Camco, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Feb 23, 1965

151 N.L.R.B. 203 (N.L.R.B. 1965)

CAMCO, INCORPORATED 203
DETERMINATION OF THE DISPUTE
Pursuant to Section 10(k) of the National Labor Relations Act,
as amended, and upon the basis of the foregoing findings, the
National Labor Relations Board hereby makes the following deter-
mination of the dispute.
Employees engaged as sheet metal workers are entitled to perform
the work of installing interior and exterior porcelain enamel panel-
ing and related work at gasoline service stations constructed by
Lusterlite Corporation in Sacramento, California, and Tacoma,
Washington.
Camco, Incorporated and International Association of Machin-
ists, District Lodge 37, AFL-CIO. Cases Nos. 23-CA-1754 and
23-CA-1784. February 23, 1965
DECISION AND ORDER
On October 6, 1964, Trial Examiner William J. Brown issued
his Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the
Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair
labor practices and recommending that it cease and desist there-
from and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the
attached Trial Examiner's Decision. The Trial Examiner also
found that the Respondent had not engaged in certain other
alleged unfair practices and recommended dismissal thereof. There-
after, the Respondent and the General Counsel filed exceptions to
the Trial Examiner's Decision and supporting briefs.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board
has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-
member panel [Members Fanning, Brown, and Jenkins].
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner
made at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was com-
mitted. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered
the Trial Examiner's Decision, the exceptions and briefs, and the
entire record in this proceeding, and hereby adopts the findings,
conclusions, and recommendations of the Trial Examiner, except
as noted herein.
We agree with the Trial Examiner that the Respondent violated
Section 8(a) (3) and (1) of the Act by discharging employee
Jay Hughes. Contrary to the Trial Examiner, however, we find
that the Respondent's discharges of employees Homer Stone, Charles
Greer, and Warren Young were similarly violative of the Act.
151 NLRB No. 25.
204 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
On February 13, 1964, the Union notified the Respondent by
telegram that it was conducting an organizing campaign among
the Respondent's production and maintenance employees and named
Hughes, Stone, and Greer as members of the Union's organizing
committee. On March 9 the Respondent was notified that Young
had been added to the organizing committee. The Respondent
posted both telegrams on the plant's bulletin board. Between
February 24 and April 24, all four employees named in the tele-
grams were discharged.
Hughes was the first to be discharged. He was terminated after
signing a written reprimand which criticized his failure to sign
a scrap ticket for a piece of material he had spoiled. Upon dis-
charge, Hughes was told by the Respondent that his signature
on the reprimand had cost him his job. The discharges of Stone,
Greer, and Young soon followed. Having learned of Hughes'
experience after signing a reprimand, they refused to sign repri-
mands which were critical of their work. According to the Respond-
ent, they were terminated because of their refusals to sign the
reprimands. As to all four employees, we find that the discharges
were attributable to their union activities.
For the reasons detailed in his Decision, the Trial Examiner
found Hughes' discharge to have been unlawful. This conclusion is
clearly supported by such factors as the timing and precipitate
nature of his discharge, which occurred within 2 weeks of the
Union's notification to the Respondent that Hughes was a member
of the organizing committee; the prior satisfactory job performance
of this employee, as shown by commendations and wage increases ;
and the Respondent's hostility to the Union, as manifested by its
antiunion speeches to assemblages of plant employees and its
prior unfair labor practices.'
Stone, Greer, and Young refused to sign the written reprimands
on the ground that they were issued because of their activities
in behalf of the Union, each of them fearing a reprisal similar to
that suffered by Hughes after he had signed a reprimand. The
record demonstrates that Stone, Greer, and Young had reasonable
cause to believe that the Respondent was intent upon such reprisal.
Thus, the reprimand which Stone refused to sign pertained to his
work performance on an unusual rush job, on which, contrary
to plant custom, no night-shift employee was assigned for follow-up
work, and the materials which were machined by Stone were
immediately upon completion sent to another department to be
i 140 NLRB 361, wherein the Respondent was found guilty of independent Section 8 (a) (1)
activity and of having unlawfully discharged 11 of its employees. On January 11, 1965,
Case No. 21301, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit enforced this matter, ex-
cept as to two discharged employees [340 F. 2d 803].
CAMCO, INCORPORATED 205
checked for defects, an unprecedented procedure. Just 2 days
earlier, Stone was asked to, and did, sign a reprimand for alleged
excessive absences and tardiness. Although it was customary to
give an employee oral warning prior to a written reprimand, this
reprimand was issued without such warning and most of the
absences, which occurred in 1963, were due to hospitalization and
X-ray tests and were not the subject of any prior criticism.
Greer refused to sign a reprimand which criticized him for
excessive scrap which resulted while operating a machine specifically
assigned to him by Foreman Alexander. On an earlier occasion,
Greer had been told by the same foreman not to use this machine
for the particular operation because of its unsatisfactory perform-
ance. As appears in the Trial Examiner's Decision, the attitude
of Greer's foreman changed following the Respondent's receipt of
the Union's telegram naming Greer as a member of the organizing
committee, and "there are some solid indications of disparate treat-
ment." Significantly, on the basis of scrap reports issued prior
to Greer's activity in behalf of the Union, Greer was commended
by Foreman Alexander for having achieved the second best record
of all the automatic lathe operators.
The reprimand which Young refused to sign charged him with
scrapping a piece of material, and referred to an earlier similar
offense for which he was given a 2-day layoff. Young was also
subjected to harassment by Foreman Alexander after the Respondent
was notified of his union activity. Thereafter, he was assigned
unusually large amounts of more difficult work and was discouraged
from calling inspectors to check his work while it was on the
machine, which other machine operators were permitted to do.
