BRISTOL FARMS

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jul 6, 2016

364 NLRB No. 34 (N.L.R.B. 2016)

364 NLRB No. 34
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
bound volumes of NLRB decisions. Readers are requested to notify the Ex-
ecutive Secretary, National Labor Relations Board, Washington, D.C.
20570, of any typographical or other formal errors so that corrections can
be included in the bound volumes.
Bristol Farms and Konny Renteria. Case 21–CA–
103030
July 6, 2016
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN PEARCE AND MEMBERS MISCIMARRA
AND MCFERRAN
On October 17, 2014, Administrative Law Judge Lisa
Thompson issued the attached decision. The General
Counsel filed limited exceptions and a supporting brief,
and the Respondent filed an answering brief. The Re-
spondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief, the
General Counsel filed an answering brief, and the Re-
spondent filed a reply brief.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The judge found, applying the Board’s decision in D.
R. Horton, 357 NLRB 2277 (2012), enf. denied in rele-
vant part, 737 F.3d 344 (5th Cir. 2013), that the Re-
spondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by maintain-
ing and enforcing an arbitration agreement that requires
employees, as a condition of employment, to waive their
rights to pursue class or collective actions involving em-
ployment-related claims in all forums, whether arbitral or
judicial.1 In Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 361 NLRB No. 72
(2014), enf. denied in relevant part, 808 F.3d 1013 (5th
Cir. 2015), the Board reaffirmed the relevant holdings of
D. R. Horton, supra. The judge also found, relying on
Lafayette Park Hotel, 326 NLRB 824 (1998), enfd. 203
F.3d 52 (D.C. Cir. 1999), and Cintas Corp. v. NLRB, 482
F.3d 463 (D.C. Cir. 2007), that maintaining the Agree-
ment violated Section 8(a)(1) because employees reason-
ably would believe that it bars or restricts their right to
file unfair labor practice charges with the Board.
The Board has considered the decision and the record
in light of the exceptions and briefs2 and, based on the
judge’s application of D. R. Horton and on our subse-
quent decision in Murphy Oil, has decided to affirm the
judge’s findings and conclusions,3 and adopt the recom-
mended Order as modified and set forth in full below.4

1 See also Lewis v. Epic Systems, ___ F.3d ___ (7th Cir. May 26,
2016) (holding mandatory individual arbitration agreement that did not
permit collective action in any forum violates the Act and is also unen-
forceable under the Federal Arbitration Act, 19 U.S.C. §§1, et seq.).
2 The Respondent has requested oral argument. The request is de-
nied as the record and briefs adequately present the issues and the posi-
tions of the parties.
3 In rejecting the Respondent’s argument that the complaint was not
validly issued because the Board lacked a quorum at the time it ap-

proved the appointment of Olivia Garcia as Regional Director for Re-
gion 21, we rely on Covenant Care California, LLC, 363 NLRB No.
80, slip op. at 1 fn. 2 (2015) (Although Director Garcia’s appointment
was announced on January 6, 2012, the Board approved her appoint-
ment on December 22, 2011, at which time it had a valid quorum).
The Respondent contends that the arbitration agreement is silent on
the matter of class or collective arbitration, and therefore would not be
read to restrict collective activity under the test set forth in Lutheran
Heritage Village-Livonia, 343 NLRB 646, 647 (2004). Nevertheless,
we agree with the judge that the Respondent has applied the agreement
to restrict Sec. 7 rights under the third prong of Lutheran Heritage by
filing a motion to compel individual arbitration of the Charging Party’s
class-wide claims, and is thus unlawful. See Countrywide Financial
Corp., 362 NLRB No. 165, slip op. at 3–5 (2015); Leslie’s Poolmart,
Inc., 362 NLRB No. 184, slip op. at 1 fn. 3 (2015); Philmar Care, LLC,
d/b/a San Fernando Post Acute Hospital, 363 NLRB No. 57, slip op. at
1 (2015).
For the reasons stated by the judge, we agree that employees reason-
ably would construe the Agreement to restrict their access to the
Board’s processes. See U-Haul Co. of California, 347 NLRB 375,
377–378 (2006), enfd. 255 Fed. Appx. 527 (D.C. Cir. 2007); Chesa-
peake Energy Corp., 362 NLRB No. 80, slip op. at 2 (2015), enfd. in
relevant part 633 Fed. Appx. 613 (5th Cir. Feb. 12, 2016); SolarCity
Corporation, 363 NLRB No. 83, slip op. at 4–6 (2015). In his partial
dissent, our colleague repeats his argument that an individual arbitra-
tion agreement lawfully may require the arbitration of unfair labor
practice claims if the agreement reserves to employees the right to file
charges with the Board. As explained in Ralph’s Grocery Co., 363
NLRB No. 128, slip op. at 3 (2016), that argument is at odds with well-
established Board law.
The Respondent has also excepted to the judge’s finding that the
Agreement was a mandatory condition of employment for Charging
Party Konny Renteria and other employees, contending that its arbitra-
tion agreement is voluntary and therefore does not fall within the pro-
scriptions of Murphy Oil and D. R. Horton, supra. See D. R. Horton,
slip op. at 13 fn. 28. We agree with the judge that the Agreement was
imposed on Renteria as a condition of employment, as Renteria’s job
application stated that any offer of employment was conditioned on her
agreeing to enter into the Agreement. The dissent asserts that “[t]he
Agreement was voluntarily signed by Renteria, even though, at the
time, the Respondent was willing to hire employees or continue their
employment only if they entered into the Agreement.” Whether or not
the Agreement could be described as voluntary in some sense is irrele-
vant for purposes of Board law. The agreement was a mandatory con-
dition of employment, as our colleague acknowledges, and thus falls
under D. R. Horton. In any event, the Board holds that an arbitration
agreement that, as applied, precludes collective action in all forums is
unlawful even if not a mandatory condition of employment, because it
requires employees to prospectively waive their Sec. 7 right to engage
in concerted activity. See Haynes Building Services, 363 NLRB No.
125, slip op. at 3 fn. 12 (2016); Bristol Farms, 363 NLRB No. 45
(2015); On Assignment Staffing Services, 362 NLRB No. 189, slip op.
at 1, 5–8 (2015), enf. denied No. 15-60642 (5th Cir. June 6, 2016).
Our dissenting colleague, relying on his dissenting position in Mur-
phy Oil, 361 NLRB No. 72, slip op. at 22–35 (2014), would find that
the Respondent’s Agreement does not violate Sec. 8(a)(1). He observes
that the Act does not “dictate” any particular procedures for the litiga-
tion of non-NLRA claims, and “creates no substantive right for em-
ployees to insist on class-type treatment” of such claims. This is all
surely correct, as the Board has previously explained in Murphy Oil,
above, slip op. at 2, and Bristol Farms, 363 NLRB No. 45, slip op. at 2
& fn. 2 (2015). But what our colleague ignores is that the Act “does
create a right to pursue joint, class, or collective claims if and as avail-
able, without the interference of an employer-imposed restraint.” Mur-
2 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board orders that the
Respondent, Bristol Farms, Los Angeles, California, its
officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Maintaining an arbitration agreement that employ-
ees reasonably would believe bars or restricts the right to
file charges with the National Labor Relations Board.
(b) Maintaining and/or enforcing an arbitration agree-
ment that requires employees to waive the right to main-

