Christopher Marland

Patent Trials and Appeals BoardNov 24, 2021

2020004141 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 24, 2021)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 14/396,019 10/21/2014 Christopher Neil Marland 2011-051558 U1 US 3852 142050 7590 11/24/2021 HALLIBURTON ENERGY SERVICES, INC. C/O PARKER JUSTISS, P.C. 14241 DALLAS PARKWAY SUITE 620 DALLAS, TX 75254 EXAMINER DEWAN, KAMAL K ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2163 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 11/24/2021 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): docket@pj-iplaw.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte CHRISTOPHER NEIL MARLAND Appeal 2020-004141 Application 14/396,019 Technology Center 2100 Before DAVID J. CUTITTA II, MICHAEL J. ENGLE, and SCOTT RAEVSKY Administrative Patent Judges. CUTITTA, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1, 4–8, 12–15, and 18–21.2 We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We REVERSE. Pursuant to our discretionary authority under 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b), we enter a new ground of rejection for claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to an exception to patent-eligible subject matter without reciting significantly more. 1 “Appellant” refers to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42(a). Appellant identifies Halliburton Energy Services, Inc. as the real party in interest. Appeal Brief filed July 12, 2019 (“Appeal Br.”) at 2. 2 Appellant cancelled claims 2, 3, 9–11, 16, and 17. Appeal Br. 7. Appeal 2020-004141 Application 14/396,019 2 CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER Summary The subject matter of Appellant’s application relates to “anonymized systems and methods to classify industrial enterprises, such as well drilling activities, associated with detailed time logs.” Spec. 1:15–17.3 According to Appellant, “[f]or a performance comparison with other industrial locations or situations, a performance index for an activity is generated by comparing a respective performance indicator to an expected value, such as an industry average.” Id. at 2:19–21. “By comparing across various alternatives, efficiency gains may be found resulting in recommendations for changes to, for example, equipment, crews, timing, or technology.” Id. at 2:22–24. Illustrative Claim Claim 1, reproduced below with certain dispositive limitation(s) at issue italicized and paragraph designators added for clarity, illustrates the claimed subject matter: 1. A method comprising: [(a)] defining activities in an oilfield, defining each of the activities in terms of a start time and an end time of actions that make up the each activity, wherein the start time and the end time of the actions are determined using sensor measurements associated with the actions; 3 In addition to the above-noted Appeal Brief, throughout this Decision we refer to: (1) Appellant’s Specification filed October 21, 2014 (“Spec.”); (2) the Final Office Action (“Final Act.”) mailed July 23, 2019; (3) the Examiner’s Answer (“Ans.”) mailed April 15, 2020; and (4) the Reply Brief filed May 14, 2020 (“Reply Br.”). Appeal 2020-004141 Application 14/396,019 3 [(b)] defining performance operations to be run against raw activity data to form performance indicators for the activities, the raw activity data including time-based data of the activities; [(c)] setting an anonymity threshold that defines a minimum number of the performance indicators required for anonymity; [(d)] aggregating the performance indicators to generate anonymized statistical indicators, based on the anonymity threshold, for the activities; [(e)] storing the anonymized statistical indicators for the activities on an accessible information storage medium; [(f)] generating a performance index for each of the activities by comparing a measured performance of the each of the activities to a respective benchmark value extracted from the anonymized statistical indicators; and [(g)] identifying inefficiencies of at least one of the activities using the performance index without sacrificing confidentiality of the raw activity data. Appeal Br. 25 (Claims App.). REFERENCES The Examiner relies on the following prior art references:4 Name Reference Date Veeningen US 2005/0209912 A1 Sept. 22, 2005 King US 2008/0289876 A1 Nov. 27, 2008 Del Castillo US 2009/0194274 A1 Aug. 6, 2009 Goodermote US 2011/0016030 A1 Jan. 20, 2011 Piovesan US 2011/0071963 A1 Mar. 24, 2011 Barrow US 2011/0166789 A1 July 7, 2011 Conine US 2012/0109526 A1 May 3, 2012 4 All citations to the references use the first-named inventor or author only. Appeal 2020-004141 Application 14/396,019 4 REJECTIONS The Examiner rejects the claims as shown below: Claim(s) Rejected 35 U.S.C. § References Final Act. 1, 14, 15 103(a) Piovesan, Veeningen, Conine, Goodermote 3 4, 5, 7, 18, 19 103(a) Piovesan, Veeningen, Conine, Goodermote, Del Castillo 15 6, 20 103(a) Piovesan, Veeningen, Conine, Goodermote, Del Castillo, King 17 8, 21 103(a) Piovesan, Veeningen, Conine, Goodermote, Barrow, King 20 12, 13 