit hour course

ing to negotiate with PFAC about how to resume negotiations. (See R.
Posttrial Br. at 57–58.) As explained in the findings of fact, the College
was adamant that it would not resume face-to-face negotiations until
PFAC either responded to the College’s December 2011 contract pro-
posal or submitted a counterproposal. (FOF, sec. g, supra.)
14 The Acting General Counsel and PFAC allege that from June
2012, onward, the College continued to violate Sec. 8(a)(5) of the Act
by offering only limited time periods for bargaining. (See GC Posttrial
Br. at 18–19; PFAC Posttrial Br. at 35.) I need not rule on that theory
since it will not materially affect the remedy in this case.
that they taught. The College prorates the pay rate per credit
hour if the faculty member teaches a course that is more, or
less, than three credit hours. (R. Exh. 1, art. XI.)
As part of its ongoing operations (including evaluating and
updating its curricula), the College occasionally changes the
number of credits that it awards for particular courses. Course
credit hour changes occur to account for (among other possi-
bilities): changes to the course content; changes in, or a reas-
sessment of, how the course is taught;15 and changes in the
curriculum for a particular department or major (e.g., to make
room for a new course, a department reduces time spent on
other courses). (Tr. 540–541, 622; R. Exh. 10.)
b. Prior disagreements between PFAC and the College
concerning course credit hours
Although changes to course credit hours and other curricu-
lum changes (such as changes to course prerequisites and the
classification of a course as required or elective) can affect the
terms and conditions of employment of part-time faculty at the
College,16 PFAC has been inconsistent with requesting im-
pact/effects bargaining for these types of changes. (Tr. 537–
538, 592, 604–605, 655, 668.)
However, on October 22, 2010, the College and PFAC
reached a settlement in Case 13–CA–046171, in which the
College agreed to meet and bargain with PFAC about the ef-
fects of changes that the College made to the course credit
hours for certain courses in the photography department. (Tr.
40–41, 463; GC Exh. 4; see also GC Exh. 3 (unfair labor prac-
tice charge filed on July 23, 2010).) Consistent with the Octo-
ber 2010 settlement, the College and PFAC bargained about the
effects of course credit hour reductions in approximately 15
courses in the photography department. (See, e.g., R. Exh. 4.)
During those discussions, the College notified PFAC that it
planned to reduce the credit hours for the following two courses
in the 2011–2012 academic year: Art Director/Commercial
Photography (course 22–3500); and Art Director/Copywriter
Team (course 22–3525). (R. Exhs. 4–5.) At a bargaining ses-
sion on March 4, 2011, PFAC promised to respond in writing to
the information that the College provided about changing the
credit hours for those two courses, but ultimately did not pursue
the matter further. (R. Exh. 6.)

15 The College has a formula that calculates credit hours based on
the number of hours that the professor spends with the students (contact
hours), and the type of instruction that occurs during those contact
hours. Thus, for example, a lecture/discussion course receives 1 credit
hour for each contact hour per week, a studio course receives 1 credit
hour for every 1.33 contact hours per week, and a laboratory course
receives one credit hour for every 2 contact hours per week. (R. Exh.
10.)
16 Changes in course credit hours have a direct effect on PFAC
members because the College uses course credit hours to calculate the
wages that it pays part-time faculty for the courses that they teach, and
because PFAC members earn higher wages as their total number of
credit hours taught increases. (Tr. 39, 126–127, 537–538; R. Exh. 1.)
Meanwhile, the example curriculum changes noted above (changes to
prerequisites and whether students are required to take a course) can
have an effect on how many students sign up for a particular course,
and in turn reduce (or increase) course assignment opportunities for
PFAC members. (Tr. 591, 610–611.)
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD24
c. The school of fine and performing arts decides to
change the number of credit hours awarded
for certain courses
In the same timeframe (starting in spring 2010), College ad-
ministrators in the school of fine and performing arts began
implementing a strategic plan to evaluate that school’s curricu-
lum. (Tr. 576, 586.) As part of that process, departments re-
viewed their existing courses to determine whether they were
classified correctly (e.g., as a lecture/discussion, a studio, a
laboratory), and whether other modifications were warranted
(such as updated course content, a different course description,
etc.).17 (Tr. 576–578, 599, 622–623, 651; R. Exh. 18; see also
Tr. 604, 607 (explaining that a change to an existing course
could include a change to the number of credit hours or to
course pre-requisites, or more minor changes to the course
description or title).)
The school of fine and performing arts ultimately decided to
reduce the credit hours for the following 10 courses, with the
changes to take effect in the 2011–2012 school year: Account-
ing; Art Director/Commercial Photography; Art Direc-
tor/Copywriter Team; Screenwriting Workshop; Adaptation in
LA; Acquiring Intellectual Property/LA; Theory, Harmony &
Analysis I; Theory, Harmony & Analysis II; Directing I; and
Pro Survival & How to Audition.18 (R. Exh. 11 (indicating that
the school also increased the credit hours for 11 other courses).)
In various semesters since 2006, part-time faculty taught class
sections for each of the 10 courses slated for reduced credit
hours.19 (R. Exh. 12.)
In March 2011, the College posted its fall 2011 course offer-
ings on OASIS (an online course catalog) for students to re-
view, including the courses that would count for a reduced
number of credit hours. (Tr. 562–563.) On May 2, 2011, the
College notified part-time faculty members of their fall 2011
class assignments, including several class assignments to the

17 The school of fine and performing arts also asked its departments
to review their degree requirements to ensure that they were consistent
with national standards and College policy. (Tr. 586–588.) Through
that review, which was completed by December 2010, some depart-
ments reduced their credit hour requirements to conform to a national
standard of 36 to 42 credits for a BA degree. (Tr. 587–590; R. Exh. 17
(indicating, for example, that BA’s in Art History and Dance would
each require 42 credits) (down from 51 and 57 credits, respectively).)
Although the reduction in course credits required for certain majors
could affect PFAC members (e.g., by changing a required course for a
major to an elective, which could reduce the number of students who
enrolled in the course), PFAC did not ask the College to bargain about
this issue. (Tr. 591–592.)
18 For 3 of the 10 affected courses in the school of fine and perform-
ing arts (Screenwriting Workshop; Adaptation in LA; and Acquiring
Intellectual Property), the reduction in credit hours (from three to two
credits) only applied to graduate students taking the courses. Under-
graduates taking those three courses continued to earn three credits, and
the part-time faculty member continued to be paid for teaching a three-
credit course. (Tr. 572–575.)
19 Separately in March 2011, the school of media arts decided to re-
duce the credit hours (from three credits to two credits) for the follow-
ing two courses in the journalism department: Local Government Poli-
tics Seminar; and State and National Government Politics Seminar.
(Tr. 513–514, 528.)
courses that had reduced credit hours. (Tr. 578–584; R. Exhs.
13–15.)
d. PFAC asks the College to bargain over the effects
of the changes to course credit hours
On December 20, 2011, Diana Vallera emailed Louise Love
because she learned that course credit hours may have been
reduced in various departments. Vallera asked Love for a list
of all classes that had their credit hours reduced in the past 12
months, and requested that the College bargain with PFAC over
the impact and effects of its decision to reduce the credit hours
for certain courses. (GC Exh. 49.) On January 20, 2012, Love
acknowledged receiving Vallera’s email, and advised Vallera
that the College was preparing a reply. (GC Exh. 50.)
e. The arbitrator’s decision in employee R.P.’s grievance
about teaching assignments
On February 12, 2012, an arbitrator issued an award in a
grievance that part-time faculty member R.P. filed against the
College. R.P. claimed that the College violated the collective-
bargaining agreement when it did not assign R.P. a class to
teach in the fall 2010 semester (R.P. was initially assigned a
class, but the College withdrew that assignment before the fall
2010 semester began). (GC Exh. 54.) After reviewing the
collective-bargaining agreement, the arbitrator found that the
agreement “carefully established that an adjunct, or part-time,
instructor is employed only when he or she is teaching a course
during a finite period of time. Between teaching assignments
the adjunct has no status as an employee. He or she is hired
solely for the period of time during which the teaching oc-
curs.”20 (GC Exh. 54, p. 10.) Accordingly, the arbitrator ruled
that the College did not violate the collective-bargaining
agreement when it withdrew R.P.’s teaching assignment, be-
cause R.P. was an applicant for employment and thus “had no

20 In support of his finding that part-time faculty members are em-
ployed only when they are teaching a course during a finite period of
time, the arbitrator cited the following provisions from the collective-
bargaining agreement (among others):
The final decision of who teaches each course is the sole prerogative
of the department Chairperson. (Article VII, Section 2);
The receipt and submission of a teaching availability form by a unit
member does not obligate the College in any way to provide an ap-
pointment or a particular assignment to that unit member. . . . In addi-
tion, every form must include the following statement: “Submission of
this form constitutes a request, not a guarantee of teaching assignment.
Further, since course enrollment, as well as your qualifications and
evaluations, determine teaching assignments, no assignment can be
considered final until student registration is completed. (Article VII,
Section 4); and
The College may suspend, with or without pay, discharge, or take oth-
er appropriate disciplinary action against a unit member for just cause.
. . . For purposes of this Agreement, “discharge” shall mean termina-
tion of employment during a semester and shall not refer to the failure
to rehire or to renew a faculty member’s appointment to teach for fu-
ture semesters. This Article X shall not apply to decisions by the Col-
lege not to rehire or not to renew a unit member’s appointment to
teach future semesters. (Article X, Section 1).
(GC Exh. 54, pp. 2–3, 10–12.)
COLUMBIA COLLEGE CHICAGO 25
standing to question his future employment.” (GC Exh. 54, p.
12.)
f. The College responds to PFAC’s request
for effects bargaining
On February 21, 2012, Associate Vice President for Aca-
demic Affairs Susan Marcus sent Vallera a list of courses for
which the College reduced the number of credit hours awarded.
The list included the 10 courses that the school of fine and per-
forming arts modified after its curriculum review, as well as 2
additional courses from the school of media arts (journalism
department). (GC Exh. 51; see also Tr. 513–515, 540–541
(explaining that the journalism department reduced the course
credit hours for two seminars on local, State, and national Gov-
ernment to make room for a new course about digital journal-
ism).)
That same day, Associate Provost for Faculty Affairs Leon-
ard Strazewski notified Vallera that although the College did
not believe that it had an obligation to bargain with PFAC
about the issue of course credit hour reductions,21 the College
was willing meet to discuss the issue if PFAC first gave the
College a proposal regarding the effects, and a list of PFAC
members that have been affected by the changes to course cred-
it hours. (GC Exh. 52; see also Tr. 1131.)
Vallera responded to Strazewski’s email on March 23, 2012.
Vallera renewed PFAC’s request that the College bargain, but
asserted that the bargaining should cover both the decision to
change course credit hours and the effects of that decision.
(GC Exh. 30; compare GC Exh. 49 (requesting only effects
bargaining).) Regarding Strazewski’s request that PFAC pro-
vide a list of bargaining members who were affected by the
changes to course credit hours, Vallera responded that the Col-
lege should have that information, and requested that the Col-
lege send PFAC a list of all part-time faculty members who had
taught the courses with reduced credit hours since spring 2011.
(GC Exh. 30.)
On April 16, 2012, Strazewski wrote to Vallera to reiterate
the College’s position that it did not believe it had an obligation
to bargain with PFAC about the changes to course credit hours.
Strazewski also renewed the College’s request that PFAC iden-
tify any bargaining unit members who were affected by the
credit hour changes, since the College’s view was that no bar-
gaining unit members were affected. In the College’s view, it
could not “fulfill any bargaining obligation unless and until the
Union responds to Columbia’s information request by specify-
ing what it wants to bargain and who it believes was affected.”

21 Strazewski’s assertion was consistent with the position that the
College took when it submitted a position statement to the Board on
February 23, 2012, in response to an unfair labor practice charge that
PFAC filed in Case 13–CA–073487 to allege that the College refused
to respond to its information request or engage in effects bargaining
about the College’s decision to reduce the credit hours that it awarded
for certain courses. (GC Exh. 53 (position statement); GC Exh. 1(c)
(January 30, 2012 charge in Case 13–CA–073487).) In its position
statement, the College cited the arbitrator’s decision in R.P.’s grievance
to support its assertion that “effects bargaining is inappropriate because
bargaining unit members are not guaranteed continued employment and
do not have standing under the contract to question any future reas-
signments of classes.” (GC Exh. 53, p. 5.)
(GC Exh. 31 (also noting that the College would respond to
PFAC’s March 23, 2012 information request in the order that it
was received).)
On May 4, 2012, a breakthrough of sorts occurred when
Strazewski notified PFAC that it was willing to meet to discuss
the reductions to course credit hours, notwithstanding the Col-
lege’s belief that no effects bargaining was required and the
parties’ unresolved dispute about who should identify the bar-
gaining unit members affected by the changes. (R. Exh. 58.)
PFAC and the College accordingly participated in a bargaining
session about the reductions to course credit hours (and other
issues) on June 25, 2012, and again on July 20, 2012. (R. Exhs.
60, 62.)
3. Discussion and analysis
The Board has held that “[a]n employer has an obligation to
give a union notice and an opportunity to bargain about the
effects on union employees of a managerial decision even if it
has no obligation to bargain about the decision itself.” Allison
Corp., 330 NLRB 1363, 1365 (2000) (citing First National
Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 681–682 (1981)).
As part of its effects bargaining obligations, the employer has a
duty to give preimplementation notice to the union to allow for
meaningful effects bargaining. Allison Corp., 330 NLRB at
1366.
There is no dispute that by March 2011, the College had
made a decision to reduce the number of credit hours that it
would award for 12 courses. Although the College was aware
of PFAC’s concerns about course credit hour reductions (hav-
ing just settled a case in October 2010 about similar reductions
in the photography department), it did not notify PFAC before
it implemented the March 2011 changes to course credit hours
for 10 of the 12 courses. (FOF, sects. b–c, supra (noting that
the College did advise PFAC that it planned to reduce the credit
hours for Art Director/Commercial Photography, and Art Di-
rector/Copywriter Team).) When Vallera asked the College in
December 2011 to engage in effects bargaining, on February
21, 2012, the College agreed to bargain, but only on the pre-
condition that PFAC first submit a proposal regarding the ef-
fects, and a list of PFAC members that have been affected by
the changes to course credit hours. (FOF, sec. f, supra.)
The College’s decision to set preconditions for PFAC to sat-
isfy before the parties engaged in effects bargaining was unlaw-
ful. Under Section 8(d) of the Act, employers and unions alike
have a mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and confer
in good faith about mandatory subjects of bargaining such as
wages, hours and terms and conditions of employment. River-
side Cement Co., 305 NLRB at 818 (discussing Sec. 8(d)).
Since the changes to course credit hours affected the wages and
terms and conditions of employment of PFAC members, the
changes were mandatory subjects of bargaining, and the Col-
lege therefore was obligated to meet with PFAC at a reasonable
time for effects bargaining without preconditions.22 Id. at 818–

22 I also note that the arbitrator’s February 12, 2012 decision did not
relieve the College of its obligation to engage in effects bargaining with
PFAC. The College has admitted that notwithstanding the arbitrator’s
decision, PFAC represents all members of the PFAC bargaining unit
regardless of whether they are currently teaching. (GC Exh. 94(a), p. 3
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD26
819 (finding that it was unlawful for an employer to precondi-
tion bargaining on the presence of a Federal mediator); see also
Vanguard Fire & Security Systems, 345 NLRB at 1017 (finding
that it was unlawful for the employer to precondition bargain-
ing on the union providing a detailed proposal and agenda). To
the extent that the College relented in May 2012 and agreed to
participate in effects bargaining, that change in position did not
correct the prior unlawful refusal to bargain because by that
point, meaningful effects bargaining was precluded due to the
College’s failure to give PFAC preimplementation notice of the
credit hour changes, and due to the delay caused by the unlaw-
ful preconditions that the College set before it agreed to engage
in effects bargaining.
The College offered multiple arguments for why its response
to PFAC’s request for effects bargaining was lawful, but only
one of the College’s arguments has merit. As part of its de-
fense, the College maintains that PFAC waived its right to ef-
fects bargaining about the course credit hour reductions be-
cause it did not request such bargaining after receiving notice
of the changes. In making that argument, the College asserts
that PFAC should have requested bargaining in spring 2011,
when the College posted its fall 2011 course listings to its
online course catalog and notified PFAC members of their fall
2011 class assignments. See Medicenter, Mid-South Hospital,
221 NLRB 670, 678 (1975) (explaining that once a union re-
ceives adequate notice of a proposed change to the terms and
conditions of employment, the burden shifts to the union to
pursue bargaining on the matter if it wishes to do so).
I find that the College’s defense has merit regarding the
course credit hour reductions for Art Director/Commercial
Photography, and Art Director/Copywriter Team. For those
two courses, it is undisputed that the College notified PFAC in
February 2011 that the credit hours would be reduced. Since
PFAC acknowledged receiving that notification, but then took
no further action, I agree that the College did not violate the
Act when it refused to engage in effects bargaining about the
changes to those two courses when PFAC revisited the issue
several months later. By contrast, I do not find that PFAC re-
ceived adequate notice (in spring 2011 or otherwise) about the
College’s plan to reduce credit hours for the remaining 10
courses at issue.23 The College did not notify PFAC directly
about those changes, and the evidentiary record does not show
that the news of the changes made its way to PFAC by other

(position statement); GC Exh. 94(b), p. 10 (same).) The College has
contended, however, that the arbitrator’s decision establishes that
PFAC waived its right in the existing collective-bargaining agreement
to bargain about the effects of academic changes slated for future se-
mesters. (GC Exh. 94(b), p. 10.)
I disagree. By its terms, the arbitrator’s decision at most addressed
the right of individual employees to contest teaching assignments
through the grievance process. The arbitrator’s decision did not ad-
dress PFAC’s right to represent the interests of its members through
effects bargaining.
23 Those 10 courses are: Accounting; Screenwriting Workshop; Ad-
aptation in LA; Acquiring Intellectual Property/LA; Theory, Harmony
& Analysis I; Theory, Harmony & Analysis II; Directing I; Pro Surviv-
al & How to Audition; Local Government Politics Seminar; and State
and National Government Politics Seminar.
means until months after the changes took effect. See
Medicenter, Mid-South Hospital, 221 NLRB at 678 (collecting
cases that stand for the proposition that if a union receives ade-
quate notice of an employer’s intentions when there remains
sufficient opportunity to bargain, the employer cannot be fault-
ed for failing to provide formal notification). PFAC therefore
cannot be faulted for the time that passed before it learned of
the credit hour changes and asked the College to engage in
effects bargaining.24

24 The College missed the mark with the remaining arguments that it
raised about whether it violated the Act by failing to engage in effects
bargaining about the course credit hour reductions. First, the College
argued that it did not need to engage in effects bargaining because the
changes to course credit hours were not material, substantial and signif-
icant. While it is true that the Board has accepted such a defense in the
past where the disputed changes to working conditions are essentially
de minimis (see, e.g., Berkshire Nursing Home, LLC, 345 NLRB 220,
221 (2005)), that defense does not apply here because the changes to
course credit hours are material, substantial and significant insofar as
course credit hours are used to calculate the wages that PFAC members
are paid for the classes that they teach. (FOF, sect. a, supra.)
Second, the College argues that the arbitrator’s decision in employee
R.P.’s grievance established that PFAC members do not have the right
to future course assignments, or (by extension) the right to expect that
particular courses will carry a certain number of credit hours. I disa-
gree. As a preliminary matter, the College has admitted that notwith-
standing the arbitrator’s decision, PFAC represents all members of the
PFAC bargaining unit regardless of whether they are currently teach-
ing. (GC Exh. 94(a), p. 3 (position statement); GC Exh. 94(b), p. 10
(same).) Perhaps more important, by its terms, the arbitrator’s decision
at most addressed the right of individual employees to contest teaching
assignments through the grievance process. The arbitrator’s decision
did not address or limit PFAC’s right to bargain on behalf of its mem-
bers over the effects of decisions that implicate working conditions.
Third, the College maintained that PFAC waived its right to request
effects bargaining about the changes to course credit hours because the
College had a past practice of making similar changes without any
objection from PFAC. The College is correct that PFAC did not con-
sistently request bargaining when the College made changes to its
curriculum (including some significant curriculum changes, such as the
College’s decision to lower the number of credits required for majors in
the school of fine and performing arts). However, whatever PFAC’s
practices might have been regarding curriculum changes, the record is
clear that when it came to course credit hour reductions (as here),
PFAC expected and demanded effects bargaining, as indicated by the
Board charge and eventual 2010 settlement in Case 13–CA–046171
regarding course credit hour changes in the photography department.
(FOF, sec. b, supra.)
And fourth, the College asserted that PFAC waived its right to ef-
fects bargaining about course credit hour changes in the existing collec-
tive-bargaining agreement. That waiver argument falls short because
the College’s own actions demonstrate that the existing collective-
bargaining agreement does not contain a clear and unmistakable waiver
of PFAC’s right to engage in effects bargaining. See Kingsbury, Inc.,
355 NLRB 1195, 1206 (2010) (explaining that it is the respondent’s
burden to show that the contractual waiver is explicitly stated, clear and
unmistakable); see also Omaha World-Herald, 357 NLRB 1870, 1872
(2011) (endorsing the proposition that clear and unmistakable evidence
of a parties’ intent to waive a duty to bargain is gleaned from all of the
surrounding circumstances, including bargaining history, actual con-
tract language and the completeness of the collective-bargaining
agreement). Indeed, when the College and PFAC settled Case 13–CA–
046171, the College agreed to bargain with PFAC about the effects of
COLUMBIA COLLEGE CHICAGO 27
Based on the foregoing analysis, I find that the College vio-
lated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by failing and refusing
to bargain with PFAC about the impact and effects of College’s
implementation of course credit hour reductions for the follow-
ing 10 courses: Accounting; Screenwriting Workshop; Adapta-
tion in LA; Acquiring Intellectual Property/LA; Theory, Har-
mony & Analysis I; Theory, Harmony & Analysis II; Directing
I; Pro Survival & How to Audition; Local Government Politics
Seminar; and State and National Government Politics Semi-
nar.25
C. Bargaining Over the Impact and Effects
of Prioritization
1. Complaint allegations
The complaint alleges that since on or about May 8, 2012,
Respondent has failed and refused to bargain with PFAC about
the impact and effects of Respondent’s implementation of its
prioritization plan to restructure operations. (GC Exh. 1(ff),
par. IX(d) (alleging violation of Sec. 8(a)(5) and (1).)
2. Findings of fact
a. The prioritization process
In 2011, the College, with the assistance of a consultant
group, engaged in a self-study of its academic programs, sup-
port services and operating functions, with the goal of making
strategic decisions about how the College should use its re-
sources (i.e.., should the College invest more resources in a
program? Less? The same?). The College referred to the self-
study as the prioritization process. (GC Exhs. 58(a)–(b); see
also Tr. 131, 137–139, 141, 1071–1072.)
Early in the prioritization process, the College president ap-
pointed 12 faculty members (from a pool of candidates that had
been nominated) to serve on a committee (the Academic Team)
that would evaluate the College’s academic programs. (GC

credit hour changes to courses in the photography department. Further,
in light of that settlement, the College immediately proposed that PFAC
waive its right to effects bargaining in the successor agreement. Those
actions would not have been necessary if the existing agreement had an
effects bargaining waiver.
25 The College expressed the concern that an adverse ruling on this
effects bargaining issue would harm its ability to run its business and
conduct its most basic functions. (R. Posttrial Br. at 48–49.) I do not
share the College’s stark view of the practical effects of my decision
here, because as previously noted, bargaining over mandatory subjects
is required where the contemplated change is material, substantial and
significant. Moreover, the Board rejected a similar “practical effects”
argument in Public Service Co. of Oklahoma when it explained:
The need to notify, bargain and compromise with the Union in the
face of the perceived need to change because of contractual and statu-
tory restrictions on the employer’s right to make unilateral changes: all
such limits may be characterized as a part of the inefficiencies of
American industrial relations, workplace regulation and general gov-
ernmental restriction. For good or ill, however, Congress in its wis-
dom has crafted the Act and, as interpreted by the Board under review
by the courts, it is the law of the land. The argued need for an em-
ployer to have the right to take unlimited actions regarding the unit is
not a sufficient basis under the Act for insisting on contract proposals
which essentially set aside the bargaining rights of a union represent-
ing an employer’s employees.
334 NLRB 487, 498 (2001), enfd. 318 F.3d 1173 (10th Cir. 2003).
Exhs. 58(a)–(b).) The College appointed new PFAC member
B.O. to serve on the Academic Team, but did not consult with
PFAC before making that appointment. (Tr. 133–134.)
PFAC became concerned that it was not part of the dialogue
at the College about the prioritization process. (Tr. 134; see
also GC Exh. 55.) In response, on November 4, 2011, Vice
President for Academic Affairs Louise Love sent an email to
campus personnel to assure PFAC members “that the voice of
part-time faculty is very much part of the prioritization pro-
cess.” Love cited B.O.’s placement on the Academic Team,
and also cited part-time faculty hiring and retention data as
evidence of the College’s commitment to its part-time faculty.
(GC Exh. 55.)
b. PFAC’s January 3, 2012 request for effects
bargaining regarding changes arising from
the prioritization process
On January 3, 2012, Vallera emailed Love to assert that the
College had an obligation to bargain with PFAC about the im-
pact and effects of any changes that the College planned to
make based on the prioritization process if those changes would
affect the terms and conditions of employment of part-time
faculty members. Vallera maintained that such bargaining
needed to occur in a meaningful manner and at a meaningful
time, and requested that a meeting for bargaining be scheduled
in early January 2012. Finally, Vallera asked the College to
provide PFAC with information about recommendations pro-
duced through the prioritization process, and information about
any written communication that the College was having with
PFAC members that involved the collective-bargaining agree-
ment. (GC Exh. 56.)
Love responded to Vallera on January 9, 2012. Regarding
PFAC’s information request, Love encouraged Vallera to check
the prioritization process homepage on the College’s faculty
intranet, where the College would be posting prioritization
recommendations. As for PFAC’s request for bargaining, Love
stated that effects bargaining would only be triggered if and
when the College made a decision to implement a recommen-
dation affecting the terms and conditions of employment of
PFAC members. Love asserted that the College had not yet
made any firm decisions related to prioritization, but assured
Vallera that the College was “committed to giving proper no-
tice, and upon request, engaging in effects bargaining” in the
event that the College did decide to implement recommenda-
tions affecting PFAC members. (GC Exh. 57; see also Tr. 136–
137.)
c. PFAC’s March 14, 2012 request for effects bargaining
regarding changes arising from the prioritization process
On March 14, 2012, Vallera wrote to Love to renew PFAC’s
request that the College bargain with PFAC “over the decision
and/or effects of any changes related to the prioritization pro-
cess.” (GC Exh. 59, p. 2.) Vallera reiterated PFAC’s position
that effects bargaining needed to occur in a meaningful manner
and at a meaningful time, and pointed out that the prioritization
process already had produced several recommendations to re-
structure or eliminate programs and make changes to curricu-
lum and personnel. (GC Exh. 59, p. 3; see also GC Exh. 58(b)
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD28
(noting that prioritization team recommendations were due to
the College president in February/March 2012); GC Exh. 58(c)
(recommendations from the Office of the Provost/Academic
Affairs, including several recommendations to modify academ-
ic programs).) Since the recommended program changes would
likely affect the work assignments, job qualification require-
ments and job availability for PFAC members, PFAC requested
immediate decisional and effects bargaining over the prioritiza-
tion process because further delay could make it impossible to
engaged in meaningful negotiations. (GC Exh. 59, p. 4; see
also Tr. 144–147.)
d. The College’s May 8, 2012 response to PFAC’s
request for effects bargaining
On May 8, 2012, interim associate provost Leonard
Strazewski responded to Vallera’s request that the College
bargain with PFAC about the prioritization process. Strazewski
began stating that the prioritization process had only produced
recommendations for discussion, and thus the College had not
made any or implemented any final decisions. However,
Strazewski went on to assert that in any event, the College was
not obligated to engage in decisional bargaining about the pri-
oritization process because the management-rights clause in the
collective-bargaining agreement gave the College sole discre-
tion to establish, modify or terminate all aspects of educational
policies and practices. (GC Exh. 59, p. 1.)
Strazewski also maintained that the College did not need to
engage in effects bargaining concerning the prioritization pro-
cess. In the College’s view, the arbitrator’s decision in em-
ployee R.P.’s grievance established that PFAC did not have
standing to bargain about the potential effects that changes
proposed through the prioritization process could have on work
assignments, job qualification requirements, and job availabil-
ity for PFAC members. (See sec. B(2)(e), supra.) Strazewski
also maintained that PFAC waived its right to bargain over the
impact and effects of those changes because the College had a
history of using its sole discretion to modify its curriculum and
set job qualifications, and the collective-bargaining agreement
set forth procedures that the parties agreed to follow when a
faculty member is no longer qualified to teach a course that has
been modified. Strazewski therefore explained that the College
“does not believe that any form of bargaining would be appro-
priate in the event that it chooses to move forward with its Pri-
oritization recommendations.” (GC Exh. 59, pp. 1–2; see also
Tr. 1131.)
e. The College concludes the first phase of
the prioritization process
On May 23, 2012, the College president posted his prioritiza-
tion recommendations26 (titled “Focus 2016—Blueprint for
Action”) on the faculty intranet for review, and also for com-
ment at a community listening session scheduled for May 25.
(GC Exhs. 60(a)–(b).) On June 19, the College president post-

26 In its prioritization paperwork, the College described the presi-
dent’s report both as “decisions” and as “recommendations.” (GC
Exhs. 58(b), 60(a), 61.) There is no dispute, however, that the presi-
dent’s report needed to go to the board of trustees for approval. (GC
Exhs. 58(b), 62.)
ed his revised prioritization recommendations. (GC Exh. 61.)
On June 29, 2012, the College board of trustees announced that
it reviewed the president’s recommendations, and notified the
college community that the senior vice president “will be re-
sponsible for organizing a college-wide effort to carry out the
ambitious multi-year program outlined in the recommenda-
tions.” (GC Exh. 62.)
3. Discussion and analysis
The Board has held that “[a]n employer has an obligation to
give a union notice and an opportunity to bargain about the
effects on union employees of a managerial decision even if it
has no obligation to bargain about the decision itself.” Allison
Corp., 330 NLRB at 1365. As part of its effects bargaining
obligations, the employer has a duty to give preimplementation
notice to the union to allow for meaningful effects bargaining.
Allison Corp., 330 NLRB at 1366.
As described in the findings of fact, the College’s prioritiza-
tion process was a significant project that implicated all facets
of the College’s programs and operations. Because of that fact,
it was certainly understandable that PFAC was interested in
having an active role in the process, and in advocating for the
interests of its members as the prioritization process moved
forward.
The College, as established by the record, chose not to in-
volve PFAC in the prioritization process beyond assuring
PFAC that it was taking the concerns of PFAC members into
account. The College offered several reasons for its approach
on May 8, 2012, when it rejected PFAC’s request for effects
bargaining about prioritization, but the reason that carries the
day here is a simple one: PFAC’s request for effects bargaining
was premature. In 2011 and early 2012, the prioritization pro-
cess involved collecting data, evaluating programs, and devel-
oping recommendations for how the College should allocate its
resources in the future. The College president “decided” what
recommendations to forward to the board of trustees in June
2012, and the board of trustees accepted those recommenda-
tions on June 29, 2012. When it made its decision, the board of
trustees notified the College community that the College’s sen-
ior vice president would be responsible for “organizing a col-
lege-wide effort to carry out the ambitious multi-year program
outlined in the recommendations.” (FOF, sec. f, supra.) June
29, 2012, therefore, was the earliest date that the College actu-
ally made a decision to implement any recommendations that
arose from the prioritization process. Accordingly, PFAC’s
January 3 and March 14, 2012 requests for effects bargaining
about prioritization were indeed premature, and the College’s
refusal to engage in effects bargaining on May 8, 2012 (several
weeks before the board of trustees approved the prioritization
recommendations), did not violate the Act. I therefore recom-
mend that the allegation in paragraph IX(d) of the complaint be
dismissed.27

27 The parties did not fully litigate whether the College and PFAC
engaged in effects bargaining about prioritization after June 29, 2012. I
therefore take no position on that issue.
COLUMBIA COLLEGE CHICAGO 29
D. Respondent’s Network and Computer Use Policy
1. Complaint allegations
The complaint alleges that since December 8, 2011, Re-
spondent has maintained an overbroad work rule (the Network
and Computer Use Policy), thereby interfering with, restrain-
ing, and coercing employees in the exercise of rights guaran-
teed by Section 7 of the Act. (GC Exh. 1(ff), par V(a) (alleging
a violation of Sec. 8(a)(1) of the Act).)
The complaint also alleges that on or about December 21,
2011, and January 5, 2012, Respondent selectively and dispar-
ately applied its Network and Computer Use policy by applying
those rules only against employees who voice their support for
unions. (GC Exh. 1(ff), par. V(b) (alleging a violation of Sec.
8(a)(1) of the Act).)
2. Findings of fact
a. The College’s Network and Computer Use Policy
In connection with the information technology that it pro-
vides to faculty, staff, and students, the College maintains a
Network and Computer Use Policy. The policy covers a wide
range of topics, including authorized use of the College’s in-
formation technology and network resources and licensing
guidelines. (GC Exh. 72(a).) The Network and Computer Use
Policy states as follows regarding the rights and responsibilities
of individuals who use the College’s information technology
and network:
The rights and responsibilities discussed in this document are
designed to ensure fair access for all users. College infor-
mation technology is intended for the use of the Columbia
College community for teaching, learning and administrative
college purposes. Any use that is counter to these purposes or
that interferes with such use by others is unacceptable. Each
person exercising the privilege of using Columbia College
Chicago information technology and network resources ac-
cepts certain implied obligations and limitations (such as stor-
age space, bandwidth, time limits, etc.). Members of the Co-
lumbia College Community may not use information technol-
ogy in ways that interfere with or demean others or that con-
sume excessive college resources.
(GC Exh. 72(a), Sec. 5.1 (emphasis added).)
b. November 2010 reprimand of employee O.V.
To understand the complaint allegation that the College se-
lectively applied its Network and Computer Use Policy, we
must begin with a dispute that arose in 2010, about an email
sent by an employee who supported United Staff of Columbia
College (US of CC), a staff/employee union established at the
college. (Tr. 412.) On November 18, 2010, a group named
“Staff for an Open Shop” circulated a newsletter that was criti-
cal of some of US of CC’s activities. On November 22, 2010,
employee O.V. sent an email response to the Staff for an Open
Shop newsletter to several employees at the College, but specif-
ically addressed his remarks to employee J.F. (an employee
who had previously sent communications on behalf of Staff for
an Open Shop, but who denied circulating the newsletter in
question). (GC Exh. 72(c); R. Exhs. 29–30; see also GC Exh.
105 (Nov. 25, 2010 email sent by employee J.F. on behalf of
Staff for an Open Shop).) Employee O.V.’s email stated:
Dear [employee J.F.]:
It must be a nice luxury to sit on the sidelines and criticize
everything that is done. US of CC, and myself personally,
worked very hard to get the employees in the Science Institute
department their 90 day notice. It means a lot to these em-
ployees to get 90 more days of pay, along with the chance to
spend 12 paid days looking for another position. The part
time staff were very stressed out to find out that their job was
eliminated, but the 90 day notice benefit that the US of CC
has negotiated for all the bargaining unit members, brought
them a lot of relief, because this gave them the opportunity to
focus on a plan on how they are going to make a living after
their notice comes to an end. This by far is a great benefit
since staff not part of the bargaining unit list have been let go
by the College without any notice in advance.
In your desire to be negative about everything that the [US of
CC] has done, including getting the administration to improve
their pay offer from nothing, you are doing a disservice to
many dedicated Columbia employees who love their jobs but
don’t want management to have the only say in how this Col-
lege treats its employees.
[Employee O.V.]
(GC Exh. 72(c).)
Upon receiving employee O.V.’s email, employee J.F. con-
tacted Vice President for Human Resources Ellen Krutz to seek
Respondent’s assistance in addressing employee O.V.’s email,
which J.F. characterized as “personal defamation” and the
“public ‘singling out’ of an individual staff member.”28 (Tr.
671, 699; R. Exhs. 29–30.) Krutz agreed to investigate the
matter, and determined that employee O.V. violated Respond-
ent’s Network and Computer Use policy when he sent the email
to employee J.F. Krutz reached her conclusion in part because
she determined that employee J.F. felt intimidated by the email
and reasonably feared that the US of CC would retaliate against
her in some fashion. (Tr. 709–710, 713.) Accordingly, Krutz
met with employee O.V. and orally reprimanded him for violat-
ing the Network and Computer Use Policy. (Tr. 710–711, 722;
GC Exh. 73, p. 2.) Union Representative Bill Silver (who
works with both PFAC and the US of CC) was aware that
Krutz questioned employee O.V. about the email that he sent to
J.F., and was aware that Krutz admonished O.V. for sending the
email. (Tr. 420 (stating that Silver was aware that the College
“admonished” O.V., but was not aware that the College “orally
reprimanded” O.V.) (a form a discipline, in Silver’s view).)

28 Through Steven Kapelke, its provost and senior vice president at
the time, Respondent advised the US of CC (including Bill Silver, who
also works with PFAC as a union representative) that it also believed
that employee O.V.’s email “did not meet the College’s policies and
procedures,” and that the email should not have singled out employee
J.F. as the person responsible for the Staff for an Open Shop newsletter.
(Tr. 415–416; GC Exh. 72(d).)
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD30
c. December 2011—PFAC members disagree via email
about Vallera’s leadership
Over 1 year later, on December 8, 2011, employee J.M. cir-
culated an email to College faculty and staff to voice his frus-
trations about PFAC’s leadership. Employee J.M. explained
that he was a PFAC member and was “definitely pro-union,”
but asserted that PFAC’s leadership did not have its members’
interests at heart. Specifically, employee J.M. asserted:
In my opinion, and it is wholly MY opinion, the adversarial
rhetoric and accusations that our leadership has been hurling
at the administration over the last two years have been coun-
terproductive, and often, just plain incorrect! This “Us against
them” atmosphere has created unnecessary and unwarranted
tension and animosity between colleagues and within depart-
ments as a whole. These tactics are a waste of time. I can’t
see that they serve any purpose other than to drag out the con-
tract negotiations. . . .
I think the blame for this nonsense has to be placed squarely
at the feet of our current president, Diana Vallera. I believe
that she misrepresents the administration and distorts/edits the
numbers and other facts to make things sound abusive (e.g.,
“new hire” numbers.) It’s my impression with regards to ne-
gotiations is that Diana is disruptive and uncooperative. Why
is our union president pursuing such a course of action, and
not trying to bring some constructive end to contract negotia-
tions? I don’t know, but it looks to me like we need new
leadership.
One last thing: you’ll notice that I haven’t included any
“proof” to support my opinions and impressions. That’s be-
cause I don’t want you to take my word for it. I want each of
you to take a good hard look at what’s going on. I don’t think
you’ll have to look too deep to see the same things that I do.
Thanks for your time and your ear.
Sincerely, [Employee J.M.]
(GC Exh. 71.) Employee J.M.’s email prompted other PFAC
members to send responsive emails, with some PFAC members
agreeing with J.M.’s concerns about PFAC’s leadership (see,
e.g., R. Exhs. 27–28; Tr. 684) and other PFAC members ex-
pressing support for Vallera and her efforts as PFAC’s presi-
dent (see, e.g., R. Exh. 79). One of the College’s department
coordinators (a supervisor within the meaning of the Act) for-
warded employee J.M.’s email to other college personnel, and
J.M.’s email was also published in the December 12 issue of
the Columbia Chronicle, a student-run newspaper at the Col-
lege. (Tr. 174, 316, 327–328; GC Exh. 71(a).)
d. The College decides not to take action against
PFAC members who criticized Vallera
On December 12, 2011, Bill Silver sent a letter to interim
provost Louise Love to assert that employee J.M. misused Re-
spondent’s email system when J.M. sent the email criticizing
PFAC/Vallera, and to request that Respondent “take immediate
action to prevent any further misuse of the College’s email
system for personal attacks and harassment against a fellow
campus employee.” Silver reminded Love that approximately 1
year earlier, Respondent admonished employee O.V. for the
remarks that he made in the November 22, 2010 email to em-
ployee J.F. about the US of CC, and asserted that employee
J.M.’s email about PFAC’s leadership also violated Respond-
ent’s Network and Computer Use Policy. (GC Exh. 73, pp. 3–
5; see also Tr. 441–442.)
Similarly, on December 14, 2011, PFAC’s steering commit-
tee wrote to Love and Krutz to request that Respondent investi-
gate whether employee J.M.’s email violated Respondent’s
Network and Computer Use Policy and/or Respondent’s
antiharassment policy. The PFAC steering committee also
asserted that by not enforcing its policies, Respondent permit-
ted other employees to compound the problem by re-sending
employee J.M.’s email to others at the College. (GC Exh. 73,
pp. 6–7; see also Tr. 175, 395, 679–680; GC Exh. 72(b) (Re-
spondent’s AntiDiscrimination and Harassment policy).)
On December 21, 2011, Krutz responded to the letters from
Silver and the PFAC steering committee. (Tr. 680–681.) Krutz
explained that in Respondent’s view, it did not need to disci-
pline employee J.M. or take any other action regarding J.M.’s
December 8, 2011 email because “no reasonable person would
find that [employee J.M.’s] email intimidated, harassed and/or
created a hostile work environment with regard to Union Presi-
dent Diana Vallera.” (GC Exh. 73, p. 1.) In particular, Krutz
asserted that employee J.M. did not violate Respondent’s poli-
cies by exercising his Section 7 right to question the wisdom of
PFAC’s leadership, nor did he attempt to threaten or intimidate
Vallera (in contrast to Krutz’ interpretation of employee O.V.’s
November 2010 email to employee J.F.). (Id., p. 2; see also Tr.
682–683.) Vallera and Silver contested Krutz’ analysis in an
email to Krutz dated January 2, 2012, but Krutz responded on
January 5 that she would stand by her earlier decision. (GC
Exh. 73, pp. 1, 3.)
3. Discussion and analysis
As its initial salvo regarding the allegations in this section,
the College contends that the complaint allegations concerning
the Network and Computer Use Policy must be dismissed be-
cause they are not closely related to the underlying charge that
PFAC filed with the Board in Case 13–CA–076794. (R.
Posttrial Br. at 73–75.) To decide whether complaint allega-
tions are closely related to the allegations in a timely filed
charge, the Board evaluates whether the complaint allegations
are factually and legally related to the charge. Redd-I, Inc., 290
NLRB 1115, 1116 (1988).
In the charge for Case 13–CA–076794, PFAC alleged that
“[s]ince in or about October 2011, the [College has violated the
Act] . . . by encouraging Union members to attack and under-
mine the current leadership of PFAC . . . , disparately enforcing
its email policy by allowing employees to disparage Vallera
and by permitting agents of the College to disseminate the dis-
paraging statements to other employees thereby placing man-
agement’s imprimatur on these statements.” (GC Exh. 1(m).)
The complaint allegations regarding the College’s Network and
Computer Use Policy are closely related to the allegations in
the underlying charge, because: (a) both the charge and para-
graph V(b) of the complaint assert that the College enforced its
policy in a disparate manner; and (b) the allegation that the
policy itself is unlawful (par. V(a) of the complaint) is factually
COLUMBIA COLLEGE CHICAGO 31
and legally related to the charge insofar as the same Network
and Computer Use Policy is at issue, and the legal question of
whether a work rule is unlawful on its face is commonly linked
to the question of whether an employer has applied or enforced
a work rule in an unlawful manner. (See sec. a, infra (discuss-
ing the legal standard that applies to allegations that a work rule
violates Sec. 8(a)(1) of the Act).) I therefore find that the com-
plaint allegations about the College’s Network and Computer
Use Policy are procedurally valid, and I accordingly turn to the
merits of those allegations.
a. Did the College violate Section 8(a)(1) of the Act
by maintaining its Network and Computer Use Policy?
The Board has articulated the following standard that specif-
ically applies when it is alleged that an employer’s work rule
violates Section 8(a)(1):
If the rule explicitly restricts Section 7 activity, it is unlawful.
If the rule does not explicitly restrict Section 7 activity, it is
nonetheless unlawful if (1) employees would reasonably con-
strue the language of the rule to prohibit Section 7 activity; (2)
the rule was promulgated in response to union activity; or (3)
the rule has been applied to restrict the exercise of Section 7
rights. In applying these principles, the Board refrains from
reading particular phrases in isolation, and it does not presume
improper interference with employee rights.
NLS Group, 352 NLRB 744, 745 (2008) (citing Lutheran Her-
itage Village-Livonia, 343 NLRB 646, 646–647 (2004)), adopt-
ed in 355 NLRB 1154 (2010), enfd. 645 F.3d 475 (1st Cir.
2011). As with all alleged 8(a)(1) violations, the judge’s task is
to “determine how a reasonable employee would interpret the
action or statement of her employer . . . , and such a determina-
tion appropriately takes account of the surrounding circum-
stances.” The Roomstore, 357 NLRB 1690, 1690 fn. 3 (2011).
In this case, the Acting General Counsel does not claim that
the Network and Computer Use Policy explicitly restricts Sec-
tion 7 activity. Instead, the Acting General Counsel asserts that
the policy is overbroad, and thus includes language that em-
ployees could reasonably construe as prohibiting Section 7
activity. Specifically, the Acting General Counsel takes issue
with the policy language that prohibits individuals from using
the College’s information technology system “in ways that
interfere with or demean others,” because in the Acting General
Counsel’s view, that policy language could be interpreted as
including protected Section 7 activity. (GC Posttrial Br. at 48.)
The Board has issued two decisions that are instructive on
the merits of the Acting General Counsel’s challenge to the
College’s policy. In Claremont Resort & Spa, the Board was
presented with a work rule that prohibited “negative conversa-
tions” about employees or managers and warned employees
that such conversations were in violation of the employer’s
standards of conduct and could result in disciplinary action.
344 NLRB 832, 832, 836 (2005). Applying the test set forth in
Lutheran Heritage Village-Livonia, supra, the Board found that
the rule was unlawful because its “prohibition of ‘negative
conversations’ about managers would reasonably be construed
by employees to bar them from discussing with their coworkers
complaints about their managers that affect working conditions,
thereby causing employees to refrain from engaging in protect-
ed activities.” Claremont Resort & Spa, 344 NLRB at 832; see
also Southern Maryland Hospital, 293 NLRB 1209, 1222
(1989) (finding that a rule that prohibited “derogatory attacks”
was unlawful because it could reasonably be construed as pro-
hibiting permissible union propaganda that placed the employer
in a negative light), enfd. in pertinent part 916 F.2d 932 (4th
Cir. 1990).
In Hyundai America Shipping Agency, the Board was pre-
sented with a number of work rules that the Acting General
Counsel challenged as unlawful. 357 NLRB 860, 860 (2011).
The Board agreed that the employer violated Section 8(a)(1) of
the Act by maintaining work rules that threatened employees
with discipline if they disclosed information from their person-
nel files, or if they complained to their coworkers instead of
voicing complaints directly to their supervisor or the human
resources office. Id. However, the Board also held that it was
lawful for the employer to threaten employees with discipline
for “indulging in harmful gossip.” Id., slip op. at 2. As the
Board explained, employees could not reasonably construe the
harmful gossip rule as prohibiting Section 7 activity because
the rule was only directed at gossip, which was commonly de-
fined as chatty talk or rumors or reports of an intimate nature.
Id. (distinguishing the work rule at issue in Claremont, which
referred to any negative conversations about employees or
managers, and thus implicitly extended to protected activity).
After considering the relevant legal authorities and the sur-
rounding circumstances that relate to the Network and Comput-
er Use Policy, I agree with the Acting General Counsel that the
policy is unlawfully overbroad. Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate
Dictionary (11th edition) defines the term “demean” as “to
lower in character, status or reputation.” Given that broad defi-
nition, an employee could reasonably construe the College’s
prohibition of communications that demean others as including
protected statements that fall short of being malicious, but
nonetheless lower the character, status or reputation of the Col-
lege because the statements place the College in a negative
light. See Southern Maryland Hospital, 293 NLRB at 1222
(applying this reasoning to a work rule that prohibited deroga-
tory attacks); see also Central Security Services, 315 NLRB
239, 243 (1994) (explaining that false and inaccurate employee
statements are protected under the Act unless they are knowing-
ly false or otherwise are malicious). The surrounding circum-
stances support my assessment, because the evidentiary record
shows that both the College and PFAC invoked the Network
and Computer Use Policy to challenge a permissible union (or
antiunion) activity. (See FOF, secs. b and d, supra (policy used
to challenge remarks made by O.V. and J.M.).) Accordingly, I
find that the College violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by
maintaining its overbroad Network and Computer Use Policy.
b. Did the College violate Section 8(a)(1) of the Act
by selectively applying its Network and Computer
Use Policy only against employees who
support unions?
The Acting General Counsel also maintains that the College
disparately applied its Network and Computer Use Policy by
permitting employees to send antiunion emails in December
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD32
2011, but reprimanding employee O.V. for sending a prounion
email in November 2010. The Acting General Counsel con-
tends that by applying its policies in this disparate manner, the
College violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by engaging in con-
duct that has a reasonable tendency to interfere with, restrain,
or coerce union or protected activities. KenMor Electric Co.,
355 NLRB 1024, 1027 (2010) (noting that the employer’s sub-
jective motive for its action is irrelevant); Yoshi’s Japanese
Restaurant & Jazz House, 330 NLRB 1339, 1339 fn. 3 (2000)
(same); see also Park N’ Fly, Inc., 349 NLRB 132, 140 (2007).
While I understand the Acting General Counsel’s theory, I
find that it fails because it runs afoul of Section 10(b) of the
Act. Simply put, the Acting General Counsel does not really
take issue with the College’s decision not to intervene when
PFAC members began exchanging emails about Vallera’s lead-
ership in December 2011. (See R. Exh. 90, p. 2 (letter from the
Acting General Counsel to PFAC, taking the position that em-
ployee J.M.’s email about Vallera did not violate the Act).)
Instead, the Acting General Counsel takes issue with the fact
that the College reprimanded employee O.V. for arguably simi-
lar (but prounion) conduct in November 2010.
Section 10(b) bars the Acting General Counsel from alleging
in the complaint in this case that the College violated the Act
when it reprimanded employee O.V, and it also bars the Acting
General Counsel from litigating that issue indirectly by arguing,
in effect, that the College’s reprimand of employee O.V. con-
tinues to cast a chill on employees who engage in protected
activities.29 See NLRA, Section 10(b) (explaining that “no
complaint shall issue based upon any unfair labor practice oc-
curring more than six months prior to the filing of the charge
with the Board”). Accordingly, I recommend that the allega-
tion in paragraph V(b) of the complaint be dismissed as untime-
ly.
In the alternative, I recommend that the allegation in para-
graph V(b) of the complaint be dismissed on the merits. The
evidentiary record shows that once PFAC members began de-
bating Vallera’s leadership in December 2011, the College
allowed employees to circulate both pro and anti-Vallera
emails. (See FOF, sec. b.) Thus, at the time of the incident, the
College enforced its Network and Computer Use Policy in a
neutral manner. To the extent that the College may have en-
forced the policy differently in November 2010, I find that in
light of the facts presented in this case, the November 2010
incident was too remote from the events of December 2011 to
have a reasonable tendency to interfere with, restrain, or coerce
employees in the exercise of their Section 7 rights.

29 I emphasize that my finding here does not implicate the ability of
parties to present disparate treatment evidence to prove discrimination.
In a discrimination case, a party may use older incidents to prove that
the employer handled a recent (i.e., timely filed under 10(b)) event
unlawfully.
The Acting General Counsel does not present such a theory here.
Instead, the Acting General Counsel generally agrees that the College
properly handled the December 2011 emails about Vallera’s leadership
(which were timely presented in a charge filed with the Board), but
then asserts that the College nonetheless violated the Act based on how
it handled employee O.V.’s email communications in November 2010
(an issue that is barred by 10(b)).
E. Information Request about Respondent’s
Early Feedback System
1. Complaint allegations
The complaint alleges that since on or about February 17,
2012, Respondent has failed and refused to provide PFAC with
information that PFAC requested on December 20, 2011, con-
cerning Respondent’s unilateral implementation of its Early
Feedback System. (GC Exh. 1(ff), pars. VIII(a), (e) (alleging
violation of Sec. 8(a)(5) and (1)).)
2. Findings of fact
a. The Early Feedback System—overview
In fall 2011, the College implemented a pilot “Instructor Ear-
ly Feedback System” to monitor the performance of instructors
in the College’s First Year Seminar classes. (Tr. 943–945; GC
Exh. 45.) The Early Feedback System consists of five steps
(paraphrased from the original):
1. Survey—in the fifth week of the semester, all First Year
Seminar students are asked to complete a survey about
their classroom experience. In the survey, students are
asked to indicate whether they “strongly agree,” “agree,”
“disagree” or “strongly disagree” with the following
statements:
a. My instructor effectively encourages all
students to participate in class activities
and discussions.
b. My instructor’s assignments and directions
are clear.
c. My instructor treats students fairly and re-
spectfully.
d. My work is graded in a way that is clear
and makes sense.
e. So far, the kind of work that we have been
asked to do is worthwhile.
f. My instructor is available to talk outside of
class.
g. Overall, my instructor is an effective teach-
er.
The survey also asked students to state what “has most
shaped your perception of the course and instructor,”
and to provide any constructive feedback they would
like to share.
2. Analysis—First Year Seminar staff will review student
survey results and use them to help identify classes
where student satisfaction seems low or there are other
“red flags.”
3. Discussion and Classroom visits—First Year Seminar
staff members will contact any instructors “whose sur-
vey results indicate a high level of dissatisfaction or oth-
er potential problem” to discuss the survey results and
their possible implications or genesis. Staff members
may also observe the class to determine whether some
form of mentoring is needed.
4. Mentoring—Instructors who could benefit from a great-
er level of guidance and support will, in concert with
COLUMBIA COLLEGE CHICAGO 33
First Year Seminar staff, devise a mentoring plan that
will be carried out during the remainder of the semester
(e.g., face to face meetings, more classroom visits or ob-
servations, or a review of instructional materials and
class plans). The mentoring plan will also state a means
of determining whether the mentoring was successful.
5. Follow-up and further steps—First Year Seminar staff
will determine the progress of the mentoring plan. In
most cases, the mentoring plan will produce a positive
impact on the instructor’s classroom performance and
the students’ classroom experience. If the mentoring
plan does not produce positive results, however, “an of-
ficial College Part-Time Faculty Evaluation Report may
be completed, indicating that the instructor has not met
expectations. . . . In most cases, [First Year Seminar]
will not offer future teaching assignments to such in-
structors.”30
(GC Exh. 45.)
b. PFAC requests information about the Early
Feedback System
On October 19, 2011, PFAC President Diana Vallera re-
ceived an email from a PFAC member who was notified by
First Year Seminar staff that the 5-week student surveys (from
step one of the Early Feedback System) raised some concerns.
(Tr. 114–115; GC Exh. 42.)
After obtaining a written description of the Early Feedback
System, on December 20, 2011, Vallera wrote a letter to inter-
im provost Louise Love about the program. In her letter,
Vallera asked Respondent “to immediately cease and desist in
the implementation of this evaluation program, and to rescind
any and all actions taken under this evaluation program,” be-
cause Respondent implemented the Early Feedback System
unilaterally and without any discussion with PFAC. (Tr. 115,
955–956; GC Exh. 46.)
Vallera also asked Love to provide PFAC with the following
information about the Early Feedback System:
1. The names of any instructors who have been notified
that there is dissatisfaction with his/her work perfor-
mance.
2. Any subsequent action(s)—disciplinary, remediation or
otherwise—that has been taken with those instructors
identified in the above item # one.
3. A copy of all student surveys that have been compiled,
with the names of the students redacted.
4. Any other department affected by this new evaluation
system.
5. The names of any members that were evaluated under
this new Procedure.
(GC Exh. 46.) On January 20, 2012, Love acknowledged re-
ceiving Vallera’s December 20, 2011 email, and advised that

30 Instructors who have taught at least 51 credit hours and have not
met expectations for First Year Seminar teaching will be offered an
opportunity to remediate those deficiencies. Instructors may or may
not be offered a First Year Seminar section during the remediation
semester. (GC Exh. 45.)
Respondent was in the process of preparing a reply. (GC Exh.
47.)
c. The College responds to PFAC’s information request
about the Early Feedback System
On January 30, 2012, PFAC filed an unfair labor practice
charge to assert that the College failed to comply with
Vallera’s/PFAC’s information request regarding the Early
Feedback System. (GC Exh. 1(a); see also GC Exh. 1(e)
(amended charge filed on February 10, 2012).)
On February 17, 2012, Susan Marcus, associate vice presi-
dent for Academic Affairs, responded to Vallera’s December
20, 2011 email to Love, since she (Marcus) was the College’s
liaison with PFAC. (Tr. 941; R. Exh. 43.) Marcus asserted that
the Early Feedback System was consistent with the terms of the
existing collective-bargaining agreement, including the man-
agement-rights clause and the College’s evaluation policy
(which Marcus maintained was established in accordance with
the collective-bargaining agreement). Therefore, Marcus ad-
vised Vallera that the College would continue to use the Early
Feedback System, and would not rescind any actions taken
under that program. (R. Exh. 43.)
Regarding PFAC’s request for information about the Early
Feedback System, Marcus did not provide any information in
response to PFAC’s first two requests (for the names of instruc-
tors who had been notified that there was dissatisfaction with
their work performance, and any actions taken regarding those
instructors) because she determined that those requests were
“overbroad, unlimited in scope, vague, and ambiguous.”31 (R.
Exh. 43, p. 2; Tr. 120.) Marcus admitted during trial, however,
that she had not seen or reviewed Respondent’s written descrip-
tion of the Early Feedback System when she prepared her letter
in response to PFAC’s information request (she instead relied
on a verbal description of the program that another employee
provided). (Tr. 964–967.) Marcus did provide the student
surveys that PFAC requested (request #3), and also provided
brief responses to PFAC requests 4 and 5. (R. Exh. 43, p. 2
(indicating that the First Year Seminar program implemented
the Early Feedback System independent of other departments,
and stating that PFAC should refer to the student surveys pro-
vided in response to request #3 for the names of the faculty

31 Marcus testified that she believed items 1 and 2 of PFAC’s in-
formation request were ambiguous because: the collective-bargaining
agreement does not have any provisions regarding notifying faculty
about dissatisfaction; it was not clear what PFAC meant by notification
of dissatisfaction, since such notification could range from a comment
made in casual conversation to a more formal type of notification; and
because PFAC did not specify a time frame for its request. (Tr. 946–
949.)
I do not credit Marcus’ explanation because Vallera’s letter specifi-
cally referred to the Early Feedback System, and Marcus demonstrated
that she understood that fact when she provided PFAC with the student
surveys that the First Year Seminar program compiled under the Early
Feedback System (information request item 3). (R. Exh. 43; see also
Tr. 957.) Moreover, the College’s own description of the Early Feed-
back System discusses contacting instructors if their student survey
results indicate a high level of dissatisfaction. (GC Exh. 45; Tr. 958–
959.) To the extent that Marcus did not understand that terminology
(see Tr. 964–967), that misunderstanding is chargeable to the College.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD34
members who were evaluated under the program).) PFAC and
the College did not correspond further about the College’s re-
sponses to the information request. (Tr. 950.)
3. Discussion and analysis
An employer’s duty to bargain includes a general duty to
provide information needed by the bargaining representative in
contract negotiations and administration. Generally, infor-
mation concerning wages, hours, and other terms and condi-
tions of employment for unit employees is presumptively rele-
vant to the union’s role as exclusive collective-bargaining rep-
resentative. By contrast, information concerning extra-unit
employees is not presumptively relevant, and thus relevance
must be shown. A-1 Door & Building Solutions, 356 NLRB
499, 500 (2011). The burden to show relevance is not excep-
tionally heavy, as the Board uses a broad, discovery-type stand-
ard in determining relevance in information requests. Id.
The information that PFAC requested about the Early Feed-
back System is presumptively relevant because it relates to the
terms and conditions of employment of PFAC members.
Through Marcus, the College admitted that it did not provide
any information to PFAC in response to its requests for the
names of instructors who had been notified that there was dis-
satisfaction with their work performance, and any actions taken
regarding those instructors, because Marcus determined that
those requests were “overbroad, unlimited in scope, vague, and
ambiguous.”
Marcus’ explanation does not establish a defense. As the
Board has explained, “[i]t is well established that an employer
may not simply refuse to comply with an ambiguous or over-
broad information request, but must request clarification and/or
comply with the request to the extent it encompasses necessary
and relevant information.” National Steel Corp., 335 NLRB
747, 748 (2001) (quoting Keauhou Beach Hotel, 298 NLRB
702 (1990)), enfd. 324 F.2d 928 (7th Cir. 2003). The College
ran afoul of those legal principles when it decided not to pro-
vide information in response to items 1 and 2 of PFAC’s infor-
mation request without attempting to clarify, or comply with,
those requests.32
Since the College did not fulfill its obligations under the Act
in responding to PFAC’s request for information about the
Early Feedback System, I find that the College violated Section
8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act as alleged in paragraphs VIII(a) and
(e) of the complaint.

32 The Board’s decision in AT&T Corp., 337 NLRB 689 (2002) (a
case cited by the College—(see R. Posttrial Br. at 69–70) is not appli-
cable here because it did not involve a refusal to provide information
(as here) because the employer believed the request was overbroad and
ambiguous. Instead, the employer in AT&T Corp. responded to all of
the union’s information requests, and the question of whether the em-
ployer violated Sec. 8(a)(5) turned on the factual question of whether
the employer reasonably believed that its information request responses
were complete. 337 NLRB at 691. The College cannot make a similar
claim here since, as previously noted, it did not respond to two of
PFAC’s requests because it deemed them to be overbroad and ambigu-
ous.
F. Class Assignments to Vallera for Summer
and Fall 2012
1. Complaint allegations
The complaint alleges that since March 2012, the College
failed to refused to assign summer 2012 semester classes to
Diana Vallera because she engaged in union and protected con-
certed activities, and because she testified in Case 30–CA–
018888, and cooperated in the investigation (including provid-
ing affidavits to the Board) in Cases 13–CA–073486, 13–CA–
076794, 13–CA–078080, and 13–CA–081162. (GC Exh. 1(ff),
pars. VI(e)–(f) (alleging violations of Sec. 8(a)(3), (4), and (1)
of the Act).)
The complaint also alleges that since March 2012, the Col-
lege failed and refused to assign more than one class section to
Diana Vallera for the fall 2012 semester because she engaged
in union and protected concerted activities, and because she
testified in Case 30–CA–018888, and cooperated in the investi-
gation (including providing affidavits to the Board) in Cases
13–CA–073486, 13–CA–076794, 13–CA–078080, and 13–
CA–081162. (GC Exh. 1(ff), pars. VI(e)–(f) (alleging viola-
tions of Sec. 8(a)(3), (4), and (1) of the Act).)
And, the complaint alleges that since on or about May 13,
2012, the College has failed and refused to provide PFAC with
information that PFAC requested concerning the College’s
assignments of classes to part-time faculty in the photography
department for fall 2012. (GC Exh. 1(ff), pars. VIII(b), (f)
(alleging violation of Sec. 8(a)(5) and (1)).)
2. Findings of fact
a. Faculty class assignment process—overview
For every semester, the College has to determine what
courses it will offer, how many class sections it will offer for
each course, and which faculty members it will assign to teach
the various class sections.33 The number of class sections that
is needed for a particular course generally depends on student
demand for the course. Student demand for courses can be
affected by a host of factors, including: whether student en-
rollment is increasing or decreasing in a particular department
or in the College as a whole; whether the course is required for
a particular major, or is an elective; and whether the course has
prerequisites or is a prerequisite for other courses. (Tr. 457,
591–592, 610–611, 814–815.)
As part of the process of assigning faculty to teach classes,
several months before each academic year each department at
the College asks its faculty members to submit forms setting
forth their availability to teach and their desired course assign-
ments. (Tr. 259.) The departments then make faculty teaching
assignments, keeping in mind that full-time faculty members
have priority over part-time faculty members, and that in some
limited circumstances, part-time faculty members who have
taught at least 51 credit hours at the College have assignment
priority (and bumping rights) over less experienced part-time

33 A single course can have several class sections, depending on the
number of students who wish to complete the course. (Tr. 476.) For
example, in the fall 2010 semester, the View Camera course had four
class sections. (R. Exh. 82.)
COLUMBIA COLLEGE CHICAGO 35
faculty members.34 (Tr. 456, 524; R. Exh. 1, art. VII(1) (ex-
plaining that bumping rights arise when, due to low enrollment
or the need to assign classes to a full-time faculty member, an
experienced part-time faculty member loses a class section that
they were assigned); see also R. Exh. 1, art. VII(2) (for purpos-
es of “instructional continuity,” the College generally will ex-
plore finding alternate classes for part-time faculty members if
the class they were slated to teach is canceled).)
The College notifies part-time faculty members of their class
assignments by sending them an adjunct faculty teaching as-
signment form. (See, e.g., GC Exhs. 97–99.) When faculty
assignments have been completed, the College posts all course
and class offerings on its online catalog (OASIS) for students to
review and begin course registration. (Tr. 259–260.)
b. Diana Vallera’s teaching assignment history
Between 2006 and 2011, Vallera generally taught two clas-
ses each spring and fall semester: View Camera I; and either
Studio I (a/k/a Introduction to Lighting) or Studio II (a/k/a Ad-
vanced Lighting). In addition, between 2008 and 2011, Vallera
taught View Camera I during each summer semester.35 (GC
Exh. 90(b); see also Tr. 270, 1219–1220.) It is undisputed that
Vallera consistently received outstanding evaluations from
students who took her classes. Among other awards and acco-
lades, Vallera was selected to teach in Italy for the summer of
2007, and was nominated at least twice for the College’s excel-
lence in teaching award (finishing as runner up for that award
in 2010). (Tr. 245, 250–251, 271–273, 300, 1248; GC Exhs.
103, 104.)
c. December 2011 faculty meetings about the faculty
class assignment process
On December 7–8, 2011, the photography department held
meetings to advise faculty about the faculty class assignment
process. First, department managers explained that they would
be following a “leaner” scheduling model than in previous
years. In previous years, the department used a comprehensive
scheduling model, under which it would announce a full list of
classes, and then eliminate certain classes if student enrollment
fell short. For the next and future school years, however, the
department would announce a limited (leaner) list of classes,
and then add classes only if warranted by high student enroll-
ment or other factors.36 (Tr. 835–836.) As the department

34 Part-time faculty members are limited to teaching 9 credit hours
per semester, and a total of 18 credit hours for the fall and spring se-
mesters. The College may grant special permission to exceed those
limits. (Tr. 263–264.)
35 The faculty assignment process for summer semester classes was
more informal than the assignment process for fall and spring semes-
ters. In Vallera’s case, instead of filling out an availability form, she
was approached by Elizabeth Ernst in 2008 to see if she was interested
in teaching a summer class, agreed to do so, and generally was “rolled
over” to teach in subsequent summers. (Tr. 274–275; see also GC Exh.
90(b).)
36 Eliza Nichols, dean of the school of fine and performing arts, is-
sued the directive for departments to begin using leaner scheduling.
(Tr. 836; see also R. Exh. 20 (February 2010 email from Nichols to
department chairs that encouraged them to take steps to, among other
things, avoid opening up classes that would have to be canceled later).)
explained, a “lean schedule is set to [e]nsure that courses will
fill and that faculty are able to teach the courses they are of-
fered to teach.” (R. Exh. 35, p. 3.)
Second, department managers presented data showing that
enrollment in the photography department had declined to 689
students (down from 776 in fall 2009). (R. Exh. 35, p. 9.) And
third, department managers advised faculty of changes in the
photography department curriculum due to revisions that the
department made to its B.A. degree requirements. Among
other changes, View Camera I would no longer be a required
course for the B.A. degree. (R. Exh. 35, p. 13 (also noting that
three other courses were no longer required for the B.A. de-
gree).)
d. Vallera’s union activities in 2012
In early 2012, Vallera remained active in her role as PFAC
president. For example, on February 6–8, Vallera testified as a
witness for the Acting General Counsel/PFAC and also sat at
counsels’ table during the trial that the Acting General Counsel,
the College, and PFAC litigated in Case 30–CA–018888. (Tr.
189; GC Exh. 7.) PFAC also filed charges with the Board in
Cases 13–CA–073486, 13–CA–076794, 13–CA–078080, and
13–CA–081162 that related to Vallera’s activities as PFAC’s
president. (GC Exhs. 1(a), (e), (g), (i), (m), and (s) (original
and amended charges filed between January 30 and May 16,
2012).)
In addition, on March 12, the Columbia Chronicle ran an ar-
ticle about the ongoing difficulties that PFAC and the College
were having with bargaining for a new collective-bargaining
agreement. In that article, Vallera asserted that PFAC was
going to file another unfair labor practice charge against the
College because it had not provided PFAC with dates to meet
for further negotiations. (GC Exh. 27.)
e. Photography department announces new
“foundations” courses
On February 8, the photography department held a faculty
meeting to discuss its new “foundations” courses that would
replace four courses (Photo I & II, and Darkroom I & II), and
would require some modifications to other courses (including
Digital I and Introduction to Lighting). (R. Exh. 34; see also R.
Exh. 94.) The department notified faculty that it would offer
training in the new foundations courses beginning in May and
June 2012, and would start phasing in the foundations courses
in fall 2012. (R. Exh. 34.)
f. March 2012—Vallera notifies the College of her
availability to teach during the 2012–2013 school year
On February 10, 2012, the photography department distrib-
uted class availability forms to its faculty for the fall 2012 and
spring 2013 semesters. (GC Exh. 91(a); R. Exh. 38.) Vallera
returned her form, and indicated that she would be interested in
teaching the following courses (listed in order of preference):
Introduction to Lighting (two classes); View Camera; Photo
Seminar; Documentary; and Advanced Lighting. Vallera also
expressed interest in taking the training for, and teaching, the
new foundations courses, but noted that she might need to
amend her form after she received information from Photog-
raphy Department Chair Peter Fitzpatrick about course and
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD36
curriculum changes in the department that were announced in
the February 8 faculty meeting.37 (GC Exh. 91(a); see also R.
Exh. 93.)
On February 17, 2012, Vallera contacted Associate Photog-
raphy Department Chair Kelli Connell to discuss her teaching
availability for the 2012-2013 academic year. (R. Exh. 95.)
Connell first confirmed with Fitzpatrick and Susan Marcus38
that it would be appropriate for her to meet with Vallera. (Tr.
864; R. Exh. 95.) In the ensuing communications between
Connell and Vallera about Vallera’s schedule and availability,
Vallera asked if she would still have a View Camera class for
the summer. Connell responded on February 27, 2012, by ad-
vising Vallera that the College would not be offering View
Camera during the summer 2012 semester. (R. Exh. 96.)
g. Vallera expresses concern to the College about
summer and fall 2012 faculty class assignments
On March 19, 2012, Vallera observed that students had
commenced online registration for the fall 2012 semester, but
did not see any part-time faculty members listed as teaching
classes. Vallera also observed that a full-time faculty member
was teaching the only View Camera class offered. Vallera
emailed Connell to ask about discussing alternative classes that
she could teach in fall 2012, and also to ask about “the loss of
[her] summer class,” why View Camera was not offered in
summer 2012, and why she was not offered any other classes
for that semester. Finally, Vallera advised Connell that they
needed to meet to discuss curriculum changes in the photog-
raphy department, any class limits, and any changes in past
practices for how faculty class assignments are handled. (Tr.
194, 284–285; GC Exh. 91(b); see also GC Exh. 90(c) (indicat-
ing that the photography department offered 15 classes and 1
internship in summer 2012, and that View Camera dropped
from 5 classes in summer 2010 (and before), to 1 class section
in summer 2011, and no classes in summer 2012).)39
Vallera emailed Connell (along with Fitzpatrick) again on
March 22 to followup on her March 19 email, and to state
PFAC’s view that working conditions at the College should

37 Vallera was not able to attend the February 8 faculty meeting, and
could not obtain a copy of the PowerPoint presentation that was used at
the meeting. In response to Vallera’s request for information about the
photography department curriculum changes that were announced at
the meeting, on February 17, Fitzpatrick emailed a memorandum to
photography department faculty about the new foundations courses that
would be offered in the department. (R. Exhs. 93–94.)
38 Since Fitzpatrick was relatively new to the College, and it was at
times unclear whether Vallera sent her email correspondence in her
personal capacity or in her capacity as PFAC president, Marcus wished
to monitor his communications with Vallera. Vallera was the only
faculty member in the photography department that Marcus monitored
in this fashion. (Tr. 862, 872–873, 885–886, 910, 932–934.)
39 There is no evidence that Vallera was in a position to bump any
of the faculty members assigned to summer 2012 classes from their
assignments. (R. Exh. 1, art. VII (outlining the parameters for “bump-
ing” or class reassignment); R. Exh. 46, p. 2 (indicating that 13 of 15
the part-time faculty members assigned to summer classes could not be
bumped because they had accrued 21 or more credit hours; no data is
available for the remaining 2 part-time faculty members); GC Exh.
90(c) (indicating that one faculty member was assigned to 1 class and 1
internship).)
remain at the status quo while the College and PFAC bargained
for a successor collective-bargaining agreement. Vallera as-
serted that the changes taking place in the photography depart-
ment impacted the working conditions of part-time faculty
members, and demanded that the College bargain with PFAC
about its decisions regarding the photography department, and
the impact and effects of those decisions. (GC Exh. 91(b), p.
7.)
h. The College responds to Vallera’s questions
about faculty class assignments
Connell responded to Vallera’s emails on March 23 by invit-
ing Vallera to add another course to her availability form in-
stead of View Camera. Vallera agreed to do so, and sent Con-
nell a list of the following 14 types of classes that she would be
willing to teach: Introduction to Lighting; View Camera; Pho-
tography Seminar; Advanced Lighting; Foundations of Photog-
raphy I; Documentary; Portfolio Development; Advanced Col-
or; 19th Century or Experimental; digital classes; other studio
classes; Photography in Chicago; Advanced View Camera; and
darkroom classes. (GC Exh. 91(b), pp. 3–5.)
On March 23, 2012, Susan Marcus also responded to
Vallera’s March 19 email to Connell.40 Regarding class as-
signments for fall 2012, Marcus agreed that Vallera should
contact Connell about the classes that Vallera believed she was
qualified to teach for that semester. However, regarding
Vallera’s concern about losing her summer class, Marcus re-
sponded:
Please clarify your rationale that there was a ‘loss of my’
summer class in relation to the decisions in the [employee
R.P.] arbitration and case # (13–CA–045973).41
Similarly, regarding Vallera’s request that the College bargain
with PFAC about its decisions to make changes in the photog-
raphy department and the effects of those decisions, Marcus
stated:
With respect to your request for a meeting about the above
topics, please also see the decisions in the [employee R.P.] ar-
bitration and case # (13–CA–045973).42 Additionally, as you