phy Oil, above, slip op. at 2 (emphasis in original). The Respondent’s
Agreement is just such an unlawful restraint.
Likewise, for the reasons explained in Murphy Oil and Bristol
Farms, there is no merit to our colleague’s view that finding the
Agreement unlawful runs afoul of employees’ Sec. 7 right to “refrain
from” engaging in protected concerted activity. See Murphy Oil,
above, slip op. at 18; Bristol Farms, above, slip op. at 2. Nor is he
correct in insisting that Sec. 9(a) of the Act requires the Board to permit
individual employees to prospectively waive their Sec. 7 right to en-
gage in concerted legal activity. See Murphy Oil, above, slip op. at 17–
18; Bristol Farms, above, slip op. at 2.
Further, we reject the position of the Respondent and our dissenting
colleague that the Respondent’s motion to compel arbitration was pro-
tected by the First Amendment’s Petition Clause. In Bill Johnson’s
Restaurants v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731 (1983), the Court identified two
situations in which a lawsuit enjoys no such protection: where the ac-
tion is beyond a State court’s jurisdiction because of Federal preemp-
tion, and where “a suit . . . has an objective that is illegal under federal
law.” 461 U.S. at 737 fn. 5. Thus, the Board may properly restrain
litigation efforts such as the Respondent’s motion to compel arbitration
that have the illegal objective of limiting employees’ Sec. 7 rights and
enforcing an unlawful contractual provision, even if the litigation was
otherwise meritorious or reasonable. See Murphy Oil, supra, slip op. at
20–21; Convergys Corp., 363 NLRB No. 51, slip op. at 2 fn. 5 (2015).
4 Consistent with our decision in Murphy Oil, supra, at 21, and the
General Counsel’s exceptions, we shall order the Respondent to reim-
burse Konny Renteria and any other plaintiffs for all reasonable ex-
penses and legal fees, with interest, that they incurred in opposing the
Respondent’s unlawful motion in the Superior Court of California, City
of Los Angeles, to compel arbitration of their class or collective claims.
See Bill Johnson’s Restaurants v. NLRB, 461 U.S. at 747 (“If a viola-
tion is found, the Board may order the employer to reimburse the em-
ployees whom he had wrongfully sued for their attorneys’ fees and
other expenses” as well as “any other proper relief that would effectu-
ate the policies of the Act.”). Interest shall be computed in the manner
prescribed in New Horizons, 283 NLRB 1173 (1987), compounded
daily as prescribed in Kentucky River Medical Center, 356 NLRB 6
(2010). See Teamsters Local 776 (Rite Aid), 305 NLRB 832, 835 fn.
10 (1991) (“[I]n make-whole orders for suits maintained in violation of
the Act, it is appropriate and necessary to award interest on litigation
expenses”), enfd. 973 F.2d 230 (3d Cir. 1992).
We shall also amend the judge’s remedy to order the Respondent to
notify the Superior Court of California, City of Los Angeles, in Case
No. BC491186, that it has rescinded or revised the arbitration agree-
ment and to inform the court that it no longer opposes Renteria’s law-
suit on the basis of the arbitration agreement.
Finally, we shall modify the judge’s recommended Order to conform
to the amended remedy and to the Board’s standard remedial language,
and we shall substitute a new notice to conform to the Order as modi-
fied.
tain employment-related class or collective actions in all
forums, whether arbitral or judicial.
(c) In any like or related manner interfering with, re-
straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of rights
guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Rescind the arbitration agreement in all of its
forms, or revise it in all of its forms to make clear to em-
ployees that the arbitration agreement does not constitute
a waiver of their right to maintain employment-related
joint, class, or collective actions in all forums, and that it
does not bar or restrict employees’ right to file charges
with the National Labor Relations Board.
(b) Notify all current and former employees who were
required to sign or otherwise become bound to the arbi-
tration agreement in any form that it has been rescinded
or revised and, if revised, provide them a copy of the
revised agreement, and further notify them that the
agreement will not be enforced in a manner that compels
them to waive their right to maintain employment-related
joint, class or collective actions in all forums.
(c) Notify the Superior Court of California, City of Los
Angeles, in Case No. BC491186, that it has rescinded or
revised the arbitration agreement upon which it based its
motion to dismiss Konny Renteria’s collective lawsuit
and compel individual arbitration of her claims, and in-
form the court that it no longer opposes the lawsuit on
the basis of the agreement.
(d) In the manner set forth in this decision, reimburse
Konny Renteria and any other plaintiffs in Case No.
BC491186 for any reasonable attorneys’ fees and litiga-
tion expenses that they may have incurred in opposing
the Respondent’s motion dismiss the collective lawsuit
and compel individual arbitration.
(e) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at
its Carson, California copies of the attached notice
marked “Appendix A” and at all other facilities where
the unlawful agreement is or has been if effect, copies of
the attached notice marked “Appendix B.”5 Copies of
the notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director
for Region 21, after being signed by the Respondent’s
authorized representative, shall be posted by the Re-
spondent and maintained for 60 consecutive days in con-
spicuous places, including all places where notices to
employees are customarily posted. In addition to physi-
cal posting of paper notices, the notices shall be distrib-

5 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notices reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”
BRISTOL FARMS 3
uted electronically, such as by email, posting on an intra-
net or an internet site, and/or other electronic means, if
the Respondent customarily communicates with its em-
ployees by such means. Reasonable steps shall be taken
by the Respondent to ensure that the notices are not al-
tered, defaced, or covered by any other material. If the
Respondent has gone out of business or closed the facili-
ty involved in these proceedings, the Respondent shall
duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a copy of the no-
tice marked “Appendix A” to all current employees and
former employees employed by the Respondent at any
time since October 17, 2012, and any current or former
employees against whom the Respondent has enforced
its mandatory arbitration agreement since October 17,
2012. If the Respondent has gone out of business or
closed any facilities other than the one involved in these
proceedings, the Respondent shall duplicate and mail, at
its own expense, a copy of the notice marked “Appendix
B” to all current employees and former employees em-
ployed by the Respondent at those facilities at any time
since October 17, 2012.
(f) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file
with the Regional Director for Region 21 a sworn certifi-
cation of a responsible official on a form provided by the
Region attesting to the steps that the Respondent has
taken to comply.
Dated, Washington, D.C. July 6, 2016
______________________________________
Mark Gaston Pearce, Chairman
______________________________________
Lauren McFerran, Member
(SEAL) NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
MEMBER MISCIMARRA, concurring in part and dissenting
in part.
In this case, my colleagues find that the Respondent’s
Mutual Agreement to Arbitrate (Agreement) violates
Section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act (the
Act or NLRA) because the Agreement waives the right
to participate in class or collective actions regarding non-
NLRA employment claims.1 Konny Renteria signed the

1 I agree with my colleagues that Regional Director Garcia was ap-
pointed by a Board that had a valid quorum and that the complaint in
this case was validly issued. However, I believe this case should have
been disposed of last year, when the Respondent proposed a settlement
agreement that included implementing a revised arbitration agreement.
Agreement, and later she filed a class action lawsuit
against the Respondent in state court alleging wage-and-
hour and other violations under the California Labor
Code and California Industrial Welfare Commission
Wage Orders. In reliance on the Agreement, the Re-
spondent filed a motion to dismiss Renteria’s class-wide
claims and compel individual arbitration, and the court
granted the motion. My colleagues find that the Re-
spondent thereby unlawfully enforced its Agreement. I
respectfully dissent from these findings for the reasons
explained in my partial dissenting opinion in Murphy Oil
USA, Inc.2 For the reasons stated below, however, I con-
cur in finding that the Agreement violates Section 8(a)(1)
on the basis that it unlawfully interferes with NLRB
charge filing.
1. Alleged Interference with Class Action Participa-
tion. I agree that an employee may engage in “concert-
ed” activities for “mutual aid or protection” in relation to
a claim asserted under a statute other than NLRA.3
However, Section 8(a)(1) of the Act does not vest author-
ity in the Board to dictate any particular procedures per-
taining to the litigation of non-NLRA claims, nor does
the Act render unlawful agreements in which employees
waive class-type treatment of non-NLRA claims. To the
contrary, as discussed in my partial dissenting opinion in
Murphy Oil, NLRA Section 9(a) protects the right of
every employee as an “individual” to “present” and “ad-
just” grievances “at any time.”4 This aspect of Section

The revised arbitration agreement included, among other things, lan-
guage that made signing the arbitration agreement entirely optional.
Nonetheless, my colleagues rejected the Respondent’s proposed settle-
ment agreement. See Bristol Farms, 363 NLRB No. 45, slip op. at 1–2
(2015). I would have approved it. Id., slip op. at 2–4 (Member
Miscimarra, dissenting).
2 361 NLRB No. 72, slip op. at 22–35 (2014) (Member Miscimarra,
dissenting in part). The Board majority’s holding in Murphy Oil inval-
idating class-action waiver agreements was denied enforcement by the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. Murphy Oil USA, Inc. v. NLRB,
808 F.3d 1013 (5th Cir. 2015).
3 I agree that non-NLRA claims can give rise to “concerted” activi-
ties engaged in by two or more employees for the “purpose” of “mutual
aid or protection,” which would come within the protection of NLRA
Sec. 7. See Murphy Oil, 361 NLRB No. 72, slip op. at 23–25 (Member
Miscimarra, dissenting in part). However, the existence or absence of
Sec. 7 protection does not depend on whether non-NLRA claims are
pursued as a class or collective action, but on whether Sec. 7’s statutory
requirements are met—an issue separate and distinct from whether an
individual employee chooses to pursue a claim as a class or collective
action. Id.; see also Beyoglu, 362 NLRB No. 152, slip op. at 4–5
(2015) (Member Miscimarra, dissenting).
4 Murphy Oil, above, slip op. at 30–34 (Member Miscimarra, dis-
senting in part). Sec. 9(a) states: “Representatives designated or select-
ed for the purposes of collective bargaining by the majority of the em-
ployees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the exclusive
representatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of
collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of em-
ployment, or other conditions of employment: Provided, That any indi-
4 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
9(a) is reinforced by Section 7 of the Act, which protects
each employee’s right to “refrain from” exercising the
collective rights enumerated in Section 7. Thus, I be-
lieve it is clear that (i) the NLRA creates no substantive
right for employees to insist on class-type treatment of
non-NLRA claims;5 (ii) a class-waiver agreement per-
taining to non-NLRA claims does not infringe on any
NLRA rights or obligations, which has prompted the
overwhelming majority of courts to reject the Board’s
position regarding class-waiver agreements;6 and (iii)
enforcement of a class-action waiver as part of an arbitra-
tion agreement is also warranted by the Federal Arbitra-
tion Act (FAA).7 Although questions may arise regard-
ing the enforceability of particular agreements that waive
class or collective litigation of non-NLRA claims, I be-

