Boothwyn Fire Company No. 1

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

May 16, 2016

363 NLRB No. 191 (N.L.R.B. 2016)

363 NLRB No. 191
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
bound volumes of NLRB decisions. Readers are requested to notify the Ex-
ecutive Secretary, National Labor Relations Board, Washington, D.C.
20570, of any typographical or other formal errors so that corrections can
be included in the bound volumes.
Boothwyn Fire Company No. 1 and Aaron Kisela.
Cases 04–CA–133498 and 04–CA–140365
May 16, 2016
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN PEARCE AND MEMBERS MISCIMARRA
AND HIROZAWA
On April 15, 2015, Administrative Law Judge Robert
A. Giannasi issued the attached decision. The General
Counsel filed exceptions, the Respondent filed cross-
exceptions,1 and the General Counsel and the Respond-
ent filed answering briefs.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the record
in light of the exceptions and brief and has decided to
affirm the judge’s rulings, findings,2 and conclusions, to
amend the remedy, and to adopt the judge’s recommend-
ed Order as modified and set forth in full below.3

1 Although we rejected the Respondent’s brief in support of its
cross-exceptions because it was not timely filed, we have considered
the Respondent’s exceptions because they were accompanied by suffi-
cient argument to satisfy the requirements of Sec. 102.46(b) of the
Board’s Rules and Regulations.
2 The Respondent has implicitly excepted to some of the judge’s
credibility findings. The Board’s established policy is not to overrule
an administrative law judge’s credibility resolutions unless the clear
preponderance of all the relevant evidence convinces us that they are
incorrect. Standard Dry Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd.
188 F.2d 362 (3d Cir. 1951). We have carefully examined the record
and find no basis for reversing the findings.
In adopting the judge’s finding that employee Kisela engaged in
concerted activity, Member Miscimarra does not rely on Alternative
Energy Applications, Inc., 361 NLRB No. 139 (2014), or Worldmark
by Wyndham, 356 NLRB 765 (2011), cited by the judge. Instead,
Member Miscimarra would find that when Kisela joined employees
Brees and Fabinger in raising the issue of pay increases to management,
he acted with other employees and not solely by and on behalf of him-
self, see Meyers Industries, 268 NLRB 493, 496 (1984) (Meyers I),
remanded sub nom. Prill v. NLRB, 755 F.2d 941 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert.
denied 474 U.S. 948 (1985), and he also brought a group complaint to
the attention of management, see Meyers Industries, 281 NLRB 882,
887 (1986) (Meyers II), affd. sub nom. Prill v. NLRB, 835 F.2d 1481
(D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied 487 U.S. 1205 (1988).
3 In accordance with our decision in Advoserv of New Jersey, Inc.,
363 NLRB No. 143 (2016), we shall modify the judge’s recommended
tax compensation and Social Security reporting remedy. We shall
modify the judge’s recommended Order to reflect this remedial change,
to conform to the Board’s standard remedial language, and in accord-
ance with our decision in Excel Container, Inc., 325 NLRB 17 (1997)
(holding that the contingent notice-mailing date in the order’s notice-
posting paragraph should correspond with the date of the first unfair
labor practice). We shall substitute a new notice to conform to the
Order as modified.
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board orders that the
Respondent, Boothwyn Fire Company No. 1, Boothwyn,
Pennsylvania, its officers, agents, successors, and as-
signs, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Threatening employees with retaliation if they en-
gage in protected concerted activity regarding wage in-
creases.
(b) Preparing written documentation against, discharg-
ing, or otherwise disciplining or discriminating against
employees because they engage in protected concerted
activity regarding wage increases.
(c) In any like or related manner interfering with, re-
straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of rights
guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Within 14 days from the date of this Order, offer
Aaron Kisela full reinstatement to his former job or, if
that job no longer exists, to a substantially equivalent
position, without prejudice to his seniority or any other
rights or privileges previously enjoyed.
(b) Make Aaron Kisela whole for any loss of earnings
and other benefits suffered as a result of the discrimina-
tion against him, in the manner set forth in the remedy
section of the judge’s decision as amended in this deci-
sion.
(c) Compensate Aaron Kisela for the adverse tax con-
sequences, if any, of receiving a lump-sum backpay
award, and file with the Regional Director for Region 4,
within 21 days of the date the amount of backpay is
fixed, either by agreement or Board order, a report allo-
cating the backpay award to the appropriate calendar
years.
(d) Within 14 days from the date of this Order, re-
move from its files the unlawful verbal warning and in-
cident documentations prepared against Aaron Kisela in
June and July 2014, as well as all references to his un-
lawful discharge; and, within 3 days thereafter, notify
him in writing that this has been done and that neither the
verbal warning, documentations, nor the discharge will
be used against him in any way.
(e) Preserve and, within 14 days of a request, or such
additional time as the Regional Director may allow for
good cause shown, provide, at a reasonable place desig-
nated by the Board or its agents, all payroll records, so-

The General Counsel excepts to the judge’s failure to order that
Kisela be reimbursed for his search-for-work and work-related expens-
es regardless of his interim earnings. Because the relief sought would
involve a change in Board law, we decline to order this relief at this
time.
2 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
cial security payment records, timecards, personnel rec-
ords and reports, and all other records, including an elec-
tronic copy of such records if stored in electronic form,
necessary to analyze the amount of backpay due under
the terms of this Order.
(f) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at
its Boothwyn, Pennsylvania facility copies of the at-
tached notice marked “Appendix.”4 Copies of the notice,
on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region
4, after being signed by the Respondent’s authorized
representative, shall be posted by the Respondent and
maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous plac-
es, including all places where notices to employees are
customarily posted. In addition to physical posting of
paper notices, notices shall be distributed electronically,
such as by email, posting on an intranet or an internet
site, and/or other electronic means, if the Respondent
customarily communicates with its employees by such
means. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respond-
ent to ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or
covered by any other material. If the Respondent has
gone out of business or closed the facility involved in
these proceedings, the Respondent shall duplicate and
mail, at its own expense, a copy of the notice to all cur-
rent employees and former employees employed by the
Respondent at any time since April 24, 2014.
(g) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file
with the Regional Director for Region 4 a sworn certifi-
cation of a responsible official on a form provided by the
Region attesting to the steps that the Respondent has
taken to comply.
Dated, Washington, D.C. May 16, 2016
______________________________________
Mark Gaston Pearce, Chairman
______________________________________
Philip A. Miscimarra, Member
______________________________________
Kent Y. Hirozawa, Member
(SEAL) NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD

4 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we
violated Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and
obey this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on
your behalf
Act together with other employees for your bene-
fit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected
activities.
WE WILL NOT threaten you with retaliation for engag-
ing in protected concerted activity regarding wage in-
creases.
WE WILL NOT prepare written documentations against,
discharge, or otherwise discipline or discriminate against
you for engaging in protected concerted activity regard-
ing wage increases.
WE WILL NOT, in any like or related manner, interfere
with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights
listed above.
WE WILL, within 14 days from the date of this order,
offer Aaron Kisela full reinstatement to his former job or,
if that job no longer exists, to a substantially equivalent
position, without prejudice to his seniority or any other
rights or privileges previously enjoyed.
WE WILL make Aaron Kisela whole for any loss of
earnings and other benefits resulting from his discharge,
less any net interim earnings, plus interest.
WE WILL compensate Aaron Kisela for the adverse tax
consequences, if any, of receiving a lump-sum backpay
award, and WE WILL file with the Regional Director for
Region 4, within 21 days of the date the amount of
backpay is fixed, either by agreement or Board order, a
report allocating the backpay award to the appropriate
calendar years.
WE WILL, within 14 days from the date of this order,
remove from our files all unlawful verbal warning and
incident documentations prepared against Aaron Kisela
in June and July 2014, as well as all references to his
unlawful discharge, and WE WILL, within 3 days thereaf-
ter, notify him in writing that this has been done and that
BOOTHWYN FIRE COMPANY NO. 1 3
neither the verbal warning, incident documentations, nor
the discharge will be used against him in any way.
BOOTHWYN FIRE COMPANY NO. 1
The Board’s decision can be found at
www.nlrb.gov/case/04–CA–133498 or by using the QR
code below. Alternatively, you can obtain a copy of the
decision from the Executive Secretary, National Labor
Relations Board, 1015 Half Street, S.E., Washington,
D.C. 20570, or by calling (202) 273–1940.
William B. Slack, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Mark Alan Raith, Esq. (Holsten & Associates), of Media, Penn-
sylvania, for the Respondent.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
ROBERT A. GIANNASI, Administrative Law Judge. This case
was tried in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, on March 9, 2015.
The complaint, as amended in one respect at the hearing (Tr.
94–95), alleges that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act by threatening employee Aaron Kisela with reprisals for
joining in a protected concerted complaint about wages, and by
thereafter issuing written disciplinary documentations to, and
finally discharging, Kisela for such protected concerted activi-
ty. The Respondent filed an answer denying the essential alle-
gations in the complaint.
After the trial, the General Counsel and the Respondent filed
briefs, which I have read and considered. Based on the entire
record, including the testimony of the witnesses, and my obser-
vation of their demeanor, I make the following1
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
Respondent, a Pennsylvania corporation with a facility in
Boothwyn, Pennsylvania, is engaged in performing fire rescue,
ambulance and related services. During a representative one-
year period, Respondent purchased and received, at its facility
described above, goods valued in excess of $50,000 directly
from points outside the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Ac-
cordingly, I find that it is an employer within the meaning of
Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.

1 The General Counsel filed an unopposed motion to correct tran-
script as follows: At p. 83, line 1, the word “paragraph” should read
“paragraph 3.” The motion is granted.
II. ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
The Facts
Background
As indicated above, Respondent provides ambulance, fire
and emergency services in the Boothwyn and Upper Chichester
Township areas. It employs a group of about 20–25 volunteer
fire fighters as well as about 12 emergency medical technicians
(EMTs). Some of the EMTs are paid and some are volunteers.
In May 2014, Respondent added a group of about 10–14 para-
medics to its staff as it expanded its operations to upgrade the
medical services it provided directly. Previously, paramedic
services were provided through a subcontract with Crozer
Chester Medical Center, a local hospital. Paramedics perform
some medical procedures that EMTs do not; for example, they
may provide advance life support. At the time Respondent
added the new paramedics, it also purchased a substantial
amount of new equipment to accommodate the new service it
provided.
The Respondent’s supervisory hierarchy included Jason
Heacock, who was Respondent’s vice president and supervisor,
as well as Timothy Murray, who was ambulance committee
chair and head of the EMTs until May 2014. At that point,
Michael Lynch took over Murray’s responsibilities to supervise
the EMTs and also undertook responsibility to supervise the
paramedics. Lynch was designated EMS chief, and Murray
acted as a liaison between Lynch and Respondent’s board of
directors.
Employee Aaron Kisela was a paid, part-time EMT who
worked in that capacity from July 2009 until his discharge in
July 2014. Although he was designated part time and also
worked part time as an EMT for another nearby fire company,
he worked some 40–60 hours a week for Respondent. Normal-
ly he worked 12-hour shifts, but he volunteered for and was
given extra shifts. Kisela was a well-regarded employee with
no previous disciplinary difficulties.2
On January 29, 2014, Kisela was given a very favorable
evaluation by Supervisor Heacock, scoring 29 out of a possible
30 points. The categories evaluated included attendance and
timeliness, dress/uniform, daily duties, skills, attitude, and
charting. (GC Exh 2.)3
During the evaluation process, Heacock discussed with
Kisela the possibility that he might be promoted to a superviso-
ry position. Kisela also raised the issue of a pay raise for him-
self and another employee, Dwyne Wallace. Heacock men-
tioned that pay raises would be discussed in a future staff meet-

