Calgary Scientific Inc.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Nov 22, 2021

2020005587 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 22, 2021)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
15/285,851 10/05/2016 Kevin Douglas Viggers 10172-086US1 9530
96039 7590 11/22/2021
Meunier Carlin & Curfman LLC
999 Peachtree Street NE
Suite 1300
Atlanta, GA 30309
EXAMINER
JOSHI, SURAJ M
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2447
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
11/22/2021 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
docketing@mcciplaw.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte KEVIN DOUGLAS VIGGERS,
CHRISTIAN DOEHRING, JONATHAN CHARLES REARDON,
JACEK WIELEBNOWSKI, and DANIEL ANGELO PIGAT
___________

Appeal 2020-005587
Application 15/285,851
Technology Center 2400
____________

Before JEREMY J. CURCURI, JAMES B. ARPIN, and
PHILLIP A. BENNETT, Administrative Patent Judges.

ARPIN, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant1 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
decision rejecting claims 1–9 and 11–20, all of the pending claims. Final
Act. 2.2 Claim 10 is canceled. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.

1 “Appellant” refers to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42.
Appellant identifies the real party-in-interest as Calgary Scientific, Inc.
Appeal Br. 3.
2 In this Decision, we refer to Appellant’s Appeal Brief (“Appeal Br.,” filed
April 3, 2020); the Final Office Action (“Final Act.,” mailed September 6,
2019), the Advisory Action (“Adv. Act.,” mailed January 13, 2020), and the
Examiner’s Answer (“Ans.,” mailed May 27, 2020); and the Specification
(“Spec.,” filed October 5, 2016). Rather than repeat the Examiner’s findings
and Appellant’s contentions in their entirety, we refer to these documents.
Appeal 2020-005587
Application 15/285,851

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The claimed methods and media relate to “real-time, peer-to-peer
communication within a collaborative session. Within the session, content,
such as applications, multimedia, and other content is shared over a peer-to-
peer connection between a Source and a Target that are each associated with
a computing device.” Spec. ¶ 3.
As noted above, claims 1–9 and 11–20 are pending. Claims 1, 16, and
20 are independent. Appeal Br. 13 (claim 1), 16–17 (claim 16), 18–19
(claim 20) (Claims App.). Claims 2–9 and 11–15 depend directly or
indirectly from claim 1, and claims 17–19 depend directly or indirectly from
claim 16. Id. at 13–18.
Claims 1 and 8, reproduced below with disputed limitations
emphasized, are illustrative.
1. A method of selectively sharing content between a
source computing device and a target computing device,
comprising:
establishing a peer-to-peer connection between the source
computing device and the target computing device;
launching a first browser at the source computing device;
receiving a selection of the content within the first
browser;
broadcasting the content from the source computing
device to the target computing device over the peer-to-peer
connection using the first browser to make the content available
within a second browser at the target computing device; and
presenting a first independent view of the content at the
source computing device and a second independent view of the
content at the target computing device, wherein the first
independent view and the second independent view are
Appeal 2020-005587
Application 15/285,851

3

independently sized and positioned within the first browser and
the second browser, respectively.
Appeal Br. 13 (emphasis added).
8. The method of claim 1, further comprising:
capturing a first graphical layer displayed in the first
independent view or a second graphical layer displayed in the
second independent view using a capture tool provided at the
first browser or the second browser, respectively; and
saving the captured first graphical layer or second
graphical layer as an image file on the source computing device
or target computing device, respectively.
Id. at 14–15 (emphasis added). Each of independent claims 16 and 20
recites a limitation corresponding to the disputed limitation of claim 1. Id.
at 16, 18. Claim 18 depends directly from independent claim 16 and recites
a limitation corresponding to the disputed limitation of claim 8. Id. at 18.
REFERENCES AND REJECTIONS
The Examiner relies upon the following references:
Name3 Reference Published Filed
Nishiyama US 2009/0119602 A1 May 7, 2009 Oct. 13, 2008
Stephure B US 2013/0290408 A1 Oct. 31, 2013 Apr. 11, 2013
Stephure A US 2014/0053085 A1 Feb. 20, 2014 Aug. 15, 2013
Lieb US 2015/0039998 A1 Feb. 5, 2015 July 31, 2014
The Examiner rejects: (1) claims 1–7, 13, 16, and 20 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103 as obvious over the combined teachings of Stephure A, Stephure B,
and Nishiyama (Final Act. 3–8); and (2) claims 8, 9, 11, 12, 14, 15, and 17–