vidual employee or a group of employees shall have the right at any
time to present grievances to their employer and to have such griev-
ances adjusted, without the intervention of the bargaining representa-
tive, as long as the adjustment is not inconsistent with the terms of a
collective-bargaining contract or agreement then in effect: Provided
further, That the bargaining representative has been given opportunity
to be present at such adjustment” (emphasis added). The Act’s legisla-
tive history shows that Congress intended to preserve every individual
employee’s right to “adjust” any employment-related dispute with his
or her employer. See Murphy Oil, above, slip op. at 31–32 (Member
Miscimarra, dissenting in part).
5 When courts have jurisdiction over non-NLRA claims that are po-
tentially subject to class treatment, the availability of class-type proce-
dures does not rise to the level of a substantive right. See D. R. Horton,
Inc. v. NLRB, 737 F.3d 344, 362 (5th Cir. 2013) (“The use of class
action procedures . . . is not a substantive right.”) (citations omitted),
petition for rehearing en banc denied No. 12–60031 (5th Cir. 2014);
Deposit Guaranty National Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 332 (1980)
(“[T]he right of a litigant to employ Rule 23 is a procedural right only,
ancillary to the litigation of substantive claims.”).
6 The Fifth Circuit has repeatedly denied enforcement of Board or-
ders invalidating mandatory arbitration agreements that waived class-
type treatment of non-NLRA claims. See, e.g., Murphy Oil, Inc., USA
v. NLRB, above; D. R. Horton, Inc. v. NLRB, above. The overwhelm-
ing majority of courts considering the Board’s position have likewise
rejected it. See Murphy Oil, above, slip op. at 34 (Member Miscimarra,
dissenting in part); id., slip op. at 36 fn. 5 (Member Johnson, dissent-
ing) (collecting cases); see also Patterson v. Raymours Furniture Co.,
Inc., 96 F. Supp. 3d 71 (S.D.N.Y. 2015); Nanavati v. Adecco USA, Inc.,
99 F. Supp. 3d 1072 (N.D. Cal. 2015), motion to certify for interlocuto-
ry appeal denied 2015 WL 4035072 (N.D. Cal. June 30, 2015); Brown
v. Citicorp Credit Services, Inc., No. 1:12-cv-00062-BLW, 2015 WL
1401604 (D. Idaho Mar. 25, 2015) (granting reconsideration of prior
determination that class waiver in arbitration agreement violated
NLRA); Bell v. Ryan Transportation Service, Inc., No. 15-9857-JWL,
2016 WL 1298083 (D. Kan. Mar. 31, 2016); but see Lewis v. Epic
Systems Corp., No. 15-2997, 2016 WL 3029464 (7th Cir. May 26,
2016); Totten v. Kellogg Brown & Root, LLC, No. ED CV 14-1766
DMG (DTBx), 2016 WL 316019 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 2016).
7 For the reasons expressed in my Murphy Oil partial dissent and
those thoroughly explained in former Member Johnson’s dissent in
Murphy Oil, the FAA requires that the arbitration agreement be en-
forced according to its terms. Murphy Oil, above, slip op. at 34 (Mem-
ber Miscimarra, dissenting in part); id., slip op. at 49–58 (Member
Johnson, dissenting).
lieve these questions are exclusively within the province
of the court or other tribunal that, unlike the NLRB, has
jurisdiction over such claims.8
Because I believe the Respondent’s Agreement was
lawful under the NLRA, I would find it was similarly
lawful for the Respondent to file a motion in state court
seeking to enforce the Agreement.9 It is relevant that the
state court that had jurisdiction over the non-NLRA
claims granted the Respondent’s motion to compel arbi-
tration. That the Respondent’s motion was reasonably
based is also supported by court decisions that have en-

8 The Agreement was voluntarily signed by Renteria, even though, at
the time, the Respondent was willing to hire employees or continue
their employment only if they entered into the Agreement. For my
colleagues, however, the voluntariness of a class-action waiver is im-
material. See On Assignment Staffing Services, 362 NLRB No. 189
(2015) (finding class-action waiver agreement unlawful even where
employees are free to opt out of the agreement), revd. No. 15-60642
(5th Cir. June 6, 2016) (per curiam); Bristol Farms, above (finding
class-action waiver agreement unlawful even where employees must
affirmatively opt in before they will be covered by a class-action waiv-
er agreement, and where they are free to decline to do so). I disagree.
By definition, every agreement sets forth terms upon which each party
may insist as a condition to entering into the relationship governed by
the agreement. Thus, conditioning employment on the execution of a
class-action waiver does not make it involuntary. However, the
Board’s position is even less defensible when the Board finds that
NLRA “protection” operates in reverse—not to protect employees’
rights to engage or refrain from engaging in certain kinds of collective
action, but to divest employees of those rights by denying them the
right to choose whether to be covered by an agreement to litigate non-
NLRA claims on an individual basis. See Bristol Farms, above, slip
op. at 2–4 (Member Miscimarra, dissenting).
9 The Agreement is silent as to whether arbitration may be conducted
on a class or collective basis. For the reasons stated in former Member
Johnson’s dissent in Countrywide Financial Corp., 362 NLRB No. 165,
slip op. at 8–10 (2015), and in my dissent in Philmar Care, LLC, 363
NLRB No. 57, slip op. at 4 fn. 11 (2015), finding that the Respondent’s
efforts to compel individual arbitration violated the Act is in conflict
with the FAA and Supreme Court precedent construing that statute.
The Court has held that a “party may not be compelled under the FAA
to submit to class arbitration unless there is a contractual basis for
concluding that the party agreed to do so.” Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. Animal
Feeds International Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 684–685 (2010) (emphasis in
original). Obviously, where an arbitration agreement is silent regarding
class arbitration, there is no such contractual basis. Thus, Respondent’s
motion to compel individual arbitration “was well-founded in the FAA
as authoritatively interpreted by the Supreme Court.” Philmar Care,
LLC, above (Member Miscimarra, dissenting).
As I explain below, I concur in my colleagues’ finding that the
Agreement unlawfully interfered with the right of employees to allege a
violation of the NLRA through the filing of an unfair labor practice
charge with the NLRB. However, the unlawfulness of the Agreement
in this regard is not material to the merits of the Respondent’s state
court petition to compel the Charging Party to arbitrate her non-NLRA
claims. See Fuji Food Products, Inc., 363 NLRB No. 118, slip op. at 4,
4–5 fn. 13 (2016) (Member Miscimarra, concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part) (finding that employer lawfully enforced class-waiver
agreement by filing motion to compel arbitration of non-NLRA claims,
notwithstanding additional finding that agreement unlawfully interfered
with Board charge filing).
BRISTOL FARMS 5
forced similar agreements.10 As the Fifth Circuit ob-
served after rejecting (for the second time) the Board’s
position regarding the legality of class-waiver agree-
ments: “[I]t is a bit bold for [the Board] to hold that an
employer who followed the reasoning of our D. R. Hor-
ton decision had no basis in fact or law or an ‘illegal ob-
jective’ in doing so. The Board might want to strike a
more respectful balance between its views and those of
circuit courts reviewing its orders.”11 I also believe that
any Board finding of a violation based on the Respond-
ent’s meritorious state court motion to compel arbitration
would improperly risk infringing on the Respondent’s
rights under the First Amendment’s Petition Clause. See
Bill Johnson’s Restaurants v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731
(1983); BE & K Construction Co. v. NLRB, 536 U.S. 516
(2002); see also my partial dissent in Murphy Oil, above,
361 NLRB No. 72, slip op. at 33–35. Finally, for similar
reasons, I believe the Board cannot properly require the
Respondent to reimburse the Charging Party and any
other plaintiffs for their attorneys’ fees in the circum-
stances presented here. Murphy Oil, above, 361 NLRB
No. 72, slip op. at 35.
2. Alleged Interference with NLRB Charge Filing.
For the following reasons, however, I concur in my col-
leagues’ finding that the Agreement unlawfully interferes
with NLRB charge filing in violation of NLRA Section
8(a)(1). In pertinent part, the Agreement requires em-
ployees to resolve by arbitration “any dispute between
[the employee] and [the Respondent], except for claims
for Workers’ Compensation, Unemployment Compensa-
tion, or any other claim that is non-arbitrable under ap-
plicable state or federal law.” The Agreement further
states that “except for the claims carved out above,” it
covers “all . . . statutory claims.”
For the reasons stated in my separate opinion in The
Rose Group d/b/a Applebee’s Restaurant, 363 NLRB
No. 75, slip op. at 3–5 (2015) (Member Miscimarra, con-
curring in part and dissenting in part), I believe that an
agreement may lawfully provide for the arbitration of
NLRA claims, and such an agreement does not unlawful-
ly interfere with Board charge filing, at least where the
agreement expressly preserves the right to file claims or
charges with the Board or, more generally, with adminis-
trative agencies.12 Here, however, the Agreement does