103(a) Piovesan, Veeningen, Goodermote, Del Castillo 23 OPINION We review the appealed rejections for error based upon the issues identified by Appellant and in light of Appellant’s arguments and evidence. Ex parte Frye, 94 USPQ2d 1072, 1075 (BPAI 2010) (precedential). Rejection of Illustrative Claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 The Examiner finds that claim 1 is unpatentable over the combined teachings of Piovesan, Veeningen, Conine, and Goodermote. Final Act. 3–8. The Examiner relies on Veeningen to teach or suggest “generating a performance index for each of the activities by comparing a measured performance of the each of the activities to a respective benchmark value Appeal 2020-004141 Application 14/396,019 5 extracted from the anonymized statistical indicators.” Final Act. 6; Ans. 6–7 (citing Veeningen ¶¶ 52, 57, 128, 1017, 1025, 1100). Of particular relevance, the Examiner relies on Veeningen’s drill bit matching to teach the limitation is issue, finding that Veeningen: teaches “it uses statistical processing of historical bit performance data and several specific Key Performance Indicators (KPI) to match the earth properties and rock strength data to the appropriate bit while optimizing the aggregate time and cost to drill each hole section, replace a bit based on proprietary algorithms, statistics, logic, and risk factors where the Average Total Risk is calculated from the risk subcategory and the Total Risk for a scenario is calculated based on the cumulative results (average) of all of the group/category risks. Ans. 6. Appellant argues that Veeningen’s bit matching discussion does not teach or suggest comparing a measured performance of the drill bit to a benchmark value: But even if the “statistical processing of historical bit performance data and several specific Key Performance Indicators (KPI)” are somehow comparable to the claimed anonymized statistical indicators, the cited paragraphs still do not teach the above limitation because they fail to teach extracting a benchmark value from these “statistical processing of historical bit performance data and several specific Key Performance Indicators (KPI)” and comparing it to measured performance of each activity. Instead, the cited paragraphs merely teach using these purported anonymized statistical indicators to match earth properties and rock strength data to the appropriate bit. Reply Br. 3 (citing Veeningen ¶¶ 1025, 1100). Appeal 2020-004141 Application 14/396,019 6 We are persuaded by Appellant’s arguments. Although we agree with the Examiner’s finding that Veeningen’s statistical processing of historical bit performance data and several specific KPIs teaches the claimed “anonymized statistical indicators,” the Examiner has not sufficiently explained how Veeningen’s matching of earth properties and rock strength data to the appropriate bit teaches measuring a performance of the drill bit against a benchmark extracted from the historical performance data and KPIs. Accordingly, given the current record, the Examiner has not demonstrated that Veeningen teaches or suggests “generating a performance index for each of the activities by comparing a measured performance of the each of the activities to a respective benchmark value extracted from the anonymized statistical indicators,” as recited in claim 1. Nor does the Examiner show that Piovesan, Conine, and Goodermote, alone or in combination, compensate for the noted deficiencies of Veeningen. Final Act. 3–8. Therefore, we do not sustain the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of claim 1. Because we agree with at least one of the dispositive arguments advanced by Appellant, we need not reach the merits of Appellant’s other arguments seeking to distinguish claim 1 from the cited prior art. For similar reasons, we do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of independent claim 12, which recites a limitation identical to that at issue in claim 1. Appeal Br. 8–10. In addition, we do not sustain the Examiner’s rejections of claims 4–8 and 13, which depend directly or indirectly from claims 1 or 12. Independent claim 14, although not specifically reciting generating a performance index for each of a plurality of activities, recites “generating a Appeal 2020-004141 Application 14/396,019 7 performance index for [a] custom activity.” In rejecting claim 14, the Examiner’s rejection, similar to claim 1 above, relies on Veeningen’s use of statistical processing of historical bit performance data and several specific KPIs to match earth properties and rock strength data to an appropriate drill bit to teach the limitation at issue in claim 14. Ans. 6. We determine this finding to be erroneous for the same reasons discussed above for independent claim 1. Accordingly, we do not sustain the Examiner’s rejections of independent claim 14 and of claims 15 and 18–21, which depend directly or indirectly from claim 14. New Ground of Rejection for Claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a “new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101. However, the Supreme Court has held