2 Kisela candidly testified that he had received one warning early in
his tenure of employment. But that was apparently not documented in
a written form and Respondent’s witnesses did not mention it in their
testimony. Kisela’s candor on this and other issues in this case was
impressive. I found him a most reliable and credible witness, who
survived sharp cross-examination by Respondent’s attorney.
3 In an apparent attempt to downplay the significance of this positive
evaluation, Heacock testified that he was mostly positive in all his
evaluations at this time. But Respondent did not submit any other
evaluations to support his testimony or to show that Kisela’s evaluation
was no more favorable than those of other employees. I therefore do
not find Heacock’s testimony in this respect reliable.
4 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
ing. Kisela thereafter discussed the possibility of pay raises and
Heacock’s statement about them with Wallace. (Tr. 15–17,
19.) Heacock confirmed in his testimony that several employ-
ees had approached him about pay raises, and that it was a mat-
ter of interest among the employees. (Tr. 113–114.)
The Staff Meeting of April 24
On April 10, 2014, Tim Murray sent an email to all EMTs
announcing a staff meeting that would take place on April 24.
The purpose of the meeting was described as covering “how we
are moving forward with the ALS unit and the BLS unit and
general overview of where things are going.” (GC Exh. 3.)
This was meant to announce the changes that involved the new
paramedics’ service and the new equipment related to that ser-
vice, as well as to announce the new chief of both the paramed-
ics and the EMTs, Michael Lynch. In fact, at the April 24,
meeting, these announcements were made by Tim Murray.
During the meeting, Murray was joined at the head of the room
by Heacock and Lynch, who also spoke to the assembled em-
ployees.
At one point during the April 24 meeting, two employees,
Dave Fabinger and Jim Brees raised the issue of pay raises for
the EMTs. The issue was raised most vocally by Brees, who
complained that Respondent was spending a lot of money to
hire paramedics and to purchase new equipment, but not to give
the EMTs raises. Murray answered Brees by asking, when was
the last time he took a shift. Brees replied that Murray knew
that he had conflicting needs. Murray also said that there was
no money for raises at this time and that the issue might be
discussed in the future, but not at this meeting. The exchange
between Brees and Murray was somewhat heated. At some
point, Kisela joined the discussion. He mentioned that he had
taken many shifts, was promised pay raises and had not re-
ceived them. Murray replied once again that Respondent did
not have money for pay raises. At this point, Murray left the
meeting. Thereafter, both Brees and Kisela continued to press
the pay raise issue with Kisela repeating that Respondent had
spent money to purchase new equipment and uniforms.
Heacock responded, repeating that Respondent had no money
for raises, but said maybe it would later. The meeting ended on
that note when Lynch said that the issue had been exhausted.4
Shortly after the meeting concluded, while Kisela was out-
side with two other employees, Murray angrily approached
Kisela and “yelled” at him. As the two other employees moved
away, Murray accused Kisela of stabbing him in the back and
asked him how he would like it if Murray reduced his hours.
Murray also said he could send Kisela home and have him re-
placed.5

4 The above is based mostly on Kisela’s testimony that was basically
corroborated by Respondent’s witnesses. Murray confirmed that, while
he was in the meeting room, Kisela mentioned “the amount of hours he
worked and felt he should get a raise as well as others.” Tr. 88.
5 The above is based on a composite of Kisela’s and Murray’s testi-
mony, which was essentially the same. Tr. 26–28, 91–93. This ac-
count was also corroborated by another witness, Patrick Adams, who
was employed by Respondent when he testified. Adams described
Murray as being “upset” that Kisela was “repeatedly bringing up the
wage increases at the meeting.” Tr. 81.
Murray testified that, after his confrontation with Kisela, he
told Lynch about it. According to Murray, he did this because
Lynch was now Kisela’s “boss.” (Tr. 93–94.) Lynch con-
firmed that Murray told him about the confrontation. (Tr. 153–
154.)
On April 25, the day after the staff meeting, Brees resigned
his position with Respondent. Also on that day, Fabinger, one
of the other employees who mentioned pay raises at the April
24 meeting, but had to leave the meeting early, sent an email to
other EMTs, with copies to Murray and Lynch. The email
repeated some of the arguments made in favor of a pay raise
that were made in the staff meeting, pointing out that no raises
had been given to EMTs in 9 years and that the new paramedics
were being paid almost twice the hourly rate paid to EMTs.
Murray replied in another email that same day, copy to all
EMTs and Lynch, stating that the matter was covered in the
meeting and inviting employees to see him personally if they
wanted to discuss the matter further. He also emphatically said
that, “[w]e are NOT going to keep an email chain running.”
(GC Exh. 4.)
The Discharge of Kisela
Respondent discharged Kisela on July 10, 2014. He was no-
tified of his discharge by Lynch, who told him only that his
services were no longer needed and that he was not able to
follow “the chain of command.” Lynch did not elaborate even
after Kisela kept pressing him for a reason for the discharge.
(Tr. 33–36.)6
No written documentation was provided to Kisela explaining
the reason for his discharge. The record does not show that
Respondent has fired any other EMTs or paramedics, except for
one in 2008. In that case, Respondent gave the employee a
written reason for her discharge.7

6 Kisela’s version of the discharge conversation, set forth above, was
essentially corroborated by Lynch. Tr. 149. But I do not credit
Lynch’s testimony that his discharge decision was not motivated by
Kisela’s complaints about pay raises. I found Lynch to be a generally
unreliable and evasive witness, with a truculent demeanor and a ten-
dency to ramble in a most defensive manner. His testimony about
consulting other officials before firing Kisela was contradicted by his
pre-trial affidavit, and, when confronted with the inconsistency, he tried
to avoid a direct answer. See Tr. 149–151. In addition, as I discuss
elsewhere in this decision, Lynch’s testimony about the written docu-
ments he inserted in Kisela’s personnel file, never presenting Kisela
with the documents, most without even telling him that those docu-
ments were being placed in his file, and often without getting his side
of the story, reflect poorly on his asserted reasons for preparing the
documentations. Indeed, Lynch’s testimony about those documents
reflects poorly on his credibility. Although he testified that he similarly
wrote up other employees (Tr. 148–149, 152–153, 157), none of that
documentation was provided by Respondent, either at the hearing or in
response to the General Counsel’s subpoena. See note 9 below. For all
of these reasons, I cannot credit any of Lynch’s testimony on the signif-
icant issues in this case.
7 In a position statement submitted by its attorney during the investi-
gation of this case, Respondent stated that Kisela was the only EMT
fired by Respondent in 2013 or 2014 “for any reason.” GC Exh. 17. In
response to the General Counsel’s subpoena for documents showing the
discharge of EMTs or paramedics since January 1, 2013, Respondent
provided documents to support the discharge of one employee and that
BOOTHWYN FIRE COMPANY NO. 1 5
The Respondent’s Allegations of Misconduct by Kisela
Respondent, through EMS Chief Lynch, placed 5 written
documents in Kisela’s personnel file between June 3 and July 8,
2014. The first was titled a verbal warning documentation; the
others were titled incident documentations. (GC Exhs. 5–9.)8
Kisela was not given copies of any of the documents, which
recorded 5 incidents of alleged misconduct on his part. Except
for the first one, Kisela did not even know such documents
were being prepared and placed in his personnel file. The 5
documents involving Kisela are the only incident documenta-
tions and verbal warning documentations prepared by Re-
spondent for EMTs or paramedics from January 2013 to the
date of the hearing.9
The incidents referred to in the written documents involving
Kisela are described below.
A June 3 verbal warning document describes a complaint
from a volunteer fireman that Kisela had taken the chair he
regularly used and hid it in another part of the firehouse. A
video camera apparently recorded that Kisela indeed had hid-
den the chair. Pranks of this type were not uncommon. When
Lynch initially heard about the prank, he did not consider it a
“big deal” and told the person whose chair was hidden that he
was not going to discipline Kisela for the incident. (Tr. 137.)
But Lynch later told Kisela that his conduct was inappropriate;
Kisela agreed and stated that he would not engage in such con-
duct in the future. But Lynch went further and prepared a writ-
ten documentation of the incident, something that has never
been done for someone engaging in a prank. Indeed Lynch
made the following statement in the documentation, which was
not transmitted to Kisela: “Should similar complaints come
forward, Aaron will (sic) receiving further disciplinary actions
up to and including termination of employment.” (GC Exh. 5.)
On June 6, Lynch placed an incident documentation in
Kisela’s personnel file setting forth what he described as an
example of rudeness to a student volunteer riding along with
Kisela on one of his runs. The documentation is labeled a se-
cond warning. Lynch’s documentation was apparently based
on a report from the student, Kayla McGuire. Lynch did not
provide a copy of the incident documentation to Kisela. Nor
did he seek Kisela’s side of the story, despite his statement in
the document that he did speak to Kisela. (Tr. 40–42.) Lynch
admitted in his testimony that he did not talk to Kisela about
this matter. (Tr. 140.) This internal contradiction reflects poor-
ly on Lynch’s credibility. It is also clear from reading the doc-
ument as an objective matter that Lynch was describing a one-
sided story from the student. Lynch appeared to take great

was in 2008. And she was given a written letter documenting the rea-
son for her discharge. Tr. 82–83, GC Exhs. 12 and 13.
8 The Respondent admitted that these written documentations
amounted to a form of discipline. GC Exh. 1(g) and (h) (paragraph 5 of
the complaint is admitted).
9 In response to the General Counsel’s subpoena for the documents
described above since January 1, 2013, Respondent produced only 2
such documents, both dated in 2007 and both signed by the employee
given the documents. Tr. 82–83, GC Exhs. 12 and 14. I reject Lynch’s
testimony, unsupported by actual documents, that he prepared similar
write-ups for other employees. See footnote 6 above.
pains in this document to exaggerate the alleged impropriety
committed by Kisela. For example, he stated that there had
been past incidents of rudeness to this student as well as rude-
ness to a patient, none of which was independently supported
by other evidence or testimony.
Contrary to the incident documentation, I find that Kisela
credibly testified that he did not treat McGuire with disrespect,
nor did he belittle a patient. That testimony is uncontradicted.
Respondent did not call McGuire as a witness, thus further
undermining the credibility of Lynch’s account of this incident
and his documentation of it. Indeed, I find that Lynch’s docu-
mentation of the incident was so flawed that it shows he was
more intent on establishing a paper file to use against Kisela
than in finding out what happened.
The next incident took place on June 12, 2014. According to
Kisela’s uncontradicted testimony, he was sitting in an office in
the fire house taking a computer education class. Paramedic
Laura Thomas came into the office and asked if Kisela had seen
her paperwork, which she apparently misplaced after returning
from an assignment. Kisela said he had not. Thomas apparent-
ly approached Lynch about her lost paperwork and Lynch later
asked Kisela about the paperwork. Kisela told Lynch he had
not seen Thomas’ paperwork. Kisela also credibly testified that
other people came in and out of the office while he was there.
(Tr. 43–44, 69.)
Thomas did not testify, but Lynch did, basically corroborat-
ing Kisela’s testimony about their conversation. However,
Lynch testified, contrary to Kisela, that Kisela was the only
person in the office so he assumed that Kisela was somehow
responsible for doing something with Thomas’ paperwork. I do
not credit Lynch’s testimony in this respect because he was not,
unlike Kisela, in a position to know who else, if anyone, was in
the room while Kisela was taking his computer course. Nor,
without Thomas’ testimony, can there be any finding that
Thomas left her paperwork in the office or that other people
could not have been responsible for taking or misplacing her
paperwork. Indeed, on the present record, there is every reason
to believe that she herself was responsible for her lost paper-
work.
Nevertheless, and despite conceding that Kisela denied doing
anything with Thomas’ paperwork and that he had no proof of
Kisela’s responsibility for the missing paperwork (Tr. 142),
Lynch prepared a written incident documentation on the matter,
which he did not show Kisela or tell Kisela he was preparing.
The document accused Kisela of “destroying” Thomas’ paper-
work. (GC Exh. 7.) The document also implied that he spoke
to Kisela on this occasion about Kisela’s need to improve his
relationship with fellow employees, extolling at length on his
alleged shortcomings in this respect. But that written narrative
was not, even considering Lynch’s testimony about his conver-
sation with Kisela on this occasion, an accurate reflection of
their conversation, thus further undermining Lynch’s credibil-
ity. I therefore conclude that the written incident documenta-
tion was another example of Lynch’s attempt to create a paper
file against Kisela for reasons other than what actually hap-
pened, which was nothing. I find that Kisela had no responsi-
bility at all for Thomas’ lost documents. If anyone should have
6 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
been written up for losing documents, it should have been
Thomas.
The next incident took place on June 19. Kisela arrived at
Respondent’s facility after a shift at his other EMT employ-
ment. According to Kisela, he and Laura Thomas decided to go
to a Wawa, presumably to get coffee or a snack. According to
Kisela, it was not unusual for employees to do personal errands
or get food a “couple of miles away from the station.” Tr. 46.
Heacock confirmed that this was the case. (Tr. 112–113.) On
the way to the Wawa, Kisela dropped off a pager he had to
return to his other employment location. Thomas made no
objection to the detour from Wawa to return the pager, and, as
indicated above, she did not testify in this proceeding. Kisela
heard nothing more about the matter from Thomas, Lynch or
anyone else. (Tr. 46–47.)10
But, once again, Lynch prepared a written incident documen-
tation on the matter, which was not presented to Kisela. The
written documentation accused Kisela of “rudeness.” (GC Exh.
8.) As in a previous documentation, Lynch made it appear that
he talked to Kisela about this incident. But he clearly did not,
as he admitted when I questioned him about it. Indeed, when
presented with the apparent inconsistency, he backtracked and
insisted he had talked to Kisela about similar matters on other
occasions. (Tr. 159–163.) Here again, I find Lynch’s testimo-
ny on the matter reflects adversely on his credibility as a wit-
ness. I also find that Lynch’s documentation of this incident
was another attempt to create a paper file to use against Kisela,
particularly since there is no evidence that Respondent had any
rules against side-trips during a tour of duty or that it disci-
plined other employees for doing so.
The final incident that resulted in an incident documentation,
took place on July 8, 2 days before Kisela was discharged.
Kisela was on an ambulance run with Laura Thomas answering
a call about injuries in an automobile accident. What follows is
Kisela’s uncontradicted and credible account of what happened
because, here again, Thomas did not testify. As Kisela and
Thomas exited their ambulance, they were directed to a woman
who was sitting on a curb. She was involved in the accident
and had a golf-ball sized hematoma on the side of her head. It
was swelling and a little discolored. (Tr. 48.) Thomas, who
was the senior medical officer, attended the patient, who stated
she did not want to go to a hospital. Thomas then turned to
Kisela and said, “[s]he’s all yours.” (Tr. 49.) Kisela under-
stood that to mean that he should secure from the patient a
signed refusal form. (Tr. 49–50.) It is the normal practice for
emergency responders to suggest that injured patients go to a
hospital emergency room, but they cannot force a patient to go.
Then responders get the patient to sign a refusal form in ac-
cordance with government sanctioned protocols. (Tr. 85–87.)
Those government protocols require that emergency re-
sponders take certain steps before securing patient refusals.
The EMT protocol provides a checklist that requires checking
boxes if there is evidence of a certain type of injury, one of
which is a head injury. If any of the boxes are checked, the

10 The above is based on Kisela’s credible and uncontradicted testi-
mony about the incident. As indicated, Thomas did not testify in this
proceeding.
responder is directed to contact “medical command,” meaning a
medical doctor. A similar protocol for paramedics urges the
responder to contact “medical command” when “in doubt.”
(GC Exhs. 15 and 16.)
Kisela assisted the patient into the ambulance and began fill-
ing out the refusal form. As directed by the form and the re-
quired protocols, he asked the patient questions about the acci-
dent and her injuries. He then came to the point on the form
titled, “medical command.” Before filling in an answer, and
following the applicable protocol, Kisela called a doctor at
Crozer-Chester Medical Center and reached a Dr. Kitchner.
(Tr. 51–52.) Dr. Kitchner asked whether there was a paramedic
on the scene and Kisela said there was, but the patient had been
turned over to him. (Tr. 55). Dr. Kitchner then asked to talk to
the patient. After that conversation was completed, the patient
turned the phone back to Kisela, who talked to the doctor.
They agreed that the patient should go to an emergency room,
but, if she wanted to go to her own doctor, that was her deci-
sion. Kisela then completed the rest of the form, had the pa-
tient sign it, and he himself signed it. (Tr. 52–54.)
At some point during Kisela’s assessment of the patient in
the ambulance, Thomas, who had been elsewhere at the acci-
dent scene, opened the side entrance of the ambulance and
asked why Kisela was calling medical command. Before
Kisela could answer, Thomas slammed the door and left. (Tr.
53–54.) After the patient was released and Thomas joined
Kisela in the ambulance to return to the fire house, Thomas
remarked to Kisela, “[n]ow, don’t throw me under the bus for
this one.” Kisela replied that he was going to put “exactly what
happened” in his report or chart. (Tr. 55.) That report or chart
prepared by Kisela was turned over to Respondent, as is the
normal practice. (Tr. 55–56, GC Exh. 11.)
In the 2days between the above incident and Kisela’s dis-
charge, Lynch never talked to Kisela about the incident. (Tr.
56, 158.) But he prepared an incident documentation, errone-
ously dated July 7,11 and apparently relying solely on Thomas’s
account of what happened, that accused Kisela of insubordina-
tion and violation of company policies. It is clear from the
incident documentation that Lynch also did not talk to Dr.
Kitchner or the patient. Thus, the documentation does not ac-
curately reflect what actually happened, as shown by the factual
findings set forth above. The documentation also mentions
“chain of command” in the context of the accusation that Kisela
chose “to supersede the authority of Ms. Thomas.” But it is
clear from Kisela’s credible, uncontradicted testimony that he
did not disobey an order from Thomas. She did not, for exam-
ple, order Kisela not to contact medical command. (Tr. 47–49,
73.) Nor does the documentation cite any specific company
policy that was violated. And none was presented at the hear-
ing, other than the government required protocols mentioned
above, which Kisela dutifully followed. The documentation
also states that Lynch discussed the matter with other members
of Respondent’s management and that a decision was made to
discharge Kisela. (GC Exh. 9.)

11 Kisela’s report or chart (GC Exh. 11) clearly states that the inci-
dent took place on July 8.
BOOTHWYN FIRE COMPANY NO. 1 7
Discussion and Analysis
Kisela Engaged in Protected Concerted Activity
As shown in the factual statement, Kisela joined fellow em-
ployees in complaining about wages during the April 24 meet-
ing with management officials. Such complaints about wages
clearly involve group concerns and deal with matters protected
by Section 7 of the Act. See Whittaker Corp., 289 NLRB 933,
934 (1988); and Alternative Energy Applications, Inc., 361
NLRB No. 139, slip op. 4, fn. 10 (2014) (wage discussions are
“inherently concerted” even if they are not engaged in with the
“express object of inducing group action.”). Even though it
appears that the issue of wage increases was a concern among
employees prior to the April 24 meeting, the spontaneous na-
ture of the protest during the meeting does not diminish its
protected status. There is no need for employees to agree in
advance to join together in a group protest. See Worldmark by
Wyndam, 356 NLRB 765, 767 (2011). The protests also did
not lose their protected status because they were made, as here,
at a meeting, whose purpose was something other than wage
discussions. See Air Contact Transport, Inc., 340 NLRB 688,
695 (2003), enfd. 403 F.3d 206 (4th Cir. 2005). Finally, contra-
ry to Respondent’s contention (R. Br. 8–9, 12) an otherwise
concerted action is not rendered unprotected simply because it
includes a selfish interest. See Fresh & Easy Neighborhood
Market, 361 NLRB No. 12, slip op. 4–6 (2014).
Nor do Kisela’s remarks about wage increases lose their pro-
tected status because they included a reference to his working
extra shifts or long hours. The hours worked issue was inescap-
ably intertwined with the pay raise discussion. Even before
Kisela joined the discussion, Murray responded to Brees’ plea
for pay raises by sarcastically asking when was the last time
Brees took a shift, thus injecting the issue of hours worked into
the pay raise discussion. Kisela’s reference to his hours was
simply a demonstration of why he and others deserved a pay
raise. Murray’s own testimony confirms this connection. He
testified that, during the meeting, Kisela mentioned “the
amount of hours he worked and felt he should get a raise as
well as others.” (Tr. 88.)
The Threats Against Kisela
There is no serious dispute that, immediately following the
April 24 meeting, Murray angrily confronted Kisela, told him
he had stabbed Murray in the back, and threatened to cut Kisela
hours and send him home and replace him. These statements
were obviously in response to Kisela’s efforts, in the meeting,
to make common cause with fellow employees who were urg-
ing pay raises for EMTs, which was, as shown above, a pro-
tected concerted activity. Indeed, an independent employee
witness described Murray’s remarks on this occasion as a reac-
tion to Kisela’s “repeatedly bringing up the wage increases at
the meeting.” (Tr. 81.) Although Murray attempted to explain
his statements as a response to a perceived attack on him be-
cause he had accommodated Kisela’s desire for more hours, it
is clear that, in context, Murray’s remarks threatened retaliation
that had the tendency to stifle employee efforts to obtain pay
raises. It is well settled that coercive and threatening state-
ments are measured not by the subjective views of either the
speaker or the listener, but by whether the remarks had the
reasonable tendency to interfere with the free exercise of Sec-
tion 7 rights. See NLRB v. Illinois Tool Works, 153 F.2d 811,
816 (7th Cir. 1946). In these circumstances, Murray’s remarks
were clearly coercive, and Respondent thus violated Section
8(a)(1) of the Act. See Ellison Media Co., 344 NLRB 1112,
1113 (2005); George L. Mee Memorial Hospital, 348 NLRB
327 (2006); Armstrong Machine Co., 343 NLRB 1149, 1151
(2004).12
The Written Documentations and Discharge of Kisela
In determining whether an employer’s discipline or dis-
charge is unlawful, the Board applies the mixed motive analysis
as set forth in Wright Line, 251 NLRB 1083 (1980), enfd. on
other grounds 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied 455
U.S. 989 (1982), approved in NLRB v. Transportation Man-
agement Corp., 462 U.S. 393 (1983). Under Wright Line, the
General Counsel must satisfy an initial burden of showing by a
preponderance of the evidence that the employee’s protected
activity was a motivating factor in an employer’s adverse ac-
tion. If the General Counsel meets that initial burden, the bur-
den shifts to the employer to show it would have taken the
same action even absent the employee’s protected activity. The
employer does not meet its burden merely by showing it had a
legitimate reason for the action; it must demonstrate that it
would have taken the same action in the absence of the protect-
ed conduct. And if the employer’s proffered reasons are
pretextual—either false or not actually relied on—the employer
fails by definition to meet its burden of showing it would have
taken the same action for those reasons, absent the protected
activity. See Alternative Energy Applications, cited above, 361
NLRB No. 139, at slip op. 3, citing authorities.
Indeed, it has long been recognized that where an employer’s
reasons are false, it can be inferred “that the [real] motive is one
that the employer desires to conceal—an unlawful motive—at
least where . . . the surrounding facts tend to reinforce that in-
ference. Shattuck Denn Mining Corp. v. NLRB, 362 F.2d 466,
470 (9th Cir. 1966). Finally, a trier of fact may not only reject
a witness’ story, but also find that the truth is the opposite of
that story. Pratt (Corrugated Logistics), LLC, 360 NLRB No.
48, slip op. 11–12 (2014), and cases there cited.
Applying the above principles to the facts in this case, I find
that the General Counsel has established that the Respondent
issued several warnings or incident reports against Kisela and
later discharged him for joining fellow employees in pressing
for raises for the EMTs, a protected concerted activity. The
reasons offered by Respondent for these actions were pretexts
and the management official who prepared these warnings and
reports and who discharged Kisela, Michael Lynch, was not a
credible witness, as I have set forth at various points in the

12 It seems appropriate here to quote from Judge Learned Hand in
NLRB v. Federbush Co., Inc., 121 F.2d 954, 957 (2nd Cir. 1941):
Words are not pebbles in alien juxtaposition; they each interpenetrate
the other, but all in their aggregate take their purport from the setting
in which they are used, of which the speaker and the hearer is perhaps
the most important part. What to an outsider will be no more than the
vigorous presentation of a conviction, to an employee may be the
manifestation of a determination that it is not safe to thwart.
8 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
factual presentation of this decision. I therefore reject his tes-
timony that Kisela’s protected activity did not enter into his
personnel decisions and I believe the opposite of his story, that
is, that he discriminated against Kisela for his protected activi-
ty.
The General Counsel has easily met the initial burden of
showing that the written documentations and the discharge of
Kisela were motivated by his making common cause with his
fellow employees in pressing management for a pay raise in the
April 24 meeting. The Respondent’s hostility to any group
discussion of pay raises is confirmed by Murray’s response to
an email string attempting to keep the pay raise issue alive the
day after the meeting. He precipitously stopped the email dis-
cussion and directed all future inquires to be made on an indi-
vidual, not a collective, basis. Significantly, immediately after
the April 24 meeting, Murray angrily confronted Kisela and
threatened him with retaliation for his wage protests. Murray
discussed this confrontation with Lynch, who thereafter placed
written documentations in Kisela’s personnel file. As I have
indicated, those documentations were pretextual and thus fur-
ther support the initial showing of discrimination. In most cas-
es, the documentations failed to accurately reflect what had
happened in the incidents that were recorded; and Kisela was
not even shown the documentations or told that they were being
prepared. These documentations were unusual and contrary to
past practice. Respondent only provided two such written doc-
umentations in response to a subpoena from the General Coun-
sel. And those were some 7 years old and both signed by the
employee, unlike the documents against Kisela. More im-
portantly, in most cases, Lynch, who prepared the documents,
did not even secure Kisela’s side of the story. Such failure to
engage in a full investigation of alleged incidents of misconduct
is a recognized indicia of pretext. See Midnight Rose Hotel &
Casino, 343 NLRB 1003, 1004–1105 (2004), enfd. 198 Fed.
Appx. 752 (10th Cir. 2006).
The unlawful documentations, particularly the last one, led
to Kisela’s discharge. The discharge itself was unusual because
it appears to be only the second such discharge in the past 6
years. And unlike that discharge, here, Kisela was not given a
written documentation of the reason for his discharge. Moreo-
ver, the discharge was based on an incident that Respondent did
not adequately investigate. Indeed, uncontradicted testimony
shows that Kisela did not engage in insubordination or failure
to follow the chain of command, the reason given by Respond-
ent for his discharge. Kisela followed the paramedic’s instruc-
tion to take over the patient for the purposes of preparing a
refusal form. He also followed the applicable protocols for
notifying medical command before obtaining a refusal from the
patient to have medical treatment. Even when in doubt about
the condition of a patient and his or her refusal to accept medi-
cal services, emergency responders are advised, surely out of an
abundance of caution, to contact medical command. Sadly,
Lynch’s explanation that medical command should not have
been contacted suggests that Respondent was less interested in
ensuring that all precautions are taken for the health of patients
during emergencies than in finding a pretext to fire an employ-
ee. More pertinent to this case, the pretextual explanation but-
tresses my finding of discrimination.
In these circumstances, it is clear that the documentations
and the discharge of Kisela were motivated by his participation
in protected concerted activities. And since Respondent’s ex-
planations were pretexts, it is also clear that Respondent’s rea-
sons for its actions were not sufficient to overcome the evi-
dence that they were discriminatorily motivated. Respondent
has failed to show that it would have taken the same actions in
the absence of Kisela’s protected concerted activity. Thus, in
its treatment of Kisela, Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(1)
of the Act.13
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. By threatening employee Aaron Kisela with retaliation,
preparing verbal warning and incident documentations against
him in June and July 2013, and by discharging him on July 10,
2014, all for engaging in protected concerted activity, Re-
spondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
2. The above violations constitute unfair labor practices
within the meaning of the Act.
REMEDY
Having found that Respondent committed unfair labor prac-
tices within the meaning of the Act, I shall order it to cease and
desist from such conduct and take certain affirmative action
designed to effectuate the purposes of the Act. Having found
that Respondent unlawfully prepared written documentations
against employee Aaron Kisela, I shall order it to remove and
expunge all such documentations from his personnel file. Hav-
ing found that Respondent also unlawfully discharged Kisela, I
shall order it to offer him full reinstatement to his former posi-
tion, or, if that position no longer exists, to a substantially
equivalent position, without prejudice to his seniority or any
other rights or privileges previously enjoyed, and to make him
whole for any loss of earnings and other benefits suffered as a
result of the discrimination against him.
Backpay shall be computed in accordance with F.W. Wool-
worth Co., 90 NLRB 289 (1950), with interest as prescribed in
New Horizons, 283 NLRB 1173 (1987), compounded daily as
prescribed in Kentucky River Medical Center, 356 NLRB 6
(2010). In addition, Respondent must compensate Kisela for
the adverse tax consequences, if any, of receiving a lump-sum
backpay award and to file a report with the Social Security
Administration allocating the backpay award to the appropriate
calendar quarters. Don Chavas, LLC d/b/a Tortillas Don
Chavas, 361 NLRB No. 10 (2014). Respondent will also be
ordered to remove from its files all the unlawful written docu-

13 Respondent makes much of the fact that employee Fabinger, who
also spoke in favor of a pay raise in the April 24 meeting, was not
confronted, disciplined, or discharged, as was Kisela (R. Br. 10–11).
But Fabinger left the meeting early and was thus unavailable for a
postmeeting confrontation; and his subsequent email repeating con-
cerns about a pay raise was met with some amount of disdain by Mur-
ray. In any event, an employer cannot escape a finding of discrimina-
tion simply because it did not similarly discriminate against other em-
ployees engaged in similar protected activity. As one court has ob-
served, “it is well established that a discriminatory motive, otherwise
established, is not disproved by an employer’s proof that it did not
weed out all [those engaged in the protected activity].” Nachman Corp.
v. NLRB, 337 F.2d 421, 424 (7th Cir. 1964).
BOOTHWYN FIRE COMPANY NO. 1 9
mentations issued to Kisela in June and July 2014, as well as
any references to his unlawful discharge, and to notify him in
writing that this has been done and that those unlawful written
documentations and the unlawful discharge will not be used
against him in any way.14
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law, and on the
entire record herein, I issue the following recommended15
ORDER
Respondent, Boothwyn Fire Company No. 1, Boothwyn,
Pennsylvania, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Threatening employees with retaliation for joining with
other employees in discussing wage increases.
(b) Preparing written documentations against, discharging or
otherwise disciplining or discriminating against, employees for
joining with other employees in discussing wage increases.
(c) In any like or related manner interfering with, restrain-
ing, or coercing employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed
by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effec-
tuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Within 14 days from the date of this order, offer Aaron
Kisela full reinstatement to his former position or, if that posi-
tion no longer exists, to a substantially equivalent position,
without prejudice to his seniority or any other rights or privi-
leges previously enjoyed.
(b) Make Aaron Kisela whole for any loss of earnings or
other benefits suffered as a result of the discrimination against
him, in the manner set forth in the remedy section of this deci-
sion.
(c) Compensate Aaron Kisela for the adverse tax conse-
quences, if any, of receiving a lump sum backpay award, and
file a report with the Social Security Administration allocating
the backpay award to the appropriate calendar quarters.
(d) Within 14 days from the date of this order, remove from
its files all unlawful verbal warning and incident documenta-
tions prepared against Aaron Kisela in June and July 2014, as
well as all references to his unlawful discharge; and, within 3
days thereafter, notify him that this had been done and that the
documentations and the discharge will not be used against him
in any way.
(e) Preserve and, within 14 days of a request, or such addi-
tional time as the Regional Director may allow for good cause

14 Counsel for the General Counsel requests (brief 37–40) that the
order in this case should include a requirement that Kisela be reim-
bursed for search-for-work and work-related expenses, without regard
to whether interim earnings are in excess of these expenses. Normally,
those expenses are considered an offset to interim earnings. But the
General Counsel seeks a change in existing rules regarding search-for-
work and work-related expenses. This would require a change in Board
law, which is solely in the province of the Board and not an administra-
tive law judge. Therefore, I shall not include this remedial proposal in
my recommended order.
15 If no exceptions are filed, as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Board’s Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recom-
mended order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopted
by the Board and all objections to them shall be waived for all purpos-
es.
shown, provide, at a reasonable place designated by the Board
or its agents, all payroll records, social security payment rec-
ords, timecards, personnel records and reports, and all other
records, including an electronic copy of such records if stored
in electronic form, necessary to analyze the amount of backpay
due under the terms of this order.
(f) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its
Boothwyn, Pennsylvania facility, copies of the attached notice
marked “Appendix.”16 Copies of the notice, on forms provided
by the Regional Director for Region 4, after being signed by
Respondent’s authorized representative, shall be posted by the
Respondent and maintained for 60 consecutive days in con-
spicuous places, including all places where notices to employ-
ees are customarily posted. In addition to physical posting of
paper notices, notices shall be distributed electronically, such as
by email, posting on an intranet or an internet site, and/or other
electronic means, if the Respondent customarily communicates
with its employees by such means. Reasonable steps shall be
taken by the Respondent to ensure that the notices are not al-
tered, defaced, or covered by any other material. If the Re-
spondent has gone out of business or closed the facility in-
volved in these proceedings, the Respondent shall duplicate and
mail, at its own expense, a copy of the notice to all current em-
ployees and former employees employed by Respondent at any
time since July 28, 2014.
(g) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the
Regional Director for Region 4 a sworn certification of a re-
sponsible official on a form provided by the Region attesting to
the steps that the Respondent has taken to comply.
Dated, Washington, D.C., April 15, 2015
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated
Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and obey this no-
tice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on your be-
half
Act together with other employees for your benefit and
protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activi-
ties.
WE WILL NOT threaten employees with retaliation for joining
with other employees in discussing wage increases.
WE WILL NOT prepare written documentations against, dis-
charge or otherwise discipline or discriminate against, employ-

16 If this order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”
10 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
ees for joining with other employees in discussing wage in-
creases.
WE WILL NOT, in any like or related manner, interfere with,
restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of rights guaran-
teed by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL, within 14 days from the date of this order, offer
Aaron Kisela full reinstatement to his former position or, if that
position no longer exists, to a substantially equivalent position,
without prejudice to his seniority or any other rights or privi-
leges previously enjoyed.
WE WILL make Aaron Kisela whole for any loss of earnings
or other benefits suffered as a result of the discrimination
against him, with interest.
WE WILL compensate Aaron Kisela for the adverse tax con-
sequences, if any, of receiving a lump sum backpay award, and
file a report with the Social Security Administration allocating
the backpay award to the appropriate calendar quarters.
WE WILL, within 14 days from the date of this order, remove
from our files all unlawful verbal warning and incident docu-
mentations prepared against Aaron Kisela in June and July
2014, as well as all references to his unlawful discharge; and,
within 3 days thereafter, notify him that this has been done and
that the documentations and the discharge will not be used
against him in any way.
BOOTHWYN FIRE COMPANY NO. 1
The Administrative Law Judge’s decision can be found at
www.nlrb.gov/case/04–CA–133498 or by using the QR code
below. Alternatively, you can obtain a copy of the decision
from the Executive Secretary, National Labor Relations Board,
1099 14th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20570, or by calling
(202) 273–1940.