10 See, e.g., Murphy Oil USA, Inc. v. NLRB, above; Johnmohammadi
v. Bloomingdale’s, 755 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 2014); D. R. Horton, Inc. v.
NLRB, above; Owen v. Bristol Care, Inc., 702 F.3d 1050 (8th Cir.
2013); Sutherland v. Ernst & Young LLP, 726 F.3d 290 (2d Cir. 2013).
11 Murphy Oil USA, Inc. v. NLRB, 808 F.3d at 1021.
12 The Respondent contends that the Agreement’s exclusion of
claims that are “non-arbitrable under applicable state or federal law”
places NLRA claims outside the Agreement’s scope. To the contrary,
the Board for decades has held that NLRA claims may lawfully be
not qualify in any way the requirement that all statutory
claims must be resolved in binding arbitration and in this
manner only. There is no exception preserving employ-
ees’ right to file charges with administrative agencies
such as the NLRB. For these reasons, I join my col-
leagues in finding that the Agreement violates the Act by
unlawfully restricting the filing of charges with the
Board. See U-Haul Co. of California, 347 NLRB 375,
377 (2006), enfd. mem. 255 Fed. Appx. 527 (D.C. Cir.
2007); Murphy Oil, above, slip op. at 22 fn. 4 (Member
Miscimarra, dissenting in part); GameStop Corp., 363
NLRB No. 89, slip op. at 6–7 (Member Miscimarra, con-
curring in part and dissenting in part); The Rose Group
d/b/a Applebee’s Restaurant, above (Member
Miscimarra, concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent in part from, and I
concur in part with, my colleagues’ decision.
Dated, Washington, D.C. July 6, 2016
______________________________________
Philip A. Miscimarra, Member
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
APPENDIX A
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we
violated Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and
obey this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on
your behalf
Act together with other employees for your bene-
fit and protection

resolved in arbitration (although the Board, applying a deferential
standard, retains the right to evaluate whether the resulting award is
inconsistent with the Act). Indeed, the Board’s decision in Babcock &
Wilcox Construction leaves no doubt that NLRA claims can be made
subject to a mandatory arbitration agreement. The Board majority in
Babcock stated that, as a prerequisite to affording deference to any
resulting arbitration award, the Board would require the parties to have
“explicitly authorized” the arbitrator “to decide the unfair labor prac-
tice issue.” 361 NLRB No. 132, slip op. at 5 (emphasis added). See
Ralph’s Grocery Co., 363 NLRB No. 128, slip op. at 6–7 (2016)
(Member Miscimarra, concurring in part and dissenting in part).
6 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Choose not to engage in any of these protected
activities.
WE WILL NOT maintain an arbitration agreement that
employees reasonably would believe bars or restricts the
right to file charges with the National Labor Relations
Board.
WE WILL NOT maintain and/or enforce an arbitration
agreement that requires employees to waive the right to
maintain employment-related class or collective actions
in all forums, whether arbitral or judicial.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner, interfere
with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights
listed above.
WE WILL rescind the arbitration agreement in all of its
forms or revise it in all of its forms to make clear that the
arbitration agreement does not constitute a waiver of
your right to maintain employment-related joint, class, or
collective actions in all forums, and that it does not bar or
restrict your right to file charges with the National Labor
Relations Board.
WE WILL notify all current and former employees who
were required to sign or otherwise become bound to the
arbitration agreement in all of its forms that it has been
rescinded or revised and, if revised, WE WILL provide
them a copy of the revised agreement.
WE WILL notify the court in which Konny Renteria
filed her collective lawsuit that we have rescinded or
revised the arbitration agreement upon which we based
our motion to dismiss her collective lawsuit and compel
individual arbitration, and WE WILL inform the court that
we no longer oppose Konny Renteria’s collective lawsuit
on the basis of that agreement.
WE WILL reimburse Konny Renteria and any other
plaintiffs for any reasonable attorneys’ fees and litigation
expenses that they may have incurred in opposing our
motion to dismiss the collective lawsuit and compel indi-
vidual arbitration.
BRISTOL FARMS
The Board’s decision can be found at
http://www.nlrb.gov/case/21–CA–103030 or by using the
QR code below. Alternatively, you can obtain a copy of
the decision from the Executive Secretary, National La-
bor Relations Board, 1015 Half Street SE Washington,
D.C. 20570, or by calling (202) 273–1940.
APPENDIX B
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we
violated Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and
obey this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on
your behalf
Act together with other employees for your bene-
fit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected
activities.
WE WILL NOT maintain an arbitration agreement that
employees reasonably would believe bars or restricts the
right to file charges with the National Labor Relations
Board.
WE WILL NOT maintain an arbitration agreement that
requires employees to waive the right to maintain em-
ployment-related class or collective actions in all forums,
whether arbitral or judicial.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner, interfere
with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights
listed above.
WE WILL rescind the arbitration agreement in all of its
forms or revise it in all of its forms to make clear that the
arbitration agreement does not constitute a waiver of
your right to maintain employment-related joint, class, or
collective actions in all forums, and that it does not bar or
restrict your right to file charges with the National Labor
Relations Board.
WE WILL notify all current and former employees who
were required to sign or otherwise become bound to the
arbitration agreement in all of its forms that it has been
rescinded or revised and, if revised, WE WILL provide
them a copy of the revised agreement.
BRISTOL FARMS
BRISTOL FARMS 7
The Board’s decision can be found at
http://www.nlrb.gov/case/21–CA–103030 or by using the
QR code below. Alternatively, you can obtain a copy of
the decision from the Executive Secretary, National La-
bor Relations Board, 1015 Half Street SE Washington,
D.C. 20570, or by calling (202) 273–1940.
Ami Silverman, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Matthew W. Gordon, Esq. (Mattern Law Group), for the Charg-
ing Party.
Denica E. Anderson and Kimberly M. Talley, Esqs. (Sanchez &
Amador, LLP), for the Respondent.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
LISA THOMPSON, Administrative Law Judge. This is another
case raising issues related to D. R. Horton, Inc., 357 NLRB
2277 (2012), enf. granted in part and denied in part 737 F.3d
344 (5th Cir. 2013). It was tried in Los Angeles, California, on
June 17 and 18, 2014. Konny Renteria (Renteria or the Charg-
ing Party) filed the original charge on April 18, 2013,1 and filed
an amended charge on August 22. The General Counsel issued
the complaint November 19. Bristol Farms (the Respondent or
Company), filed a timely answer, and later an amended answer,
denying all material allegations and setting forth its affirmative
defenses.
The complaint alleges that Respondent violated Section
8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act (the Act), when, (1)
by virtue of its written application for employment, Respondent
required Renteria to be bound by its Mutual Agreement to Ar-
bitrate (MAA); (2) Respondent enforced the MAA by filing a
motion to compel arbitration of Renteria’s class-action wage-
and-hour lawsuit; and (3) Respondent maintained provisions of
the MAA that interfere with employees’ access to the Board
and its processes.
On the entire record and after considering the briefs filed by
the Acting General Counsel, the Charging Party, and the Re-
spondent, I make the following.

1 Abbreviations used in this decision are as follows: “Tr.” for Tran-
script; “GC Exh.” for General Counsel’s Exhibit; “CP Exh.” for Charg-
ing Party’s Exhibit; “R. Exh.” for Respondent’s Exhibit; “Jt. Exh.” for
Joint Exhibit; “GC Br.” for the General Counsel’s brief; “CP Br.” for
the Charging Party’s Brief; and “R. Br.” for Respondent’s brief.
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
Bristol Farms, a corporation with an office and place of
business in Carson, California, is engaged in the operation of
retail grocery stores. The parties stipulate and I find that it is an
employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Sections
2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
II. ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Respondent and the Charging Party.
Respondent operates retail grocery stores in the State of Cali-
fornia. It also operates a central kitchen, which, along with its
corporate headquarters, is located in Carson, California.
Renteria was educated in Mexico, and though their school
system does not align perfectly with the United States’ educa-
tion system, she attained the equivalent of a high school diplo-
ma. At the time of the hearing, she lived in the United States
for about 15 years (since roughly 1999) but had not gone to
school in the United States or taken any English classes.
B. Renteria’s Application, Orientation, and
Arbitration Agreement.
Renteria went to Bristol Farms’ Carson facility and filled out
an application for employment on November 14, 2006. The
application contained a certification, which stated, in relevant
part:
I agree that any offer of employment with Bristol Farms is
conditioned upon my entering into an arbitration agreement
with Bristol Farms/Lazy Acres, pursuant to which all disputes
that might arise out of my employment with Bristol
Farms/Lazy Acres, whether during or after that employment,
will be submitted to binding arbitration. I understand that
consideration of my employment application is conditioned
upon my agreement to arbitrate any employment-related dis-
pute with Bristol Farms/Lazy Acres. I understand that this
agreement does not alter my status (if hired) as an at-will em-
ployee.
(Jt. Exh. 2.) Upon submitting her application, Renteria at-
tempted to speak with Manager Craig Gehr who did not speak
Spanish. Gehr summoned Assistant Manager Juvenal Isidoro
to translate. At the time, Renteria could speak some basic Eng-
lish though she did not read or understand English beyond a
simple conversational level.
Joseph Reichard, a human resources recruiter for Respondent
during this time period, was responsible for conducting new
employee orientation. The orientation for central kitchen
workers took 2 to 4 hours, part of which was spent reviewing
and completing paperwork.2 One of the paperwork items was a
mutual agreement to arbitrate (MAA). (Jt. Exh. 4.) According
to Reichard, his practice was to read the MAA aloud and tell
the employees it was optional. He also told them that if they
did not understand the MAA, they could take it with them and