3 All reference citations are to the first named inventor only. Appellant and
the Examiner refer to “Stephure A” and “Stephure B” in their briefing; we
use this nomenclature in our decision.
Appeal 2020-005587
Application 15/285,851

4

19 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over the combined teachings of
Stephure A, Stephure B, Nishiyama, and Lieb (id. at 8–13).
We review the appealed rejections for error based upon the issues
identified by Appellant, and in light of the contentions and evidence
produced thereon. Ex parte Frye, 94 USPQ2d 1072, 1075 (BPAI 2010)
(precedential). The Examiner and Appellant focus their findings and
contentions on claims 1 and 8; so we do as well. See Appeal Br. 7, 10–11;
Ans. 4. Arguments not made are forfeited.4 Unless otherwise indicated, we
adopt the Examiner’s findings in the Final Office Action and the Answer as
our own and add any additional findings of fact for emphasis. We address
the rejections below.
ANALYSIS
A. Obviousness over Stephure A, Stephure B, and Nishiyama
As noted above, the Examiner rejects claims 1–7, 13, 16, and 20 as
obvious over the combined teachings of Stephure A, Stephure B, and
Nishiyama. Final Act. 3–8. With respect to claim 1, the Examiner finds
Stephure A teaches or suggests the majority of the limitations of claim 1. Id.
at 3 (citing Stephure A ¶¶ 3–5, 29, Fig. 1 (items 108–111)). Nevertheless,
the Examiner finds,
Stephure A does not explicitly disclose presenting a first
independent view of the content at the source computing device

4 See In re Google Tech. Holdings LLC, 980 F.3d 858, 863 (Fed. Cir. 2020)
(“Because Google failed to present these claim construction arguments to
the Board, Google forfeited both arguments.”); 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv)
(2019) (“Except as provided for in §§ 41.41, 41.47 and 41.52, any arguments
or authorities not included in the appeal brief will be refused consideration
by the Board for purposes of the present appeal.”).
Appeal 2020-005587
Application 15/285,851

5

and a second independent view of the content at the target
computing device, wherein the first independent view and the
second independent view are independently sized and positioned
within the first browser and the second browser, respectively.
Id. at 4.
The Examiner finds, however, Stephure B teaches or suggests this
missing limitation. Final Act. 4 (citing Stephure B ¶ 31, Fig. 3). In
particular, Stephure B discloses:
FIG. 3 illustrates an exemplary client user interface 800
having independently controlled views 802 and 806 and remoted
views 812 and [816]. . . . Any number of views displaying any
type of graphical component may be provided. The user
interface 800 may be created using MICROSOFT
SILVERLIGHT, ADOBE FLASH, HTML5, iOS, etc. The first
view 802 and the second view 806 may each correspond to an
instance of the View(s) 750 generated by the SDK 712 in the
application tier 740. Thus, using one or more Views 750, the
application 107A/107B may be broken into separate,
independently controlled areas within the user interface 800.
Stephure B ¶ 31. Thus, Stephure B teaches or suggests presenting
independent views within browsers of a source computing device and a
target computing device. Further, the Examiner finds a person of ordinary
skill in the relevant art would have had reason to combine the teachings of
Stephure A and Stephure B “in order to provide remote access.” Final
Act. 4.
Nevertheless, the Examiner also finds, “Stephure A and Stephure B do
not explicitly disclose the connection being a peer-to-peer connection and
broadcasting the content from the source computing device to the target
computing device over the peer-to-peer connection using the first browser.”
Final Act. 4. The Examiner finds, however, “Nishiyama does [teach] the
connection being a peer-to-peer connection and broadcasting the content
Appeal 2020-005587
Application 15/285,851