that § 101 includes implicit exceptions—laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas—which are not patent-eligible. See Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014). In January 2019, the Office issued the 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“Guidance”), which addresses the manner in which § 101 case law is to be applied by the Office. In October 2019, the Office issued an update to explain further the manner in which the Guidance should be implemented. See October 2019 Update: Subject Matter Eligibility, available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites /default/files/documents/peg_oct_2019_update.pdf (“Guidance Update”). The Board is required to adhere to these guidance documents as a matter of Office policy. Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 51. The Guidance sets forth a four- part analysis for determining whether a claim is eligible subject matter under Appeal 2020-004141 Application 14/396,019 8 § 101; the four parts are labeled here as Step 1, Step 2A Prong 1, Step 2A Prong 2, and Step 2B. Id. at 53–56. Guidance Step 1 First, under “Step 1,” we consider whether the claimed subject matter falls within the four statutory categories set forth in § 101, namely “[p]rocess, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 53–54; see 35 U.S.C. § 101. Claim 1 recites a method (i.e., a “process”). As such, the claim is directed to a statutory class of invention within § 101 and we proceed to the next step. Guidance Step 2A Prong 1 (Judicial Exceptions) Second, under “Step 2A Prong 1,” we evaluate “whether the claim recites a judicial exception, i.e., an abstract idea, a law of nature, or a natural phenomenon.” Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54; see Alice, 573 U.S. at 216–17. Apart from additional elements and post-solution activity discussed separately below, we first look to whether the claim recites certain groupings of abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing human activities such as commercial and business activities, or mental processes). MPEP § 2106.04(a).5 Limitation (a) recites, in part, “defining activities in an oilfield . . . in terms of a start time and an end time of actions that make up the each activity.” The Specification describes such well drilling activities broadly to encompass various types of activities including human-performed tasks, e.g., the total connection time, the testing time for the blow out preventer or “a 5 The Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (“MPEP”) (9th ed. Rev. 10.2019, rev. June 2020). Appeal 2020-004141 Application 14/396,019 9 custom activity [that] may include a definition for non-productive time (NPT) while in a drilling phase.” Spec. 6:1–10, 8:9–10. Defining activities in terms of a start time and an end time of actions that make up the activity can be characterized as a mental evaluation that can be performed in the human mind or with the aid of paper and pencil. For example, a person could make a mental note of the start and stop time by observing an activity. Accordingly, limitation (a) recites abstract ideas recognized by the 2019 Guidance. MPEP § 2106.04(a); see also October 2019 Guidance Update at 9 (“A claim that encompasses a human performing the step(s) mentally with the aid of a pen and paper recites a mental process”) (emphasis omitted). Limitation (b) recites, in part, “defining performance operations to be run against raw activity data to form performance indicators for the activities.” According to the Specification, “[p]erformance may be defined either through use of industry standards, historical performance measurement, or manufacturer specific time expectations.” Spec. 9:6–8. A person could have selected one or more of the available types of performance indicators mentally without analyzing a large amount of data and hence this activity can be characterized as entailing a mental evaluation that can be performed in the human mind. Limitation (c) recites, “setting an anonymity threshold that defines a minimum number of the performance indicators required for anonymity.” Setting a threshold can be characterized as a judgement and therefore entails a mental evaluation that can be performed in the human mind. Appeal 2020-004141 Application 14/396,019 10 Limitation (d) recites, “aggregating the performance indicators to generate anonymized statistical indicators, based on the anonymity threshold, for the activities.” According to the Specification, “[a]fter the statistical indicators have been generated, a database of the statistical indicators may be generated” and the “database of statistical indicators has the advantage of having anonymous data while being formed from confidential, proprietary information.” Spec. 9:17–19. Merely aggregating data from different workers to provide anonymity by making it more difficult to view data linked to any individual worker can be performed in the human mind or with the aid of paper and pencil. Limitation (e) recites, in part, “storing the anonymized statistical indicators for the activities.” This limitation