2 The orientation for employees in the retail stores is longer, lasting 5
to 7 hours.
8 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
have someone explain it.3 The pertinent provisions of the
MAA state:
It is in the interest of Bristol Farms and its Owners/Partners
that, whenever possible, disputes related to employment mat-
ters be resolved quickly and fairly. Should any matter remain
unresolved, and in consideration of the promises below and
your employment with Bristol Farms, you and Bristol Farms
agree as follows:
You and Bristol Farms agree that final and binding arbitration
shall be the exclusive remedy for any dispute between you
and Bristol Farms, except for claims of Workers’ Compensa-
tion, Unemployment Compensation, or any other claim that is
non-arbitrable under applicable state or federal law. Thus,
except for claims carved out above, this Agreement includes
all common-law and statutory claims, including but not lim-
ited to, any claim for breach of contract, unpaid wages,
wrongful termination, and for laws forbidding discrimination,
harassment, and retaliation on the basis of race, color, reli-
gion, gender, age, national origin, disability, and any other
protected status. You understand that you are giving up no
substantive rights, and this Agreement simply governs forum.
(Jt. Exh. 4.) The MAA then states that the arbitration will be
conducted under the rules and procedures of the American Ar-
bitration Association (AAA), and discusses how an arbitrator
will be selected, along with the payment and fee structure. The
MAA concludes by stating:
BY SIGNING THIS AGREEMENT, YOU AND THE
COMPANY ACKNOWLEDGE THAT THE RIGHT TO A
COURT TRIAL AND TRIAL BY JURY IS OF VALUE, AND
KNOWINGLY AND VOLUNTARILY WAIVE SUCH RIGHT
FOR ANY DISPUTE SUBJECT TO THE TERMS OF THIS
AGREEMENT.
(Id.) It is silent as to class action claims.
On November 20, 2006, Renteria signed a conditional job of-
fer to work in Respondent’s central kitchen as a meat cutter, at
a pay rate of $12.50 per hour. (Jt. Exh. 3.) She began work on
or about November 28, 2006, starting with an orientation from
9:30 to 12:15. (R. Exh. 5.) Reichard conducted the orientation,
though at the time of the hearing he did not specifically recall
Renteria being present. During Renteria’s orientation, Reichard
spoke English and gave her and the other attendees some pa-
pers, also in English, to sign. Renteria did not understand eve-
rything he was saying, but was under the impression she was to
sign the documents given to her. (Tr. 142.) There was not a
Spanish version of the MAA, or any of the other documenta-
tion, presented at the orientation. Renteria signed the MAA
during her orientation on November 28.
Renteria worked in the central kitchen, cutting chicken and
beef, and preparing pastas. She generally worked the morning
shift, along with about 20 coworkers, supervised by Isidoro.
The coworkers spoke to each other and to Isidoro in Spanish.4

3 Reichard’s practice was the same for the predesignation form,
which was the only other optional form.
4 Renteria was terminated in March 2012, for falsifying her time-
card.
C. Respondent’s Current Application and Orientation.
Since at least October 18, 2012, Respondent has used an ap-
plication form that differs from the one Renteria completed.
(Jt. Exh. 1, ¶ 6.) This application does not contain language
conditioning employment upon entering into an arbitration
agreement with Respondent. (Jt. Exh. 5.)
At the time of the hearing, Oquilla Jones was store director
at Bristol Farms’ Hollywood store. She began doing orienta-
tions in June 2013, and described her current practice. During
orientation, she distributes forms from Human Resources. One
of these forms is the mutual agreement to arbitrate (MAA),
detailed above. At times, she or one of the participants will
read the MAA during the orientation. She informs employees
that the MAA is an optional form but does not explain what the
ramifications are for choosing to sign it or not to sign it. She
collects all the various orientation forms at the end of the orien-
tation class, but if the employees want to consult with someone
before turning in the MAA, they can turn it into Human Re-
sources later. Jones maintains a checklist for each employee
attending the orientation to verify that an employee has turned
in his or her respective forms. She then returns the completed
forms she collects to Human Resources. Not all employees
sign the MAA, and Jones was not aware of any employee being
terminated for failing to sign it.
D. Class Action Complaint and Response.
On August 28, 2012, Renteria, through her attorneys, filed a
class action complaint in Superior Court for the State of Cali-
fornia. The complaint alleged various claims regarding wages,
including a claim under the California Private Attorney General
Act of 2004 (PAGA). (Jt. Exhs. 1 ¶ 9(a), 7.) On April 2, 2012,
Bristol Farms filed a motion to dismiss Renteria’s class com-
plaint, and to dismiss, or in the alternative, compel arbitration
of Renteria’s individual claims. Renteria responded and Bristol
Farms replied. On May 30, 2012, Superior Court Judge Elihu
M. Berle granted Bristol Farms’ motion to compel arbitration,
with the exception of her PAGA claim. (Jt. Exh. 11.) Judge
Berle dismissed Renteria’ class claims on December 9, 2012.
(Jt. Exh. 12.)
E. Observations of Renteria’s Communication Skills.
At all relevant times, Lynn Mellilo has been Respondent’s
senior director of asset management. She saw Renteria a cou-
ple times a week and spoke English with her. The regular con-
versations consisted of niceties, such as “Hello, how are you?”
and “How is production today?” (Tr. 184.) They had one
longer conversation where Mellilo told Renteria she liked her
hat, and they discussed how she likes to wear color to liven up
the uniform. Mellilo also spoke with Renteria in 2008, after
she had fallen down and sustained an injury in the central
kitchen. Mellilo visited Renteria at the hospital to follow up,
asked her how she was feeling, whether there was anyone she
needed to contact, the types of testing she was having, and the
like. Mellilo never had any difficulty conversing with Renteria
in English, though she recalled Renteria used basic words.
In late 2012/early 2013, Renteria worked as a deli clerk and
bagger under the supervision of Paul Pewrdaza, store director
of Sprouts Farmers’ Market in San Pedro, California. Renteria
BRISTOL FARMS 9
was required to communicate with customers in English for
both positions, and he never witnessed her having trouble. He
had known her about a year-and-a-half at the time of the hear-
ing.
III. DECISION AND ANALYSIS
The complaint asserts violations of Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act. Under Section 8(a)(1), it is an unfair labor practice for an
employer to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the
exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act. The
rights guaranteed in Section 7 include the right “to form, join or
assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through repre-
sentatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other con-
certed activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or
other mutual aid or protection. . . .”
In D. R. Horton, slip op. at 1, the Board explained that an
employer violates Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by imposing, as a
condition of employment, a mandatory arbitration agreement
that precludes employees from “filing joint, class, or collective
claims addressing their wages, hours, or other working condi-
tions against the employer in any forum, arbitral or judicial.”
Citing to Spandsco Oil & Royalty Co., 42 NLRB 942, 948–949
(1942), Salt River Valley Water Users Assn., 99 NLRB 849,
853–854 (1952), enfd. 206 F.2d 325 (9th Cir. 1953), and a
string of other cases, the Board noted that concerted legal ac-
tion addressing wages, hours, and working conditions has con-
sistently fallen within Section 7’s protections.
A. Renteria’s Agreement and Respondent’s Enforcement.
Paragraphs 4, 5(b), and 7 of the complaint allege that Re-
spondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by maintaining the
MAA as a condition of the Charging Party’s employment, and
enforcing it to require individual arbitration of her wage-related
claims.
First, I must address whether the MAA was a mandatory
condition of Renteria’s employment. It is hard to imagine lan-
guage more clear than the language in Renteria’s job applica-
tion, articulated above and reiterated here:
I agree that any offer of employment with Bristol Farms is
conditioned upon my entering into an arbitration agreement
with Bristol Farms/Lazy Acres, pursuant to which all disputes
that might arise out of my employment with Bristol
Farms/Lazy Acres, whether during or after that employment,
will be submitted to binding arbitration. I understand that
consideration of my employment application is conditioned
upon my agreement to arbitrate any employment-related dis-
pute with Bristol Farms/Lazy Acres. I understand that this
agreement does not alter my status (if hired) as an at-will em-
ployee.
Clearly, Renteria’s employment, by virtue of this clear and
unambiguous language, was conditioned upon her agreement to
arbitrate “any employment related dispute” with Bristol Farms.
I therefore find the agreement was a mandatory rule imposed
by Respondent.5