6

from the source computing device to the target computing device over the
peer-to-peer connection using the first browser . . . in order to provide a
web-screen sharing system.” Id. (quotations omitted, citing Nishiyama
¶¶ 17, 26). Further, the Examiner finds a person of ordinary skill in the
relevant art would have had reason to combine the teachings of Nishiyama
with those of Stephure A and Stephure B “in order to provide a web-screen
sharing system” and, thereby, to achieve the methods of claim 1. Id. at 5.
Appellant does not challenge the Examiner’s findings regarding the
teachings of Stephure A, Stephure B, and Nishiyama. See Appeal Br. 7–8.
Appellant contends, however, that the Examiner errs because “Nishiyama
cannot be properly combined with either Stephure A or Stephure B as one of
ordinary skill would not be motivated to do so.” Id. at 8. Moreover, in the
absence of a reason to combine the teachings of Nishiyama with those of
Stephure A and Stephure B, Appellant contends “the only motivation to
combine the references, as proposed by the Examiner, is in Appellant’s own
specification.” Id. at 9. Thus, Appellant contends the Examiner relies on
improper hindsight in combining the references’ teachings. Id. Appellant’s
contentions do not persuade us of Examiner error.
With regard to the reason for combining the teachings of Nishiyama
with those of Stephure A and Stephure B, Appellant notes that
“modifications or combinations of the prior art that change the principle of
operation of the prior art invention being modified are not sufficient to
render the claims prima facie obvious.” Appeal Br. 8 (citing In re Ratti, 270
F.2d 810, 813 (CCPA 1959)). First, Appellant contends, “both Stephure A
and Stephure B teach a client/server arrangement.” Id.; see, e.g.,
Appeal 2020-005587
Application 15/285,851

7

Stephure A, Fig. 1 (depicting “Remote Access Server 104”). Second,
Appellant contends:
The Examiner’s proposed combination requires a modification
of Stephure A’s and Stephure B’s . . . client/server operation such
that the remote access server is effectively removed. However,
without this component of the Stephure A and Stephure B
infrastructure, there is no mechanism to communicate requests
and responses between the client devices as they are only
connected by server components.
Appeal Br. 8–9 (emphasis added). Thus, because Stephure A and B employ
a client/server infrastructure and because the proposed combination of
Nishiyama’s teachings of peer-to-peer connection with those of Stephure A
and Stephure B allegedly would remove the server from the infrastructure,
Appellant contends the combination would change the principle of operation
of Stephure A and B. Id. at 9.
The Examiner responds:
Appellants, argue there would be no motivation to combine
Nishiyama with Stephure A & Stephure B, since the latter prior
arts establish their connection using a client/server model.
However, as seen in Nishiyama, the [peer-to-peer (P2P)]
connection is established initially using a mediation server
(server in a client/server mode), which then mediates a P2P
connection, “The mediation server 300 mediates a P2P (Peer to
Peer) connection between the transmission terminal 100 and the
receiving terminal 200. Thus, the mediation server 300 may be
an SIP (Session Initiation Protocol) server” ([Nishiyama ¶ 26]).
The mediation server of Nishiyama acts as the remote access
servers in Stephure A & Stephure B, but provides the further
ability to establish P2P connections.
Ans. 3 (emphases added); see Adv. Act. 2 (“Nishiyama further teaches a
system for collaborative web-screen sharing, (abstract), but more
specifically uses a mediation server to mediate a P2P connection between
Appeal 2020-005587
Application 15/285,851