merely involves storing data and, hence, recites an abstract idea under the Guidance. Guidance Update at 9 n.55; see Content Extraction & Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat. Ass’n, 776 F.3d 1343, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (applying Mayo/Alice step one to determine that claims relating to “1) collecting data, 2) recognizing certain data within the collected data set, and 3) storing that recognized data in a memory are drawn to an abstract idea”). Limitation (f) recites, in part, “generating a performance index for each of the activities by comparing a measured performance of the each of the activities to a respective benchmark value.” Appellant cites pages 9 and 10 of the Specification in support of this limitation. Appeal Br. 4 (citing Spec. 9:22–26, 10:1–16). The cited portions of the Specification describe that the “process may generate a performance index by automatically comparing actual performance to the expected value,” wherein “the expected value may be a benchmark.” Spec. 10:1–5. Thus, under a broadest Appeal 2020-004141 Application 14/396,019 11 reasonable interpretation, limitation (f) merely recites comparing a measured performance value to a predefined threshold in the form of a benchmark, which is a judgement or an act of evaluating information that can be practically performed in the human mind. The Guidance expressly recognizes mental processes, including judgments that can be performed in the human mind, as patent-ineligible abstract ideas. Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52; MPEP § 2106.07(a)(I). Thus, limitation (f) recites an abstract idea in the “mental process” grouping. Limitation (g) recites, in part, “identifying inefficiencies of at least one of the activities using the performance index without sacrificing confidentiality of the raw activity data.” Appellant cites page 9 of the Specification in support of this limitation. Appeal Br. 4 (citing Spec. 9:17– 21). The cited portion of the Specification describes that a “database of the statistical indicators may be generated,” which “has the advantage of having anonymous data while being formed from confidential, proprietary information. This anonymous data may allow for comparisons with others’ work without sacrificing the confidential, proprietary nature of the raw data.” Spec. 9:16–21. The Specification discloses no algorithm or technical detail to support an assertion that this ordinary human mental process of identifying inefficiencies could not be practically performed in the mind. Accordingly, limitation (f) reasonably can be characterized as reciting a mental process. In summary, apart from additional element(s) and post-solution activity discussed separately below, reading claim 1 as a whole, the claim recites a method of identifying inefficiencies of oil drilling related activities using a performance index obtained by comparing the activities to a Appeal 2020-004141 Application 14/396,019 12 benchmark. Such activities constitute certain methods of organizing human activities, such as commercial and business activities, that were performed manually well before the advent of the Internet. For example, employers have attempted to enhance operational efficiency since at least the beginning of the industrial era using work activity benchmarks such as by paying workers bonuses when the workers measured output exceeds a benchmarked value. Limitations (a)–(g) also constitute mental processes, such as observations, evaluations, and judgments that can be performed either in the human mind or with the aid of pencil and paper, as discussed above. For these reasons, each of limitations (a) through (g) recites a judicial exception to patent-eligible subject matter under step 2A, prong 1, of the 2019 Guidance. See RecogniCorp, LLC v. Nintendo Co., 855 F.3d 1322, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“Adding one abstract idea . . . to another abstract idea . . . does not render the claim non-abstract.”). Guidance Step 2A Prong 2 (Practical Application) Third, having determined that claim 1 recites at least one abstract idea, we evaluate whether “the claim as a whole integrates the recited judicial exception into a practical application of the exception.” Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54–55 (citing MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h)). “A claim that integrates a judicial exception into a practical application will apply, rely on, or use the judicial exception in a manner that imposes a meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that the claim is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the judicial exception.” Id.; see Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 78 (2012). This evaluation is conducted by first “[i]dentifying whether there are any Appeal 2020-004141 Application 14/396,019 13 additional elements recited in the claim beyond the judicial exception(s),” and then “evaluating those additional elements individually and in combination to determine whether they integrate the exception into a practical application.” Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54–55. Limitation (e) further recites storing the anonymized statistical indicators for the activities on an accessible information storage medium, and therefore recites an additional element in the form of an accessible information storage medium. However, even interpreting limitation (e) as limited to electronically storing data on a physical device in an electronic format for later access or output, the storing step of limitation (e) does not add any meaningful limits to the recited abstract idea. Although claim 1 recites storing particular data, i.e., anonymized statistical indicators, in the storage medium, the claim does not recite any specific technical features of memory or database technology or use the storage medium in an unconventional way. In this regard, the claim uses the storage medium generically for data storage and retrieval. Consistent with the Guidance, the additional element of a storage medium such as a memory, used generically, is not a practical application of a judicial exception. Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54. This is because a generic memory is included among additional elements that merely recite “apply it” or similar language, merely include instructions to implement an abstract idea on a computing device, or merely use a computing device as a tool to perform an abstract idea. Id. Furthermore, our reviewing court has indicated that generic use of memory may not satisfy the inventive-concept requirement. See Mortg. Grader, Inc. v. First Choice Loan Servs. Inc., 811 F.3d 1314, 1324–25 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Appeal 2020-004141 Application 14/396,019 14 Moreover, this limitation reasonably may be characterized as directed to the insignificant post-solution activity of outputting data, and, therefore, does not integrate the recited abstract ideas into a practical application. Such broadly recited outputting of data that is not integrated into the claim as a whole is insignificant post-solution activity. See Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 590 (1978) (“The notion that post-solution activity, no matter how conventional or obvious in itself, can transform an unpatentable principle into a patentable process exalts form over substance.”); FairWarning IP, LLC v. Iatric Sys., Inc., 839 F.3d 1089, 1093–94 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (finding abstract claims drawn to collecting and analyzing information and notifying a user based on the analysis). As such, any additional element in limitation (e) recites either insignificant post-solution activity or activity that does not result in a practical application of the abstract idea. Additionally, none of the remaining indicia of integration identified by the Guidance are present in the claim. Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55; see MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h). For example, the claim does not recite a particular machine and, instead, generically recites a storage medium. Nor does the claim recite the “[t]ransformation and reduction of an article ‘to a different state or thing.’” Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 604 (2010); MPEP § 2106.05(c). The claimed additional element in limitation (e) does not transform an article, i.e., some type of tangible or physical object, but instead transforms an intangible concept, i.e., information, from one form to another. That is, the claim simply collects sensor measurements, analyzes data, and stores certain results of the collection and analysis in the form of anonymized statistical indicators. See MPEP § 2106.05(c); see also Appeal 2020-004141 Application 14/396,019 15 Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71–72 (1972) (holding that an algorithm that merely transforms data from one form to another is not patent-eligible). In summary, the additional element of claim 1, i.e., the generic storage medium, is not applied in any meaningful way beyond generally linking the use of the judicial exception to a particular technological environment. We, therefore, determine claim 1 is not directed to a specific asserted improvement in technology or otherwise integrated into a practical application and thus is directed to a judicial exception. Guidance Step 2B (Inventive Concept) Finally, having concluded that claim 1 is “directed to” a judicial exception, we turn to whether the claim provides an “inventive concept,” i.e., whether the additional elements, individually or as an ordered combination, amount to “significantly more” than the judicial exception itself. Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56. To determine whether the claim provides an inventive concept, the additional elements are considered— individually and in combination—to determine whether they (1) add a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not “well- understood, routine, conventional” in the field or (2) simply append well- understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception. Id. The Specification, by describing computer-related components at a high level without details of structure or implementation, indicates that the additional element—the storage medium—is well understood, routine, and conventional: Fig. 2 is a functional block diagram of a computer system 200 for operating software according to various embodiments. The Appeal 2020-004141 Application 14/396,019 16 computer system 200 is illustrated as being equipped with the computer 50, shown at the well site in Fig. 1, solely for ease of illustration. The computer system 200 may include one or more buses 206 through which one or more processors 208 are coupled to a memory (RAM) 210, a display interface 202, a peripheral interface 204, one or more modems or network interfaces 214, and one or more types of information storage 212, such as hard drives. Spec. 5:1–7. Furthermore, Appellant’s Specification does not indicate that consideration of the claim elements as an ordered combination adds any significance beyond the additional element, as considered individually. Rather, the Specification indicates that the invention is directed to an abstract idea that is made more efficient with generic computer components such as the claimed storage medium. That is, the recited hardware adds nothing more than well-understood, routine, conventional activity, specified at a high level of generality, to the application of one or more longstanding human activities and mental processes. See MPEP § 2106.05(d)(II)(ii). Moreover, our reviewing court has also indicated that generic computer components, like Appellant’s “storage medium,” cannot confer patentability. See Alice, 573 U.S. at 225 (concluding that claims “simply instruct[ing] the practitioner to implement the abstract idea of intermediated settlement on a generic computer” are not patent eligible); DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (citing Alice, 573 U.S. at 222) (“after Alice, there can remain no doubt: recitation of generic computer limitations does not make an otherwise ineligible claim patent-eligible”); Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Fin. Corp., 850 F.3d 1332, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (explaining that “[o]ur law demands more” Appeal 2020-004141 Application 14/396,019 17 than claim language that “provides only a result-oriented solution, with insufficient detail for how a computer accomplishes it”); Credit Acceptance Corp. v. Westlake Servs., 859 F.3d 1044, 1055 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“Our prior cases have made clear that mere automation of manual processes using generic computers does not constitute a patentable improvement in computer technology.”). Accordingly, we reject claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed to an exception to patent-eligible subject matter without reciting significantly more. We designate this rejection as constituting a new ground under 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b). We leave the patent-eligibility determination of the remaining claims to the Examiner. See MPEP § 1213.02. CONCLUSION We reverse the Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1, 4–8, 12–15, and 18–21 as obvious under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). We newly reject claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed to patent- ineligible subject matter without reciting significantly more. Appeal 2020-004141 Application 14/396,019 18 DECISION SUMMARY In summary: Claim(s) Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/ Basis Affirmed Reversed New Ground 1, 14, 15 103(a) Piovesan, Veeningen, Conine, Goodermote 1, 14, 15 4, 5, 7, 18, 19 103(a) Piovesan, Veeningen, Conine, Goodermote, Del Castillo 4, 5, 7, 18, 19 6, 20 103(a) Piovesan, Veeningen, Conine, Goodermote, Del Castillo, King 6, 20 8, 21 103(a) Piovesan, Veeningen, Conine, Goodermote, Barrow, King 8, 21 12, 13 103(a) Piovesan, Veeningen, Goodermote, Del Castillo 12, 13 1 101 Eligibility 1 Overall Outcome 1, 4–8, 12–15, 18–21 1 Appeal 2020-004141 Application 14/396,019 19 FINALITY AND RESPONSE This decision contains a new ground of rejection pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b). Rule 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b) provides “[a] new ground of rejection pursuant to this paragraph shall not be considered final for judicial review.” Rule 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b) also provides that Appellant, WITHIN TWO MONTHS FROM THE DATE OF THE DECISION, must exercise one of the following two options with respect to the new ground of rejection to avoid termination of the appeal as to the rejected claims: (1) Reopen prosecution. Submit an appropriate amendment of the claims so rejected or new Evidence relating to the claims so rejected, or both, and have the matter reconsidered by the examiner, in which event the prosecution will be remanded to the examiner. . . . (2) Request rehearing. Request that the proceeding be reheard under § 41.52 by the Board upon the same Record. . . . REVERSED; 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b)