5 Respondent does not explicitly argue a timeliness defense. Any
such argument would lack merit under controlling case law holding that
a continuing violation exists as long as the rule is still being enforced at
Respondent introduced testimony that the employees were
orally told, at orientation, that signing the agreement was vol-
untary. Where language is unambiguous, as here, “Board prec-
edent prohibits the use of parole evidence to vary the terms of
the parties’ agreement.” Contek International, Inc., NLRB 879,
884 (2005) (citing Quality Building Contractors, 342 NLRB
429 430 (2004); and NDK Corp., 278 NLRB 1035 (1986)).
Respondent points out that the MAA itself ends by stating the
employee is knowingly and voluntarily waiving the right to go
to court. The consideration for knowingly and voluntarily giv-
ing up this right, however, was (clearly and unambiguously)
employment with Respondent. I therefore apply the parole
evidence rule and decline to consider testimony that Renteria
was told signing the agreement was voluntary.6
Respondent further argues that the employment application
did not incorporate the MAA because it did not specifically
reference it. I have considered the cases Respondent cited in its
brief, yet none address the situation present here. Simply put,
Respondent required Ms. Renteria to sign an application with a
provision agreeing that any offer of employment was condi-
tioned upon entering into an arbitration agreement with Bristol
Farms. It then presented her with one, and only one, arbitration
agreement at her orientation. Respondent’s laborious argu-
ments that somehow the former does not incorporate the latter
in the present context fall flat in light of the plain language of
the documents. Moreover, it is “a cardinal principle of contract
construction that a document should be read to give effect to all
its provisions and to render them consistent with each other.”
Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 63
(1995). The provision on the application conditioning em-
ployment on signing an arbitration agreement has no effect if,
in fact, there is no such condition.
As a mandatory condition of Renteria’s employment, as well
as those employees who went through the same application and
orientation process, the MAA is evaluated in the same manner
as any other workplace rule. D. R. Horton, supra, slip op. at 5.7
When evaluating whether a rule, including a mandatory arbitra-
tion agreement, violates Section 8(a)(1), the Board applies the
test set forth in Lutheran Heritage Village-Livonia, 343 NLRB
646 (2004). See U-Haul Co. of California, 347 NLRB 375,
377 (2006), enfd. 255 Fed.Appx. 527 (D.C. Cir. 2007); D. R.
Horton, supra. Under Lutheran Heritage, the first inquiry is
whether the rule explicitly restricts activities protected by Sec-
tion 7. If it does, the rule is unlawful. If it does not, “the viola-

the time of the charge. See American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 234 NLRB
1126 fn. 1 (1978); Alamo Cement Co., 277 NLRB 1031, 1036–1037
(1985) (no time bar where enforcement allegation could not have been
litigated sooner); The Guard Publishing Co., 351 NLRB 1110, 1110,
fn. 2 (2007) (“maintenance during the 10(b) period of a rule that trans-
gresses employee rights is itself a violation of Sec. 8(a)(1).”)
6 Even if parole evidence was admissible, my decision would not
change. Reichard did not specifically remember Renteria in an orienta-
tion class, and given her limitations with English, I do not think she
understood that signing the MAA was voluntary. Rather, when faced
with a stack of papers to sign at orientation, she understood she was to
sign them.
7 Respondent claims the MAA is not a work rule because it is volun-
tary. For the reasons set forth in this decision, I disagree.
10 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
tion is dependent upon a showing of one of the following: (1)
employees would reasonably construe the language to prohibit
Section 7 activity; (2) the rule was promulgated in response to
[Section 7] activity; or (3) the rule has been applied to restrict
the exercise of Section 7 rights.” Lutheran Heritage at 647.
I find the MAA violates Section 8(a)(1) because employees
would reasonably construe its language to prohibit Section 7
activity and because it has been applied to restrict the exercise
of Section 7 rights.
Respondent contends that the MAA is distinguishable from
the agreement the Board found unlawful in D. R. Horton be-
cause it does not contain an express waiver of class and collec-
tive actions. Clearly, however, Respondent has applied the
MAA to restrict the Charging Party from proceeding with a
class action complaint. Indeed, in its motion to dismiss
Renteria’s class action complaint, the first paragraph in Re-
spondent’s statement of facts contains the following heading:
“The Parties Entered Into An Enforceable Agreement Requir-
ing Plaintiff To Resolve Her Claims Through Binding Individ-
ual Arbitration.” (Jt. Exh. 8.) Later, citing to the Supreme
Court’s decision in Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. Animal Feeds Int’l
Corp., 130 S.Ct. 1758, 1775–1776 (2010), Respondent argued,
successfully, that a party may not be compelled to submit to
class arbitration where the agreement is silent as to its permis-
sibility. In its motion to dismiss, Respondent emphasized the
singular language of the MAA as being between the individual
employee and Bristol Farms, to support its argument that MAA
does not authorize class action arbitrations. (Id.) Respondent’s
attempt to have it both ways is disingenuous. Rather, Respond-
ent construed the singular language of the MAA as prohibiting
class arbitration, and I agree that this language, with no refer-
ence to the ability to pursue claims about working conditions
jointly, would lead an employee to read the MAA as applicable
to individual employment disputes. Moreover, it was clearly
applied to restrict Renteria’s Section 7 activity of pursuing a
class action lawsuit regarding wages.
Respondent also asserts that even if the MAA was mandato-
ry, it did not violate the Act, because the use of class action
procedures is not a substantive right. The Board, however, has
found that participation in a class action is a substantive right
protected by Section 7. Respondent further argues that, absent
a congressional command to excuse enforcement of the FAA, it
must be enforced. Relying on CompuCredit Corp. v. Green-
wood, 132 S.Ct. 665, 672 fn. 4 (2012), decided a week after D.
R. Horton, Respondent argues that the Board ignored the re-
quirement of a “congressional command” to override the FAA.
The crux of Respondent’s argument is that nothing in Section 7
(which was enacted prior to the FAA) excuses application of
the FAA. Specifically, Respondent argues that Section 7 pro-
vides no substantive right to initiate a class action. Though the
Board could not have applied CompuCredit when it issued D.
R. Horton, it nonetheless addressed this argument, stating:
Any contention that the Section 7 right to bring a class or col-
lective action is merely “procedural” must fail. The right to
engage in collective action—including collective legal ac-
tion—is the core substantive right protected by the NLRA and
is the foundation on which the Act and Federal labor policy
rest. [Emphasis in original.]
D. R. Horton, supra.8
Respondent also asserts that the Board’s ruling in D. R. Hor-
ton interferes with the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C.
§§ 1 et. seq., based on the Supreme Court’s reasoning both in
AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. 1740, 1746 (2011),
Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. Animal Feeds Int’l Corp., 130 S.Ct. 1758,
1775–1776 (2010), and Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane
Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991). The Board, however, consid-
ered these arguments and precedents in D. R. Horton to support
a different conclusion, by which I am bound.
Respondent argues that the recent Supreme Court decision,
American Exp. Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, 133 S.Ct. 2304
(2013), makes clear that it is improper to find a congressional
command where none exists. American Exp. Co. involved a
group of merchants who were unhappy with the rates American
Express charged them to use their cards at their respective
businesses.9 At issue before the Court was whether the mer-
chants were bound by agreements mandating individual arbitra-
tion of these disputes and precluding a class action suit for vio-
lation of antitrust law. The merchants argued that without the
ability to proceed collectively, it was not cost-effective to chal-
lenge American Express’s rates. The Court noted that the laws
at issue, the Sherman and Clayton Acts, fail to reference class
actions, and found that the “antitrust laws do not guarantee an
affordable procedural path to the vindication of every claim.”
Id. at 2309. The Board in D. R. Horton distinguished the
NLRA, however, and found that Section 7 substantively guar-
antees employees the right to engage in collective action, in-
cluding collective legal action, for mutual aid and protection
concerning wages, hours, and working conditions. As such, I
find Respondent’s argument fails.
Next, relying on Bill Johnson’s v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 741
(1983), and BE & K Construction, 536 U.S. 516 (2002), Re-
spondent argues that the motion to compel arbitration is consti-
tutionally protected by the First Amendment. I find that instant
case falls within the exception set forth in Bill Johnson’s at
footnote 5, which states in relevant part:
It should be kept in mind that what is involved here is an em-
ployer’s lawsuit that the federal law would not bar except for
its allegedly retaliatory motivation. We are not dealing with a
suit that is claimed to be beyond the jurisdiction of the state

8 Respondent notes that the Board’s refusal to permit a class action
waiver is contrary to the Supreme Court’s decision in 14 Penn Plaza
LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247 (2009). The Board considered this argu-
ment, however, and distinguished 14 Penn Plaza. D. R. Horton, supra
at 12.
9 It is a matter of common sense that the merchants could continue to
operate their businesses without offering customers the ability to pay
with an American Express card. Other forms of currency are available
and using American Express was their choice. Likewise, it was the
Charging Party’s choice to work for Ralph’s. Taken to its logical ex-
treme, however, if waivers such as the MBAP are judicially sanctioned
and become the norm for employers, employees will increasingly be
faced with the option of foregoing class litigation for mutual aid and
protection or not working.
BRISTOL FARMS 11
courts because of federal-law preemption, or a suit that has an
objective that is illegal under federal law. Petitioner concedes
that the Board may enjoin these latter types of suits. Brief of
Petitioner 12-13, 20; Reply Brief for Petitioner 8. Nor could it
be successfully argued otherwise, for we have upheld Board
orders enjoining unions from prosecuting court suits for en-
forcement of fines that could not lawfully be imposed under
the Act, see Granite State Joint Board, Textile Workers Un-
ion, 187 N.L.R.B. 636, 637 (1970), enforcement denied, 446
F.2d 369 (CA1 1971), rev’d, 409 U.S. 213, 93 S.Ct. 385, 34
L.Ed.2d 422 (1972); Booster Lodge No. 405, Machinists &
Aerospace Workers, 185 N.L.R.B. 380, 383 (1970), enforced
in relevant part, 148 U.S.App.D.C. 119, 459 F.2d 1143
(1972), aff’d, 412 U.S. 84, 93 S.Ct. 1961, 36 L.Ed.2d 764
(1973), and this Court has concluded that, at the Board’s re-
quest, a District Court may enjoin enforcement of a state-
court injunction “where [the Board’s] federal power pre-
empts the field.” NLRB v. Nash-Finch Co., 404 U.S. 138, 144,
92 S.Ct. 373, 377, 30 L.Ed.2d 328 (1971).
The Board has determined that these exceptions apply in the
wake of Bill Johnson’s and BE & K Construction. See, e.g.,
Allied Trades Council (Duane Reade Inc.), 342 NLRB 1010,
1013, fn. 4 (2004); Teamster’s, Local 776 (Rite Aid Corp.), 305
NLRB 832, 835 (1991). Moreover, particular litigation tactics
may fall within the exception even if the entire lawsuit may not
be enjoined. Wright Electric, Inc., 327 NLRB 1194, 1195
(1999), enfd. 200 F.3d 1162 (8th Cir. 2000); Dilling Mechani-
cal Contractors, Inc, 357 NLRB 544 (2011). As such, since the
Board has concluded in D. R. Horton that precluding class or
collective actions related to wages, hours, and/or working con-
ditions is unlawful, Respondent’s attempt to enforce the MAA
in state court by moving to compel individual arbitration fall
within the unlawful objective exception in Bill Johnson’s.
Based on the foregoing, I find the MAA violates Section
8(a)(1) of the Act as alleged in complaint paragraphs 4, 5(b),
and 7.10
B. Implementation and Maintenance of Arbitration Agreements
for Other Employees.
Complaint paragraphs 5(a) and 7 allege that Respondent vio-
lated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act when, at all times since at least
October 18, 2012, it implemented and maintained a mutual
agreement to arbitrate which contains provisions requiring em-
ployees to resolve certain employment disputes through arbitra-
tion.
The first question that needs to be addressed is whether the
MAA was voluntary for those employees who filled out the on-
line application that did not contain language conditioning their
employment on signing an arbitration agreement. This is be

10 Respondent argues that Renteria is not credible. As my findings
do not rest on credibility, I decline to address these arguments. On a
related note, however, I do not find persuasive the evidence Respondent
presented about Renteria’s ability to understand English beyond a basic
level in 2006. Evidence of her engaging in conversation during subse-
quent years does not call into question her unrefuted testimony that her
understanding of English was imperfect in 2006.
cause the Board in D. R. Horton expressly declined to answer
the “more difficult” question of:
[W]hether, if arbitration is a mutually beneficial means of dis-
pute resolution, an employer can enter into an agreement that
is not a condition of employment with an individual employee
to resolve either a particular dispute, or all potential employ-
ment disputes through a non-class arbitration rather than liti-
gation in court.
D. R. Horton, supra at fn. 28.
Respondent relies on evidence that, at orientation, employees
were told the MAA was optional and they could take it home
with them and seek advice if they were not clear about its
terms. Respondent also provided unrefuted testimony that not
all employees signed the agreement, and no employees have
been terminated for failing to sign the agreement.
What is troubling, however, is that the document itself does
not mention that it is optional, and there is nothing in writing
giving employees either the opportunity to “opt in” or “opt out”
of the MAA. Instead, it is presented as one of many documents
to sign at a lengthy orientation. Orally, reading the terms of the
MAA and orally informing employees that they are not re-
quired to sign the MAA, while the terms of the agreement do
not state it is optional, creates unnecessary confusion. The
employees are not told the ramifications of signing the MAA or
not signing it. Moreover, there is a checklist for each employee
that denotes which documents that employee has signed at the
completion of orientation. Under these circumstances, I find a
reasonable employee would be coerced into signing the MAA.
Respondent cites to several cases where courts have held that
opt-out provisions render arbitration agreements voluntary. In
these cases, however, the option to opt out of the agreement
was apparent from the document itself. There is no such provi-
sion in the MAA at issue here.11
Accordingly, for the reasons set forth with regard to
Renteria’s agreement, I find the MAA violates the Act as al-
leged in paragraphs 5(a) and (7) of the complaint.
C. Effect on Employees’ Access to Board and
its Procedures.
Finally, the complaint alleges, at paragraphs 6 and 7, that
employees would reasonably conclude that the provisions of
the MAA interfere with employees’ access to the Board and its
processes, in violation of Section 8(a)(1).
In evaluating the impact of a rule on employees, the appro-
priate inquiry is whether the rule would reasonably tend to chill
employees in the exercise of their Section 7 rights. Lafayette
Park Hotel, 326 NLRB 824, 825 (1998), enfd. 203 F.3d 52
(D.C. Cir. 1999). A rule does not violate the Act if a reasona-
ble employee merely could conceivably read it as barring Sec-
tion 7 activity. Rather, the inquiry is whether a reasonable
employee would read the rule as prohibiting Section 7 activity.
Lutheran Heritage, supra. The Board must give the rule under
consideration a reasonable reading and ambiguities are con-
strued against its promulgator. Lutheran Heritage, supra at 647;

11 For this same reason, Respondent’s argument based on the
nonprecedential administrative law judge decision in Bloomingdale’s,
Inc., 2013 WL 3225945 (June 25, 2013), also fails.
12 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Lafayette Park Hotel, 326 NLRB at 828; and Cintas Corp. v.
NLRB, 482 F.3d 463, 467–470 (D.C. Cir. 2007). Moreover, the
Board must “refrain from reading particular phrases in isola-
tion, and it must not presume improper interference with em-
ployee rights.” Lutheran Heritage supra at 646.
I find a reasonable employee would read the MAA as pro-
hibiting him or her from filing unfair labor practice charges
with the Board. On its face, the MAA applies to “any dispute
between you and Bristol Farms” with specific exceptions for
“Workers’ Compensation, Unemployment Compensation, or
any other claim that is non-arbitrable under applicable state or
federal law.” Notably, the MAA does not specifically mention
an employees’ right to file charges with the Board in its excep-
tions or elsewhere. Moreover, it expressly encompasses claims
for “wrongful termination” as well as “discrimination” based
on any “protected status.” Thus a reasonable employee would
read this to require arbitration for claims of termination based
on union or other protected concerted activity, and for claims of
discrimination based on the protected status of having engaged
in union activity or other protected concerted activity. While
the MAA contains a catchall provision excluding “any other
claim that is non-arbitrable under applicable state or federal
law” this at best creates an ambiguity, which is construed
against the Respondent as the MAA’s drafter. Lafayette Park
Hotel, 326 NLRB at 828; Cintas Corp. v. NLRB, 482 F.3d 463,
467–470 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
Respondent’s argument that, under certain circumstances,
the Board has permitted waiver of the right to file charges with
the Board, is unavailing. To support its argument, Respondent
cites to BP Amoco Chemical, 351 NLRB 614 (2007), where the
Board found termination agreements that 37 employees signed,
which waived their right to file charges with the Board, were
valid. In that case, the terminated employees received en-
hanced severance packages in return for their agreement not to
bring legal action against their former employer for any em-
ployment-related issues. Unlike in the instant case, the former
employees of BP Amoco Chemical were being separated from
the company, so the waiver was not for potential prospective
violations. More importantly, the Board in BP Amoco Chemi-
cal weighed the factors set forth in Independent Stave, 287
NLRB 740 (1987), and found the former employees “were
aware of the content, advised of the meaning, and knew that
they were waiving and releasing claims.” 351 NLRB at 615.
Based on the analysis in the paragraph directly above, the situa-
tion here is far less clear, and is therefore BP Amoco Chemical
is meaningfully distinguishable.
D. Board Quorum and Appointment of Regional Director
Finally, I will address separately Respondent’s argument that
the complaint at issue here was improperly issued because Re-
gional Director Olivia Garcia was appointed at a time when the
Board lacked a quorum. As the Board stated in Pallet Cos..,
361 NLRB No. 33, slip op. at 1 (August 27, 2014):
Agency staff engaged in the investigation and prosecution of
unfair labor practices are directly accountable to the General
Counsel. 29 U.S.C. § 153(d); See NLRB v. United Food &
Commercial Workers Union, Local 23, 484 U.S. 112, 127-
128 (1987); NLRB v. FLRA, 613 F.3d 275, 278 (D.C. Cir.
2010). When a Regional Director or other designated Board
agent issues a complaint, he acts for, and with authority dele-
gated by, the General Counsel. United States Postal Service,
347 NLRB 885, 886 (2006); Roadway Express, Inc., 355
NLRB 197, 206 (2010).
Respondent does dispute that the complaint here was issued in
the General Counsel’s name and under his authority.
In any event, in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in
NLRB v. Noel Canning, a Division of the Noel Corp., 134 S.Ct.
2550 (2014), it appears the Board had a quorum at the time of
the complaint, consisting of Members Hayes, Pearce and Beck-
er. Respondent does not contest the validity of Members Hayes
and Pearce’s appointments. In NLRB v. New Vista Nursing &
Rehabilitation, 719 F.3d 203, 218 (3d Cir. 2013), the Third
Circuit found that Member Becker’s appointment was invalid
because it occurred during a 17-day intrasession Senate recess.
In Noel Canning, however, the Court held that the President’s
constitutional recess appointment authority extended to
intrasession recesses of the Senate. Moreover, the Court’s
analysis suggests that recess appointments are valid if, among
other criteria, the recess lasted 10 days or longer. I find, there-
fore, that the Board had a quorum at the time the complaint was
issued. I further find that the Board had a quorum when D. R.
Horton was decided by a panel consisting of Members Hayes,
Pearce and Becker.
IV. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
(1) Respondent, Bristol Farms, is an employer within the
meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
(2) Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by main-
taining and enforcing a mandatory mutual agreement to arbi-
trate (MAA), and enforcing that agreement by moving to com-
pel individual arbitration of the Charging Party’s class-action
lawsuit pertaining to wages.
(3) Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by main-
taining mutual agreement to arbitrate that employees reasona-
bly would believe bars or restricts their right to file charges
with the National Labor Relations Board.
REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has engaged in certain unfair
labor practices, I shall order it to cease and desist therefrom and
to take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the
policies of the Act.
As I have concluded that the MAA is unlawful, the recom-
mended order requires that Respondent revise or rescind it and
advise its employees in writing that said rule has been so re-
vised or rescinded. Because Respondent utilized the MAA on a
corporate wide basis, Respondent shall post a notice at all loca-
tions where the MAA, or any portion of it requiring all em-
ployment-related disputes to be submitted to individual binding
arbitration, was in effect. See, e.g., U-Haul Co. of California,
supra, fn. 2 (2006); D. R. Horton, supra, slip op. at 17.
I recommend Respondent be required to reimburse Charging
Party Renteria for any litigation and related expenses, with
interest, to date and in the future, directly related to Respond-
ent’s filing its motion to compel arbitration in Case No.
BC491186 in the Superior Court of California. Determining
BRISTOL FARMS 13
the applicable rate of interest on the reimbursement will be as
outlined in New Horizons, 283 NLRB 1173 (1987) (adopting
the Internal Revenue Service rate for underpayment of Federal
taxes). Interest on all amounts due to Ms. Renteria shall be
computed on a daily bases as prescribed in Kentucky River
Medical Center, 356 NLRB 8 (2010).
The General Counsel requests that Respondent be required to
move the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, jointly with
the Charging Party on request, to vacate its order compelling
arbitration if a motion to vacate can still be timely filed. The
law does not require the employer to permit class action arbitra-
tions. Instead, D. R. Horton states that a forum for class or
collective claims must be available. It is therefore beyond my
authority to require Respondent to permit classwide arbitration.
Instead, the employees must be permitted to proceed with class
action claims regarding wages, hours and/or working condi-
tions in some forum, whether arbitral or judicial.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the
entire record, I issue the following recommended.12
ORDER
Respondent, Bristol Farms, Carson, California, its officers,
agents, successors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Maintaining a mutual agreement to arbitrate that employ-
ees would construe as prohibiting class or collective actions;
(b) Enforcing the mutual agreement to arbitrate to prohibit
class actions;
(c) Maintaining a mutual agreement to arbitrate that restricts
employees’ protected activity or that employees reasonably
would believe bars or restricts their right to file charges with
the National Labor Relations Board.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effec-
tuate the policies of the Act
(a) Rescind or revise the mutual agreement to arbitrate to
make it clear to employees that the agreement does not consti-
tute a waiver in all forums of their right to maintain employ-
ment-related class or collective actions, and that the agreement
does not bar or restrict their right to file charges with the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board.
(b) Notify the employees of the rescinded or revised agree-
ments to include providing them copies of the revised agree-
ments or specific notification that the agreements have been
rescinded.
(c) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its fa-
cility in Carson, California, and in all facilities where it has
maintained and/or enforced the mutual agreement to arbitrate,
copies of the attached notice marked “Appendix.”13 Copies of

12 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Board’s Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recom-
mended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopt-
ed by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for
all purposes.
13 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”
the notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Re-
gion 21, after being signed by the Respondent’s authorized
representative, shall be posted by the Respondent and main-
tained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places including
all places where notices to employees are customarily posted.
In addition to physical posting of paper notices, the notices
shall be distributed electronically, such as by email, posting on
an intranet or an internet site, and/or other electronic means, if
the Respondent customarily communicates with its employees
by such means. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Re-
spondent to ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or
covered by any other material. In the event that, during the
pendency of these proceedings, the Respondent has gone out of
business or closed the facility involved in these proceedings,
the Respondent shall duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a
copy of the notice to all current employees and former employ-
ees employed by the Respondent at any time since June 2011.
(d) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the
Regional Director a sworn certification of a responsible official
on a form provided by the Region attesting to the steps that the
Respondent has taken to comply.
Dated, Washington, D.C., October 17, 2014
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated
Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and obey this no-
tice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on your be-
half
Act together with other employees for your benefit and
protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activi-
ties.
WE WILL NOT maintain or enforce a mutual agreement to ar-
bitrate that requires all employment-related disputes to be sub-
mitted to individual binding arbitration.
WE WILL NOT enforce a mandatory arbitration program by
requiring Charging Party Konny Renteria to agree to the mutual
agreement to arbitrate.
WE WILL NOT enforce a mandatory arbitration program by as-
serting it in class-action litigation regarding wages the Charg-
ing Party Konny Renteria brought against us.
WE WILL NOT maintain a mandatory arbitration policy that
employees reasonably would believe bars or restricts their right
to file charges with the National Labor Relations Board.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, re-
strain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
you by Federal labor law.
WE WILL rescind or revise the mutual agreement to arbitrate
to make it clear to employees that the agreement does not con-
14 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
stitute a waiver of their right in all forums to maintain class or
collective actions and does not restrict employees’ right to file
charges with the National Labor Relations Board.
WE WILL notify employees of the rescinded or revised man-
datory arbitration program, including providing them with a
copy of any revised agreements, acknowledgement forms or
other related documents, or specific notification that the agree-
ment has been rescinded.
WE WILL reimburse Charging Party Konny Renteria for any
litigation expenses: (i) directly related to opposing the Re-
spondent’s Motion to Compel Arbitration; and/or (ii) resulting
from any other legal action taken in response to Respondent’s
efforts to enforce the arbitration agreement to require individual
arbitration.
WE WILL ensure the Charging Party Konny Renteria has a fo-
rum to litigate her class complaint by either moving the Superi-
or Court of Los Angeles County, jointly with the Charging
Party upon request, to vacate its order compelling arbitration, or
permitting her claims to be arbitrated on a class-wide basis
BRISTOL FARMS
The Administrative Law Judge’s decision can be found at
www.nlrb.gov/case/21–CA–103030 or by using the QR code
below. Alternatively, you can obtain a copy of the decision
from the Executive Secretary, National Labor Relations Board,
1099 14th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20570, or by calling
(202) 273–1940.