8

the sharing terminals (Paragraph 26), which would enable the systems of
Stephure A & B to utilize a P2P connection through the remote access server
(mediation server).”). Thus, the Examiner finds that because Nishiyama
uses a mediation server that may function as Stephure A’s remote access
server, combining the teachings of Nishiyama with those of Stephure A and
Stephure B would not change the principle of operation Stephure A and B.5
We agree with the Examiner.
In addition, the Examiner finds that “[t]he claim limitations do not
state how the P2P connection is established, as the claimed language in
Claim 1 merely states, ‘establishing a peer-to-peer connection between the
source computing device and the target computing device.’” Ans. 4 (quoting
the disputed limitation of claim 1); see Spec. ¶ 24 (“In some
implementations, the communication connection 120 may be provided as a
peer-to-peer connection, or a proxy connection through an intermediate
computing device (e.g., a proxy server). It should be understood that the
environment 100A is provided only as an example environment and that the
environment 100A can include more or less components than as shown in
FIG. 1.”). Thus, the Examiner finds the claim language is broad enough to
encompass the client/server infrastructure teachings of Stephure A and B in
combination with Nishiyama’s teachings of a peer-to-peer connection. Id.;
see In re Mouttet, 686 F.3d 1322, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (citing In re
Umbarger, 407 F.2d 425, 430–31 (CCPA 1969) (finding Ratti inapplicable
where the modified apparatus will operate “on the same principles as
before”)). On this record, we agree with the Examiner.

5 Appellant does not file a Reply Brief challenging this response.
Appeal 2020-005587
Application 15/285,851

9

We determine the Examiner’s reasons to have combined the teachings
of Stephure A, Stephure B, and Nishiyama are proper. Ans. 3–4; see In re
McLaughlin, 443 F.2d 1392, 1395, (CCPA 1971) (discussing proper
reconstruction). Thus, we are not persuaded the Examiner errs in rejecting
independent claim 1 as obvious over the combined teachings of Stephure A,
Stephure B, and Nishiyama, and we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of that
claim. Appellant does not challenge the rejection of claim 2–7, 13, 16, or 20
separately from the challenge to claim 1. Appeal Br. 12–13; see Ans. 13.
Consequently, we also sustain the rejection of those claims.
B. Obviousness over Stephure A, Stephure B, Nishiyama, and Lieb
As noted above, the Examiner also rejects claims 8, 9, 11, 12, 14, 15,
and 17–19 as obvious over the combined teachings of Stephure A, Stephure
B, Nishiyama, and Lieb. Final Act. 8–13. With respect to these claims,
Appellant notes,
Stephure A, Stephure B and Nishiyama do not explicitly disclose
capturing a first graphical layer displayed in a first independent
view or a second graphical layer displayed in a second
independent view using a capture tool. The Examiner asserted
that Lieb teaches a capture tool, as recited in the claims in
paragraphs [0015] and [0027].
Appeal Br. 10; see Final Act. 9.
Moreover, Appellant contends:
With regard to Lieb, Appellant notes that Lieb teaches that “the
web browser 164 is designed to enable browser-to-browser
applications for voice calling, video chat, and peer-to-peer (P2P)
file sharing without plugins.” See, Lieb at paragraph [0032]
(emphasis added). These are ancillary services, whereas
Appellant’s invention uses the browser to broadcast shared
content over the peer-to-peer connection. Yet further, Lieb fails
Appeal 2020-005587
Application 15/285,851