40 It was highly unusual for an administrator at Marcus’ level to get
involved with questions about class assignments to individual faculty
members, unless such an issue arose as part of a formal grievance.
Normally, a faculty member would be expected to raise class assign-
ment issues with their immediate supervisor. (Tr. 485–487, 911–912.)
41 As previously noted, the arbitrator in employee R.P.’s grievance
ruled that R.P., as a part-time faculty member, was only employed
during the semesters that R.P. was hired to teach, and had no standing
to question decisions about future employment. (See sec. B(2)(e),
supra (discussing GC Exh. 54).) In Case 13–CA–045973 (a charge
asserting that the College made unlawful changes to Vallera’s class
schedule), the Acting General Counsel denied PFAC’s appeal from the
Regional Director’s refusal to issue a complaint, explaining that “the
evidence indicated no contractual right of part-time faculty to any par-
ticular course or schedule.” (R. Exh. 7.)
42 Marcus admitted that she should have forwarded Vallera’s request
for bargaining to Leonard Strazewski, since he was handling all bar-
gaining with PFAC. (Tr. 980–982.) Marcus’ expertise is with handling
grievances that allege that the College violated the existing collective-
bargaining agreement. (Tr. 980.)
COLUMBIA COLLEGE CHICAGO 37
have been informed repeatedly, these questions should not be
asked of the Associate Chair [Connell]. If you persist in ig-
noring appropriate channels, your requests will not be for-
warded to the appropriate office.
(GC Exh. 92; see also Tr. 926–928, 935.)
Marcus’ intervention prompted a swift response from
Vallera. Indeed, later on March 23, Vallera emailed Marcus
and asserted:
As you have been repeatedly warned in the past, PFAC will
not tolerate any intimidation tactics on the part of this admin-
istration. Your tactics [] of avoiding to answer questions, in-
timidating, and not allowing chairs of departments to meet
with PFAC to resolve issues will not be tolerated. PFAC ab-
solutely has a right to request a demand to bargain over the
terms [and] conditions of employment and what you seem to
be avoiding is the very important issue of remaining status
quo while in bargaining.
(GC Exh. 92.) Vallera went on to contend that the College
changed the status quo by not including part-time faculty in the
online course catalog, and asked Marcus to explain whether the
photography department chair made that change on his own, or
instead pursuant to a directive from someone else at the Col-
lege. (Id.)
i. March 28, 2012—studio program coordinator
weighs in on Vallera’s request for an additional class
to teach in the fall 2012 semester
On March 28, 2012, Elizabeth Ernst, coordinator of the stu-
dio program in the photography department, offered her input
to Fitzpatrick about whether Vallera should be assigned a se-
cond class to teach for the fall 2012 semester.43 (Tr. 886–887,
912; GC Exh. 106.) Ernst offered the following comments:
Peter,
Are the natives restless yet? I am not sure if the schedule has
gone live yet but wanted to let you know my thoughts about a
second class for Diana [Vallera]. She will request a section of
Advanced Lighting, which she has taught ONCE a few years
ago. [Employee T.] graciously tutored her for teaching this
class. She is not qualified to teach this course again, thus she
hasn’t been offered this as a possibility. I mentioned to Kelli
[Connell] that she would actually be good teaching a section
of the new foundations course. I believe she uses/knows
Lightroom. But we are not as you know, obligated to provide
more [than] one class to anyone. I am looking forward to

43 In 2005, Ernst and Vallera were friends, and Ernst asked Vallera
if she would be interested in teaching a course at the College. (Tr. 25.)
Ernst and Vallera had a falling out in early 2009, and have had a
strained relationship since that time. (Tr. 336–337, 1216, 1277–1278.)
I have not made findings regarding the specific reason for the 2009
dispute between Ernst and Vallera because the competing accounts of
that dispute were equally credible.
It is unclear what specifically prompted Ernst to contact Fitzpatrick
with her thoughts about Vallera in March 2012. However, it is an
established practice in the photography department for the associate
chair to consult with coordinators such as Ernst about faculty class
assignments. (R. Exh. 35, pp. 5–6.)
[employee L.L.] teaching a studio course in the fall.44 I assure
you that I will work with her, as I do with everyone to get her
up to speed. It was a great suggestion by Kelli. [Employee
L.L.] is great to work with, dedicated, and very committed to
our department. I like her work, and respect the fact that she
is a problem solver and not a problem maker.45 Her part time
faculty evaluations have been really good. Feedback from the
students is also very good. We can of course discuss the
above further in person or on the phone. . . .
Please let me know your thoughts regarding any of the above.
I just feel that we have to make our decisions based on the
needs of our students, and not people needing additional clas-
ses or just because they put a “request” to teach a class on
their availability forms. I know from our conversations that
you agree with this.
(GC Exh. 106.) Fitzpatrick agreed that he defers to Ernst re-
garding assignment of classes to faculty members in the studio
area of the photography department.46 (Tr. 913.)

44 Employee L.L. was a relatively new teacher at the College. Fitz-
patrick admitted that Vallera was highly qualified to teach a studio
(Introduction to Lighting) class, and was more experienced than em-
ployee L.L. (Tr. 878, 887–888.) Fitzpatrick explained, however, that
the photography department has an interest in bringing new faculty
members into the program to ensure that there is a pool of instructors
available to draw from each semester. (Tr. 890–891.)
45 Ernst admitted that she viewed Vallera as a problem maker, but
asserted that she only formed that opinion based on individual, petty
concerns that Vallera raised periodically. (Tr. 1211–1214; see also Tr.
921.) I do not credit Ernst’s explanation on that point. The record is
clear that Vallera was vocal on a host of issues in the photography
department (and at the College as a whole), including multiple issues
related to the PFAC bargaining unit. It is not plausible that Ernst lim-
ited her frustration with Vallera only to the occasions where Vallera
raised concerns that would not qualify as union or protected concerted
activities.
I also have not credited Ernst’s assertion that Vallera was not quali-
fied to teach the Advanced Lighting course. Ernst’s assessment is
tainted by her negative views of Vallera, and is also undermined by the
fact that in January 2009 (shortly after Vallera finished teaching the
Advanced Lighting course), Photography Department Academic Man-
ager Liz Chilsen asked Vallera to send her the goals and objectives that
she developed for Advanced Lighting so they could be shared with the
rest of the photography department. (Tr. 1282; CP Exh. 8.)
Finally, I have considered the fact that Ernst stated that Vallera
would be a good fit for the new Foundations course. That recommen-
dation, however, is consistent with my findings about Ernst’s views of
Vallera, because the Foundations courses were not part of the studio
program, and thus assigning Vallera to one of those classes would
reduce Ernst’s contact with Vallera (a desirable result, from Ernst’s
perspective). (Tr. 913, 1203–1204, 1206 (noting that Ernst was respon-
sible for the studio area, but was merely part of a team that handled the
Foundations courses).)
46 I do not credit Fitzpatrick’s testimony that Ernst’s characteriza-
tion of Vallera as a problem maker had no effect on his decisions facul-
ty class assignments for the summer and fall 2012 semesters. (Tr. 922.)
Fitzpatrick himself was new to the College (having started in fall 2011),
and admitted that he deferred to Ernst when it came to faculty assign-
ments in the studio and foundations areas. (Tr. 913, 1218.)
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD38
j. The College cautions Vallera to direct her requests for
bargaining to the correct College personnel
On April 10, Marcus responded to Vallera’s March 23 email
to explain that the purpose of her (Marcus’) March 23 email
was to ask PFAC to follow the proper protocol for bargaining.
Specifically, Marcus stated:
[I]t is not appropriate for PFAC to attempt to discuss bargain-
ing/contract related topics with Associate Chairs. The Col-
lege does not know how much clearer it can make this point:
Bargaining issues raised by PFAC should be directed to Len
Strazewski, issues arising under the contract should be ad-
dressed to Pegeen Quinn. Those are the appropriate avenues
for PFAC. Unit members are always encouraged to com-
municate with the Chair or Associate Chair about their indi-
vidual concerns or questions. Under the CBA, individual unit
members meet with the Chair to informally resolve any griev-
ance.
(R. Exh. 92; see also Tr. 931–932.) Marcus added that it was
not clear until Vallera’s March 23 email that PFAC wished to
bargain about whether the photography department should
maintain the status quo with its operations, and promised to
forward that issue to Strazewski for a response. Finally, Mar-
cus advised Vallera that the College would interpret Vallera’s
questions about who authorized the changes in the photography
department as a request for information, and accordingly would
forward the request to Pegeen Quinn for processing. (R. Exh.
92.)
k. The College finalizes its faculty class assignments
for the fall 2012 semester
On April 23, 2012, the College notified Vallera that she was
assigned to teach one class in the fall 2012 semester (Introduc-
tion to Lighting). (Tr. 294–295; GC Exh. 99.) Employee L.L.
was also assigned to teach one Introduction to Lighting class
for fall 2012. (GC Exh. 90(d).) The following part-time facul-
ty members in the photography department were assigned to
teach more than one class for fall 2012:
Name
Classes Assigned—Fall
2012 Comments
A. B. Foundations of Photog-
raphy I
Introduction to Lighting
J.E. Advanced Retouching
Fashion Photography
B.F. Advanced Lighting
Furniture Construction
Furniture Con-
struction is not in
the photography
department [Tr.
897–898, 915–
916].
K.G. Foundations of Photog-
raphy I
Documentary Methods
G.G. Foundations of Photog-
raphy I
First Year Seminar
First Year Semi-
nar is not in the
photography de-
partment [Tr.
917].
W.J. Foundations of Photog-
raphy I
Foundations of Photog-
raphy I
First Year Seminar
First Year Semi-
nar is not in the
photography de-
partment [Tr.
917].
C.K. Photography II Workshop
Website Publishing I
A.M. Digital Imaging I
Digital Imaging II
J.M. Advanced Lighting
Internship: Photography
Internship: Pho-
tography is an
extra assignment,
but not a tradi-
tional class, and is
thus paid at a
lower rate of ap-
proximately
$25/hour [Tr.
895–896, 917–
918].
J.O. Experimental Photography
Experimental Photography
C.S. Foundations of Photog-
raphy I
Special Topics in Fine Art
Photography
M.S. Foundations of Photog-
raphy I
Digital Imaging II
Digital Imaging II
(GC Exh. 90(d); see also Tr. 875–877, 881 (Fitzpatrick admit-
ted that Vallera was competent to teach Introduction to Light-
ing, View Camera, Foundations of Photography, Advanced
View Camera, digital classes, and darkroom classes).) All of
the faculty members listed in the table above had sufficient
accrued credit hours (21 or more) to preclude being bumped
from their classes by a more experienced part-time faculty
member (such as Vallera). (R. Exh. 1, art. VII; R. Exh. 46, p.
2.)
On May 1, 2012, Vallera emailed Connell and asked to
speak with her about a second class for fall 2012.47 On May 2,
Connell responded:
We have sent out the teaching assignments for the fall. Due
to low enrollment and our new BA [degree requirement]
changes, we have fewer classes offered for this fall. As of
now, you are only scheduled for one course in the fall.
(R. Exh. 97.)

47 Earlier on May 1, Vallera and PFAC Representative Mary Lou
Carroll attempted to meet with Connell and Fitzpatrick to discuss issues
in the photography department. The meeting was canceled when a
dispute arose about whether Carroll (who was not part of the photog-
raphy department) should be permitted to attend the meeting. (Tr. 857–
858.)
COLUMBIA COLLEGE CHICAGO 39
l. May 13, 2012—Vallera submits an information
request about faculty class assignments
On May 13, Vallera wrote to Louise Love and Leonard
Strazewski to request that the College bargain over the curricu-
lum and faculty class assignment changes in the photography
department, and the effects of those changes. Vallera included
an information request in her letter to obtain: a list of all pho-
tography part-time faculty that have accrued less than 51 credit
hours of teaching experience but were offered a second class; a
copy of all part-time faculty availability forms for fall 2012; the
number of classes offered to PFAC members that have accrued
over 51 credit hours of teaching experience; and the rationale
for all changes in the photography department. (GC Exh. 76, p.
2)
m. July 19, 2012—Vallera renews her May 13, 2012
information request
On July 19, 2012, Vallera contacted Strazewski to renew the
information request that she submitted on May 13.48
Strazewski confirmed receipt of Vallera’s renewal request later
that same day. (GC Exh. 76.) On September 28, 2012, the
College provided PFAC with information in response to
Vallera’s May 13 information request.49 (Tr. 194, 746; R.
Exhs. 46, 48.)
3. Discussion and analysis
a. Did the College violate Section 8(a)(3) or (4) of
the Act by failing to assign Vallera any classes to
teach for the summer 2012 semester?
The Acting General Counsel and I agree that the allegations
regarding the College’s failure to assign classes to Vallera
should be analyzed under the legal standard that the Board
described in FES, 331 NLRB 9 (2000). To establish that
Vallera’s nonselection for certain classes was discriminatory,
the Acting General Counsel needed to make the following ini-
tial showing: (1) that the College was selecting faculty for
class assignments, or had concrete plans to do so, at the time of
the alleged unlawful conduct; (2) that Vallera had experience or
training relevant to the announced or generally known require-
ments of the available classes (or in the alternative, that the
College has not adhered uniformly to the requirements, or that
the requirements were themselves pretextual or were applied as
a pretext for discrimination); and (3) that antiunion animus
contributed to the decision not to select Vallera for the class
assignments. Once the Acting General Counsel makes its ini-
tial showing, the burden will shift to the College to show that it
would not have selected Vallera even in the absence of her
union activities. If the College fails to show that it would have
made the same decisions even in the absence of Vallera’s union

48 On June 13, Vallera contacted Strazewski to re-submit her May
13 request that the College bargain with PFAC about curriculum and
faculty class assignment changes (and their effects) in the photography
department. (GC Exh. 76, pp. 1–2.)
49 The record is unclear as to whether the College’s response was
complete. (Compare Tr. 194 and R. Exh. 49 with Tr. 758.) That ambi-
guity is not material to my analysis.
activities or affiliation, then a violation of Section 8(a)(3) (or
8(a)(4)) has been established. Id. at 12.
There is no dispute that the College needed to select faculty
members (including part-time faculty members) to teach classes
for the summer 2012 semester. There is also no dispute that
Vallera was qualified to teach several classes that the College
was offering that semester. The Acting General Counsel runs
into difficulty, however, with its initial showing that antiunion
animus contributed to the College’s decision not to select
Vallera for a summer 2012 teaching assignment. Suspicious
timing can support a finding of discriminatory animus, but in
this case, the probative value of the close timing between
Vallera’s early 2012 protected activities (including her partici-
pation in the trial in Case 30–CA–018888 and PFAC’s filing of
the charge in Case 13–CA–07348650) and the College’s deci-
sion about summer 2012 class assignments is limited because
the College did not deviate from its customary time period for
making summer semester teaching assignments. Given that
fact, the close timing between Vallera’s early 2012 protected
activities and the College’s February 27, 2012 decision not to
offer Vallera’s customary View Camera class in the summer
2012 semester was coincidental. See El Paso Electric Co., 355
NLRB 428, 429 (2010) (finding that the probative value of a
temporal relationship between the employee’s protected activi-
ty and the employer’s action was diminished where the timing
of the employer’s action was dictated by the employee). More-
over, the College’s decision not to offer View Camera in the
summer 2012 semester was not tainted by discriminatory ani-
mus.51 To the contrary, student demand for View Camera had
been decreasing since summer 2011, and the drop in demand
accelerated after the College reclassified View Camera as an

50 The charges in Cases 13–CA–076794. 13–CA–078080, and 13–
CA–081162 were filed after the College made its summer 2012 faculty
class assignments. (GC Exh. 1(m) (charges filed on March 16, April 4,
and May 16, 2012, respectively).)
51 On this point, the Acting General Counsel argued that the Col-
lege’s actions associated with the bargaining disputes between the
College and PFAC support a finding that animus contributed to the
College’s decisions regarding Vallera’s class assignments. (GC
Posttrial Br. at 58–59 (citing the College’s decision to resubmit an old
contract proposal the day after it received service of the complaint in
Case 30–CA–018888, and the fact that the College blamed Vallera for
the breakdown in negotiations for a successor bargaining agreement).)
While it is true that, depending on the facts of a given case, evidence of
8(a)(5) violations may support a finding that an employer acted with
animus for purposes of an 8(a)(3) claim, that theory does not fit here.
Love, Strazewski and Annice Kelly were the key players for the Col-
lege when it came to bargaining. They had no involvement, however,
with the decisions that the College made about Vallera’s summer and
fall 2012 class assignments. I therefore do not see a basis for drawing a
connection (for purposes of animus or otherwise) between the 8(a)(5)
violations that the College committed and the 8(a)(3) and (4) claims at
issue here.
Similarly, the Acting General Counsel did not establish that a find-
ing of animus could be based on Vallera’s interactions with Marcus.
While Marcus did respond to some of Vallera’s emails about class
assignments, her role was limited to addressing Vallera’s requests for
information and bargaining. There is no evidence that Marcus partici-
pated in or influenced Fitzpatrick’s decisions about Vallera’s summer
and fall 2012 class assignments.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD40
elective course in December 2011, leading to the College rea-
sonably deciding not to offer the course in summer 2012.52
Since the Acting General Counsel did not present sufficient
evidence to make an initial showing that the College discrimi-
nated against Vallera when it did not assign her a class to teach
for the summer 2012 semester, its 8(a)(3) and (4) claims about
that decision fall short. I accordingly recommend that the alle-
gation in paragraphs VI(e)–(f) concerning summer 2012 class
assignments be dismissed.
b. Did the College violate Section 8(a)(3) or (4)
of the Act by failing to assign Vallera more than
one class to teach for the fall 2012 semester?
In contrast to its presentation regarding summer 2012 class
assignments, the Acting General Counsel made a strong initial
showing that the College discriminated against Vallera when it
did not select her to teach a second class for the fall 2012 se-
mester. There is no dispute that the College needed to select
faculty members (including part-time faculty members) to teach
classes for the fall 2012 semester, or that Vallera was qualified
to teach several classes that the College was offering that se-
mester (such as Foundations of Photography, which was the
“second” class assigned to several faculty members). The Act-
ing General Counsel also presented the following compelling
evidence that antiunion animus contributed to the College’s
decision: (a) the College decided not to assign Vallera a second
fall semester 2012 class shortly after Vallera asked the College
to bargain with PFAC about changes to working conditions in
the photography department; and, more important, and (b) stu-
dio coordinator Elizabeth Ernst sent an email to Fitzpatrick
that labeled Vallera as a “problem maker,” and discouraged
Fitzpatrick from assigning additional classes to faculty mem-
bers (such as Vallera) just because they requested them on their
availability forms. I therefore find that the Acting General
Counsel made an initial showing that the College discriminated
against Vallera when it made its fall 2012 faculty class assign-
ments.

52 Contrary to the Acting General Counsel’s assertion in its brief
(see GC Posttrial Br. at 62–63), the Acting General Counsel did not
demonstrate that the College had a past practice of finding replacement
classes for faculty who did not receive their usual summer class as-
signments. See Palm Beach Metro Transportation, LLC, 357 NLRB
180, 183–184 (2011) (noting that the party asserting the existence of a
past practice bears the burden of proof on the issue, and that the evi-
dence must show that the practice occurred with such regularity and
frequency that employees could reasonably expect the practice to con-
tinue or reoccur on a regular and consistent basis), enfd. 459 Fed.
Appx. 874 (11th Cir. 2012). The College’s class assignment records do
not show any such past practice. (See GC Exhs. 90(c)–(d) (showing
that it was not uncommon for a faculty member to teach a class one
summer, and then not teach any classes the following summer, and also
showing no clear pattern of faculty receiving “extra” classes in the fall
semester after not receiving a summer semester class (such as employ-
ees C.E. (2012), G.K. (2011), and P.C. (2011).) Further, to the extent
that Vallera testified that the College did have a past practice of finding
replacement classes (see Tr. 1293), I did not credit that testimony be-
cause although it was unrebutted, Vallera’s testimony on that point was
not based on her personal knowledge, and was therefore speculative
and unreliable.
As its affirmative defense, the College maintains that it did
not have enough classes available to assign Vallera a second
class for the fall 2012 semester. Consistent with the College’s
assertion, the evidentiary record shows that only 12 part-time
faculty members in the photography department received more
than one class to teach in fall 2012. The record also shows,
however, that Vallera’s chances at receiving an additional class
ended when Ernst labeled Vallera as a problem maker because
of her protected activities, and effectively discouraged Fitzpat-
rick from assigning Vallera a second class. As a result, Fitzpat-
rick’s decision not to assign Vallera a second class was tainted
by discriminatory animus, stemming from his reliance on
Ernst’s biased recommendation, and from the fact that Ernst
had direct input into Fitzpatrick’s consideration of Vallera for a
second fall 2012 class assignment. Bruce Packing Co., Inc.,
357 NLRB 1084, 1086 (2011) (explaining that “the Board’s
case law is clear that the anti-union motivation of a supervisor
will be imputed to the decision making official, where the su-
pervisor has direct input into the decision”). The College’s
affirmative defense accordingly fails, and I find that the Col-
lege violated Section 8(a)(3) of the Act when it failed to assign
Vallera more than one class to teach in the fall 2012 semester.53
c. Did the College unlawfully fail and refuse to
respond to PFAC’s May 13, 2012 information
request concerning the College’s class assignments
to part-time faculty in the photography department
for fall 2012?
An employer’s duty to bargain includes a general duty to
provide information needed by the bargaining representative in
contract negotiations and administration. Generally, infor-
mation concerning wages, hours, and other terms and condi-
tions of employment for unit employees is presumptively rele-
vant to the union’s role as exclusive collective-bargaining rep-
resentative. By contrast, information concerning extra-unit
employees is not presumptively relevant, and thus relevance
must be shown. A-1 Door & Building Solutions, 356 NLRB
499, 500 (2011). The burden to show relevance is not excep-
tionally heavy, as the Board uses a broad, discovery-type stand-
ard in determining relevance in information requests. Id.
The duty to furnish information requires a reasonable good-
faith effort to respond to the request as promptly as circum-
stances allow. An employer must respond to the information
request in a timely manner, and an unreasonable delay in fur-
nishing such information is as much of a violation of Section
8(a)(5) as a refusal to furnish the information at all. Castle Hill
Health Care Center, 355 NLRB 1156, 1179 (2010) (citing
Good Life Beverage Co., 312 NLRB 1060, 1062 fn. 9 (1993),
and Amersig Graphics, Inc., 334 NLRB 880, 885 (2000)).
The evidentiary record shows that on May 13, 2012, Vallera
contacted the College to request information relevant to faculty
class assignments in the photography department. Specifically,

53 Ernst’s comments about Vallera, and Fitzpatrick’s resulting deci-
sion not to assign Vallera a second class, were based on Vallera’s union
activities, and not based on Vallera’s participation in the trial in Case
30–CA–018888 or on the Board charges that PFAC filed that related to
Vallera’s union activities. I therefore do not find that the College vio-
lated Sec. 8(a)(4) of the Act.
COLUMBIA COLLEGE CHICAGO 41
Vallera asked for: information about part-time photography
faculty that were offered a second class to teach; a copy of all
part-time faculty availability forms for fall 2012; the number
of classes offered to PFAC members that have accrued over 51
credit hours of teaching experience; and the rationale for all
changes in the photography department. For 2 months, the
College did not respond at all to Vallera’s request, prompting
her to renew her request on July 19, 2012. An additional 2
months passed before the College (on September 28, 2012)
finally provided Vallera with materials in response to her in-
formation request.
Based on those undisputed facts, I find that the College un-
reasonably delayed in responding to PFAC’s May 13, 2012
information request. Although the College maintains that
PFAC could have obtained some of the information that it
sought by performing its own search on the College’s online
course database, and that PFAC liaison Pegeen Quinn respond-
ed to the information request as quickly as possible under the
circum-stances (see R. Posttrial Br. at 71–72), I do not find
either of those arguments to be persuasive. Regardless of
PFAC’s ability to obtain some information through its own
research, PFAC’s information requests were reasonable and
relevant because PFAC needed to have the College’s data and
responses to establish a foundation for discussion if and when
the parties met to discuss faculty class assignments at the bar-
gaining table. See Castle Hill Health Care Center, 355 NLRB
at 1183 (noting that an employer’s duty to provide relevant
information in its possession is not excused by the fact that the
information may be obtained elsewhere). Further, it was the
College’s decision to leave information request responses sole-
ly in the hands of one person (Pegeen Quinn)—to the extent
that the College’s staffing decision resulted in unreasonable
delays, those delays are chargeable to the College.
In light of the foregoing analysis, I find that the College un-
lawfully delayed in responding to PFAC’s May 13, 2012 in-
formation request concerning class assignments to part-time
faculty in the photography department for the fall 2012 semes-
ter.54
G. Alleged Unilateral Change to the Scope of
the Bargaining Unit and Repudiation of the
Grievance Procedure
1. Complaint allegations
The complaint alleges that on or about March 23, 2012, Re-
spondent unilaterally changed the scope of the PFAC bargain-
ing unit by only applying the terms of the collective-bargaining
agreement to individuals currently teaching a course. (GC Exh.
1(ff), pars. X(a)–(c) (alleging violation of Sec. 8(a)(5) and (1),
and Sec. 8(d)).)

54 My finding here relies on a theory (unreasonable delay in re-
sponding to an information request) that is slightly different from the
theory that the Acting General Counsel alleged in the complaint (failure
and refusal to respond to an information request). However, the Board
may find and remedy a violation even in the absence of a specified
allegation in the complaint if the issue is closely connected to the sub-
ject matter of the complaint and has been fully litigated. That standard
is satisfied here. See Pergament United Sales, 296 NLRB 333, 335
(1989), enfd. 920 F.2d 130 (2d Cir. 1990).
The complaint also alleges that on or about March 23, 2012,
Respondent repudiated the grievance procedure contained in
Respondent and PFAC’s collective-bargaining agreement. (GC
Exh. 1(ff), par. X(d) (alleging violation of Sec. 8(a)(5) and (1),
and Sec. 8(d)).)
2. Findings of fact
a. The grievance procedure
Under the existing collective-bargaining agreement between
the College and PFAC, the parties agreed to a grievance proce-
dure for any “complaint by a unit member, group of unit mem-
bers, or [PFAC] that there has been a violation, misinterpreta-
tion, or misapplication of any provision” of the collective-
bargaining agreement. (R. Exh. 1, art. IX.) Per the collective-
bargaining agreement, parties should first use their best efforts
to resolve grievances informally via a meeting with the relevant
department chair. However, if the informal process fails, the
grieving party may initiate formal grievance proceedings that
are composed of the following steps:
Step 1—The grieving party must file a written grievance with
the College’s PFAC liaison. The grievance “must cite the Ar-
ticle allegedly violated, misinterpreted, or misapplied; the
dates of the events which are the subject of the grievance; the
person present at the events, if applicable; the facts supporting
the grievance, and the requested remedy.” Once the griev-
ance has been filed, the PFAC liaison shall meet with the
grievant, and then render a written decision on the grievance.
Step 2—If the grievance is not resolved at Step 1, the grievant
may submit the grievance to the Provost/Vice President for
Academic Affairs. The Provost, or his/her designee, shall
meet with the grievant and then render a written decision.
Step 3—If the grievance is not resolved at Step 2, then PFAC
may submit the grievance to binding arbitration.
(R. Exh. 1, art. IX.)
b. Arbitrator’s decision in employee R.P.’s grievance
about teaching assignments
On February 12, 2012, an arbitrator issued an award in a
grievance that part-time faculty member R.P. filed against the
College. R.P. claimed that the College violated the collective-
bargaining agreement when it did not assign R.P. a class to
teach in the fall 2010 semester (R.P. was initially assigned a
class, but the College withdrew that assignment before the fall
2010 semester began). (GC Exh. 54.) After reviewing the
collective-bargaining agreement, the arbitrator found that the
agreement “carefully established that an adjunct, or part-time,
instructor is employed only when he or she is teaching a course
during a finite period of time. Between teaching assignments
the adjunct has no status as an employee. He or she is hired
solely for the period of time during which the teaching oc-
curs.”55 (GC Exh. 54, p. 10.) Accordingly, the arbitrator ruled

55 In support of his finding that part-time faculty members are em-
ployed only when they are teaching a course during a finite period of
time, the arbitrator cited the following provisions from the collective-
bargaining agreement (among others):
The final decision of who teaches each course is the sole prerogative
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD42
that the College did not violate the collective-bargaining
agreement when it withdrew R.P.’s teaching assignment, be-
cause R.P. was an applicant for employment and thus “had no
standing to question his future employment.” (GC Exh. 54, p.
12.)
c. Susan Marcus’ March 23 letter to Vallera
As previously noted, in spring 2012, Vallera was engaging in
a dialogue with the photography department chair and associate
chair about her summer and fall 2012 class assignments (or
lack thereof). On March 23, Susan Marcus intervened in that
discussion to respond to issues that Vallera raised in a March
19 email to the photography department. Specifically, in re-
sponse to Vallera’s request for a rationale for why she lost her
summer class, Marcus asked Vallera to “[p]lease clarify your
rationale that there was a ‘loss of my’ summer class in relation
to the decisions in the [employee R.P.] arbitration and case #
(13–CA–045973).”56
Marcus also responded to Vallera’s request that the College
bargain with PFAC about its decisions to make changes to the
photography department’s class assignment procedures and
curriculum, and the effects of those decisions. On that issue,
Marcus stated as follows:
With respect to your request for a meeting about the above
topics, please also see the decisions in the [employee R.P.] ar-
bitration and case # (13–CA–45973).57 Additionally, as you
have been informed repeatedly, these questions should not be
asked of the Associate Chair [Connell]. If you persist in ig-

of the department Chairperson. [Artl. VII, sec. 2];
The receipt and submission of a teaching availability form by a unit
member does not obligate the College in any way to provide an ap-
pointment or a particular assignment to that unit member. . . . In addi-
tion, every form must include the following statement: “Submission of
this form constitutes a request, not a guarantee of teaching assignment.
Further, since course enrollment, as well as your qualifications and
evaluations, determine teaching assignments, no assignment can be
considered final until student registration is completed. [Art. VII, sec.
4]; and
The College may suspend, with or without pay, discharge, or take oth-
er appropriate disciplinary action against a unit member for just cause.
. . . For purposes of this Agreement, “discharge” shall mean termina-
tion of employment during a semester and shall not refer to the failure
to rehire or to renew a faculty member’s appointment to teach for fu-
ture semesters. This Article X shall not apply to decisions by the Col-
lege not to rehire or not to renew a unit member’s appointment to
teach future semesters. [Art. X, sec. 1.]
(GC Exh. 54, pp. 2–3, 10–12.)
56 In Case 13–CA–45973 (a charge asserting that the College made
unlawful changes to Vallera’s class schedule), the Acting General
Counsel denied PFAC’s appeal from the Regional Director’s refusal to
issue a complaint. In support of that decision, the Acting General
Counsel stated that “the evidence indicated no contractual right of part-
time faculty to any particular course or schedule.” (R. Exh. 7.)
57 Marcus admitted that she should have forwarded Vallera’s request
for bargaining to Leonard Strazewski, since he was handling all bar-
gaining with PFAC. (Tr. 980–982.) Marcus’ expertise is with handling
grievances that allege that the College violated the existing collective-
bargaining agreement. (Tr. 980.)
noring appropriate channels, your requests will not be for-
warded to the appropriate office.
(GC Exh. 92; see also Tr. 926–928, 935.)
Marcus’ intervention prompted a swift response from
Vallera, as later on March 23, Vallera emailed Marcus and
asserted:
As you have been repeatedly warned in the past, PFAC will
not tolerate any intimidation tactics on the part of this admin-
istration. Your tactics [] of avoiding to answer questions, in-
timidating, and not allowing chairs of departments to meet
with PFAC to resolve issues will not be tolerated. PFAC ab-
solutely has a right to request a demand to bargain over the
terms [and] conditions of employment and what you seem to
be avoiding is the very important issue of remaining status
quo while in bargaining.
(GC Exh. 92.) Vallera went on to contend that the College
changed the status quo by not including part-time faculty in the
online course catalog, and asked Marcus to explain whether the
photography department chair made that change on his own, or
instead pursuant to a directive from someone else at the Col-
lege. (Id.)
d. The College clarifies its position about PFAC
bargaining requests
On April 10, Marcus responded to Vallera’s March 23 email
to explain that the purpose of her (Marcus’) March 23 email
was to ask PFAC to follow the proper protocol for bargaining.
Specifically, Marcus stated:
[I]t is not appropriate for PFAC to attempt to discuss bargain-
ing/contract related topics with Associate Chairs. The Col-
lege does not know how much clearer it can make this point:
Bargaining issues raised by PFAC should be directed to Len
Strazewski, issues arising under the contract should be ad-
dressed to Pegeen Quinn. Those are the appropriate avenues
for PFAC. Unit members are always encouraged to com-
municate with the Chair or Associate Chair about their indi-
vidual concerns or questions. Under the CBA, individual unit
members meet with the Chair to informally resolve any griev-
ance.
(R. Exh. 92; see also Tr. 931–932.) Marcus added that it was
not clear until Vallera’s March 23 email that PFAC wished to
bargain about whether the photography department should
maintain the status quo with its operations, and promised to
forward that issue to Strazewski for a response. Finally, Mar-
cus advised Vallera that the College would interpret Vallera’s
questions about who authorized the changes in the photography
department as a request for information, and accordingly would
forward the request to Pegeen Quinn for processing. (R. Exh.
92.)
e. PFAC files a grievance about faculty class assignments,
and the College’s responses
On May 1, PFAC Representative Mary Lou Carroll filed a
grievance on behalf of PFAC regarding summer 2012 class
assignments. In the grievance, PFAC alleged that the College
“abandoned its obligation to distribute teaching assignments for
COLUMBIA COLLEGE CHICAGO 43
Summer 2012 classes on the basis of adjunct faculty” summer
availability, summer teaching history, accrued credit hours,
applicable teaching qualifications, and summer student enroll-
ment and interest. (GC Exh. 93(a) (citing the “Appoint-
ment/Reappointment” section of the collective-bargaining
agreement, past practice, and principles of reasonableness and
fairness in support of PFAC’s position).) PFAC also alleged
that the College failed to make an effort to assign alternative
classes to affected PFAC members, and unilaterally adopted
new criteria/methods for making faculty class assignments.
(Id.)
f. The College’s May 8, 2012 response to PFAC’s
request for effects bargaining about the
prioritization process
On May 8, 2012, interim associate provost Leonard
Strazewski responded to a request that Vallera made for the
College bargain with PFAC about the prioritization process.
On the issue of effects bargaining, Strazewski maintained that
no such bargaining was warranted. In support of the College’s
view, Strazewski asserted that the arbitrator’s decision in em-
ployee R.P.’s grievance established that PFAC did not have
standing to bargain about the potential effects that changes
proposed through the prioritization process could have on work
assignments, job qualification requirements, and job availabil-
ity for PFAC members. (See sec. B(2)(e), supra.)
g. The College responds to PFAC’s grievance
On May 15, Susan Marcus responded to PFAC’s grievance
regarding summer 2012 faculty class assignments. In her
email, Marcus asserted that the grievance was untimely because
PFAC did not request an informal meeting in the proper
timeframe. Marcus also asserted that the College intended to
honor the rationale that the arbitrator set forth in his February
12 decision (in employee R.P.’s grievance). Specifically, in the
College’s view, the arbitrator’s decision established that “out-
side of the narrow exceptions under the Appoint-
ment/Reappointment pro-vision of the CBA, a unit member is
considered to be an applicant for employment prior to each
semester and does not have standing to question or challenge
his future employment at the college.”58 In light of those con-
cerns, Marcus stated that the College would not be able to hold
a step 1 grievance hearing until Carroll sent documentation
showing that she did request an informal meeting with her de-
partment chair, and documentation showing that she/PFAC had
standing to pursue the grievance under the collective-
bargaining agreement. (GC Exh. 93(b).)
On June 1, Pegeen Quinn wrote to Carroll to followup on
Marcus’ May 1 email to Carroll about the information that the
College required before it could hold a step 1 grievance meet-
ing. Quinn stated that PFAC still had not provided the College
with information showing that a step 1 meeting was appropriate
in light of the concerns that the College raised about timeliness
and whether PFAC had standing to bring a grievance about
future employment. Quinn renewed the College’s request that

58 PFAC has not agreed to any changes to the grievance procedure
set forth in the collective-bargaining agreement. (Tr. 313.)
PFAC provide information that addressed those issues. (GC
Exh. 93(c).)
The College modified its position somewhat on June 8, when
Quinn notified Carroll that notwithstanding the College’s con-
cerns about whether PFAC’s grievance was timely and whether
PFAC had standing, the College would agree to hold a step 1
grievance meeting. Accordingly, Quinn asked Carroll to con-
tact her to schedule a meeting, and also asked Carroll to pro-
vide the information about timeliness, standing and the substan-
tive merits of the grievance before the meeting. (GC Exh.
93(d).)
h. June 2011—the College files a position statement
in response to the allegation that it unilaterally
changed the scope of the PFAC bargaining unit
On June 11, the College submitted a position statement to the
Region in Case 13–CA–081162. In its position statement, the
College rejected PFAC’s claim that through its reliance on the
arbitrator’s decision in employee R.P.’s case, the College uni-
laterally changed the scope of the PFAC bargaining unit. As
the College explained, it “has never taken the position that
PFAC does not represent adjuncts (who have completed at least
one semester) in between semesters or that the scope of the
bargaining unit has somehow changed.” Instead, the College
maintained that the arbitrator’s decision simply defined the
extent of coverage that the existing collective-bargaining
agreement provided to adjuncts—that is, that adjuncts are only
College employees during the semesters they are actually
teaching. (GC Exh. 94(a), pp. 2–3.)
i. The College denies PFAC’s grievance about
faculty class assignments
On July 2, 2012, Quinn notified Carroll that the College was
denying the grievance that she filed on behalf of PFAC on May
1.59 First, Quinn asserted that PFAC/Carroll lacked standing to
bring the grievance because: Carroll did not request an informal
meeting with her department chair; PFAC did not provide in-
formation about the individual grieving parties or underlying
facts; and per the arbitrator’s decision in employee R.P.’s case,
individual unit members have no standing to question their
future employment. Second, Quinn stated that even if Carroll
and/or PFAC did have standing to file the grievance, Carroll
failed to demonstrate that the College was required under the
collective-bargaining agreement to assign classes to an adjunct
based on the number of credit hours that they had accrued, or
that the College otherwise violated the collective-bargaining
agreement when it made its summer 2012 faculty class assign-
ments. (GC Exh. 93(e).)
3. Discussion and analysis
For the complaint allegations at issue in this section, the Act-
ing General Counsel essentially takes issue with how the Col-
lege has applied the reasoning in the arbitrator’s decision in
employee R.P.’s case to other disagreements with PFAC. Spe-

59 The step 1 hearing for the grievance was held on June 18, 2012,
and addressed not only the grievance that Carroll filed on May 1 re-
garding faculty class assignments for summer 2012, but also another
grievance that Carroll filed on May 2. (GC Exh. 93(e).)
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD44
cifically, the Acting General Counsel maintains that although
the arbitrator’s decision only a narrow issue, the College seized
upon the decision to “redefine its bargaining relationship with
the Union to one that essentially ceases every time the College
finishes an academic semester. . . . Flowing from this interpre-
tation, the College has taken the position that the Union there-
fore has no right to bargain over future changes in terms and
conditions of employment or the effects of such changes be-
cause the Union has no standing under the contract to demand
such bargaining. In so doing, the [College] has unilaterally
altered the scope of the bargaining unit and repudiated the
grievance procedure.” (GC Posttrial Br. at 43.)
In its defense, the College maintains that it is entitled to rely
on the arbitrator’s decision as a binding interpretation of the
terms and coverage of the existing collective-bargaining
agreement. The College therefore denies that it acted unilater-
ally or made any changes to the contract. (R. Posttrial Br. at
61.)
The Acting General Counsel advances two separate legal
theories for the complaint allegations at issue here. First, the
Acting General Counsel challenges the College’s actions as
unlawful unilateral changes that violate Section 8(a)(5) and (1)
of the Act. “Under the unilateral change doctrine, an employ-
er’s duty to bargain under the Act includes the obligation to
refrain from changing its employees’ terms and conditions of
employment without first bargaining to impasse with the em-
ployees’ collective-bargaining representative concerning the
contemplated changes.” Lawrence Livermore National Securi-
ty, LLC, 357 NLRB 203, 205 (2011). The Act prohibits em-
ployers from taking unilateral action regarding mandatory sub-
jects of bargaining such as rates of pay, wages, hours of em-
ployment, and other conditions of employment. Garden Grove
Hospital & Medical Center, 357 NLRB 653, 653 fn. 4, 5
(2011). Notably, an employer’s regular and longstanding prac-
tices that are neither random nor intermittent become terms and
conditions of employment even if those practices are not re-
quired by a collective-bargaining agreement. Id; see also Palm
Beach Metro Transportation, LLC, 357 NLRB 180, 183–184
(2011) (noting that the party asserting the existence of a past
practice bears the burden of proof on the issue, and that the
evidence must show that the practice occurred with such regu-
larity and frequency that employees could reasonably expect
the practice to continue or reoccur on a regular and consistent
basis), enfd. 459 Fed. Appx. 874 (11th Cir. 2012).
Second, the Acting General Counsel challenges the Colleges
actions as unlawful contract modifications within the meaning
of Section 8(d) of the Act, and in violation of Section 8(a)(5)
and (1) of the Act. Section 8(d) states that “where there is in
effect a collective-bargaining contract . . . no party to such con-
tract shall terminate or modify such contract.” In a contract
modification case, the Acting General Counsel must identify a
contractual provision, and then show that the employer modi-
fied that contractual provision without the consent of the union.
Where an employer has a “sound arguable basis” for its in-
terpretation of a contract and is not motivated by union animus
or acting in bad faith, the Board ordinarily will not find a viola-
tion. Bath Iron Works Corp., 345 NLRB 499, 501–502 (2005),
affd. 475 F.3d 14 (1st Cir. 2007).
a. Did the College violate the Act on or about March 23,
2012, by unilaterally changing the scope of the
PFAC bargaining unit by only applying the terms of
the collective-bargaining agreement to individuals
currently teaching a course?
The Acting General Counsel maintains that the College vio-
lated the Act by relying on the arbitrator’s decision to unilater-
ally redefine the bargaining unit as only including PFAC mem-
bers who were currently teaching a course. The Acting General
Counsel’s argument fails, however, because the evidentiary
record shows that the College did not change the scope of the
bargaining unit.
On March 19, 2012, Vallera requested a meeting about
changes that the photography department allegedly made to its
faculty class assignment procedures, and the changes to the
photography department’s curriculum. There is no dispute that
on March 23, 2012, the College (through Susan Marcus) re-
sponded to Vallera’s request by advising her to review the arbi-
trator’s decision and the dismissal of the allegations in Case
13–CA–045973. If that were the end of the story, then there
would be some merit to the Acting General Counsel’s assertion
that the College changed the scope of the bargaining unit, be-
cause through her brief email, Marcus arguably took the posi-
tion that the College did not need to bargain with PFAC about
the issues in the photography department that Vallera identi-
fied. However, the evidentiary record clearly shows that after
reviewing Vallera’s March 23 email, Marcus recognized
PFAC’s bargaining request and notified Vallera on April 10,
2012, that she would forward PFAC’s request to Leonard
Strazewski for a response. (See FOF, secs. c, d, supra.)
For similar reasons, I am not persuaded that the College
modified the scope of the bargaining unit when Strazewski
emailed Vallera on May 8 to refuse PFAC’s request for effects
bargaining about the prioritization process. (See PFAC
Posttrial Br. at 52.) As I found when I analyzed the complaint
allegation about that issue, the College’s refusal to engage in
effects bargaining on May 8 was lawful because PFAC’s re-
quest for such bargaining was premature. (See sec. C(3), su-
pra.) To the extent that Strazewski asserted that PFAC “lacked
standing” to bargain about the effects of the prioritization pro-
cess (presumably because of the arbitrator’s decision and anal-
ysis), the College quickly clarified its position on that point
when it affirmed in its position statement that PFAC represents
its members at all times (i.e., during and between semesters
when they are teaching). (See FOF, secs. f, h, supra.)
Based on those facts, I find that the College did not make
any unilateral changes to the scope of the PFAC bargaining
unit. I also find that the College did not modify any contractual
provisions about the scope of the bargaining unit. To the con-
trary, after sending emails that erroneously suggested that the
arbitrator’s decision relieved the College of its duty to engage
in effects bargaining, the College corrected its errors and reaf-
firmed the full extent of PFAC’s right to bargain. I therefore
recommend that the allegations in paragraphs X(a)–(c) of the
complaint be dismissed.
COLUMBIA COLLEGE CHICAGO 45
b. Did the College violate the Act on or about March 23,
2012, by repudiating the grievance procedure contained
in its collective-bargaining agreement with PFAC?
The Acting General Counsel also takes issue with the Col-
lege’s reliance on the arbitrator’s decision when it responded to
PFAC’s grievance about faculty class assignments. The evi-
dentiary record does show that the College repeatedly asserted
that based on the arbitrator’s decision, PFAC lacked standing to
pursue a grievance about future teaching assignments. The
record also shows, however, that notwithstanding its questions
about PFAC’s standing, the College ultimately did process
PFAC’s grievance and respond to it on the merits. (FOF, secs.
f, h, supra.)
After considering the applicable case law, I find that the Col-
lege did not repudiate the grievance procedure as alleged in the
complaint. The Board’s decision in Velan Valve Corp., 316
NLRB 1273 (1995), is instructive. In that case, the Board con-
sidered whether an employer’s refusal to arbitrate certain un-
timely grievances violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act,
and set forth the following principles:
It is well settled that not every employer refusal to arbitrate
violates Section 8(a)(5). Mid-American Milling Co., 282
NLRB 926 (1987). Where there is a refusal to arbitrate all
grievances, or where the refusal to arbitrate a particular class
of grievances amounts to a wholesale repudiation of the con-
tract, a violation will be found. See Indiana & Michigan Elec-
tric Co., 284 NLRB 53 (1987). Conversely, if the refusal to
arbitrate is limited to a single grievance or specifically de-
fined, ‘‘narrow class’’ of grievances, Section 8(a)(5) is not vi-
olated. GAF Corp., 265 NLRB 1361, 1365 (1982); Mid-
American Milling Co., supra. The relevant inquiry in deter-
mining whether an employer’s refusal to arbitrate violates the
Act is whether the employer, by its refusal, has thereby unilat-
erally modified terms and conditions of employment during
the contract term.
Velan Valve Corp., 316 NLRB at 1274. Applying that stand-
ard, the Board held that the employer did not violate the Act
because its “refusal to arbitrate on timeliness grounds was not
tantamount to a wholesale repudiation of the contractual arbi-
tration provision.” Id.; compare Exxon Chemical Co., 340
NLRB 357, 359 (2003) (employer’s refusal to arbitrate a wide
range of contractual issues violated the Act because the em-
ployer’s refusal amounted to a wholesale repudiation of the
collective-bargaining agreement), enfd. 386 F.3d 1160 (D.C.
Cir. 2004).
As with the employer in Velan Valve, in this case the College
did not engage in a wholesale repudiation of the grievance pro-
cedure. Instead, the College questioned PFAC’s standing to
pursue a narrow class of grievances—namely, grievances that
addressed faculty class assignments and thus were arguably
covered by the arbitrator’s decision and rationale. Thus, con-
sistent with Velan Valve, the College did not violate Section
8(a)(5) of the Act.
Nor, for that matter, did the College violate Section 8(d) of
the Act. At a minimum, the arbitrator’s decision supplied a
sound arguable basis for the College’s position that PFAC did
not have standing to pursue its grievance about faculty class
assignments. Since the Acting General Counsel did not show
that the College acted with antiunion animus or in bad faith
when it invoked the arbitrator’s decision, the College acted
lawfully when it relied on the arbitrator’s decision in its re-
sponses to PFAC’s grievance. I therefore recommend that the
allegation in paragraph X(d) of the complaint be dismissed.
H. Investigation of Vallera for Misconduct
1. Complaint allegations
The complaint alleges that because Diana Vallera engaged in
union and protected concerted activities, and because she testi-
fied in Case 30–CA–018888, and cooperated in the investiga-
tion (including providing affidavits to the Board) in Cases 13–
CA–073486, 13–CA–076794, 13–CA–078080, and 13–CA–
081162, in April or May 2012, the College began investigating
Diana Vallera for alleged misconduct concerning claims about
employees of the College’s office of general counsel. (GC
Exh. 1(ff), pars. VI(e)–(f) (alleging violations of Sec. 8(a)(3),
(4), and (1) of the Act).)
The complaint also alleges that because Diana Vallera en-
gaged in union and protected concerted activities, and because
she testified in Case 30–CA–018888, and cooperated in the
investigation (including providing affidavits to the Board) in
Cases 13–CA–073486, 13–CA–076794, 13–CA–078080, and
13–CA–081162, on or about May 14, 2012, the College issued
Diana Vallera a notice of “Complaint of Misconduct” concern-
ing claims about employees of the College’s office of general
counsel. (GC Exh. 1(ff), pars. VI(e)–(f) (alleging violations of
Sec. 8(a)(3), (4), and (1) of the Act).)
And, the complaint alleges that since on or about June 5,
2012, the College has failed and refused to provide PFAC with
information that PFAC requested on May 17, 2012, concerning
the nature of and basis for the College’s investigation of Diana
Vallera for misconduct. (GC Exh. 1(ff), pars. VIII(c), (g) (al-
leging violation of Sec. 8(a)(5) and (1)).)
2. Findings of fact
a. Alleged surveillance incident at Vallera’s home
On January 30, 2012, Diana Vallera was teaching when she
received a phone call from her nanny, who reported seeing a
man who appeared to be taking pictures outside of Vallera’s
home (as well as a woman who remained in a car parked in
front of the home). Vallera went to her home, and after speak-
ing with her nanny, contacted the police to file a police report.
(Tr. 181–182; R. Exh. 77.)
During the conversation with the police officer who re-
sponded to Vallera’s home, Vallera’s nanny described the man
that she encountered. The nanny’s description prompted
Vallera to remark that the description sounded like someone
from the College’s general counsel’s office (employee P.D.).
Accordingly, the police officer asked Vallera to obtain a photo-
graph of P.D. and show it to her nanny to see if she could iden-
tify P.D. as the man who was at Vallera’s home. Vallera ob-
tained a photograph of P.D. from PFAC’s steering committee,
and Vallera’s nanny reviewed the photograph and identified
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD46
P.D. as the man that she saw.60 After a couple of days, the
police officer notified Vallera that the incident was a civil mat-
ter and not a criminal matter. (Tr. 183–184, 383–385, 387–
388; R. Exh. 77.)
b. Vallera’s union activities, including references
to alleged surveillance
On February 6–8, the Acting General Counsel, the College
and PFAC litigated a trial in Case 30–CA–018888. (GC Exh.
7.) Vallera testified as a witness for the Acting General Coun-
sel/PFAC during the trial, and also sat at counsels’ table during
the trial. (Tr. 189; GC Exh. 7.)
On March 2, Vallera gave a speech at the National Education
Association Higher Education Conference, held in Chicago.
During her speech, Vallera spoke about “the crisis throughout
the country around higher education specifically with the ex-
ploitation of part-time faculty,” and observed that the crisis
provided an opportunity for unions to organize. To illustrate
her point, Vallera described PFAC’s and her experience at the
College, and mentioned the police report that was filed about
the January 30, 2012 surveillance at her home. (Tr. 186–188,
370–372.)
On April 14, Vallera participated in a PFAC membership
meeting attended by approximately 75 PFAC members. At the
meeting, PFAC grievance chair Susan Tyma gave an update
about the recent trial before the Board in Case 30–CA–018888,
potential new charges that PFAC might file, and surveillance of
Vallera’s home. Vallera advised the meeting participants that
she notified the IEA about the surveillance issue, and that the
IEA was looking into the matter. (Tr. 188–190.) Meeting at-
tendees also discussed having a vote of “no confidence” against
the College administration. In connection with that discussion,
PFAC later sent an email to its members that asked them to
register their opinion on a vote of “no confidence.” The email
cited various reasons for a no confidence vote, including the
assertion that “[t]his administration has attempted to prevent
the union and its leadership from communicating with the wid-
er college community, and has attempted surveillance of the
union leadership.” (GC Exh. 74; see also Tr. 190–192.)
Finally, between January 30 and May 16, 2012, PFAC filed
charges with the Board in Cases 13–CA–073486, 13–CA–
076794, 13–CA–078080, and 13–CA–081162 that related to
Vallera’s activities as PFAC’s president. (GC Exhs. 1(a), (e),
(g), (i), (m), and (s) (original and amended charges).)
c. Complaint of misconduct filed against Vallera
On April 19, Annice Kelly, the College’s general counsel,
sent an email to Vice President for Human Resources Ellen
Krutz to submit a formal complaint against Vallera. Kelly stat-
ed as follows in her email:
This morning I was informed by Louise [Love] that Diana
Vallera has been telling people that me/my office has been

60 I emphasize here that I take no position on whether Vallera’s
nanny was correct when she identified employee P.D. as the man who
she saw in front of Vallera’s home. I have only set forth these facts to
outline the basis for Vallera’s belief that one of the College’s agents
was taking pictures at her home.
conducting surveillance of her/her nanny. She has told people
that she has filed a police report with the Evanston police.
A couple of months ago I did receive a phone call from
someone claiming to be an Evanston police officer asking me
vague questions about being at some unidentified person’s
house in Evanston and a complaint being made. At the time I
was confused by the call and thought it very odd. It did not
make sense to me that if they had my license plate number
(which the officer claimed, but then when I asked him what it
was he could not give it to me) then why were they calling me
at work and not at home. How did he connect my car to my
work? It was very odd. It was a short conversation and in the
end he said he would get back to me but never did.
Now hearing what Louise has said, this phone call makes
sense and it gives credence that Diana is actually saying these
things. These untrue statements have the potential to be ca-
reer ending as it puts my law license in jeopardy.
I would like this matter investigated. Consider this a formal
complaint against Diana Vallera for making false, damaging
statements about me/my office by alleging we are involved in
criminal activity. I would like Columbia to investigate this as
I believe it is misconduct. Of course, Columbia should follow
its policies and the CBA in conducting the investigation.
Given my involvement, and that of my office, I think it ap-
propriate that the OGC [recuse] itself from the investigation.
If you feel the need to seek legal counsel during the course of
the investigation, that you would normally seek from the
OGC, I think you should seek it. I would recommend using
an attorney who has not represented Columbia or that the
OGC is not associated with so that we avoid all [appearance]
of undue influence.
(GC Exh. 75; see also CP Exh. 4, p. 25 (noting that Louise
Love learned of this issue from her husband, who had learned
of the incident from a part-time faculty member).) Krutz for-
warded Kelly’s complaint to Louise Love for processing, since
the office of Academic Affairs handles faculty personnel mat-
ters. (CP Exh. 4, p. 22.)
d. The College learns of additional public statements
about alleged surveillance at Vallera’s home
The following day, Robert Koverman, the College’s associ-
ate vice president for Campus Safety and Security, notified
Love and three other College administrators that PFAC’s re-
quest for a “no confidence” vote had been posted on a website
for Occupy Columbia.61 (GC Exh. 100 (including a copy of
PFAC’s request for a no confidence vote and the allegation that
the College had engaged in surveillance of union leadership).)
PFAC was not involved in placing the email on the Occupy
Columbia website. (Tr. 240.)
On April 26, PFAC filed an amended charge in Case 13–
CA–076794 to allege (among other things) that the College
violated the Act by creating the appearance of surveillance.

61 In December 2011, PFAC joined a coalition with students, facul-
ty, and staff to protest various conditions at the College. The protest
effort was associated with Occupy Columbia, a branch of the national
Occupy Movement. (See Tr. 166–170, 1109–1110; GC Exh. 69.)
COLUMBIA COLLEGE CHICAGO 47
(Tr. 324; GC Exh. 84(b).) Two days later, Vallera and two full-
time College faculty members attended an American Associa-
tion of University Professors (AAUP) meeting. At the meeting,
Vallera spoke about what was happening at Columbia College,
and mentioned the police report that she filed concerning the
possible surveillance at her home. (Tr. 206–208, 382.) After
Vallera spoke, one of the full-time professors from the College
who was at the meeting told Vallera that her remarks about
what was happening at her home were very serious, and added
that if attorneys did come to Vallera’s home, something had to
be done about it. (Tr. 382–383.)
e. The College begins investigating Vallera
for misconduct
Love assigned interim associate provost Leonard Strazewski
and Associate Vice President for Academic Affairs Susan Mar-
cus to investigate Kelly’s complaint against Vallera. (Tr. 495,
1086.) Accordingly, on May 14, Strazewski sent Vallera an e-
mail that stated as follows:
Dear Ms. Vallera:
A complaint of misconduct has been made against you by [the
College’s] office of the General Counsel. The Office of the
Provost/Academic Affairs is conducting a neutral and impar-
tial investigation. You may have union representation at the
investigatory meeting.
We would like to proceed within ten (10) days following the
re-opening of the College after the closing for the NATO
summit May 17–22. Please reply with your available dates.
(GC Exh. 77.)
f. PFAC information request about the investigation
Vallera notified IEA organizer Bill Silver about Strazewski’s
email and the complaint of misconduct. Acting on Vallera’s
behalf, on May 17, Silver sent Strazewski an information re-
quest that sought the following information: (1) a copy of the
complaint against Vallera; (2) all documentation used in pre-
paring, or offered in support of, the allegations in the com-
plaint; (3) the steps that Strazewski’s office has taken or will
take to ensure that the investigation is neutral and impartial; (4)
a copy of the college policy under which the complaint was
initiated and processed; (5) the names of those initiating the
complaint and an explanation of why the complaint was initiat-
ed by an office instead of individuals; (6) an explanation for
why the investigation was assigned to the Office of the Prov-
ost/Academic Affairs instead of Vallera’s supervisor, and when
the assignment was made; and (7) the total number of com-
plaints that the College’s office of general counsel has issued
against employees for misconduct, including the names of the
employees who were charged with misconduct and information
about how each such complaint was ultimately resolved. Silver
asked Strazewski to provide a copy of the complaint within 48
hours, and to provide the remaining information within 10 days.
(Tr. 422–424; GC Exh. 78.)
Hearing no response from the College, Silver renewed his
request for information in a followup email to Strazewski on
May 30. (GC Exh. 79.) Strazewski responded later that same
day with a brief email that stated that the charge against Vallera
“was filed by the Columbia College Chicago general counsel
against Diana Vallera for making ‘false, damaging statements’
about the general counsel and her office by alleging the office
was involved in criminal activity such as personal surveil-
lance.” Strazewski proposed that he and Vallera meet on June
5, 6, or 7 to discuss the facts of the complaint. (GC Exh. 80.)
On June 4, Silver acknowledged receiving Strazewski’s May
30 email and request for a meeting, but reiterated the Union’s
request for a copy of the full complaint before any such meet-
ing to ensure that the meeting would be as productive as possi-
ble, and to avoid unnecessary delays that would result if the
Union required time to review the complaint. Silver also stated
that the Union still needed the additional information that it
requested, because that information was necessary for the Un-
ion to evaluate whether Vallera was being singled out and
treated in a discriminatory manner. (GC Exh. 81.) Silver sub-
sequently notified Strazewski that Vallera would be available to
meet on June 6. (GC Exh. 82.)
On June 5, Strazewski agreed to meet on June 6, subject to
Vallera confirming the proposed meeting date and time. Re-
garding the Union’s information requests, Strazewski respond-
ed that “this is a confidential inquiry into a complaint filed by
the general counsel regarding a matter that does not appear to
be directly related to union activity, bargaining or the mandato-
ry subjects of bargaining, so I have not responded directly to
PFAC inquiries. I expect my questions and our conversation
will be between us though I understand you have Weingarten
rights to union representation. I expect to have a nonparticipat-
ing notetaker present.” (GC Exh. 83.) Strazewski did not pro-
vide any information in response to PFAC’s information re-
quests about the misconduct investigation. (Tr. 226, 427, 1108,
1171.)
g. Strazewski interviews Vallera and
completes investigation
Vallera and Silver finally met with Strazewski on June 6
(with a notetaker provided by the College present). (Tr. 202;
CP Exh. 4, p. 8.) Early in the meeting, Silver asked Strazewski
to explain what policy Vallera violated. Strazewski responded
that the misconduct charge was based on public remarks that
Vallera made about the alleged surveillance at her home.
Strazewski added that there was no written policy that applied,
other than a general faculty misconduct policy for which there
was no formal procedure. (Tr. 205; CP Exh. 4, p. 8.) Silver
also asked what evidence Strazewski was relying on in the
investigation, and Strazewski identified the remarks that
Vallera made at the April 28 AAUP meeting (as reported by
full-time faculty members who attended that meeting), a re-
dacted copy of the police report that Vallera filed, and state-
ments that PFAC members and representatives made at PFAC
meetings and in written material about the alleged surveillance
at Vallera’s home. (Tr. 203, 430, 1091–1093, 1095; CP Exh. 4,
p. 9; see also CP Exh. 3 (Facebook posting made by a PFAC
member); R. Exh. 78; and Tr. 331 (PFAC steering committee
newsletters and communications that were not published by
Vallera).) Silver asked for a copy of the evidence that
Strazewski identified, but Strazewski refused. (Tr. 204.)
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD48
Strazewski then asked Vallera questions about what hap-
pened at her home on January 30, and how employee P.D. was
identified as the person who was at Vallera’s home. In connec-
tion with those questions, Strazewski asserted that if the Col-
lege determined that no one from the College’s office of gen-
eral counsel was at Vallera’s home on January 30, then Vallera
would be disciplined. (Tr. 204; CP Exh. 4, p. 9.) Strazewski
also asked for: a copy of the charge that PFAC filed with the
Board regarding the alleged surveillance; an unredacted copy of
the police report that Vallera filed; a copy of the photograph
that Vallera showed her nanny; and the opportunity to interview
Vallera’s nanny. (Tr. 205, 434; CP Exh. 4, pp. 9–10.)
On June 11, Silver provided Strazewski with a copy of the
Board charge that included the alleged surveillance at Vallera’s
home. (GC Exhs. 84(a)–(c).) Silver also expressed the Union’s
concerns about the ongoing investigation of Vallera for mis-
conduct. First, Silver asserted that the College was using the
investigation process to retaliate against Vallera for alleging
that the College engaged in unlawful surveillance in the
amended charge that PFAC filed with the Board in Case 13–
CA–076794. Second, Silver objected to the fact that the Col-
lege was not conducting the investigation under either of its
existing policies related to employee conduct, and instead was
following an unwritten procedure that did not give Vallera no-
tice of any rule violation and relied on second-hand reports
about union meetings as evidence for the investigation. And
third, Silver objected to Strazewski’s efforts to determine
whether Vallera’s nanny’s identification of employee P.D. was
true or false, because that inquiry was “beyond the ability or
scope” of Strazewski’s investigation. In light of those con-
cerns, Silver urged Strazewski to drop the investigation of
Vallera. (GC Exh. 84(a).)
Meanwhile, Strazewski asked Vallera to provide him with
additional information, including the name of the employee
who may have been conducting surveillance of Vallera’s home,
and/or the photograph that Vallera’s nanny reviewed to make
her identification. (GC Exh. 85(a).) When Vallera complied
and advised Strazewski that her nanny identified employee P.D.
as the man who was taking pictures at Vallera’s home, on June
25, 2012, Strazewski requested a followup interview with
Vallera to address “some significant questions and concerns.”
(GC Exh. 86.) Silver objected to Strazewski’s request for an-
other interview, citing the union’s concerns about the investiga-
tion and how it was being conducted. Strazewski did not re-
spond to Silver’s concerns, and thus no followup meeting oc-
curred. (Tr. 230, 448; GC Exhs. 87(a), 88; see also GC Exh.
87(b).)
h. Strazewski and Marcus recommend that Vallera
be disciplined for misconduct
On August 9, Strazewski and Marcus submitted a report to
Love with their findings and recommendations regarding the
complaint of misconduct against Vallera. In the report, Marcus
and Strazewski explained that they “reviewed PFAC publica-
tions, including member newsletters and public postings on the
union Facebook pages. The publications documented that the
accusation of surveillance had been communicated widely and
was accepted as accurate by union members who had repeated
the claim online, citing by number a police report filed with the
Evanston Police in late January.” Marcus and Strazewski in-
terviewed personnel from the College’s general counsel and
human resources offices (including employee P.D.),62 and
found no evidence that the College was involved in any surveil-
lance at Vallera’s home.
By contrast, Marcus and Strazewski found Vallera to be
“evasive and difficult” during the investigation. Specifically,
Marcus and Strazewski described Vallera’s conduct during the
investigation as follows:
Vallera denied making the surveillance accusation until pre-
sented with documents to the contrary.63 Vallera stated that
there was an open police investigation; the police report is to
the contrary. Vallera has failed to respond to a request for a
follow-up interview subsequent to her email identifying [em-
ployee P.D.], thereby refusing to participate with this investi-
gation through to its conclusion. Vallera failed to file a com-
plaint with the College about the alleged surveillance, nor did
she ask the College to investigate her allegations. Vallera did
not explain why she would not provide access to her nanny or
the photograph which she had shown to her nanny and
claimed was of [employee P.D.].
Ultimately, Marcus and Strazewski found that Vallera commit-
ted misconduct by: filing a false police report; widely publish-
ing the false accusations; falsely stating that there was an ongo-
ing police investigation; refusing to cooperate with the Prov-
ost’s office in its investigation of the misconduct charge; and
giving false statements at the investigation interview. Accord-
ingly, Marcus and Strazewski recommended that Vallera be
censured for her misconduct and suspended from employment
at the College for one semester (with further instances of this
misconduct being cause for termination). (GC Exh. 101; see
also Tr. 1104–1106.) Love agreed with the recommended dis-
cipline because she agreed that Vallera made a false charge of
surveillance that was promulgated verbally and in writing.64
(Tr. 495–496.)

62 Strazewski interviewed employee P.D. and credited employee
P.D.’s explanation that he was working in his office when the alleged
surveillance incident occurred at Vallera’s home on January 30. (Tr.
1099, 1102-1103 (noting that employee P.D. provided Strazewski with
work product that he completed on January 30).)
63 Vallera maintained that her nanny (rather than Vallera) was the
one who filed the police report, because Vallera’s nanny was the one
who had first-hand knowledge about the incident. (Tr. 224, 1101–
1102; GC Exh. 85(b); see also Tr. 1175, 1186–1187 (Strazewski agreed
that Vallera did not file the police report).)
64 During trial, Love testified that Vallera wrote at least one of the
documents that asserted that someone from the College conducted
surveillance at her home. However, when Love was asked to identify
such a document in the materials that the College provided pursuant to
subpoena, she was not able to do so. (Tr. 496, 503–506.) Love also
could not explain why she concluded that Vallera made a “false” police
report, as opposed to a report that Vallera honestly believed but was
erroneous (e.g., because Vallera’s nanny mistakenly, but in good faith,
identified employee P.D. as the man she saw taking pictures at
Vallera’s home). (Tr. 508–509.)
COLUMBIA COLLEGE CHICAGO 49
i. Love notifies Vallera that disciplinary action
is forthcoming
On August 13, Love notified Vallera that the investigation of
the complaint of misconduct was complete, and that Love
wished to meet with her on August 17 pursuant to the collec-
tive-bargaining agreement to inform Vallera of the contemplat-
ed disciplinary action and the reason for it. (GC Exh. 89(a).)
Love later postponed the meeting to August 24, and then can-
celed that meeting without scheduling an alternate meeting
date. (GC Exhs. 89(b)–(c); see also Tr. 233, 437.)
3. Discussion and analysis
a. Did the College violate the Act by investigating
Vallera for misconduct, or by issuing a notice to
Vallera on May 14, 2012 that she was
being investigated?
As previously noted, the Acting General Counsel contends
that the College violated Section 8(a)(3), (4), and (1) of the Act
when it began investigating Vallera for misconduct in April
2012, and when it issued a notice to Vallera on May 14, 2012,
that she was being investigated. Since there is no dispute that
the College took those steps because of the statements that
Vallera and other PFAC members were making about the al-
leged surveillance that took place at Vallera’s home, the “single
motive” line of cases serves as the relevant case law for my
analysis.
In a single-motive case where an employer is charged with
discriminating against an employee because of the employee’s
protected concerted or union activities, the only issue is wheth-
er the employee’s conduct lost the protection of the Act be-
cause the conduct crossed over the line separating protected and
unprotected activity. Phoenix Transit System, 337 NLRB 510,
510 (2002), enfd. 63 Fed. Appx. 524 (D.C. Cir. 2003). Specifi-
cally, when an employee is disciplined or discharged for con-
duct that is part of the res gestae of protected concerted activi-
ties, the pertinent question is whether the conduct is sufficiently
egregious to remove it from the protection of the Act. Alumi-
num Co. of America, 338 NLRB 20 (2002). In making this
determination, the Board examines the following factors:
(1) the place of the discussion; (2) the subject matter of the
discussion; (3) the nature of the employee’s outburst; and (4)
whether the outburst was, in any way, provoked by an employ-
er’s unfair labor practice. Fresenius USA Mfg., 358 NLRB
1261, 1264 (2012) (citing Atlantic Steel Co., 245 NLRB 814,
816 (1979)).
In this case, the Acting General Counsel did not assert that
the College unlawfully disciplined Vallera for engaging in pro-
tected activities (nor could it, since the College has not, as of
yet, imposed any discipline). Instead, the Acting General
Counsel asserted that the College ran afoul of the Act merely
by investigating Vallera for misconduct, and by notifying
Vallera of the investigation. Those claims miss the mark. The
Board’s single-motive cases establish that an employer may
discipline or discharge an employee if the employee engages in
conduct that could have qualified as protected activity, but was
sufficiently egregious to remove it from the Act’s protection.
See Stanford Hotel, 344 NLRB 558 (2005) (citing Atlantic
Steel Co., 245 NLRB at 816). Given that an employer may
discipline an employee under those circumstances, it stands to
reason that an employer also may investigate whether an em-
ployee should be disciplined for engaging in activity that lost
the protection of the Act, assuming, of course, that the investi-
gation is done for legitimate reasons. See Fresenius USA Mfg.,
358 NLRB 1261, 1263 (2012) (noting that the Board “has rec-
ognized that employers have a legitimate business interest in
investigating facially valid complaints of employee miscon-
duct”); Bridgestone Firestone South Carolina, 350 NLRB 526,
528 (2007) (interrogation of employee was lawful where it
occurred as part of a legitimate investigation into whether the
employee engaged in misconduct). Indeed, the employer’s
right to conduct an investigation under these circumstances is
essential to the employer’s ability to make an informed decision
about whether the employee’s conduct warrants disciplinary
action.
With those principles in mind, I find that the College’s deci-
sions to investigate Vallera for misconduct and issue a notice to
Vallera about the investigation were legitimate and lawful. The
College received a complaint from its general counsel’s office
that raised two issues: (a) whether Vallera was maliciously
spreading false information that an attorney from the general
counsel’s office had conducted surveillance at her home; and
(b) whether, in the alternative, someone from the general coun-
sel’s office in fact did conduct surveillance at Vallera’s home.
The College understandably wished to get to the bottom of both
of those issues, and it was therefore reasonable for the College
to investigate the complaint against Vallera, and to notify
Vallera of the investigation so she could present her side of the
story. I therefore recommend that the allegations in paragraphs
VI(c)–(d) of the complaint be dismissed.
b. Did the College unlawfully fail and refuse to respond
to PFAC’s May 17, 2012 information request?
An employer’s duty to bargain includes a general duty to
provide information needed by the bargaining representative in
contract negotiations and administration. Generally, infor-
mation concerning wages, hours, and other terms and condi-
tions of employment for unit employees is presumptively rele-
vant to the union’s role as exclusive collective-bargaining rep-
resentative. By contrast, information concerning extra-unit
employees is not presumptively relevant, and thus relevance
must be shown. A-1 Door & Building Solutions, 356 NLRB
499, 500 (2011). The burden to show relevance is not excep-
tionally heavy, as the Board uses a broad, discovery-type stand-
ard in determining relevance in information requests. Id.
If a dispute about an information request centers around un-
ion requests for relevant but assertedly confidential infor-
mation, the Board balances the union’s need for the information
against any legitimate and substantial confidentiality interests
established by the employer. The party asserting confidentiali-
ty has the burden of proving that such interests exist and that
they outweigh its bargaining partner’s need for the information.
Further, a party refusing to supply information on confidentiali-
ty grounds has a duty to seek an accommodation that would
meet the needs of both parties. A-1 Door & Building Solutions,
356 NLRB 499, 501; National Steel Corp., 335 NLRB at 748.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD50
As described in the findings of fact, on May 17, 2012,
Vallera’s union representative sent an information request to
the College to request (among other things): a copy of the com-
plaint against Vallera; any supporting documentation associated
with the complaint; information about the steps that the College
would take to ensure that the investigation was neutral and
impartial; a copy of the policy under which the complaint was
initiated and processed; the names of the people initiating the
complaint; and information about any previous complaints that
the College’s office of general counsel initiated, and how those
complaints were resolved. In response, Strazewski provided
his own paraphrased summary of the complaint, but did not
provide PFAC with any other information in response to the
information request because the College maintained that the
investigation was confidential and did not appear to be directly
related to union activities (though, contrary to that claim, he
recognized Vallera’s right to have a union representative assist
her during the investigation). (FOF, sec. f, supra.)
Based on those facts, it is clear that, as alleged, since June 5,
2012, the College unlawfully failed and refused to provide
PFAC with the information that it sought in its May 17, 2012
information request. Through its information request, PFAC
sought information that was directly relevant to its role as the
collective-bargaining representative of part-time faculty mem-
bers (including Vallera), particularly given that Vallera faced
an investigation that could lead to disciplinary action. See Al-
can Rolled Products, 358 NLRB 37, 42 (2012) (finding that a
union’s request for the names of coworkers who complained
about an employee was presumptively relevant to the union’s
efforts to represent the employee in a grievance proceeding).
Moreover, although Strazewski maintained that he could not
provide the requested information because of confidentiality
concerns, that generalized concern fell short because “it is well
established that an employer may not avoid its obligation to
provide a union with requested information that is relevant to
bargaining simply by asserting a confidentiality interest in the
information.” National Steel Corp., 335 NLRB at 748. The
College made no effort to work out an accommodation that
would provide PFAC with the information that it needed while
still addressing the College’s concerns about confidentiality,
and thus the College did not fulfill its obligations under the
Act.65
Accordingly, I find that as alleged in paragraph VIII(c) of the
complaint, the College violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the

65 In its brief, the College correctly observes that the Board, after
balancing the interest of the Union in receiving relevant information to
its representational duties against the confidentiality interests of the
employer, at times has permitted the employer to withhold certain
information to preserve confidentiality. (R. Posttrial Br. at 72–73 (cit-
ing, e.g., Postal Service, 306 NLRB 474, 477 (1992), a case in which
the Board, after balancing the competing interests, agreed that the em-
ployer permissibly withheld information that would have revealed the
identity of confidential informants who were involved in a criminal
investigation).) In this case, the College flatly refused to work out any
type of accommodation regarding its confidentiality concerns, and as a
result unlawfully withheld information that would have been responsive
to PFAC’s information request and could have been disclosed without
jeopardizing any legitimate confidentiality concerns.
Act by, since June 5, 2012, failing and refusing to respond to
PFAC’s May 17, 2012 information request.
c. Did the College violate the Act by notifying Vallera
on August 13, 2012, that disciplinary action was
forthcoming based on the investigation of
alleged misconduct?
As previously noted, the Acting General Counsel alleged that
the College violated the Act by investigating Vallera for alleged
misconduct, and by notifying Vallera of that investigation. The
Acting General Counsel did not allege that the College violated
the Act when it later (on August 13, 2012) notified Vallera that
based on its investigation, the College wanted Vallera to attend
a meeting to advise her of contemplated disciplinary action and
the reasons for that action.
It is well settled that the Board may find and remedy a viola-
tion even in the absence of a specified allegation in the com-
plaint if the issue is closely connected to the subject matter of
the complaint and has been fully litigated. See Pergament
United Sales, 296 NLRB 333, 335 (1989), enfd. 920 F.2d 130
(2d Cir. 1990). That standard has been met here, since: (a) the
parties fully litigated the entire investigation of Vallera by,
among other things, presenting extensive evidence about the
investigation, the rationale for the discipline that Strazewski
and Marcus recommended, and Love’s decision to accept their
recom-mendation and contact Vallera to schedule a meeting
about the discipline; and (b) the College’s decision to contact
Vallera about the contemplated discipline is closely related to
its decision to investigate Vallera for misconduct. I therefore
will consider whether the College violated Section 8(a)(3), (4),
and (1) of the Act when it notified Vallera on August 13, 2012,
that she needed to attend a meeting about the discipline that the
College was contemplating based on its investigation.
Since the College sought to discipline Vallera based on its
view that Vallera’s statements about surveillance at her home
were false and therefore unprotected, the pertinent question is
whether Vallera’s statements were sufficiently egregious to
remove them from the protection of the Act. Aluminum Co. of
America, 338 NLRB 20 (2002). In making this determination,
the Board examines the following factors: (1) the place of the
discussion; (2) the subject matter of the discussion; (3) the na-
ture of the employee’s outburst; and (4) whether the outburst
was, in any way, provoked by an employer’s unfair labor prac-
tice. Fresenius USA Mfg., 358 NLRB 1261, 1264 (citing Atlan-
tic Steel Co., 245 NLRB at 816).
To the extent that Vallera commented publicly about the al-
leged surveillance at her home, she did so at one PFAC meet-
ing, and two conferences/meetings with professional col-
leagues. She also limited her discussion to stating that a police
report had been filed regarding surveillance at her home, and
that the IEA was looking into the issue. Since none of those
actions are egregious, both factors one and two of the Atlantic
Steel framework support Vallera. The fourth factor, whether
Vallera’s statements were provoked, is neutral, since Vallera’s
remarks were not really an outburst, and since (on the other
hand) she did not make her remarks in the heat of the moment
in response to an unfair labor practice.
COLUMBIA COLLEGE CHICAGO 51
Regarding the third factor, the College took the position at
the conclusion of its investigation that Vallera should be disci-
plined because she filed a false police report and then widely
publicized those false allegations to various college person-
nel.66 However, even if one assumes, arguendo, that the Col-
lege was correct in finding that its general counsel’s office did
not engage in surveillance at Vallera’s home, it does not follow
that Vallera’s statements to the contrary were so egregious as to
lose the protection of the Act. Indeed, as the Board has held,
false and inaccurate employee statements are protected under
the Act unless they are knowingly false or otherwise are mali-
cious. Central Security Services, 315 NLRB 239, 243 (1994).
Since the College did not demonstrate (through its investigation
or otherwise) that Vallera’s statements about the surveillance at
her home were knowingly false (as opposed to, for example,
inaccurate, but made in good faith), the nature of Vallera’s
statements weighs in Vallera’s favor.
Considering the Atlantic Steel factors as a whole, I find that
Vallera’s statements about the alleged surveillance at her home
were not sufficiently egregious to remove them from the pro-
tection of the Act. Vallera had a right under the Act to voice
her good-faith concern that College personnel were responsible
for the alleged surveillance, even if her suspicions were in fact
incorrect. Since Vallera’s statements about the surveillance
incident were protected under the Act, it was unlawful for the
College to notify Vallera that it was contemplating disciplinary
action against her based on her statements.
I therefore find that the College violated Section 8(a)(3) and
(1) of the Act when it notified Vallera on August 13, 2012, that
it was contemplating disciplinary action against her because of
her protected statements about alleged surveillance at her
home.67

66 To be sure, the College also based its decision to discipline
Vallera on its findings that Vallera falsely stated that there was an
ongoing police investigation, refused to cooperate with the Provost’s
office in its investigation of the misconduct charge, and gave false
statements at the investigation interview. As an initial matter, I would
be remiss if I did not point out that some, if not all, of this additional
“misconduct” is rather dubious, insofar as: (a) Vallera’ s alleged refusal
to cooperate arose after the College unlawfully refused to provide
Vallera and her representative with information about the investigation;
and (b) some of the allegedly false statements were essentially disa-
greements between Strazewski and Vallera about semantics (such as
whether Vallera or her nanny “filed” the police report).
More important, the additional reasons for the College’s decision to
discipline Vallera do not change the result here. Simply put, even if the
additional misconduct that the College identified is valid, the fact re-
mains that the College explicitly identified Vallera’s protected state-
ments about surveillance as one of its reasons for planning to discipline
Vallera. See FOF, sec. h, supra.
67 I do not find that the College sought to discipline Vallera based
on her participation in the trial in Case 30–CA–018888, or because she
cooperated with the Board in Cases 13–CA–073486, 13–CA–076794,
13–CA–078080, and 13–CA–081162. Accordingly, I do not find that
the College violated Sec. 8(a)(4) of the Act.
I. Overall Bad-Faith Bargaining
1. Complaint allegations
The complaint alleges that by its overall conduct, Respond-
ent has failed and refused to bargain in good faith with PFAC
as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of the
bargaining unit. (GC Exh. 1(ff), par. XII (alleging violation of
Sec. 8(a)(5) and (1).)
2. Findings of fact
In support of its allegation that the College engaged in over-
all bad-faith bargaining, the Acting General Counsel primarily
asserted that the College: refused to meet and bargain with
PFAC face to face; refused to provide PFAC with responses to
PFAC’s information requests in a timely manner; refused to
bargain with PFAC about the effects of changes that the Col-
lege was making to working conditions; unilaterally changed
the scope of the bargaining unit; and repudiated the grievance
procedure set forth in the collective-bargaining agreement.
(GC Posttrial Br. at 4.)
My findings of fact and analysis concerning the alleged mis-
conduct that the Acting General Counsel cited are set forth in
other sections of this decision. In those sections, I found that
the College did not violate the Act when it refused to bargain
with PFAC about the effects of the College’s prioritization
process. I also found that the College did not unilaterally
change the scope of the bargaining unit or repudiate the griev-
ance procedure. (See secs. C and G, supra.) The Acting Gen-
eral Counsel’s overall bad-faith bargaining allegation must
therefore succeed or fail based on the remaining misconduct
that the Acting General Counsel identified, along with any
additional facts about the College’s conduct at and away from
the bargaining table. With that limitation in mind, I provide the
following factual timeline:
January 2010 The College and PFAC begin negotiations for
a
successor collective bargaining agreement.
Javier Ramirez, a mediator from the Federal
Mediation and Conciliation Service, facilitates
negotiations. [Sec. A(2)(a), supra.]
October 2010 The College submits a contract proposal that,
inter alia, asks PFAC to waive its right to ef-
fects bargaining. PFAC objects, in part be-
cause it believes the proposal is retaliatory
given that the parties just settled a case in
which PFAC alleged that the College failed to
engage in effects bargaining. The College
admits that it added the effects bargaining
waiver language because it does not want a
dispute about effects bargaining to arise in the
future. [Sec. A(2)(b).]
Early 2011 The parties continue negotiations and identify
several areas of the contract that are not in
dispute (NIDs), and therefore can be set aside
at least until the parties have a complete work-
ing proposal in place. [Sec. A(2)(c).]
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD52
Summer 2011 The parties begin using a small group format
for
negotiations. Leonard Strazewski joins the
College’s bargaining team, in preparation for
replacing Louise Love as the lead negotiator.
[Sec. A(2)(d).]
October 2011 The College receives a copy of the complaint
that the Acting General Counsel filed in Case
30–CA–18888. At the next bargaining ses-
sion, the College resubmits its March 2011
contract proposal for consideration, even
though that proposal did not include any of
the NIDs that the parties had identified in the
preceding months.
When Vallera questions the College about the
reason for making what she views as a regres-
sive proposal, the College asserts that Vallera
violated the small group negotiation guideline
that discussions in those sessions are off the
record.
The Federal mediator withdraws after the par-
ties are unable to agree on a process for future
bargaining sessions. [(Sec. A(2)(e).]
November 2011 The College notifies PFAC that it will pro-
vide
PFAC with a new contract proposal in De-
cember 2011. Accordingly, the College states
that the parties do not need to meet until after
PFAC has an opportunity to review and re-
spond to the new proposal. [Sec. A(2)(f).]
December 2011 The College sends its new contract proposal
to
PFAC. Among other changes, the new pro-
posal explicitly states that PFAC waives its
right to effects bargaining, and does not in-
clude many of the NIDs that the parties identi-
fied earlier in 2011. [Sec. A(2)(g).]
Vallera sends the College an information re-
quest about its Early Feedback System. [Sec.
E(2)(b).]
Vallera asks the College to bargain about the
impact and effects of its decision to reduce the
credit hours awarded for certain courses.
[Sec. B(2)(d).]
February 2012 Vallera asks the College for dates to resume
face-to-face negotiations for a successor col-
lective-bargaining agreement, and states that
PFAC wishes to pick up negotiations from
where the parties left off in October 2011.
Strazewski replies that PFAC should either
respond to the College’s December 2011 con-
tract proposal or make a counterproposal.
[Sec. A(2)(h).]
The College fails and refuses to respond to
part of Vallera’s December 2011 information
request about its Early Feedback System.
[Sec. E(2)(c).]
An arbitrator rules in employee R.P.’s case
that part-time faculty members are only em-
ployees of the College during semesters when
they are teaching, and therefore do not have
standing to question their future employment.
[Sec. B(2)(e).]
The College advises Vallera that it will meet
with PFAC about the changes that it made to
course credit hours if PFAC first provides the
College with information to indicate which
PFAC members were affected by the changes.
[Sec. B(2)(f).]
Spring 2012 The parties continue their bargaining standoff,
with PFAC demanding that the College re-
sume face-to-face negotiations, and the Col-
lege demanding that PFAC respond to the
College’s December 2011 proposal before
any face-to-face meetings occur. [Sec.
A(2)(h).]
May 2012 The College notifies PFAC that it is willing to
meet to discuss the effects of the changes that
the College made to course credit hours. [Sec.
B(2)(f).]
Vallera sends the College an information re-
quest about faculty class assignments for fall
2012. [Sec. F(2)(l).]
Vallera sends the College an information re-
quest about the College’s investigation of her
for misconduct. [Sec. H(2)(f).]
June 2012 The College refuses to provide information in
response to Vallera’s May 2012 information
request about the College’s investigation of
her for misconduct. [Sec. H(2)(f).]
The College agrees to resume face-to-face
bargaining sessions regarding a successor col-
lective-bargaining agreement, and regarding
the effects of the changes that the College
made to course credit hours. [Secs. A(2)(i),
B(2)(f).]
July 2012 PFAC renews its request for information
about
faculty class assignments for fall 2012. [Sec.
F(2)(m).]
September 2012 The College provides PFAC with infor-
mation
in response to PFAC’s May 2012 information
request about faculty class assignments for
fall 2012. [Sec. F(2)(m).]
COLUMBIA COLLEGE CHICAGO 53
As stated elsewhere in this decision, I have found that the
College violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by: (a) fail-
ing and refusing to meet and bargain with PFAC from February
16 to June 13, 2012, regarding a successor collective-
bargaining agreement (sec. A(3), supra); (b) failing and refus-
ing to bargain with PFAC about the impact and effects of Col-
lege’s implementation of course credit hour reductions in sev-
eral departments (sec. B(3), supra); (c) failing and refusing to
respond to PFAC’s information requests about the Early Feed-
back System and the College’s investigation of Vallera for
misconduct (secs. E(3), H(3)(b), supra); and (d) unreasonably
delaying in responding to PFAC’s information request about
faculty class assignments for fall 2012 (sec. F(3)(c), supra).68
3. Discussion and analysis
Section 8(d) of the Act defines the duty to bargain collective-
ly as “the performance of the mutual obligation of the employer
and the representative of the employees to meet at reasonable
times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and
other terms and conditions of employment . . . but such obliga-
tion does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or re-
quire the making of a concession.” Good-faith bargaining pre-
supposes a desire to reach ultimate agreement to enter into a
collective bargaining contract. Public Service Co. of Oklaho-
ma, 334 NLRB 487, 487–488 (2001) (citing NLRB v. Insurance
Agents’ Union, 361 U.S. 477, 485 (1960)), enfd. 318 F.3d 1173
(10th Cir. 2003).
In determining whether a party has violated its statutory duty
to bargain in good faith, the Board examines the totality of the
party’s conduct, both at and away from the bargaining table.
From the context of an employer’s total conduct, it must be
decided whether the employer is engaging in hard but lawful
bargaining to achieve a contract that it considers desirable or is
unlawfully endeavoring to frustrate the possibility of arriving at
any agreement. Although the Board does not evaluate whether
particular proposals are acceptable or unacceptable, the Board
will examine proposals when appropriate and consider whether,
on the basis of objective factors, bargaining demands constitute
evidence of bad-faith bargaining. An inference of bad-faith
bargaining is appropriate when the employer’s proposals, taken
as a whole, would leave the union and the employees it repre-
sents with substantially fewer rights and less protection than
provided by law without a contract.

In such circumstances, the
union is excluded from the participation in the collective-
bargaining process to which it is statutorily entitled, effectively
stripping it of any meaningful method of representing its mem-
bers in decisions affecting important conditions of employment
and exposing the employer’s bad faith. Public Service Co. of
Oklahoma, 334 NLRB at 487–488.

68 I also, of course, found that the College violated Sec. 8(a)(3) and
(1) of the Act when it did not assign Vallera a second class to teach for
the fall 2012 semester, and when the College notified Vallera that it
was contemplating disciplinary action against her because of her pro-
tected statements about alleged surveillance at her home. Based on the
facts of this case, however, those findings are not probative on the
question of whether the College engaged in overall bad-faith bargain-
ing.
Finally, it is axiomatic that under the NLRA neither the
Board nor the courts may compel concessions or otherwise sit
in judgment upon the substantive terms of collective-bargaining
agreements. However, enforcement of the obligation to bargain
collectively is crucial to the NLRA statutory scheme. Public
Service Co. of Oklahoma, 334 NLRB at 488 (citing NLRB v.
American National Insurance Co., 343 U.S. 395, 402–404
(1952)). Therefore, to the extent that I examine the Respond-
ent’s proposals in this proceeding, my purpose is not to deter-
mine their merits, but instead to determine whether in combina-
tion and by the manner proposed they evidence an intent not to
reach agreement. Id. (citing Coastal Electric Cooperative, 311
NLRB 1126, 1127 (1993)).
In this case, the evidentiary record shows that within days of
learning in October 2011 that the Board filed a complaint
against it in Case 30–CA–018888, the College abruptly decided
to resubmit its March 30, 2011 contract proposal. In so doing,
the College discarded 6 months of productive bargaining with
PFAC (including the NIDs that the parties identified), save for
the instances where PFAC agreed to language that was in the
March 30 proposal. When Vallera understandably challenged
the College’s decision, the College asserted that Vallera violat-
ed the ground rules for small group negotiations, and the Col-
lege then ceased all face-to-face bargaining to prepare a revised
contract proposal. The proposal that the College submitted in
December 2011, however, was largely similar to the College’s
March 2011 proposal, except that the College amplified its
demand that PFAC waive its right to effects bargaining, and
eliminated the instructional continuity clause from the contract.
And, when PFAC approached the College to resume face-to-
face negotiations for a successor collective-bargaining agree-
ment (and to request effects bargaining about the reductions
that the College made to the credit hours awarded for certain
courses), the College unlawfully insisted that PFAC first meet
preconditions before the College would agree to such bargain-
ing.
The evidentiary record supports a finding that the College
engaged in a course of overall bad-faith bargaining. First, the
College presented PFAC with regressive contract proposals in
October and December 2011 that retaliated against PFAC for
protected activity in the form of litigating the charges in the
complaint in Case 30–CA–018888.69 Indeed, the College sub-
mitted its October 2011 regressive proposal within days of
receiving the complaint, and offered no explanation for why it

69 It should be noted that the College engaged in similar retaliatory
conduct in October 2010. Specifically, in October 2010, the College
demanded for the first time in a contract proposal that PFAC waive its
right to effects bargaining. When questioned about its rationale for that
demand, the College referenced the recent settlement that PFAC ob-
tained regarding the College’s failure to bargain about the effects of
credit hour changes in the photography department, and stated that it
did not want to go through a similar dispute in the future. While I do
not rely heavily on the events of 2010 for my analysis and findings, I
note that the Board has recognized that when bad-faith is at issue, the
violation does not occur at a precise point in time, and it may not be-
come apparent until long after negotiations began that negotiations
were in bad faith from the inception. Regency Service Carts, 345
NLRB 671, 676 fn. 14 (2005).
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD54
was returning to an outdated proposal that did not incorporate
any of the progress that the parties made in their negotiations.70
The Board has held that regressive proposals that are retaliatory
and/or lack justification are evidence of bad faith. Whitesell
Corp., 357 NLRB 1119, 1179 (2011) (finding of bad faith es-
tablished in part by evidence that respondent was committed to
forcing employees to accept worse contract terms in retaliation
for the union’s success in requiring the employer to rescind an
unlawfully imposed contract); Quality House of Graphics, 336
NLRB 497, 515 (2001) (finding that the timing of the employ-
er’s bargaining proposal, the lack of justification for the pro-
posal, and the proposal’s drastic and unprecedented nature sug-
gested that the employer was bargaining in bad faith and with
an aim of retaliating against the union for pursuing charges that
led to the complaint before the Board).
Second, when the College presented PFAC with its Decem-
ber 2011 contract proposal, it made it clear that it wanted PFAC
to agree to contract language that would constitute a clear and
unmistakable waiver of PFAC’s right to effects bargaining.
Without a contract, of course, the College would be obligated
under the Act to notify and bargain with PFAC about any
changes that it wished to make to the terms and conditions of
PFAC bargaining unit members. Public Service Co. of Okla-
homa, 334 NLRB at 498. By insisting on contract language
that would have PFAC and its members waive their right to
engage in both decisional and effects bargaining concerning
virtually all terms and conditions of employment, and thereby
leave PFAC members with substantially fewer rights and less
protection than they would have under the Act without a con-
tract, the College engaged in bargaining that demonstrated an
intent to frustrate the possibility of arriving at any agreement.71
Whitesell Corp., 357 NLRB 1119, 1121 (employer frustrated
bargaining by insisting on retaining control over a broad range
of mandatory subjects); Public Service Co. of Oklahoma, 334
NLRB at 501 (employer engaged in bad-faith bargaining by
insisted during negotiations that it have the right to change all
aspects of the bargaining unit’s terms and conditions of em-
ployment without interference from the union).
And third, when the time arose for the parties to resume ne-
gotiations (or start negotiations, as to the effects of course cred-
it hour reductions), the College unlawfully refused to partici-
pate in face-to-face negotiations until PFAC first satisfied pre-
conditions set by the College. (See secs. A(3), B(3), supra.)

70 At trial, Strazewski asserted that the College prepared its Decem-
ber 2011 proposal because the language in prior proposals was ambigu-
ous, and because the College wanted PFAC to respond to concrete
proposed contract language. (See sec. A(2)(f), supra.) Those explana-
tions are not persuasive because they do not explain or offer justifica-
tion for why the December 2011 proposal was regressive in nature.
71 I have considered the fact that the College’s request for an effects
bargaining waiver was not new, given that the College requested such a
waiver as far back as October 2010. The October 2010 request, how-
ever, was made in retaliation for PFAC’s protected activity. Moreover,
the evidentiary record indicates that after October 2010, the parties
tabled that issue and focused their negotiations on other parts of the
contract. The College, therefore, essentially revived the effects bar-
gaining waiver as a prominent and live issue when it included more
explicit effects bargaining waiver language in its December 2011 con-
tract proposal.
Because of the College’s preconditions, the parties did not meet
face to face to bargain about a successor collective-bargaining
agreement from February 16 to June 13, 2012. Similarly, be-
cause of the College’s preconditions, the parties did not engage
in effects bargaining about course credit hour reductions from
February 21 to May 4, 2012. Thus, by setting preconditions to
face-to-face bargaining, the College frustrated the parties’ ef-
forts to reach an agreement, and thereby engaged in bad-faith
bargaining. See Whitesell Corp., 357 NLRB 1119, 1121 (ex-
plaining that the employer obstructed negotiations when it noti-
fied the union that it would not schedule additional bargaining
sessions until the union first provided proof of its intent to
come to an agreement).
In sum, viewing the College’s conduct in its totality, I find
that the College did engage in overall bad-faith bargaining as
alleged in paragraph XII of the complaint. Indeed, by making
contract proposals that were retaliatory and that lacked justifi-
cation, insisting on a management-rights clause that would
leave PFAC members with substantially fewer rights than they
would have under the Act, and engaging in delaying tactics by
setting unlawful preconditions to face-to-face bargaining, the
College demonstrated an intent to frustrate the possibility of
reaching any agreement.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. By failing and refusing to meet and bargain with PFAC
since February 16, 2012, regarding a successor collective-
bargaining agreement, the College violated Section 8(a)(5) and
(1) of the Act.
2. By failing and refusing to bargain with PFAC about the
impact and effects of the College’s implementation of its deci-
sion to reduce the number of credit hours awarded for 10 cours-
es (Accounting; Screenwriting Workshop; Adaptation in LA;
Acquiring Intellectual Property/LA; Theory, Harmony & Anal-
ysis I; Theory, Harmony & Analysis II; Directing I; Pro Sur-
vival & How to Audition; Local Government Politics Seminar;
and State and National Government Politics Seminar) since
February 21, 2012, the College violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1)
of the Act.
3. By, since December 8, 2011, maintaining an overbroad
work rule (the Network and Computer Use Policy) that inter-
feres with, restrains, and coerces employees in the exercise of
rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act, the College violated
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
4. By, since February 17, 2012, failing and refusing to pro-
vide PFAC with certain information that PFAC requested about
the College’s unilateral implementation of its Early Feedback
System, the College violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.
5. By, in or about March 2012, failing and refusing to assign
more than one class section to Diana Vallera for the fall 2012
semester because she engaged in union and protected concerted
activities, the College violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the
Act.
6. By, since May 13, 2012, failing and refusing to provide
PFAC with certain information that PFAC requested about the
College’s assignments of classes to part-time faculty in the
photography department for fall 2012, the College violated
Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.
COLUMBIA COLLEGE CHICAGO 55
7. By, since June 5, 2012, failing and refusing to provide
PFAC with certain information that PFAC requested concern-
ing the nature of and basis for the College’s investigation of
Diana Vallera for misconduct, the College violated Section
8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.
8. By notifying Diana Vallera on or about August 13, 2012,
that the College planned to discipline her for engaging in union
and protected concerted activities (specifically, for telling oth-
ers about her belief that the College engaged in surveillance of
her home), the College violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the
Act.
9. By failing and refusing to bargain in good faith with
PFAC, as demonstrated by the College’s overall conduct in
2011–2012, the College violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the
Act.
10. By committing the unfair labor practices stated in Con-
clusions of Law 1–9 above, the College engaged in unfair labor
practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section
8(a)(1), (3), and (5) and Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
11. I recommend dismissing the complaint allegations that
are not addressed in the conclusions of law set forth above.
REMEDY
A. Traditional Remedies
Having found that Respondent has engaged in certain unfair
labor practices, I shall order it to cease and desist therefrom and
to take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the
policies of the Act.
Respondent, having unlawfully refused to assign Diana
Vallera a second class to teach in the fall 2012 semester for
discriminatory reasons, must make her whole for any loss of
earnings and other benefits that resulted from that decision.
Backpay for this violation shall be computed in accordance
with Ogle Protection Service, 183 NLRB 682 (1970), enfd. 444
F.2d 502 (6th Cir. 1971), with interest at the rate prescribed in
New Horizons for the Retarded, 283 NLRB 1173 (1987), com-
pounded daily as prescribed in Kentucky River Medical Center,
356 NLRB 6 (2010).
Regarding Respondent’s failure to bargain with PFAC about
the effects of its decision to reduce the number of credit hours
awarded for 10 courses, I will order Respondent to bargain with
PFAC about that issue.72 In addition, to restore some measure
of economic strength to PFAC and recreate a measure of bal-
anced bargaining power, I will order a limited backpay remedy
designed to make bargaining unit members whole for any loss-
es they suffered as a result of Respondent’s failure to bargain
about the effects of its decision to reduce credit hours for the 10
courses identified in the conclusions of law. Specifically, for
each bargaining unit member who taught one of the 10 courses
after the credit hours were reduced, Respondent shall pay
backpay at the rate of their normal wages for the affected

72 PFAC also requested that I order Respondent to engage in effects
bargaining about the Early Feedback System. (CP Posttrial Br. at 69–
70.) I decline that request because the complaint did not allege that,
and the parties did not litigate whether, Respondent failed to engage in
effects bargaining regarding its decision to implement the Early Feed-
back System.
course(s) from 5 days after the date of this Decision and Order
until the occurrence of the earliest of the following conditions:
(1) Respondent bargains to agreement with PFAC about credit
hour reductions for the 10 courses; (2) the parties reach a bona
fide impasse in bargaining; (3) PFAC fails to request bargain-
ing within 5 business days after receipt of this Decision and
Order, or to commence negotiations within 5 days after receipt
of Respondent’s notice of its desire to bargain with PFAC; or
(4) PFAC subsequently fails to bargain in good faith. In no
event shall the sum paid to these employees exceed the amount
they would have earned as wages from the date on which
course credit hours were reduced to the time they secured
equivalent employment elsewhere, or the date on which Re-
spondent shall have offered to bargain in good faith, whichever
occurs sooner. However, in no event shall this sum be less than
the employees would have earned for a 2-week period at the
rate of their normal wages before Respondent reduced course
credit hours. See Smurfit-Stone Contractor Enterprises, 357
NLRB 1732, 1736–1737 (2011) (citing Transmarine Naviga-
tion Corp., 170 NLRB 389 (1968)). Backpay shall be based on
earnings that the affected employees would normally have re-
ceived during the applicable period, less any net interim earn-
ings, and shall be computed in accordance with Ogle Protection
Service, 183 NLRB 682 (1970), enfd. 444 F.2d 502 (6th Cir.
1971), with interest at the rate prescribed in New Horizons for
the Retarded, 283 NLRB 1173 (1987), compounded daily as
prescribed in Kentucky River Medical Center, 356 NLRB 6
(2010).
For all backpay required herein, Respondent shall file a re-
port with the Social Security Administration allocating backpay
to the appropriate calendar quarters. Respondent shall also
compensate the discriminatees for the adverse tax consequenc-
es, if any, of receiving one or more lump-sum backpay awards
covering periods longer than 1 year, Latino Express, Inc., 359
NLRB No. 44 (2012).
B. Special Remedies
In addition to the remedies that I have discussed above, the
Acting General Counsel and/or PFAC request that I impose the
following special remedies in this case: (a) a broad remedial
order; (b) bargaining expenses; (c) litigation expenses; (d) a
bargaining order with specific timelines and reporting require-
ments; (e) an order requiring Respondent to notify PFAC and
provide PFAC an opportunity to bargain about “all future
changes affecting the union with regard to course scheduling
and assignment”; (f) an order requiring Respondent to honor all
NIDs that the parties identified; and (g) an order requiring Re-
spondent to pay, or otherwise arrange, for a full page adver-
tisement in the Columbia Chronicle (a student-run newspaper at
the College) that will include a copy of the Notice that will
issue in this case. (GC Posttrial Br. at 75-80; CP Posttrial Br. at
67-68.) As described in more detail below, I do not find that
any of the requested special remedies are warranted, and there-
fore decline to impose them.
1. Broad remedial order
The Acting General Counsel and PFAC have requested that I
issue a broad remedial order in this case. The Board has stated
that “a broad cease-and-desist order enjoining a respondent
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD56
from violating the Section 7 rights of employees ‘in any other
manner,’ is warranted ‘when a respondent is shown to have a
proclivity to violate the Act or has engaged in such egregious or
widespread misconduct as to demonstrate a general disregard
for the employees’ fundamental statutory rights.’” Five Star
Mfg., 348 NLRB 1301, 1302 (2007) (citing Hickmott Foods,
242 NLRB 1357, 1357 (1979), enfd. 278 Fed. Appx. 697 (8th
Cir. 2008)). In either situation, the Board reviews the totality
of circumstances to ascertain whether the respondent’s specific
unlawful conduct manifests an attitude of opposition to the
purposes of the Act to protect the rights of employees general-
ly, which would provide an objective basis for enjoining a rea-
sonably anticipated future threat to any of those Section 7
rights. Id.
I do not find that Respondent has shown a proclivity to vio-
late the Act. Nor do I find that Respondent has engaged in
egregious or widespread misconduct that demonstrates a gen-
eral disregard for employees’ fundamental statutory rights. The
majority of the violations that Respondent has committed in
recent history (including this case and Case 30–CA–018888)
have been failures to comply with information requests, setting
unlawful preconditions to bargaining, and failures to engage in
effects bargaining after making material changes to the terms
and conditions of employment. Any future misconduct of that
nature (or, for that matter, any future overall bad-faith bargain-
ing), however, would be in violation of a narrow order directing
Respondent to cease and desist from violating the Act “in any
like or related manner,” and subject to contempt proceedings.
See Hospital San Cristobal, 358 NLRB 769, 769 fn. 2 (2012).
More generally, reviewing the totality of circumstances, I
find that while Respondent did violate the Act, it did not en-
gage in conduct that manifests an attitude of opposition to the
Act and its purposes. The bargaining relationship between
Respondent and PFAC is a strained one, but it is not beyond
repair, as demonstrated by the fact that the parties have shared
periods of cooperative and productive negotiations, including,
but not limited to, early 2011, when the parties worked with a
Federal mediator and identified several NIDs. A broad remedi-
al order is therefore not warranted at this time.
2. Bargaining expenses
The Board has a “long established practice of relying on bar-
gaining orders to remedy the vast majority of bad-faith bargain-
ing violations,” specifically by relying on the combination of
bargaining orders, a customary cease-and-desist order and the
posting of a notice to “induce a respondent to fulfill its statutory
obligations.” Whitesell Corp., 357 NLRB 1119, 1122 (2011)
(citing Frontier Hotel & Casino, 318 NLRB 857, 859 (1995)).
However, in “cases of unusually aggravated misconduct . . .
where it may fairly be said that a respondent’s substantial un-
fair labor practices have infected the core of a bargaining pro-
cess to such an extent that their effects cannot be eliminated by
the application of traditional remedies, . . . an order requiring
the respondent to reimburse the charging party for negotiation
expenses is warranted both to make the charging party whole
for the resources that were wasted because of the unlawful
conduct, and to restore the economic strength that is necessary
to ensure a return to the status quo ante at the bargaining table.”
Id. (citations omitted); see also Santa Barbara New Press, 358
NLRB 1415, 1417 (2012).
After considering the facts of this case, I do not find that re-
spondent engaged in “unusually aggravated misconduct” that
would warrant an award of bargaining expenses. As I have
found, Respondent did engage in some serious misconduct,
including insisting that PFAC agreed to waive its right to ef-
fects bargaining, making regressive proposals in retaliation for
PFAC’s protected activity, and setting unlawful preconditions
to bargaining. I cannot find, however, that Respondent’s mis-
conduct was so aggravated as to infect the bargaining process
to the point where traditional remedies would not be effective.
Indeed, when the Board has awarded bargaining expenses, it
has been able to cite misconduct well beyond that which the
Respondent engaged in here. See, e.g., Santa Barbara New
Press, 358 NLRB 1415, 1417–1418 (bargaining expenses
award based not only on the respondent’s insistence on a broad
management-rights clause, but also the insistence on the right
to unilaterally identify disciplinary offenses and the appropriate
level of discipline, as well as the respondent’s misconduct away
from the bargaining table that demonstrated a calculated strate-
gy to reduce negotiations to a sham); Whitesell Corp., 357
NLRB 1119, 1122 (same, where the respondent insisted on
unilateral control over a broad range of mandatory subjects,
repeatedly asserted that the parties were at impasse despite the
union’s concessions, refused to agree to a union recognition
clause, made regressive and retaliatory contract proposals,
threatened future regressive proposals if the union did not ac-
cede to its demands, and set unlawful preconditions to future
meetings). Respondent’s misconduct, while serious, falls short
of the aggravated level required to justify an award of bargain-
ing expenses.
3. Litigation expenses
The Board has stated that an order requiring a respondent to
reimburse a union for litigation expenses is appropriate only
where the defenses raised by the respondent are frivolous, ra-
ther than debatable. A respondent’s defenses will be consid-
ered debatable if they turn on issues of credibility. Whitesell
Corp., 357 NLRB 1119, 1185 (2011) (citing Frontier Hotel &
Casino, 318 NLRB at 860). In addition, the Board has denied
reimbursement of litigation costs in cases where some of the
complaint allegations were dismissed, a fact that undermined
the claim that the respondent’s defenses were frivolous. Fron-
tier Hotel & Casino, 318 NLRB at 860, enfd. 118 F.3d 795
(D.C. Cir. 1997).
As my decision in this case demonstrates, Respondent’s de-
fenses in this case were not frivolous. Respondent and I saw
eye to eye on several complaint allegations that I recommended
be dismissed. Further, for the violations that I found, Respond-
ent presented good-faith, debatable arguments about the credi-
bility of witnesses and how I should interpret the parties’ ac-
tions during negotiations and concerning employment deci-
sions. It would not be appropriate for me to penalize Respond-
ent with an award of litigation expenses merely for asserting its
right to defend itself in good faith in these proceedings.
COLUMBIA COLLEGE CHICAGO 57
4. Scope of bargaining order
As part of the bargaining order that I will issue in this case,
the Acting General Counsel requests that I order Respondent to:
bargain on request within 15 days of my order; bargain for a
minimum of 4 hours per week until the parties reach an agree-
ment or a valid impasse; and prepare bargaining reports every
15 days, and submit those reports to the Regional Director and
PFAC for review. (GC Posttrial Br. at 75.) There is no sup-
port, however, for those remedies in the Board’s case law. See
Myers Investigative & Security Services, 354 NLRB 367, 368
fn. 2 (2009) (rejecting bargaining order language that would
have required respondent to meet with the union at least 24
hours per month, and at least 6 hours per session); Monmouth
Care Center, 354 NLRB 11, 11 fn. 3 (2009) (rejecting bargain-
ing order language that directed respondents to bargain jointly
with the union once a week). Seeing no basis for extraordinary
remedies here, I will direct Respondent to comply with a tradi-
tional bargaining order.
5. Requirement that the College bargain with PFAC
about all future changes affecting PFAC regarding
course scheduling and assignment
The Acting General Counsel asks that I order the College to
bargain with PFAC about all future changes affecting PFAC
regarding course scheduling and assignment. (GC Posttrial Br.
at 75.) I do not believe that such an order is appropriate. As a
preliminary matter, the Acting General Counsel requests an
order that is arguably overbroad insofar as it would require
effects bargaining for any changes relating to course scheduling
and assignment, regardless of whether the changes might be de
minimis in nature. Beyond that issue, I find that the cease and
desist order that I will issue in this case is sufficient, particular-
ly when coupled with the coverage of the Act itself and the fact
that the door to the courthouse remains open should effects
bargaining disputes arise in the future.
6. Requirement that Respondent honor all NIDs
PFAC requests that I order Respondent to honor all NIDs
that the parties identified in 2011 before negotiations deterio-
rated. (CP Posttrial Br. at 67.) Once again, I do not find that
such an order would be appropriate.
As noted above, I did find that Respondent engaged in bad-
faith bargaining when it submitted regressive and retaliatory
contract proposals in October and December 2011 that, among
other things, disregarded all NIDs that the parties had identified
in the preceding months. It does not follow, however, that I
should order Respondent to honor all NIDs in future negotia-
tions, particularly when Respondent has consistently main-
tained that all NIDs remain open for further negotiation (partic-
ularly once the parties create and begin reviewing a complete
draft agreement). Indeed, the parties and the Federal mediator
came up with the term NID precisely because NIDs were not
meant to rise to the level of tentative agreements. I see no basis
for me to redefine the terms that the parties worked out during
their negotiations.
7. Full-page notice posting in student-run newspaper
Finally, in addition to the customary notice posting require-
ments, the Acting General Counsel requested that I also require
Respondent to arrange for the notice to be printed in the Co-
lumbia Chronicle, a student-run newspaper at the College. The
Board has required such a notice posting in the past, but only in
cases where the respondent’s “unfair labor practices are so
numerous, pervasive, and outrageous that special notice and
access remedies are necessary to dissipate fully the coercive
effects of the unfair labor practices found.” Fieldcrest Cannon,
Inc., 318 NLRB 470, 473 (1995); see also Dynatron/Bondo
Corp., 324 NLRB 572, 572 fn. 4, 586 (1997), enfd. in pertinent
part 176 F.3d 1310 (11th Cir. 1999). For the reasons that I
have stated elsewhere in this remedy section, I find that Re-
spondent’s conduct, while serious, does not rise to the level of
warranting the extraordinary remedy of requiring Respondent
to post a full-page copy of the notice in the student-run news-
paper.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the
entire record, I issue the following recommended73
ORDER
The Respondent, Columbia College Chicago, located in Chi-
cago, Illinois, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Failing or refusing to bargain in good faith with the Part-
Time Faculty Association at Columbia (the Union) as the ex-
clusive collective-bargaining representative of its part-time
faculty at its facility in Chicago, Illinois.
(b) Making regressive contract proposals that retaliate
against the Union and its members for exercising their under
Section 7 of the Act.
(c) Insisting on contract proposals that essentially give Re-
spondent unfettered control over a broad range of mandatory
subjects of bargaining, including the effects of decisions re-
garding those mandatory subjects of bargaining.
(d) Setting unlawful preconditions that the Union must satis-
fy before Respondent will engage in face to face bargaining or
effects bargaining.
(e) Failing or refusing to bargain in good faith with the Un-
ion about the effects of Respondent’s decision to reduce the
number of credit hours awarded for certain courses.
(f) Failing to provide, or unreasonably delaying in providing,
information requested by the Union that is relevant and neces-
sary for the Union to fulfill its role as the exclusive collective-
bargaining representative of unit employees.
(g) Maintaining the current version of its Network and Com-
puter Use Policy, which sets forth an overbroad work rule that
unit members reasonably would construe as prohibiting Section
7 activity.
(h) Notifying unit members that they face forthcoming disci-
plinary action because they engaged in Section 7 activity.
(i) Discriminating against unit members in teaching assign-
ments because they engaged in Section 7 activity.

73 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Board’s Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recom-
mended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopt-
ed by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for
all purposes.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD58
(j) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining,
or coercing unit members in the exercise of the rights guaran-
teed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effec-
tuate the policies of the Act.
(a) On request, bargain with the Union as the exclusive col-
lective-bargaining representative of the employees in the fol-
lowing appropriate unit concerning terms and conditions of
employment, and concerning the effects of Respondent’s deci-
sion to reduce the number of credit hours awarded for the fol-
lowing 10 courses: Accounting; Screenwriting Workshop; Ad-
aptation in LA; Acquiring Intellectual Property/LA; Theory,
Harmony & Analysis I; Theory, Harmony & Analysis II; Di-
recting I; Pro Survival & How to Audition; Local Government
Politics Seminar; and State and National Government Politics
Seminar; if understandings are reached, embody the under-
standings in signed agreements:
[A]ll part-time faculty members who have completed teach-
ing at least one semester at Columbia College Chicago, ex-
cluding all other employees, full-time faculty, artists-in-
residence, and Columbia College Chicago graduate students,
part-time faculty members teaching only continuing educa-
tion, music lessons to individual students or book and paper
making classes, Columbia College Chicago full-time staff
members, teachers employed by Erickson Institute, the
YMCA or Adler Planetarium, and other individuals not ap-
pearing on the Columbia College Chicago payroll, managers
and confidential employees, guards, and supervisors as de-
fined in the Act.
(b) Make any unit members who taught the 10 courses for
which the College reduced credit hours starting in 2011 whole
for any loss of earnings and other benefits suffered as a result
of Respondent’s failure to engage in effects bargaining, in the
manner set forth in the remedy section of the decision.
(c) Make Diana Vallera whole for any loss of earnings or
other benefits suffered as a result of the discrimination against
her regarding fall 2012 teaching assignments in the manner set
forth in the remedy section of the decision.
(d) Within 14 days from the date of the Board’s Order, re-
move from its files any reference to Respondent’s notice to
Diana Vallera that Respondent was contemplating disciplining
her for engaging in protected activity by telling others about her
belief that Respondent conducted surveillance at her home, and
within 3 days thereafter notify the Diana Vallera in writing that
this has been done and that the unlawful notice and the docu-
mentation on which it was based will not be used against her in
any way.
(e) To the extent that it has not yet done so, provide the Un-
ion with the information that the Union requested in the follow-
ing information requests: December 20, 2011 (Early Feedback
System); May 13, 2012 (fall 2012 faculty class assignments);
and May 17, 2012 (investigation of Diana Vallera for miscon-
duct).
(f) Preserve and, within 14 days of a request, or such addi-
tional time as the Regional Director may allow for good cause
shown, provide at a reasonable place designated by the Board
or its agents, all payroll records, social security payment rec-
ords, timecards, personnel records and reports, and all other
records, including an electronic copy of such records if stored
in electronic form, necessary to analyze the amount of backpay
due under the terms of this Order.
(g) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its fa-
cility in Chicago, Illinois, copies of the attached notice marked
“Appendix.”74 Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the
Regional Director for Region 13, after being signed by the Re-
spondent’s authorized representative, shall be posted by the
Respondent and maintained for 60 consecutive days in con-
spicuous places including all places where notices to employees
are customarily posted. In addition to physical posting of paper
notices, the notices shall be distributed electronically, such as
by email, posting on an intranet or an internet site, and/or other
electronic means, if the Respondent customarily communicates
with its employees by such means. Reasonable steps shall be
taken by the Respondent to ensure that the notices are not al-
tered, defaced, or covered by any other material. In the event
that, during the pendency of these proceedings, the Respondent
has gone out of business or closed the facility involved in these
proceedings, the Respondent shall duplicate and mail, at its
own expense, a copy of the notice to all current employees and
former employees employed by the Respondent at any time
since October 1, 2011.
(h) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the
Regional Director a sworn certification of a responsible official
on a form provided by the Region attesting to the steps that the
Respondent has taken to comply.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint is dismissed inso-
far as it alleges violations of the Act not specifically found.
Dated, Washington, D.C. March 15, 2013
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated
Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and obey this no-
tice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on your be-
half
Act together with other employees for your benefit and
protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activi-
ties.
WE WILL NOT fail or refuse to bargain in good faith with the
Part-Time Faculty Association at Columbia (the Union) as the

74 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”
COLUMBIA COLLEGE CHICAGO 59
exclusive collective-bargaining representative of the College’s
part-time faculty at the College’s facility in Chicago, Illinois.
WE WILL NOT make regressive contract proposals that retali-
ate against the Union and its members for exercising their
rights under Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL NOT insist on contract proposals that essentially
give the College unfettered control over a broad range of man-
datory subjects of bargaining, including the effects of decisions
regarding those mandatory subjects of bargaining.
WE WILL NOT set unlawful preconditions that the Union must
satisfy before the College will engage in face-to-face bargain-
ing or effects bargaining.
WE WILL NOT fail or refuse to bargain in good faith with the
Union about the effects of the College’s decision to reduce the
number of credit hours awarded for certain courses.
WE WILL NOT fail to provide, or unreasonably delay in
providing, information requested by the Union that is relevant
and necessary for the Union to fulfill its role as the exclusive
collective-bargaining representative of unit employees.
WE WILL NOT maintain the current version of the College’s
Network and Computer Use Policy, which sets forth an over-
broad work rule that unit members reasonably would construe
as prohibiting Section 7 activity.
WE WILL NOT notify unit members that they face forthcoming
disciplinary action because they engaged in Section 7 activity.
WE WILL NOT discriminate against unit members in teaching
assignments because they engaged in Section 7 activity.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, re-
strain, or coerce unit members in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL, on request, bargain with the Union as the exclusive
collective-bargaining representative of the employees in the
following appropriate unit concerning terms and conditions of
employment, and concerning the effects of the College’s deci-
sion to reduce the number of credit hours awarded for the fol-
lowing 10 courses: Accounting; Screenwriting Workshop; Ad-
aptation in LA; Acquiring Intellectual Property/LA; Theory,
Harmony & Analysis I; Theory, Harmony & Analysis II; Di-
recting I; Pro Survival & How to Audition; Local Government
Politics Seminar; and State and National Government Politics
Seminar; if understandings are reached, embody the under-
standings in signed agreements:
[A]ll part-time faculty members who have completed teach-
ing at least one semester at Columbia College Chicago, ex-
cluding all other employees, full-time faculty, artists-in-
residence, and Columbia College Chicago graduate students,
part-time faculty members teaching only continuing educa-
tion, music lessons to individual students or book and paper
making classes, Columbia College Chicago full-time staff
members, teachers employed by Erickson Institute, the
YMCA or Adler Planetarium, and other individuals not ap-
pearing on the Columbia College Chicago payroll, managers
and confidential employees, guards, and supervisors as de-
fined in the Act.
WE WILL make any unit members who taught the 10 courses
for which the College reduced credit hours starting in 2011
whole for any loss of earnings and other benefits suffered as a
result of the College’s failure to engage in effects bargaining,
plus interest compounded daily.
WE WILL make Diana Vallera whole for any loss of earnings
or other benefits suffered as a result of the discrimination
against her regarding fall 2012 teaching assignments, plus in-
terest compounded daily.
WE WILL file a report with the Social Security Administration
allocating backpay to the appropriate calendar quarters.
WE WILL compensate Diana Vallera and the unit members
who taught the 10 courses for which the College reduced credit
hours for the adverse tax consequences, if any, of receiving one
or more lump-sum backpay awards covering periods longer
than 1 year.
WE WILL, within 14 days from the date of the Board’s Order,
remove from our files any reference to the College’s notice to
Diana Vallera that the College was contemplating disciplining
her for engaging in protected activity by telling others about her
belief that the College conducted surveillance at her home, and
within 3 days thereafter notify Diana Vallera in writing that this
has been done and that the unlawful notice and the documenta-
tion on which it was based will not be used against her in any
way.
WE WILL, to the extent that we have not yet done so, provide
the Union with information in response to the following infor-
mation requests: December 20, 2011 (Early Feedback System);
May 13, 2012 (fall 2012 faculty class assignments); and May
17, 2012 (investigation of Diana Vallera for misconduct).
COLUMBIA COLLEGE CHICAGO