Young's name did not appear on the January and February 1964
scrap reports, an indication of his efficiency on the job before the
March 9 notification to the Respondent of his membership on the
organizing committee.
The refusals of Stone, Greer, and Young to sign reprimands,
which the Respondent apparently considered as acts of insubordina-
tion warranting discharge, could not seriously have interfered with
the Respondent's reprimand procedure, as the reprimands could
have been issued and recorded despite the employees' unwilling-
ness to sign them. Considering also the prior satisfactory work
performances of these employees who had been rewarded with
merit pay increases, the timing of their discharge, and the Respond-
ent's manifested union animus, we are convinced that Stone, Greer,
and Young were given a Hobson's choice when offered the alterna-
tive of signing the reprimands or terminating their employment.
The record persuades us that the Respondent was determined to
206 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
rid itself of the chief union adherents and these employees'
signatures to the reprimands would no more have saved their jobs
than did Hughes' signing of his reprimand. We conclude that
Hughes, Stone, Greer, and Young were discharged by the Respond-
ent because of their leading roles in the Union's organizing
campaign, in violation of Section 8(a) (3) and (1) of the Act.
Accordingly, Stone, Greer, and Young are entitled to be reinstated
with backpay together with interest, precisely as recommended
by the Trial Examiner with regard to Hughes.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10 (c) of the National Labor Relations Act,
as amended, the Board hereby adopts as its Order the Order recom-
mended by the Trial Examiner, and orders that Respondent, Camco,
Incorporated, Houston, Texas, its officers, agents, successors, and
assigns, shall take the action set forth in the Trial Examiner's
Recommended Order, with the following modifications :
1. Paragraph 2(a) shall be modified by substituting the following
paragraph :
"Offer to Jay Hughes, Homer Stone, Charles Greer, and Warren
Young immediate and full reinstatement to their former or sub-
stantially equivalent positions, without prejudice to their seniority
or other rights and privileges, and make them whole for any loss of
pay each may have suffered by reason of the Respondent's discrimina-
tion against them, in the manner set forth in the Trial Examiner's
Decision and in this Decision and Order."
2. Add the following as paragraph 2(b), renumbering succeed-
ing paragraphs accordingly :
"(b) Notify the above-named employees if presently serving in
the Armed Forces of the United States of their right to full
reinstatement upon application in accordance with the Selective
Service Act and the Universal Military Training and Service Act
of 1948, as amended, after discharge from the Armed Forces."
3. Amend the second indented paragraph in the notice attached
to the Trial Examiner's Decision to read:
WE WILL offer Jay Hughes, Homer Stone, Charles Greer,
and Warren Young, immediate and full reinstatement to their
former or equivalent positions, without prejudice to their
seniority or other rights and privileges, and with backpay.
4. The note below the signature line in the Appendix attached
to the Trial Examiner's Decision is amended to read :
WE WILL notify the above-named employees if presently
serving in the Armed Forces of the United States of their
right to full reinstatement upon application in accordance
CAMCO, INCORPORATED 207
with the Selective Service Act and the Universal Military
Training and Service Act of 1948, as amended, after dis-
charge from the Armed Forces.
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a proceeding under Section 10 of the National Labor Relations Act, as
amended, hereinafter sometimes referred to as the Act. The original charge of unfair
labor practice was filed on February 25, 1964, by the above-indicated Charging Party,
hereinafter sometimes referred to as the Union, and duly served on the above-indicated
Respondent, hereinafter sometimes referred to as Camco or the Company. Thereafter
the original complaint herein was issued on April 15, 1964, by the General Counsel of
the National Labor Relations Board acting through the Board 's Regional Director
for Region 23. Subsequently , the consolidated amended complaint herein was issued
May 1, 1964. It alleged, and Respondent's duly filed answer denied, the commission
of unfair labor practices defined in Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act.
Hearing was held on the issues raised by the complaint and answer at Houston,
Texas, June 15 through 17, 1964, before Trial Examiner William J. Brown. All
parties appeared and participated at the hearing as noted above; they were accorded
full opportunity to present evidence and argument on the issues
At the conclusion of the General Counsel's case-in-chief, the Trial Examiner granted
Respondent's motion to dismiss the allegations of paragraph 7(a) of the complaint
relating to interrogation of employees concerning their knowledge of union activities
on the part of J. C. Cook, one of Camco's supervisory foremen. The evidence
adduced by the General Counsel in support of this item of the complaint consisted of
the testimony of employee Robert Lira to the effect that on or about February 10 or
12, 1964, his foreman asked him at his machine if he had heard anything about the
Union; when Lira replied, "What union?" nothing more was said. In addition, Homer
Stone, an alleged discriminatee, testified that on or about the same day the same
foreman came up to him and asked if he had heard a rumor going around, and when
Stone said, "No. About what?" Cook said, "About the union." Presumably in
reliance on the Trial Examiner's ruling, Respondent presented no evidence seeking to
combat the testimony on interrogation referred to above, although Foreman J. C.
Cook was called by Respondent to testify on other matters.
In his brief General Counsel has urged that the Trial Examiner reverse his dismissal
and find Foreman Cook's conduct a violation of Section 8(a)(1). The authorities
cited by the General Counsel in his brief appear to be distinguishable. On principle
the interrogation attributed to Foreman Cook by General Counsel's witnesses Stone
and Lira, assuming their testimony to be accepted, would appear to make out a
borderline case. It would not accord with due process of law to grant the request set
forth in the General Counsel's brief and make a finding of unlawful interrogation
without according Respondent an opportunity to present contrary evidence , either by
way of direct denial by Cook or explanation or extenuation by Cook and conceivably
others. This would necessarily have to be done at a reconvention of the hearing.
Under all the circumstances , including the findings and recommendations hereinafter
set forth , I reject the General Counsel 's request.
Briefs were filed on behalf of the General Counsel and the Respondent and have
been fully considered.
Upon the entire record I in this case , and from my observation of the witnesses, I
make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT
It appears from the pleadings herein that Camco is a corporation organized and
existing under the laws of the State of Texas, with its principal office and place of
business at Houston , Texas, where it is engaged in the manufacture and sale of preci-
sion valves , regulators , and controllers . The pleadings also establish that during the
12-month period preceding issuance of the complaint herein, admittedly a representa-
tive period, the Company in the course and conduct of its business operations shipped
products valued in excess of $50,000 from its Houston, Texas, plant directly to points
1 The original official file of General Counsel's exhibits contains a document marked for
Identification as "General Counsel's Exhibit No. 8" which does not appear to have been
offered or received in evidence , it has been disregarded in the preparation of this Decision.
208 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
outside the State of Texas, and that the Company is, and has been at all material times,
an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the
Act. It also appears on the basis of the foregoing that assertion of jurisdiction on the
part of the Board is justified and required.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
It appears from the pleadings and evidence herein that the Union is, and at all
material times has been, a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5)
of the Act.
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Introduction and summary of events
Camco has been engaged at its Houston plant, the facility here involved, for a
number of years in the manufacture and sale of precision valves, regulators, and con-
trollers, primarily for use in the oil industry. Its president and principal executive
officer is Harold E. McGowen, Jr., who had been chief engineer prior to assuming
the presidency. There are several vice presidents reporting to and working directly
under McGowen; these include Vice President Albert Hughes, in charge of the manu-
facturing and production department, the department with which we are here con-
cerned. Reporting to and working directly under Vice President Hughes are the
superintendents of the several departments making up the manufacturing and produc-
tion division: tooling, assembly, welding, and the machine shop. We are here con-
cerned primarily with the machine shop whose superintendent is Walter Theeck. The
portion of the machine shop with which we are more particularly concerned includes
its two lathe sections: (1) turret, and (2) automatic and engine. The line foreman
in charge of the turret lathe section on the day shift is J. C. Cook; his night counter-
part is Arthur O'Pry. The line foreman in charge of the automatic and engine lathe
section is Henry D. Alexander. The total number of nonsupervisory employees in
the production department is about 71.
About February 1, 1964, employee Jay Hughes sought out the Union and soon
thereafter signed a card authorizing the Union to petition the Board for an election
and to act as his bargaining agent. On or about the same day employees Homer Stone
and Charles Greer signed similar cards. During this period they were in communica-
tion with Union Representative J. R. O'Neal and, under his direction, engaged in a
program of soliciting employees to sign cards supporting the Union in its organiza-
tional efforts. While the organizational efforts appeared to have been conducted away
from the plant premises there apparently were inevitable rumors of organizational
activity and on February 10 there appears to have been some reference to it by Fore-
man Cook as above mentioned.
At a meeting of the employee organizers with Union Representative O'Neal on
the night of February 12 it was decided, for some undisclosed reason, to send a tele-
gram to the Company advising it of the commencement of the organizational drive
and of the names of employee organizers Hughes, Greer, and Stone. This was done
early in the morning of February 13. A copy of the wire was posted in the plant at
the direction of McGowen, this being, according to McGowen, a means of keeping
the employees informed of developments of interest.
The General Counsel in his brief has urged a finding that the posting of the union
telegram of February 13 constituted an unfair labor practice under Section 8(a)(1)
of the Act which, though not alleged in the complaint, was fully litigated at the hear-
ing and should be found to be an unfair labor practice. In this regard the General
Counsel relies on Rocky Mountain Natural Gas Company, Inc. 140 NLRB 1191,
modifying 326 F. 2d 949 (C.A. 10). That case is distinguishable in two important
aspects: (1) there the employer's conduct could truly be said to have been fully liti-
gated as to its nature, content, and capacity to coerce, unlike the instant case where
the posting of the telegram appears to have known well in advance of issuance of the
complaint and litigated at the hearing only as a link in the chain of indications of
employer knowledge; and (2) the conduct there was plainly coercive whereas here it
is a case of Respondent's posting an item of general interest without apparent malice.
General Counsel's assertion that the posting "singled the organizers out for special
notice" does not appear meritorious. If anything the posting of the telegram was due
primarily to the act of the organizers and the Union in dispatching it to Cameo, con-
ceivably to establish the element of employer knowledge in the event of litigation.
The axiom volenti non fit injuria would seem applicable.
Therefore, on February 17, employee Warren Young signed a union authorization
card and joined the group of those organizing employees.
CAMCO, INCORPORATED 209
Soon thereafter employees Hughes, Stone, Greer, and Young were separated from
their employment with Camco. The General Counsel's position is that all were
discharged in reprisal for their activity on behalf of the Union; Camco admits the
discharge of Hughes, asserts that Stone, Greer, and Young resigned. The Company
denies antiunion motivation in any of the separations.
In the interim between the posting of the Union's telegram of February 13 and the
last of the separations, that of Young, President McGowen delivered speeches to
employees of Camco on February 18 and March 27. These speeches, not alleged in
the unfair labor practices, plainly revealed McGowen's determination as chief execu-
tive of the Company to insist on efficient production operations; they also reveal that
the Company is as McGowen candidly put it "against the Union." I do not see in
these speeches however any resort on the part of the Company to emotional or inflam-
matory propaganda or a reflection of a determination to stay unorganized by fair
means or foul. Rather they appear to be a forceful presentation of the reason why
Camco thinks that both it and its employees would be better off without the Union,
without expressed or veiled threats of reprisals or promises of benefit.
There is no doubt that the McGowen speeches reveal Cameo's firm conviction that
it and its workers would be happier without the Union. They also forcefully portray
McGowen's awareness not only of his responsibility to his stockholders and board of
directors to secure the optimum return on the corporate investment but also of his
genuine concern for the security of employees by the reference to establish procedures
for spreading available work. McGowen's determination to make employees tow the
line is revealed by the speeches, to have extended beyond the production group directly
involved in the instant case, to sales and supervisory employees. In short while the
speeches forthrightly proclaim McGowen's opposition to the Union they equally
clearly establish his determination to run a first-class machine shop with every bit of
time and material accounted for.
In connection with accounting for scrapped material, Camco had been for some 2
years prior to the hearing working in conjunction with an established accounting firm
on the installation of an IBM system of accounting for scrap on a dollar basis per
individual per month. Under the system, installed about the first of 1964, it is neces-
sary that employees sign scrap tickets for scrapped material.
The General Counsel has also urged the Trial Examiner to find significant anti-
union hostility on Cameo's part on the basis of the testimony of former employee
Godwin as to the contents of conversations between Godwin and McGowen in the
summer of 1962. These conversations would have dubious probative value as to the
1964 motivations of Camco in the four terminations here involved, particularly in
view of the General Counsel's concession at the close of the hearing that it would be
"exactly" an overstatement to characterize the testimony as clear, convincing, and
completely devoid of inconsistencies or inaccuracies.
B. The employee separations
As appears from the above summary the separation of the four employees here
involved followed relatively shortly upon their undertaking organizational efforts on
behalf of the Union. Furthermoie as appears from the cross-examination of Camco
Vice President Hughes, Camco's management knew, either through the Union's tele-
gram or otherwise, that the four employees in question were members of the Union's
organizing committee. Analysis of the issues herein, namely the reasons underlying
the separations, proceeds therefore upon the basis of two of the classic items generally
regarded as significant in appraising these issues already established-that is, timing
and company knowledge. The General Counsel, in addition to relying on timing and
knowledge has, in each case, offered evidence to show the improbability that the
assigned reasons for discharge was the true reason. The Company has come forward
with an explanation of its reasons for the separations in each of the individual cases
however. The circumstances of each case must be appraised both as an individual
situation and in the light of the totality of the evidence. The cases do not necessarily
stand or fall as a unit; the evidence may establish a discriminatory discharge in one
case and fail to preponderate in favor of such a finding in another.
1. The discharge of Jay Hughes
Jay Hughes was hired in March 1960 as a trainee, first assigned to the burring
operation and thereafter transferred to the turret lathe section under Foreman J. C.
Cook. While in trainee status he received certain automatic increases which together
with the 71/2-cent night differential brought his rate up to $1.90 on June 28, 1962, at
which time he advanced to the higher rated classification of turret lathe operator
783-133-66-vol. 151-15
210 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
trainee with an hourly rate of $2.05. On January 9, 1963, he was advanced to the
higher labor grade of third-class turret lathe operator with a base rate of $2.20 per
hour. He received additional increases of 5 cents per hour on July 1, 1963, and 10
cents per hour effective October 15, 1963, but awarded him February 10, 1964.
While Jay Hughes testified that following the receipt and posting of the Union's
telegram of February 13, pressure started building up from his Foreman Cook who
would "kind of hurry along," it also appeared from his testimony that Cook had
hurried him up in the past and that Hughes made no protest but went ahead and did
any assigned jobs, presumably in the same fashion as had been his practice theretofore.
The evidence clearly establishes that Hughes commenced an operation on a stem
retainer for an orifice valve on Friday, February 14, and finished the second operation
on all pieces involved in the job on February 17. The next morning, February 18,
Foreman Cook showed Jay Hughes a piece of material which had been scrapped. It
did not bear the identifying mark of Jay Hughes. Hughes protested that the part in
question was a piece of dropoff material which he had used for a setup. In any event,
upon Cook's order Hughes took the part to the inspection department and shortly
thereafter signed a scrap ticket for the piece of material. Later that day Cook sum-
moned Hughes to the office and directed him to sign a letter of reprimand (in evidence
as General Counsel's Exhibit No. 14-I). The written "Reprimand Report" in ques-
tion refers to repeated warnings respecting stamping parts and turning scrapped parts
in for the preparation and signature of a scrap ticket. It concludes that the offenses
involved "could be a dischargeable offense."
Although Jay Hughes protested Foreman Cook's demand that he sign the letter of
reprimand, he did sign it and returned to his machine. The next workday was Mon-
day, February 24, and shortly before 1 p.m.. on that day Cook ordered Hughes to
prepare his tools to be checked out. According to Cook this was on instructions from
Theeck. Theeck did not testify. In any event they took Hughes to Vice President
Al Hughes' office where the latter told him that his signature on the letter of reprimand
cost him his job.
According to Jay Hughes he protested during the last stages of the interview in
Vice President Hughes' office that the discharge was in fact for his union activity.
Cook and Vice President Hughes denied that Jay Hughes referred to union activity
during the course of this terminal discussion and the cross-examination of Jay Hughes
develops that his pretrial affidavit furnished the General Counsel contains no mention
of his alleged reference to union activity during the terminal interview. It does not
appear necessary to resolve the question of whether or not the self-serving statement
was made.
The case for the General Counsel with respect to the termination of Jay Hughes
can be summarized as follows: Jay Hughes was a satisfactory employee who was dis-
charged for a relatively insignificant matter under circumstances establishing that
genuine reasons for his discharge was not the alleged reason Respondent on the
other hand asserts that the evidence indicates that the discharge of Jay Hughes was
justified and in fact required under its established policy of requiring strict compliance
with its recently inaugurated IBM system of accounting for scrap material. Cameo's
personnel department report on his separation shows that the reason for his ternuna-
tion was "falsifying company record and was wasting company material."
It becomes necessary to carefully examine Jay Hughes' work on the piece in ques-
tion in the light of Cameo's established procedures for accounting for scrap material.
The testimony of Hughes and Foreman Cook together with Respondent's Exhibits
Nos. 4 to 6 established that on February 14 Jay Hughes commenced work on 15 stem
retainers for 4-inch orifice valves. His move ticket shows that he started six pieces
and finished six good pieces. The report also shows that he had some setup time on
that day and had tool trouble in the nature of inadequate clearance. On the night
shift employee C. L. Freeman ran the same operation on the remaining nine pieces
and finished nine good pieces. He had no setup time. The move ticket in evidence as
Respondent's Exhibit No. 5 shows that on the next workday, February 17, Jay Hughes
performed operation No. 20, the second operation on the 15 pieces in question finish-
ing 15 good pieces with some setup time involved. Hughes admittedly used a so-called
dropoff piece for making a setup in connection with his work on this part. Dropoff
pieces are pieces remaining when the stock being worked through a turret lathe is
worked to a point where 6 inches or less is left. The practice is for the operator then
to put this piece in a so-called dropoff pan where it may be used for setting up work,
checking tools and dye heads, or may eventually be taken away by the porters for
scrap.
The General Counsel's theory of the case appears to be that the scrapped piece of
material which was the subject of the scrap ticket Cook ordered Jay Hughes to sign
was not a piece of the same stock that was being run on the job for the stem retainer
in question. The evidence appears to indicate to the contrary.
CAMCO, INCORPORATED 211
For the credited testimony of Foreman Cook read in conjunction with the Com-
pany's "stock issued" tickets (Respondent's Exhibit Nos. 7 and 8) establish that on
February 13, 1964, Night Foreman O'Pry requisitioned one 5-foot piece of material,
4130, in connection with work order No. 18973, the same work order as involved in
the move tickets above discussed. The evidence further indicates that on the follow-
ing day, February 14, he requisitioned an additional foot of the same material for
the same work order. According to the testimony of Cook the work would normally
take 57 inches thereby establishing that there was some scrap somewhere along the
line.
Inasmuch as the material in question had been used both by Hughes and Freeman
on February 14 the added stock requisitioned does not in itself pinpoint Jay Hughes as
responsible for any scrap but it does establish that what scrap there was, was of the
4130 material. Hughes does not appear to have contended that the scrapped material
was other than 4130 stock used on the job he was performing until his cross-
examination when he asserted that the dropoff piece was of different material. The
evidence here indicates that the piece of dropoff material which came into Camco's
possession either by the night foreman finding it in Hughes' varsol bucket, or other-
wise, was one on which according to Hughes' testimony he had himself performed the
first operation.
I appraise the evidence as clearly establishing the existence of a custom and practice
to use dropoff pieces for setting up for an operation. It appears from the cross-
examination of Foreman Cook that this was frequently done and tolerated by manage-
ment. The evidence also clearly, when viewed in its totality, establishes that while
there might have been a practice of requiring employees to sign scrap tickets for
material scrapped on setup, there was usually an indication on the scrapped ticket
that the scrap involved had been in connection with the setup. The only reasonable
inference from this is that scrap on setup was regarded as a less serious offense and,
indeed, it would seem self-evident that setting up, involving as it would the manipula-
tion of machine parts to the point of final tuning or adjustment would inevitably be
productive of more scrap.
The employee reprimand report signed by Jay Hughes on February 18, is in evi-
dence as General Counsel's Exhibit No. 14-I. It refers to Hughes' failure to sign a
scrap ticket on the work in question and to his deficiencies as something which "could
be a dischargeable offense." Hughes appears to have been a relatively satisfactory
employee with a good scrap record although it is undoubtedly established that about
the time of the events in question Cameo was putting added emphasis on accounting
for scrap material. It is clear from the evidence that Hughes was not told when he
signed the letter of reprimand that it would entail his discharge. It also appears from
the testimony of Vice President Albert Hughes that the fourth reprimand for scrap is
not necessarily a matter of discharge. But Jay Hughes does not appear to have had
as many as four reprimands for scrap With respect to the charge that he falsified the
records I do not appraise the Respondent's position as anything other than a belated
attempt to add an additional item in its case against Jay Hughes. The failure in ques-
tion namely the neglect to indicate on the move ticket that a scrap ticket had been
signed, is nothing more than a necessary corollary of the failure to sign the scrap
ticket. There does not appear to be involved here a willful falsification of company
records of the type that would be embraced within paragraph 6 of the major offense
list.
On the appraisal of all the evidence relating to Jay Hughes and having particularly
in mind his relatively satisfactory performance in the past as witnessed by his com-
mendations and salary increases viewed in light of the unconvincing nature of the
assigned reasons for his discharge and the precipitate nature thereof, I am persuaded
that the evidence preponderates in favor of the conclusion that he was discharged
because of his leadership in the Union's organizational efforts at Cameo. I find his
discharge to be discriminatory within the scope of Section 8(a) (3) of the Act.
2. The separation of Homer Stone
Homer Stone was employed by Camco in March 1962 and initially assigned as a
trainee to the burring department at the rate of $1.65. He received the routine auto-
matic increases of 5 cents per hour for each of the first two stepups and 10 cents for
the third. Thereafter he received merit increases of 5 cents effective January 1, 1963,
10 cents per hour effective July 1, 1963, and 10 cents per hour effective November 4,
1963, so that at the time of his separation his hourly rate was $2.10.
Stone appears to have had a problem of excessive absenteeism and tardiness for
which he received a written reprimand February 25, 1964, which he signed without
212 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
protest , apparently feeling that the reprimand was deserved . As noted above Stone
was one of the leaders in organizational efforts and his activities in this connection
were proclaimed to the Company by the Union 's February 13 telegram.
The evidence establishes that on February 17 Foreman Cook gave Stone a rush
order to run the first operation on three parts . This consisted of boring out the
inside diameter of stock by a drilling operation to a given dimension . The following
operation would be a reaming operation which could be properly performed only if
the initial drilling operation leaves the inside diameter undersized . The evidence
indicates that two of the pieces were scrapped. The pieces were scrapped because
the reaming operation had resulted in an eccentric cutting. Pursuant to established
procedures , the parts were charged to Stone because his was the only stamp indicated
thereon . Cook asked Stone to sign a scrap ticket for the parts and Stone refused;
he also refused to sign the written reprimand which Cook said would be necessary
and which was prepared as a consequence of Cook's refusal to sign the ticket. Stone
based his refusal to sign the scrap ticket and the reprimand on his belief that his
signing would mean the penalty of discharge as it had in the earlier case of Hughes,
and also because of his assertion that he was not responsible for scrapping the parts.
The evidence preponderates in favor of the conclusion that Stone was discharged
because he refused to sign the scrap tickets and the reprimand following on his refusal
to sign them . While Stone testified to some items which might support a view that
the circumstances surrounding the job in question was somewhat different from cus-
tomary practice , they do no more than indicate his view that there was something
suspicious afoot .2 The solid evidence however fails to establish that there was any
impropriety in his discharge. Rather the evidence indicates that he was properly
charged with the responsibility of accounting for the scrap on this job and his assertion
to Cook that the reamer had scrapped the parts does not appear to be convincing
particularly since the reamer could scrap the parts most likely only as a consequence
of the initial operation being faulty.
The circumstances immediately preceding his discharge also tend to indicate the
propriety of management 's action. He was given repeated opportunities to sign the
ticket or the reprimand or both, by Cook, by Theeck, and by Vice President Hughes.
Furthermore , unlike the situation involved in the Jay Hughes instance , Cook credibly
testified that he had not been instructed to prepare for Stone's dismissal before the
interview in Vice President Hughes' office. The evidence indicates in short that
Stone 's separation , and I find it to be a discharge rather than a voluntary resignation,
has not been shown to be other than honestly motivated by Stone's refusal to sign a
scrap ticket or a reprimand based thereon. It does not appear to have been, on the
evidence in this proceeding , shown to have been in reprisal for his known union
activities.
3. The separation of Charles Greer
Greer was hired in April 1962 as a burring department trainee at $1 60 per hour;
he received the initial three automatic increases and received a merit increase of 15
cents per hour effective December 1, 1962, a merit increase of 20 cents per hour
effective May 1, 1963, and another merit increase of 20 cents per hour effective
November 4, 1963. After his initial training in the burring department he was
transferred to the automatic lathe section under Foreman Alexander. The produc-
tion department's scrap records indicate that for the 41/2-month period August 15
through December 31, 1963, Greer was fairly well down the list of scrap producers;
for the months of January and February 1964, he was among the four highest scrap
producers. As noted above he signed a card for the Union early in February 1964,
and thereafter solicited employees. His name was included in the Union's telegram
of February 13 as a member of its organizing committee.
Management policies with respect to scrap are set forth in the official employee
manual which is in evidence as General Counsel's Exhibit No. 10. This includes
among minor offenses that of repeated negligence resulting in excessive scrap. The
speeches of President McGowen on February 18 and March 27, one before and one
after Greer's discharge , also indicate the emphasis placed on scrap, accounting there-
for, and the procedures involved in disciplining for scrap . The earlier speech makes
2 Stone credibly testified that Foreman Cook gave him a rush job for shipment the fol-
lowing afternoon but that the nightman did not continue the job ; Young also testified
that the engine lathe foreman , Alexander , ordered him to check the parts immediately to
see if any error had been performed in the earlier ( Stone 's) operation . These items raise
some suspicion but do not constitute solid evidence as to discriminatory treatment. In
similar vein , I cannot attribute significant weight to Stone ' s assertions that after the
telegram posting , Cook's attitude toward him changed, since , absent testimony as to factual
disparities , the evidence is not of sufficient probative value.
CAMCO, INCORPORATED 213
it plain that management attributed a favorable turn in its profit position to improve
in the scrap accountability. When read in conjunction with the Company's rules and
regulations contained in its employee bulletin it plainly appears that an employee
receives an oral warning for the first occasion of scrap and written reprimands to be
signed by the offender thereafter, with possible discharge for the fourth offense.
On March 25, Foreman Alexander presented Greer a letter of reprimand for his
signature relating to Greer's excessive scrap for the months of January and February.
The reprimand contains the statement that if the excessive scrap continued during the
next few months disciplinary action would be taken. Greer refused to sign the repri-
mand and asked to see the scrap reports. Alexander refused to show them. The
following day Alexander again presented the reprimand which Greer again refused
to sign. Greer persisted in his refusal and, although given another opportunity to
sign before Theeck and Vice President Hughes, Greer still persisted in his refusal.
Vice President Hughes told Greer that he was either resigning or signing the repri-
mand one or the other.
There is no doubt but that there was no voluntary resignation here; there was in
effect a discharge. The evidence does not however preponderate in favor of any
conclusion other than that Greer was discharged for refusal to sign a reprimand
which appeared to be a standard practice. While there is evidence that Greer may
have been assigned to a difficult and relatively unprecedented task sometime shortly
prior to his release, there is no convincing indication that that played an operative
part in his scrap production nor would it appear of any substantial value in ascertain-
ing the reason for his termination.
As in the case of Stone, there is testimony from Greer as to a change in attitude on
the part of his foreman, Alexander, after the posting of the union telegram; unlike
Stone's case there are some solid indications of disparate treatment both as to their
socializing on break time and remaining at the machine during downtime. These
are too insubstantial elements, however, to tip the scale of preponderance in favor
of a finding of unlawful motivation in the discharge.
Greer testified that during the course of his termination conversation in Vice
President Hughes' office he asserted that he was being discharged for his union activ-
ity to which, according to Greer, Hughes rejoined, "If you stubbed your toe for the
union I would get you"; Hughes denied making this statement. I credit Hughes in
his denial.
The evidence in its totality does not preponderate in favor of the conclusion that
Greer's discharge was violative of the Act.
4. The release of Warren Young
Young started in October 1956 as a trainee in the burring department at $1.50.
Some 3 weeks later he transferred to the turret lathe section under Cook for about
21/2 years and received numerous increases in this period. Effective October 21, 1958,
he received a merit increase on the basis of his production record. In April 1959,
he received a merit increase and in September 1959 was promoted from third-class to
second-class turret lathe operator with a 10-cent hourly increase. He received a
merit increase in April 1960 and a similar increase in October 1960 and again in
October 1960. In April 1961 he received a 10-cent merit increase and an additional
10-cent increase on October 1, 1960. April 1, 1962, he was promoted to first-class
engine lathe operator at a rate of $2.65 per hour, then he received a 10-cent merit
increase in October 1962 and a 5-cent increase in November 1963, this bringing his
rate to $2.80 per hour.
As noted above, Young signed a card about the middle of February and the Com-
pany was notified of his membership in the union organizing team by the Union's
telegram of-March 9. Young appears to have been relatively high on the scrap list
for the 4-month period ending December 31, 1963.
The testimony of Young would establish that in the period shortly after his organi-
zational status became known to the Company his supervisor, Alexander, commenced
some minor harassments . I regard this as insufficient to establish that there was any
discrimination in this period nor does it amount to necessary indication that Respond-
ent had him marked for discriminatory treatment. Sometime in April 1964, Alex-
ander presented Young a reprimand for his signature referring to the scrapping of a
part due to drilling from the wrong end. The reprimand referred to an earlier
similar mistake in the past which had resulted in a 2-day layoff. Young told Alexander
that the reprimand was a form of union discrimination and he refused to sign it.
The following day Alexander again asked him to sign and Young again claimed that
discrimination was involved. The two proceeded to Theeck's office where Young
again refused to sign repeating his claim of union discrimination , an assertion which
he repeated in Vice President Hughes' office. Vice President Hughes told him it was
214 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
a matter of signing or resigning . It appears that Hughes in the course of this con-
versation strongly urged Young to sign particularly in view of the fact that the man-
agement had only recently approved an additional increase for him.
I agree with the General Counsel that there was no voluntary resignation here but
in effect a discharge. With respect to the General Counsel's assertion, however, that
there was a presentation of an unfair reprimand which would be used as an admis-
sion of unsatisfactory work, the evidence does not support the General Counsel's
assertions. There is no doubt that the evidence preponderates in favor of the fact
that there was scrap caused and that with Respondent's established concern about
accounting for scrap there would be no unfairness in the presentation of the repri-
mand. The fact that he was offered several opportunities to sign the reprimand and
was reminded of a pending increase in compensation also establishes that Respondent
was by no means anxious to rid itself of this employee. I find that the allegations of
the complaint are not sustained with respect to the release of Warren Young.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE
The activities of the Respondent set forth in section III, above, and there found
to constitute an unfair labor practice occurring in connection with the operations
described in section I, above, have a close, intimate, and substantial relation to trade,
traffic, and commerce among the several States, and tend to lead to labor disputes
burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce.
V. THE REMEDY
In view of the findings detailed above that Respondent discriminated in tenure of
employment against employee Jay Hughes, thereby engaging in an unfair labor
practice defined in Section 8(a)(3) of the Act, I shall recommend that Respondent
be required to offer him immediate and full reinstatement to his former or a sub-
stantially equivalent position, without prejudice to his seniority or other rights and
privileges, and make him whole for loss of earnings suffered because of the discrim-
ination against him by payment of backpay computed in the manner set forth in
F. W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289, with interest added thereto at the rate
and compounded in the manner prescribed in Isis Plumbing and Heating Co, 138
NLRB 716. Since the discharge of an employee in reprisal for his union activity
strikes at the heart of rights guaranteed under the Act and in view of prior unfair
labor practices which Respondent has been found to have engaged in, 140 NLRB
361, a broad cease-and-desist order appears necessary and appropriate. I shall there-
fore, recommend that Respondent be required to cease and desist from in any
manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed under Section 7 of the Act. I shall recommend the posting of an
appropriate notice.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, and upon the entire record in this
case , I make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The operations of Respondent affect commerce within the meaning of Section
2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the
Act.
3. By discriminating against employee Jay Hughes with respect to his tenure of
employment on the basis of his union activity, Respondent has engaged in unfair
labor practices defined in Section 8 (a) (3) and (1) of the Act.
4. The aforesaid unfair labor practices affect commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
RECOMMENDED ORDER
On the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, and upon
the entire record in this case, I recommend that Respondent, Carrico, Incorporated, its
officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Discouraging membership in International Association of Machinists, District
Lodge 37, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization, by discharging or otherwise
discriminating with respect to employee tenure or any term or condition of employ-
ment-on the basis of activities on behalf of the aforesaid Union.
CAMCO, INCORPORATED 215
(b) In any manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in the
exercise of their right to self-organization, to bargain collectively through representa-
tives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose
of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.
2. Take the following affirmative action which I find necessary and appropriate to
effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Offer to Jay Hughes immediate and full reinstatement to his former or a
substantially equivalent position, without prejudice to his seniority or other rights
and privileges, and make him whole for any loss of pay suffered by reasons of
Respondent's discrimination against him in the manner set forth in the section above
entitled "The Remedy."
(b) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the Board and its agents, for
examination and copying, all payroll records, social security payment records, time-
cards, personnel records and reports, and all other records necessary and appropriate
to determine the amount of backpay due under the terms hereof.
(c) Post at its plant in Houston, Texas, copies of the attached notice marked
"Appendix." 3 Copies of said notice, to be furnished by the Regional Director for
Region 23, shall, after being signed by a duly authorized representative of Respond-
ent, be posted by Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained
by it in the aforesaid places for 60 consecutive days thereafter, including all places
where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken
by Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by
any other material.
(d) Notify the Regional Director, in writing, within 20 days from the date of
receipt of this Decision, what steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith .4
It is recommended that the complaint be dismissed as to the unfair labor practices
not herein found to have been committed.
I If this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, the words "a Decision and Order"
shall be substituted for the words "the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner" in the
notice. If the Board's Order is enforced by a decree of a United States Court of Appeals,
the notice will be further amended by the substitution of the words "a Decree of the
United States Court of Appeals, Enforcing an Order" for the words "a Decision and
Order "
4If this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, this provision shall he modified
to read: "Notify the Regional Director for Region 23, in writing, within 10 days from
the date of this Order, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith."
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor
Relations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act, as amended, we hereby notify our employees that:
WE WILL NOT discourage membership in International Association of Machin-
ists, District Lodge 37, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization of our
employees, by discharging employees or otherwise discriminating against them
with respect to employees' hire, tenure, or terms or conditions of employment.
WE WILL offer Jay Hughes immediate and full reinstatement to his former or
an equivalent position, without prejudice to his seniority or other rights and
privileges, and with backpay.'
WE WILL NOT in any manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in
the exercise of their rights under the National Labor Relations Act, as amended.
CAMCO, INCORPORATED,
Employer.
Dated------------------- By-------------------------------------------
(Representative) (Title)
NOTE.-We will notify Jay Hughes if presently serving in the Armed Forces of the
United States of his right to full reinstatement upon application in accordance with
the Selective Service Act and the Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1948,
as amended, after discharge from the Armed Forces.
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting,
and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
216 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Employees may communicate directly with the Board's Regional Office, 6617 Fed-
eral Office Building, 515 Rusk Avenue, Houston, Texas, Telephone No. Capital
8-0611, Extension 4271, if they have any question concerning this notice or compli-
ance with its provisions.
The Bedford -Nugent Corp., James L. Nugent , Jr., and James
Nugent, Sr. and Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers Local
Union No. 215, International Brotherhood of Teamsters , Chauf-
feurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America
Evansville Materials , Inc., Henderson Materials , Inc., and Arnold
W. Mulzer, Roland P. Mulzer and Edgar C . Mulzer, a Partner-
ship , d/b/a Mulzer Brothers and Chauffeurs, Teamsters and
Helpers Local Union No. 215 , International Brotherhood of
Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of Amer-
ica. Cases Nos. 25-CA-1656 and 2S-CA-1685. February 23, 1965
DECISION AND ORDER
On December 16, 1963, Trial Examiner Ivar H. Peterson issued
his Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that Respond-
ent, The Bedford-Nugent Corp., had engaged in and was engaging
in certain unfair labor practices and recommending that it cease and
desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set forth
in the attached Decision. He further found that Respondent
Bedford-Nugent, and James L. Nugent, Jr., and James Nugent,
Sr., as individual Respondents, had not engaged in certain other
unfair labor practices alleged in the complaint and recommended
that such allegations be dismissed. He also found that Respondent
Evansville Materials, Inc., Henderson Materials, Inc., and Arnold
W. Mulzer, Roland P. Mulzer and Edgar C. Mulzer, a partnership,
d/b/a Mulzer Brothers, had not engaged in the unfair labor
practices alleged in the complaint and recommended that such
allegations be dismissed. Thereafter, Respondent Bedford-Nugent
and the General Counsel filed exceptions to the Trial Examiner's
Decision and supporting briefs, and Respondent Mulzer Brothers
filed a brief supporting the Trial Examiner's Decision.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board
has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-
member panel [Chairman McCulloch and Members Fanning and
Jenkins].
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner
made at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was com-
mitted. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has con-
151 NLRB No. 26.