10

to teach or suggest a capture tool that operates according to the
claims of the instant invention.
Appeal Br. 10–11 (emphasis added).
The Examiner responds:
Here, Lieb, clearly teaches the capturing of a screen of a first
independent view (presenter’s screen image) and is displayed in
a second independent view (viewers who access the provided
view URL). Furthermore, there is motivation to combine prior
art Lieb with the former prior arts, as Lieb also teaches
facilitating screen sharing and thus enabling collaborative
browsing (Paragraph 4, Lieb).
Ans. 5 (citing Lieb ¶¶ 15, 27). Specifically, Lieb discloses:
In a particular example, a screen sharing webpage containing a
sharing applet or an embedded applet 162 (e.g., a Java applet) is
to be loaded in the web browser 161 running on the presenter
device 160. The applet 162 contains the software code that can
capture screenshots of the presenter’s screen and upload the
screenshots to the screen sharing servers 140, so that screens
can be shared with viewers who access the provided viewer URL.
Lieb ¶ 27 (emphasis added). Thus, Lieb teaches or suggests that images
may be captured and stored using a capture tool provided at a browser, as
recited in claim 8.6 Again, we agree with the Examiner.
Appellant’s contention that Lieb’s capture tool does not operate
according to rejected claim 8 is not persuasive. Initially, we note that the
claim broadly recites a capture tool capturing graphical layers as image files.
Appeal Br. 14–15 (Claims App.); see Spec. ¶¶ 27–28. Moreover,
obviousness does not require the bodily incorporation of the teachings of one
reference into another reference—an ordinary artisan has the capacity for
ordinary creativity when combining references. Allied Erecting &

6 See supra note 5.
Appeal 2020-005587
Application 15/285,851

11

Dismantling Co. v. Genesis Attachments, LLC, 825 F.3d 1373, 1381 (Fed.
Cir. 2016) (quoting In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425 (CCPA 1981)); see also
KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 421 (2007) (“A person of
ordinary skill is also a person of ordinary creativity, not an automaton.”).”
Finally, the Examiner’s rejection is based on the combined teachings of
Stephure A, Stephure B, Nishiyama, and Lieb. Appellant cannot show
nonobviousness by attacking Lieb individually when the rejection is based
on the references’ combined teachings. See In re Merck & Co., Inc., 800
F.2d 1091, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1986); In re Keller, 642 F.2d at 426.
Consequently, we are persuaded the Examiner adequately shows a person of
ordinary skill in the relevant art would have had reason to combine the
teachings of Stephure A, Stephure B, Nishiyama, and Lieb to achieve the
methods of claim 8, as well as of claims 9, 14, 18, and 19, which also recite
a “capture tool” or the step of “capturing.” See Appeal Br. 15–17 (Claims
App.). Therefore, we sustain the rejection of those claims.
The Examiner relies on other teachings of Lieb in combination with
those of Stephure A, Stephure B, and Nishiyama to render claims 11, 12, 15,
and 17 obvious. Appellant does not challenge the rejection of claims 11, 12,
15, and 17 separately from the challenge to their base claim, claim 1 or 16.
Appeal Br. 11. Consequently, because we are not persuaded the Examiner
errs in rejecting claims 1 and 16 (see supra Section A), we also are not
persuaded the Examiner errs in rejecting claims 11, 12, 15, and 17 as
obvious over the combined teachings of Stephure A, Stephure B, Nishiyama,
and Lieb; and we sustain that rejection.
Appeal 2020-005587
Application 15/285,851

12

DECISION
1. The Examiner does not err in rejecting:
a. claims 1–7, 13, 16, and 20 as obvious over the combined
teachings of Stephure A, Stephure B, and Nishiyama; and
b. claims 8, 9, 11, 12, 14, 15, and 17–19 as obvious over the
combined teachings of Stephure A, Stephure B, Nishiyama, and
Lieb.
2. Thus, on this record, claims 1–9 and 11–20 are not patentable.
CONCLUSION
We affirm the Examiner’s rejections of claims 1–9 and 11–20.
In summary:
Claim(s)
Rejected
35 U.S.C.
§
Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–7, 13, 16, 20 103 Stephure A,
Stephure B,
Nishiyama
1–7, 13, 16,
20

8, 9, 11, 12, 14,
15, 17–19
103 Stephure A,
Stephure B,
Nishiyama, Lieb
8, 9, 11, 12,
14, 15, 17–19

Overall
Outcome
1–9, 11–20
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED