Beena Beauty Holding, Inc. d/b/a Planet Beauty

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

May 23, 2016

364 NLRB No. 3 (N.L.R.B. 2016)

364 NLRB No. 3
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
bound volumes of NLRB decisions. Readers are requested to notify the Ex-
ecutive Secretary, National Labor Relations Board, Washington, D.C.
20570, of any typographical or other formal errors so that corrections can
be included in the bound volumes.
Beena Beauty Holding, Inc. d/b/a Planet Beauty and
Michael Sanchez. Case 31–CA–144492
May 23, 2016
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN PEARCE AND MEMBERS MISCIMARRA
AND HIROZAWA
On March 3, 2016, Administrative Law Judge Mary
Miller Cracraft issued the attached decision. The Re-
spondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief. The
General Counsel filed limited cross-exceptions with sup-
porting argument, and the Respondent filed an opposi-
tion.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The judge found, applying the Board’s decision in D.
R. Horton, 357 NLRB 2277 (2012), enf. denied in rele-
vant part, 737 F.3d 344 (5th Cir. 2013), and Murphy Oil
USA, Inc., 361 NLRB No. 72 (2014), enf. denied in rele-
vant part, 808 F.3d 1013 (5th Cir. 2015), that the Re-
spondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by maintain-
ing and enforcing an arbitration/dispute resolution provi-
sion in its commission agreement—sales (the Agree-
ment) that requires employees, as a condition of em-
ployment, to waive their rights to pursue class or collec-
tive actions involving employment-related claims in all
forums, whether arbitral or judicial. The judge also
found, relying on D. R. Horton and U-Haul Co. of Cali-
fornia, 347 NLRB 375, 377–378 (2006), enfd. 255 Fed.
Appx. 527 (D.C. Cir. 2007), that maintaining the Agree-
ment violated Section 8(a)(1) because employees reason-
ably would believe that it bars or restricts their right to
file unfair labor practices with the Board.
The Board has considered the decision and the record
in light of the exceptions, cross-exceptions, and briefs
and, based on the judge’s application of D. R. Horton
and Murphy Oil, we affirm the judge’s rulings, findings,
and conclusions,1 modify her remedy,2 and adopt the

1 To the extent the Respondent and our dissenting colleague argue
that Charging Party Michael Sanchez was not engaged in concerted
activity in filing the state wage-and-hour class action lawsuit in state
superior court and that Sec. 7 does not guarantee any substantive right
of employees to pursue collective legal action, we reject these argu-
ments. As the Board made clear in Beyoglu, 362 NLRB No. 152
(2015), “the filing of an employment-related class or collective action
by an individual employee is an attempt to initiate, to induce, or to
prepare for group action and is therefore conduct protected by Section
7.” Id., slip op. at 2. See also D. R. Horton, 357 NLRB at 2278.
The Respondent and the dissent further argue that D. R. Horton and
Murphy Oil USA, Inc. were wrongly decided and should be overruled.
recommended Order as modified and set forth in full
below.3
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board orders that the
Respondent, Beena Beauty Holding, Inc. d/b/a Planet
Beauty, Studio City, California, its officers, agents, suc-
cessors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Maintaining and/or enforcing the arbitra-
tion/dispute resolution provision in its commission

We agree with the judge’s rejection of those arguments, and adhere to
the findings and rationale in those cases.
Our dissenting colleague, relying on his dissenting position in Mur-
phy Oil, 361 NLRB No. 72, slip op. at 22–35 (2014), observes that the
Act does not “dictate” any particular procedures for the litigation of
non-NLRA claims, and “creates no substantive right for employees to
insist on class-type treatment” of such claims. This is all surely correct,
as the Board has previously explained in Murphy Oil, above, slip op. at
2, and Bristol Farms, 363 NLRB No. 45, slip op. at 2 & fn. 2 (2015).
But what our colleague ignores is that the Act “does create a right to
pursue joint, class, or collective claims if and as available, without the
interference of an employer-imposed restraint.” Murphy Oil, above, slip
op. at 2 (emphasis in original). The Respondent’s Agreement is just
such an unlawful restraint.
Likewise, for the reasons explained in Murphy Oil and Bristol
Farms, there is no merit to our colleague’s view that finding the
Agreement unlawful runs afoul of employees’ Sec. 7 right to “refrain
from” engaging in protected concerted activity. See Murphy Oil,
above, slip op. at 18; Bristol Farms, above, slip op. at 2. Nor is he
correct in insisting that Sec. 9(a) of the Act requires the Board to permit
individual employees to prospectively waive their Sec. 7 right to en-
gage in concerted legal activity. See Murphy Oil, above, slip op. at 17–
18; Bristol Farms, above, slip op. at 2.
We reject our dissenting colleague’s view that the Respondent’s mo-
tion to compel arbitration was protected by the First Amendment’s
Petition Clause. In Bill Johnson’s Restaurants v. NLRB, 461 U. S. 731,
747 (1983), the Court identified two situations in which a lawsuit en-
joys no such protection: where the action is beyond a State court’s
jurisdiction because of Federal preemption, and where “a suit . . . has
an objective that is illegal under federal law.” 461 U. S. at 737 fn. 5.
Thus, the Board may properly restrain litigation efforts such as the
Respondent’s motion to compel arbitration that have the illegal objec-
tive of limiting employees’ Sec. 7 rights and enforcing an unlawful
contractual provision, even if the litigation was otherwise meritorious
or reasonable. See Murphy Oil, supra, slip op. at 20–21; Convergys
Corp., 363 NLRB No. 51, slip op. at 2 fn. 5 (2015).
2 We agree with the judge that, if the lawsuit is still pending, the Re-
spondent is required to notify the court that it has rescinded or revised
the Agreement and to inform the court that it no longer opposes the
lawsuit on the basis of the Agreement. Consistent with our decision in
Murphy Oil, 361 NLRB No. 72, slip op. at 21, we modify the judge’s
recommended remedy to order the Respondent to reimburse Michael
Sanchez and any other plaintiffs for all reasonable expenses and legal
fees, with interest, incurred in connection with opposing the Respond-
ent’s unlawful efforts to dismiss the class action lawsuit and compel
individual arbitration.
3 We shall modify the judge’s recommended Order to conform to
the violations found and the Board’s standard remedial language. We
shall substitute a new notice to include the missing affirmative provi-
sions, as argued by the General Counsel on cross exception, and to
conform to the Order as modified.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD2
agreement—sales that requires employees, as a condition
of employment, to waive the right to maintain class or
collective actions in all forums, whether arbitral or judi-
cial.
(b) Maintaining the arbitration/dispute resolution pro-
vision in its commission agreement—sales that employ-
ees reasonably would believe bars or restricts the right to
file charges with the National Labor Relations Board.
(c) In any like or related manner interfering with, re-
straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed to them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Rescind the arbitration/dispute resolution provi-
sion in its commission agreement—sales in all of its
forms, or revise it in all of its forms to make clear to em-
ployees that the agreement does not constitute a waiver
of their right to maintain employment-related joint, class,
or collective actions in all forums, and that it does not bar
or restrict employees’ right to file charges with the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board.
(b) Notify all current and former employees who were
required to sign or otherwise become bound to the arbi-
tration/dispute resolution provision in its commission
agreement—sales in any form that it has been rescinded
or revised and, if revised, provide them a copy of the
revised agreement, and further notify them that the
agreement will not be enforced in a manner that compels
them to waive their right to maintain employment-related
joint, class, or collective actions in all forums.
(c) Notify the Superior Court of the State of Califor-
nia, in Case BC566065, if that case is still pending, that
the Respondent has rescinded or revised the commission
agreement—sales upon which it based its motion to
compel arbitration and dismiss class claims, and inform
the court that it no longer opposes the lawsuit on the ba-
sis of the agreement.
(d) In the manner set forth in the remedy section of
the judge’s decision, as further amended in this decision,
reimburse Michael Sanchez and any other plaintiffs for
any reasonable attorneys’ fees and litigation expenses
that they may have incurred in opposing the Respond-
ent’s attempts to dismiss the class action lawsuit and
compel individual arbitration.
(e) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at
its Studio City, California facility copies of the attached
notice marked “Appendix.”4 Copies of the notices, on

4 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notices reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”
forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 31,
after being signed by the Respondent’s authorized repre-
sentative, shall be posted by the Respondent and main-
tained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places,
including all places where notices to employees are cus-
tomarily posted. In addition to physical posting of paper
notices, notices shall be distributed electronically, such
as by email, posting on an intranet or an internet site,
and/or other electronic means, if the Respondent custom-
arily communicates with its employees by such means.
Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to
ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or cov-
ered by any other material. If the Respondent has gone
out of business or closed the facility involved in these
proceedings, the Respondent shall duplicate and mail, at
its own expense, a copy of the notice marked “Appen-
dix” to all current employees and former employees em-
ployed by the Respondent at any time since April 2,
2013, and any former employees against whom the Re-
spondent has enforced its mandatory arbitration agree-
ment since April 2, 2013.
(f) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file
with the Regional Director for Region 31 a sworn certifi-
cation of a responsible official on a form provided by the
Region attesting to the steps that the Respondent has
taken to comply.
Dated, Washington, D.C. May 23, 2016
______________________________________
Mark Gaston Pearce, Chairman
______________________________________
Kent Y. Hirozawa, Member
(SEAL) NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
MEMBER MISCIMARRA, concurring in part and dissenting in
part.
In this case, my colleagues find that the Arbitra-
tion/Dispute Resolution Agreement (Agreement) con-
tained in the Respondent’s Commission Agreement—
sales violates Section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act (the Act or NLRA) because it waives the right
to participate in class or collective actions regarding non-
NLRA employment claims. Charging Party Michael
Sanchez signed the Agreement, and later he filed a class
action lawsuit against the Respondent in state court alleg-
ing violations of the California Labor Code and Business
and Professions Code. In reliance on the Agreement, the
Respondent filed a motion to compel arbitration and
BEENA BEAUTY HOLDING, INC. 3
dismiss class claims, which the court granted. My col-
leagues find that the Respondent thereby unlawfully en-
forced its Agreement.
I respectfully dissent from these findings for the rea-
sons explained in my partial dissenting opinion in Mur-
phy Oil USA, Inc.1 For the reasons stated below, howev-
er, I agree with my colleagues’ finding that the Agree-
ment unlawfully interferes with the right of employees to
file unfair labor practice charges with the Board.
1. The class-waiver agreement
I agree that an employee may engage in “concerted”
activities for “mutual aid or protection” in relation to a
claim asserted under a statute other than NLRA.2 How-
ever, Section 8(a)(1) of the Act does not vest authority in
the Board to dictate any particular procedures pertaining
to the litigation of non-NLRA claims, nor does the Act
render unlawful agreements in which employees waive
class-type treatment of non-NLRA claims. To the con-
trary, as discussed in my partial dissenting opinion in
Murphy Oil, NLRA Section 9(a) protects the right of
every employee as an “individual” to “present” and “ad-
just” grievances “at any time.”3 This aspect of Section

1 361 NLRB No. 72, slip op. at 22–35 (2014) (Member Miscimarra,
dissenting in part). The Board majority’s holding in Murphy Oil inval-
idating class-action waiver agreements was denied enforcement by the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. Murphy Oil USA, Inc. v. NLRB,
808 F.3d 1013 (5th Cir. 2015).
2 I agree that non-NLRA claims can give rise to “concerted” activi-
ties engaged in by two or more employees for the “purpose” of “mutual
aid or protection,” which would come within the protection of NLRA
Sec. 7. See Murphy Oil, 361 NLRB No. 72, slip op. at 23–25 (Member
Miscimarra, dissenting in part). However, the existence or absence of
Sec. 7 protection does not depend on whether non-NLRA claims are
pursued as a class or collective action, but on whether Sec. 7’s statutory
requirements are met—an issue separate and distinct from whether an
individual employee chooses to pursue a claim as a class or collective
action. Id.; see also Beyoglu, 362 NLRB No. 152, slip op. at 4–5
(2015) (Member Miscimarra, dissenting). Here, the Charging Party
was not engaged in concerted activity when, acting individually, he
filed a class action lawsuit in California State court. See my dissent in
Beyoglu, above.
3 Murphy Oil, above, slip op. at 30–34 (Member Miscimarra, dis-
senting in part). Sec. 9(a) states: “Representatives designated or select-
ed for the purposes of collective bargaining by the majority of the em-
ployees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the exclusive
representatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of
collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of em-
ployment, or other conditions of employment: Provided, That any indi-
vidual employee or a group of employees shall have the right at any
time to present grievances to their employer and to have such griev-
ances adjusted, without the intervention of the bargaining representa-
tive, as long as the adjustment is not inconsistent with the terms of a
collective-bargaining contract or agreement then in effect: Provided
further, That the bargaining representative has been given opportunity
to be present at such adjustment” (emphasis added). The Act’s legisla-
tive history shows that Congress intended to preserve every individual
employee’s right to “adjust” any employment-related dispute with his
9(a) is reinforced by Section 7 of the Act, which protects
each employee’s right to “refrain from” exercising the
collective rights enumerated in Section 7. Thus, I be-
lieve it is clear that (i) the NLRA creates no substantive
right for employees to insist on class-type treatment of
non-NLRA claims;4 (ii) a class-waiver agreement per-
taining to non-NLRA claims does not infringe on any
NLRA rights or obligations, which has prompted the
overwhelming majority of courts to reject the Board’s
position regarding class-waiver agreements;5 and (iii)
enforcement of a class-action waiver as part of an arbitra-
tion agreement is also warranted by the Federal Arbitra-
tion Act (FAA).6 Although questions may arise regard-
ing the enforceability of particular agreements that waive
class or collective litigation of non-NLRA claims, I be-
lieve these questions are exclusively within the province
of the court or other tribunal that, unlike the NLRB, has
jurisdiction over such claims.
Because I believe the arbitration and class-waiver lan-
guage in the Respondent’s Agreement was lawful under
the NLRA, I would find it was similarly lawful for the
Respondent to file a motion in state court seeking to en-

or her employer. See Murphy Oil, above, slip op. at 31–32 (Member
Miscimarra, dissenting in part).
4 When courts have jurisdiction over non-NLRA claims that are po-
tentially subject to class treatment, the availability of class-type proce-
dures does not rise to the level of a substantive right. See D.R. Horton,
Inc. v. NLRB, 737 F.3d 344, 362 (5th Cir. 2013) (“The use of class
action procedures . . . is not a substantive right.”) (citations omitted),
petition for rehearing en banc denied No. 12–60031 (5th Cir. 2014);
Deposit Guaranty National Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 332 (1980)
(“[T]he right of a litigant to employ Rule 23 is a procedural right only,
ancillary to the litigation of substantive claims.”).
5 The Fifth Circuit has repeatedly denied enforcement of Board or-
ders invalidating a mandatory arbitration agreement that waived class-
type treatment of non-NLRA claims. See, e.g., Murphy Oil USA, Inc.
v. NLRB, above; D.R. Horton, Inc. v. NLRB, above. The overwhelming
majority of courts considering the Board’s position have likewise re-
jected it. See Murphy Oil, 361 NLRB No. 72, slip op. at 34 (Member
Miscimarra, dissenting in part); id., slip op. at 36 fn. 5 (Member John-
son, dissenting) (collecting cases); see also Patterson v. Raymours
Furniture Co., Inc., 96 F. Supp. 3d 71 (S.D.N.Y. 2015); Nanavati v.
Adecco USA, Inc., 99 F. Supp. 3d 1072 (N.D. Cal. 2015), motion to
certify for interlocutory appeal denied 2015 WL 4035072 (N.D. Cal.
June 30, 2015); Brown v. Citicorp Credit Services, Inc., No. 1:12–cv–
00062–BLW, 2015 WL 1401604 (D. Idaho Mar. 25, 2015) (granting
reconsideration of prior determination that class waiver in arbitration
agreement violated NLRA); but see Totten v. Kellogg Brown & Root,
LLC, No. ED CV 14–1766 DMG (DTBx), 2016 WL 316019 (C.D. Cal.
Jan. 22, 2016).
6 For the reasons expressed in my Murphy Oil partial dissent and
those thoroughly explained in former Member Johnson’s dissent in
Murphy Oil, the FAA requires that the arbitration agreement be en-
forced according to its terms. Murphy Oil, above, slip op. at 34 (Mem-
ber Miscimarra, dissenting in part); id., slip op. at 49–58 (Member
Johnson, dissenting).
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD4
force the Agreement.7 It is relevant that the state court
that had jurisdiction over the non-NLRA claims granted
the Respondent’s motion to compel arbitration. That the
Respondent’s motion was reasonably based is also sup-
ported by court decisions that have enforced similar
agreements.8 As the Fifth Circuit recently observed after
rejecting (for the second time) the Board’s position re-
garding the legality of class-waiver agreements: “[I]t is a
bit bold for [the Board] to hold that an employer who
followed the reasoning of our D.R. Horton decision had
no basis in fact or law or an ‘illegal objective’ in doing
so. The Board might want to strike a more respectful
balance between its views and those of circuit courts
reviewing its orders.”9 I also believe that any Board
finding of a violation based on the Respondent’s merito-
rious state court motion to compel arbitration would im-
properly risk infringing on the Respondent’s rights under
the First Amendment’s Petition Clause. See Bill John-
son’s Restaurants v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731 (1983); BE &
K Construction Co. v. NLRB, 536 U.S. 516 (2002); see
also my partial dissent in Murphy Oil, above, 361 NLRB
No. 72, slip op. at 33–35. Finally, for similar reasons, I
believe the Board cannot properly require the Respond-
ent to reimburse the Charging Party and other plaintiffs
for their attorneys’ fees in the circumstances presented
here. Murphy Oil, above, 361 NLRB No. 72, slip op. at
35.
2. Unlawful interference with Board charge filing
I concur in my colleagues’ finding that the Agreement
unlawfully interferes with NLRB charge filing in viola-
tion of Section 8(a)(1), although I believe this presents a
relatively close question here. The Agreement, in perti-
nent part, states that the employee and the Company
agree to “resolve and binding [sic] arbitration” any claim
that, “in the absent [sic] of agreement, would be resolved
in a court of law under applicable state or federal law”
(emphasis added). On its face, this language would

7 As I explain below, I concur in my colleagues’ finding that the
Agreement unlawfully interfered with the right of employees to allege a
violation of the NLRA through the filing of an unfair labor practice
charge with the NLRB. However, the unlawfulness of the Agreement
in this regard is not material to the merits of the Respondent’s state-
court motion to compel the Charging Party to arbitrate his non-NLRA
claims. See Fuji Food Products, Inc., 363 NLRB No. 118, slip op. at 4,
4–5 fn. 13 (2016) (Member Miscimarra, concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part) (finding that employer lawfully enforced class-waiver
agreement by filing motion to compel arbitration of non-NLRA claims,
notwithstanding additional finding that agreement unlawfully interfered
with Board charge filing).
8 See, e.g., Murphy Oil USA, Inc. v. NLRB, above; Johnmohammadi
v. Bloomingdale’s, 755 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 2014); D.R. Horton, Inc. v.
NLRB, above; Owen v. Bristol Care, Inc., 702 F.3d 1050 (8th Cir.
2013); Sutherland v. Ernst & Young LLP, 726 F.3d 290 (2d Cir. 2013).
9 Murphy Oil USA, Inc. v. NLRB, 808 F.3d at 1021.
seemingly exclude from arbitration alleged unfair labor
practice claims that might be filed with the Board, since
the Board is not a “court of law.” I need not address
whether this distinction is sufficient to prevent the
Agreement from unlawfully encroaching on Board
charge filing, however, because other language in the
Agreement could reasonably be understood to preclude
the filing of a Board charge. For example, in the sen-
tence immediately following the “court of law” refer-
ence, the Agreement provides a different description of
coverage: “The claims governed by this agreement are
those that you or the company may have relating to your
employment with, behavior during, or termination from,
the Company” (emphasis added). Subsequently, the
Agreement also states (in all capital letters) that “the
Company and you agree . . . to submit any claims that
either has against the other to final and binding arbitra-
tion” (emphasis added). It is a standard principle of con-
tract construction that an agreement’s provisions are to
be construed in conjunction with one another. Yet, in
consideration of the above provisions, I believe there is a
substantial question, which employees cannot reasonably
resolve by themselves, about whether covered claims are
limited to those that would be decided by a “court of
law,” whether they include all “those that you or the
company may have relating to your employment,” or
whether they include all “claims that either [the employ-
ee or the Company] has against the other. . . .” For this
reason, and given that many individuals would not un-
derstand the difference between the Board and a “court,”
U-Haul Co. of California, 347 NLRB 375, 377 (2006),
enfd. mem. 255 Fed. Appx. 527 (D.C. Cir. 2007), I be-
lieve the Agreement arguably requires arbitration of
claims that would be within the Board’s jurisdiction.
This does not end the inquiry because, in my view,
merely providing for the arbitration of NLRA claims
does not necessarily mean that an agreement precludes
NLRB charge filing. As stated in my separate opinion in
The Rose Group d/b/a Applebee’s Restaurant, 363
NLRB No. 75, slip op. at 3–5 (2015) (Member
Miscimarra, dissenting in part), I believe that an agree-
ment may lawfully provide for the arbitration of NLRA
claims, and such an agreement does not unlawfully inter-
fere with Board charge filing, at least where the agree-
ment expressly preserves the right to file claims or
charges with the Board or, more generally, with adminis-
trative agencies. However, the Agreement not only ar-
guably requires arbitration of all matters that would be
within the Board’s jurisdiction (again, I believe this is a
close question), the Agreement also contains an exclu-
sion that places outside the Agreement’s coverage only
“[c]laims for workers compensation or unemployment
BEENA BEAUTY HOLDING, INC. 5
compensation benefits,” with no reference to the exclu-
sion of claims or complaints filed with administrative
agencies generally or the NLRB in particular. In short,
the Agreement can be interpreted as requiring that all
employment-related claims be resolved in binding arbi-
tration and in this manner only, and without some further
qualification, this would preclude the filing of a Board
charge.
Accordingly, I join my colleagues in finding that the
Agreement violates the Act by unlawfully restricting
employees’ right to file charges with the Board. See
Murphy Oil, above, slip op. at 22 fn. 4 (Member
Miscimarra, dissenting in part); GameStop Corp., 363
NLRB No. 89, slip op. at 6–7 (2015) (Member
Miscimarra, concurring in part and dissenting in part);
The Rose Group d/b/a Applebee’s Restaurant, above
(Member Miscimarra, dissenting in part).
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, I respectfully concur in part and dissent
in part.
Dated, Washington, D.C. May 23, 2016
______________________________________
Philip A. Miscimarra, Member
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we
violated Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and
obey this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on
your behalf
Act together with other employees for your bene-
fit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected
activities.
WE WILL NOT maintain or enforce the arbitra-
tion/dispute resolution provision in our commission
agreement—sales that requires our employees, as a con-
dition of employment, to waive the right to maintain em-
ployment-related class or collective actions in all forums,
whether arbitral or judicial.
WE WILL NOT maintain the arbitration/dispute resolu-
tion provision in our commission agreement—sales that
our employees reasonably would believe bars or restricts
their right to file charges with the National Labor Rela-
tions Board.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights
listed above.
WE WILL rescind the arbitration/dispute resolution pro-
vision in our commission agreement—sales in all of its
forms, or revise it in all of its forms to make clear that
the agreement does not constitute a waiver of your right
to maintain employment-related joint, class, or collective
actions in all forums, and that it does not restrict your
right to file charges with the National Labor Relations
Board.
WE WILL notify all current and former employees who
were required to sign or otherwise become bound to the
arbitration/dispute resolution provision in our commis-
sion agreement—sales in any form that the agreement
has been rescinded or revised and, if revised, WE WILL
provide them a copy of the revised agreement, and WE
WILL further notify them that the agreement will not be
enforced in a manner that compels them to waive their
right to maintain employment-related joint, class, or col-
lective actions in all forums.
WE WILL notify the Superior Court of the State of Cali-
fornia, in Case BC566065, if that case is still pending,
that we have rescinded or revised the commission
agreement—sales upon which we based our motion to
compel arbitration and dismiss class claims, and inform
the court that we no longer oppose the lawsuit on the
basis of the agreement.
WE WILL reimburse Michael Sanchez and any other
plaintiffs for any reasonable attorneys’ fees and litigation
expenses that they may have incurred in opposing our
attempts to dismiss the class action lawsuit and compel
individual arbitration.
BEENA BEAUTY HOLDING, INC. D/B/A PLANET
BEAUTY
The Board’s decision can be found at
www.nlrb.gov/case/31-CA-144492 or by using the QR code
below. Alternatively, you can obtain a copy of the decision
from the Executive Secretary, National Labor Relations
Board, 1015 Half Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20570, or
by calling (202) 273–1940.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD6
Renée M. Medved, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Jeffrey S. Ranen, Esq., and Victoria Lin, Esq., for Respondent.
Nicholas De Blouw, Esq., for the Charging Party.
DECISION
MARY MILLER CRACRAFT, Administrative Law Judge. Beena
Beauty Holding, Inc. d/b/a Planet Beauty (Respondent)1, main-
tains an arbitration/dispute resolution provision in its commis-
sion agreement-sales (the Agreement) which prohibits class or
collective legal claims in all forums, arbitral and judicial, and
requires signatory employees to settle any dispute arising out of
or relating to their employment with Respondent in accordance
with the terms of the provisions of the Agreement. The General
Counsel alleges that Respondent’s entering into, maintenance,
and enforcement2 of the Agreement with employees violates
Section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act (the Act).3
Further, the General Counsel alleges that employees would
reasonably construe the language used in the Agreement to
preclude them from filing unfair labor practice charges with the
National Labor Relations Board (the Board or NLRB) in viola-
tion of Section 8(a)(1). 4 The violations are found as alleged.
On the entire record,5 and after considering the briefs filed
by counsel for the General Counsel and the brief filed by coun-
sel for the Respondent, the following findings of fact and con-
clusions of law are made.
I. JURISDICTION
Respondent is a corporation with an office and place of busi-
ness located in Studio City, California where it engages in the
retail sale of beauty supplies and related products. During the
twelve-month period ending April 7, 2015, it derived gross
revenue in excess of $500,000 and during that same period,
sold and shipped goods valued in excess of $5000 directly to
points outside the State of California. Thus, the parties stipulate
and I find that Respondent is an employer engaged in com-
merce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the
Act. Accordingly, this dispute affects interstate commerce and
the Board has jurisdiction of this case pursuant to Section 10(a)

1 Filed on January 14 and April 8, 2015, respectively, the unfair la-
bor practice charge and first amended charge in Case 31-CA-144492
were submitted by Charging Party Michael Sanchez (Sanchez), who
worked for Respondent from June 2012 to October 2014.
2 In a civil suit brought against Respondent by Sanchez in state
court, Respondent sought to compel arbitration pursuant to the Agree-
ment.
3 29 U.S.C. §158(a)(1).
4 The complaint issued on June 30, 2015. An amendment to the
complaint issued on November 6, 2015. Respondent duly filed its an-
swer to the complaint and the amendment to the complaint.
5 The facts were submitted by stipulation. No credibility resolutions
are required on this record.
of the Act. Respondent’s claim that this matter is time-barred is
rejected.6
II. FACTS
A. Arbitration Provision of the Agreement
The parties agree and it is found that since at least April 2,
2013, Respondent has maintained an arbitration provision in the
Agreement that prohibits class or collective legal claims in all
forums, arbitral and judicial, and requires employees to settle
any dispute arising out of or relating to their employment with
Respondent in accordance with the terms of the arbitration
provision of the Agreement. The parties agree and I find that by
signing the Agreement, Sanchez and other commissioned sales
employees were required to be bound to the terms of the arbi-
tration provision of the Agreement. There is no evidence that
any employee was able to decline or opt out of the arbitration
provision of the Agreement.
Paragraph 11 of the Agreement, the arbitration provision,7
provides,
The Company (“Planet Beauty and its Affiliates”) is commit-
ted to provid[ing] the best possible working conditions for
employees. However, the Company and its employees recog-
nize that occasionally differences may arise during or follow-
ing an employee’s employment with the Company. By ac-
cepting or continuing employment with the [C]ompany, you
agree and understand that you and the Company mutually
agree to resolve an[y] binding arbitration any claim that, in the
absen[ce] of agreement, would be resolved in a court of law
under applicable state or federal law. The claims governed by
this agreement are those that you or the Company may have
relating to your employment with, behavior during or termi-
nation from, the Company. Claims for worker compensation
or unemployment compensation benefits are not subject to
this agreement. By accepting or continuing employment with
the [C]ompany, you and the Company both agree to resolve
such claims through final and binding arbitration. This in-
cludes, but is not limited to, claims of employment discrimi-
nation because of race, sex, religion, nation[al] origin, color,
age, disability, medical condition, marital status, gender iden-

6 Sec. 10(b) of the Act provides that an unfair labor practice charge
must be filed within six months of the alleged misconduct. Respondent
claims that the complaint is time barred because it was filed more than
six months from the date Sanchez signed the Agreement. However, it is
undisputed that Respondent continued to maintain the Agreement dur-
ing the six-month period preceding the filing of the initial charge. Un-
der these circumstances, maintenance of the Agreement constitutes a
continuing violation that is not time-barred by Sec. 10(b). See
Cowabunga, Inc., 363 NLRB No. 133, slip op. 2–3 (2016), citing PJ
Cheese, Inc., 362 NLRB No. 177, slip op. at 1 (2015); Neiman Marcus
Group, 362 NLRB No. 157, slip op. at 2 fn. 6 (2015); and Cellular
Sales of Missouri, LLC, 362 NLRB No. 27, slip op. at 2 fn.7 (2015).
7 In its original form, the Agreement contains minor errors which,
for ease of understanding, have been corrected in brackets. The brack-
ets replace the following: “provide” is replaced by “provid[ing];”
“company” by “[C]ompany” to conform with otherwise uniform capi-
talization of that word; “and” by “an[y];” “absent” by “absen[ce];”
“nation” by “national;” “company” by “[C]ompany” to conform with
otherwise uniform capitalization of that word;
BEENA BEAUTY HOLDING, INC. 7
tity, sexual preference or any other characteristic protected by
law. It also includes any claim you might have for unlawful
harassment including sexual harassment and unlawful retalia-
tion; any claims under contract or tort law; any claims for
wages, compensation or benefits; any claim for trade secret
violations, unlawful competition or breach of fiduciary duty.
Each party may be represented by an attorney and each party
shall bear the expenses of its/his/her own attorney’s fees and
costs, experts, witnesses, and the preparation and presentation
of evidence. The Company will pay all types of costs that are
unique to arbitration. The Company shall be entitled to recov-
er any costs paid if it prevails at the arbitration.8 . . . This
Agreement does not create a contract of employment and
does not in any way change the “At-Will” status of your em-
ployment. You and the Company hereby agree that this
agreement shall survive the termination of your employment
with the Company. THE COMPANY AND YOU AGREE
TO GIVE UP ANY RIGHT TO A TRIAL BY JURY AND
RIGHT TO APPEAL AND TO SUBMIT ANY CLAIMS
THAT EITHER HAS AGAINST THE OTHER TO FINAL
AND BINDING ARBITRATION. YOU ALSO AGREE TO
WAIVE YOUR RIGHTS TO PARTICIPATE IN A CLASS
ACTION OR BE NAMED AS CLASS
REPRESENTATIVES. Your signature below acknowledges
that you have been given sufficient time to read & understand
this agreement. Your signature further certifies that you have
had the opportunity to consult with legal counsel prior to exe-
cuting this agreement.
I acknowledge that I have received a copy of this Commis-
sion Agreement. I have read, understood and agree to the terms
and conditions set forth under this Agreement.
______________ ______________ ____________
Employee Name Employee Signa-
ture
Date Signed
______________ ______________ ____________
Planet Beauty
Representative
Manager’s Signa-
ture
Date Signed
Paragraph 10 of the Agreement provides, that,
This contract will be effective on [date of hire to be filled in
here] and will be in effect for 6 months from the effective date
unless a new contract is signed to supersede it. This contract
will supersede all other contracts previously signed and
agreed upon by the employee and employee representatives.
An expired contract is presumed to remain in full force and
effect until the contract is superseded or employment is termi-
nated by either party. This contract can be canceled at any
time by either party given a 2 month notice.
B. Wage and Hour Class Action
On December 9, 2014, after his separation from employment
with Respondent, Sanchez filed a wage and hour class action
suit against Respondent in the Superior Court of the State of

8 Procedures for selection of an arbitrator, applicable local laws,
timing of award, action to enforce arbitration or arbitration award are
omitted here.
California, County of Los Angeles (Superior Court). By letter
of December 30, 2014, Respondent informed Sanchez that the
arbitration/dispute resolution provision of the Agreement pro-
hibited bringing the class action complaint. Thereafter, on
March 6, 2015,9 Sanchez filed a first amended class action
complaint.
By motion of March 31, Respondent sought to compel indi-
vidual arbitration of the class action wage and hour claims.
Sanchez filed opposition to the motion to compel on April 23.
Respondent withdrew its motion to compel individual arbitra-
tion and on April 30, it re-filed its motion to compel individual
arbitration. On May 18, Sanchez filed an opposition and Re-
spondent’s reply brief was filed June 1.
By order of June 22, the Superior Court found in favor of
Respondent on the motion to compel arbitration. By order of
August 25, the Superior Court dismissed Sanchez’s class claims
without prejudice, giving him 60 days to find a qualified class
representative. Although the court granted Sanchez 60 days to
find a suitable class representative not subject to arbitration,
Sanchez was unable to find a class representative who had not
signed the Agreement’s arbitration provision.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Entering into and Maintenance of the Agreement
In both D. R. Horton,10 and Murphy Oil,11 the Board held
that an employer violates the Act when it requires employees,
as a condition of their employment, to sign an agreement waiv-
ing their right to file joint, class, or collective claims regarding
wages, hours or working conditions against their employer in
any forum, arbitral or judicial. As the General Counsel points
out, this holding has been extended to include agreements that
were voluntarily entered into as well.12
Respondent claims that D. R. Horton and Murphy Oil were
wrongly decided relying on (1) D. R. Horton, Inc. v. NLRB, 737
F.3d 344 (5th Cir 2013) (arbitration agreements containing
class action waivers are enforceable); (2) the Federal Arbitra-
tion Act (FAA)13 as interpreted in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Con-
cepcion, 131 S.Ct 1740, 1746 (2011) (rule neutral on its face
but applied in a fashion that disfavors arbitration is not grounds
for revocation of any contract within meaning of savings clause
of FAA); (3) American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restau-
rant, 133 S.Ct. 2304 (2013) (class action waiver must be en-
forced according to its terms in the absence of a contrary Con-
gressional command); (4) lack of inherent conflict between the
NLRA and the FAA in that individual arbitration agreements
have no effect on any collective-bargaining obligations under

9 All subsequent dates are in 2015 unless otherwise referenced.
10 D. R. Horton, Inc., 357 NLRB 2277 (2012), enf. denied in rele-
vant part 737 F.3d 344 (5th Cir. 2013), petition for rehearing en banc
denied (5th Cir. No. 12-60031, April 16, 2014).
11 Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 361 NLRB No. 72, slip op. at 2 (2014),
enf. denied in relevant part 808 F.3d 1013 (5th Cir. 2015).
12 On Assignments Staffing Services, Inc., 362 NLRB No. 189, slip
op. at 7 (2015), citing J. I. Case v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 338 (1944)
(individual arbitration agreements that would prevent employees from
engaging in concerted legal activity must yield to the Act whether or
not they were a condition of employment).
13 9 U.S.C. § 2.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD8
the NLRA; (5) inapplicability of the Norris-LaGuardia Act
(NLGA)14 because the Agreement is not illegal under the
NLGA and does not constitute a prohibited “yellow dog con-
tract.” These arguments are rejected for the reasons set forth in
D. R. Horton and Murphy Oil. Further, as the General Counsel
notes, citing On Assignment Staffing Services, Inc., 362 NLRB
No. 189, slip op. at 12 (2015), the Board is the agency with
primary responsibility for developing and applying national
labor policy and need not apologize for adopting positions firm-
ly grounded in Board precedent, Supreme Court decisions, and
federal statutes.
Nevertheless, it is clear that the provisions of the Agreement
require employees to agree to the arbitration provision as a
condition of their employment. There is no opt-out provision
and the literal provision states that by accepting or continuing
employment, the employee agrees to resolve covered claims
through binding arbitration. There is no evidence of employees
opting out. The employee’s signature to the entire Agreement is
immediately below the arbitration provision. Moreover, as not-
ed by counsel for the General Counsel, in the state court class
action suit filed by Sanchez, Respondent argued in support of
its motion to compel individual arbitration that employers may
condition employment on execution of an arbitration agreement
and that its arbitration agreement met California’s heightened
enforceability standards for mandatory employment arbitration
agreements which are imposed as a condition of employment.15
Thus, it must be concluded that the arbitration agreement con-
stitutes a condition of employment.
The parties agree that Respondent’s arbitration provision
prohibits class or collective legal claims in all forums, arbitral
and judicial, and requires that employees settle any dispute
arising out of or relating to their employment with Respondent
in accordance with the Agreement. Thus, Respondent’s arbitra-
tion requires that employees waive their right to participate in a
class action and agree to submit all employment claims except
workers compensation and unemployment claims to final and
binding arbitration. It is found that the arbitration provision
precludes concerted legal activity, a substantive right under
Section 7 of the Act, and violates Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
B. Enforcement of Arbitration Provision in Class Action Suit
Relying on the Agreement’s arbitration provision, Respond-
ent sought and was granted enforcement of individual arbitra-
tion for Sanchez’s individual claims. It is clear that by seeking
to enforce its arbitration provision in the class action lawsuit,
Respondent sought to restrain Sanchez statutory right to pursue

14 29 U.S.C. § 102.
15 See Amendariz v. Foundation Health Psychare Services, Inc., 24
Cal. 4th 83, 4 P.3d 669 (Cal SCt 2000) (In state law antidiscrimination
class action, court held mandatory arbitration as a condition of em-
ployment allowable only where the agreement insured neutrality of the
arbitrator, the provision of adequate discovery, a written decision that
will permit a limited form of judicial review, and limitations on the
costs of arbitration. Holding the arbitration agreement was unenforcea-
ble, the court found it unconscionably unilateral and did not allow full
vindication of statutory rights).
concerted legal action.16 Accordingly, I find that by seeking
enforcement of the Agreement’s arbitration provision in
Sanchez’s wage and hour class action litigation, Respondent
violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
C. Access to the Board
In Ralph’s Grocery Co., 363 NLRB No. 128 (2016), the
Board stated:
“Preserving and protecting access to the Board is a fundamen-
tal goal of the Act,” and so the Board must carefully examine
employer rules that may interfere with this goal. SolarCity,
363 NLRB No. 83, slip op. at 4 [(2015)]. In turn, the Board
recognizes that “rank-and-file employees . . . cannot be ex-
pected to have the expertise to examine company rules from a
legal standpoint.” Id., slip op. at 5, quoting Ingram Book Co.,
315 NLRB 515, 516 fn. 2 (1994).
Examination of the arbitration provision under these precepts
reveals that it does not explicitly prohibit employees from filing
unfair labor practice charges with the NLRB. Nevertheless,
employees would reasonably construe the language of the arbi-
tration provision to prohibit such action. Thus, work rules
which do not explicitly restrict Section 7 activities may never-
theless violate the Act if employees would reasonably construe
the rule as prohibiting Section 7 activity.17 With the specific
exemption of workers compensation and unemployment com-
pensation claims, Respondent’s arbitration provision requires
employees to agree to pursue any claim that could be resolved
in court under state or federal law including employment-
related claims by utilizing final and binding individual arbitra-
tion. There is no language in the agreement that exempts claims
of unfair labor practices. It is reasonable, accordingly, to con-
strue the language of the provision to prohibit the filing of un-
fair labor practice charges with the NLRB.18 Respondent ar-
gues, however, that the language of the Agreement applies only
to those claims that “would resolve in a court of law under
applicable state or federal law.” Respondent avers that this
language does not apply to claims brought in administrative
proceedings before the Board because it is not a court of law
and thus employees would reasonably understand that NLRB
proceedings are not implicated. As the General Counsel cor-
rectly notes,19 however, this argument is not viable because the

16 See Murphy Oil, supra, slip op. at 5, 19 (mandatory arbitration
agreements that bar employees from bringing joint, class, or collective
claims restrict the exercise of the substantive right to act in concert for
mutual aid and protection; enforcement of such a mandatory rule
through motion to dismiss collective legal action unlawfully restricts
Sec. 7 rights).
17 Lutheran Heritage Village-Livonia, 343 NLRB 646, 647 (2004):
A work rule may be found unlawful if it explicitly restricts Section 7
activity or (1) employees would reasonably construe the rule as prohib-
iting Section 7 activity; (2) the rule was promulgated in response to
union activity; or (3) the rule has been applied to restrict the exercise of
Section 7 activity.
18 See, e.g., U Haul Co., 347 NLRB 375, 377 (2006), enfd. mem.
255 Fed.Appx. 527 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
19 The General Counsel cites U-Haul, supra at 378 (language ex-
empting claims which would be resolved in a court of law is insuffi-
cient to cure defects in the policy).
BEENA BEAUTY HOLDING, INC. 9
Board has held that non-lawyer employees would not be famil-
iar with the intricacies of federal court jurisdiction. Thus, it is
found that by maintaining the Agreement, which is reasonably
construed as prohibiting access to the Board, Respondent vio-
lated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. By entering into and maintaining the arbitration/dispute
resolution provision of its commission agreement—sales,
which prohibits class or collective action in all forums, arbitral
and judicial, and requires employees to settle any dispute aris-
ing out of or relating to their employment with Respondent in
accordance with the terms of the arbitration provision, Re-
spondent has engaged in unfair labor practices within the mean-
ing of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act and has violated
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
2. By taking actions to enforce the arbitration/dispute reso-
lution provision of its commission agreement—sales in the Los
Angeles Superior Court class action litigation, Sanchez v. Plan-
et Beauty, Inc., Case No. BC566065, specifically by letter of
December 30, 2014, by its March 31 and April 30 motions to
compel arbitration and briefs in support of these motions, Re-
spondent has violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
3. By maintaining the arbitration/dispute resolution provi-
sion of its commission agreement—sales, which is reasonably
interpreted as precluding employees from filing unfair labor
practice charges with the Board, Respondent has violated Sec-
tion 8(a)(1) of the Act.
REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has engaged in certain unfair
labor practices, it must be ordered to cease and desist and to
take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the poli-
cies of the Act. Consistent with the Board’s usual practice in
cases involving unlawful litigation, Respondent must reimburse
Sanchez for all reasonable expenses and legal fees, with inter-
est,20 incurred in opposing Respondent’s unlawful letter and
motions to compel individual arbitration. Respondent shall also
be ordered to rescind or revise the Agreement, notify employ-
ees and the Los Angeles Superior Court that it has done so and
that it will no longer oppose the lawsuit on the basis of the
Agreement. Respondent must also rescind or revise the Agree-
ment to make clear to employees that its Agreement does not
constitute a waiver of the right to maintain employment-related
joint, class, or collective actions and that it does not bar or re-
strict employees right to file charges with the NLRB.

20 Interest shall be computed in the manner prescribed in New Hori-
zons, 283 NLRB 1173 (1987), compounded daily as prescribed in Ken-
tucky River Medical Center, 356 NLRB 6 (2010). See Bill Johnson’s
Restaurants v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 747 (1983) (If a violation is found,
the Board may order the employer to reimburse the employees who he
had wrongfully sued for their attorneys’ fees and expenses as well as
any other proper relief that would effectuate the policies of the Act);
Teamsters Local 776 (Rite Aid), 305 NLRB 832, 835 fn. 10 (1991)
(“[I]n make-whole orders for suits maintained in violation of the Act, it
is appropriate and necessary to award interest on litigation expenses.”),
enfd. 973 F.2d 230 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied 507 U.S. 959 (1993).
ORDER
Respondent, Beena Beauty Holding, Inc. d/b/a Planet Beau-
ty, Studio City, California, its officers, agents, successors, and
assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Entering into and maintaining its commission agree-
ment—sales arbitration/dispute resolution agreement with em-
ployees that prohibits class or collective legal claims in all fo-
rums, arbitral and judicial, and requires signatory employees to
settle any dispute arising out of or relating to their employment
with Respondent in accordance with the terms of the arbitration
provision.
(b) Enforcing its commission agreement—sales through let-
ters, motions, and briefs seeking to compel arbitration in re-
sponse to a wage and hour class action civil suit brought against
it in state court.
(c) Maintaining the commission agreement—sales arbitra-
tion/dispute resolution agreement which is reasonably under-
stood to preclude employees from filing unfair labor practice
charges with the NLRB.
(d) In any like or related manner interfering with, restrain-
ing, or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaran-
teed to them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effec-
tuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Rescind the arbitration/dispute resolution provision of its
commission agreement—sales in all of its forms or revise it in
all of its forms to make clear to employees that the provision
does not prohibit class or collective legal claims in all forums,
arbitral and judicial, and does not require signatory employees
to settle any dispute arising out of or relating to their employ-
ment with Respondent in accordance with the terms of the arbi-
tration provision.
(b) Rescind the arbitration/dispute resolution provision of its
commission agreement—sales in all of its forms or revise it in
all of its forms to make clear to employees that the provision
does not prohibit access to the NLRB to file unfair labor prac-
tice charges.
(c) Notify all current and former employees who signed the
Agreement in any form that it has been rescinded or revised
and, if revised, provide them a copy of the revised agreement.
(d) Notify the Los Angeles Superior Court of California that
it has rescinded or revised the arbitration/dispute resolution
provision of its commission agreement—sales upon which it
based its motions to compel individual arbitration and seek
reinstatement of the lawsuit upon that basis, informing the court
that it no longer seeks to compel individual arbitration of the
lawsuit on the basis of the Agreement and move the court joint-
ly with Sanchez to vacate its order compelling arbitration.
(e) In the manner set forth in the remedy section of this de-
cision, reimburse Sanchez for any reasonable attorneys’ fees
and litigation expenses, with interest, that he may have incurred
in opposing Respondents attempts to dismiss the lawsuit and
compel individual arbitration.
(f) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its
Studio City, California facility copies of the attached notice
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD10
marked “Appendix.”21 Copies of the notice, on forms provided
by the Regional Director for Region 31, after being signed by
the Respondent’s authorized representative, shall be posted by
the Respondent and maintained for 60 consecutive days in con-
spicuous places, including places where notices are customarily
posted. In addition to physical posting or paper notices, notices
shall be distributed electronically, such as by email, posting on
an intranet or an internet site, and/or other electronic means, if
the Respondent customarily communicates with its employees
by such means. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Re-
spondent to ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or
covered by any other material. If the Respondent has gone out
of business or closed the facility involved in these proceedings,
the Respondent shall duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a
copy of the notice marked “Appendix” to all current employees
and former employees employed by the Respondent at any time
since July 14, 2014, and any employees against whom Re-
spondent has enforced its mandatory arbitration agreement
since July 14, 2013.
(g) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the
Regional Director for Region 31 a sworn certification of a re-
sponsible official on a form provided by the Region attesting to
the steps that the Respondent has taken to comply.
Dated, Washington, D.C. March 3, 2016
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated
Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and obey this no-
tice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on your be-
half
Act together with other employees for your benefit and
protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activi-
ties.

21 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.
WE WILL NOT enter into and maintain the arbitration/dispute
resolution provision of our commission agreement—sales,
which prohibits class or collective action in all forums, arbitral
and judicial and requires employees to settle any dispute arising
out of or relating to their employment with us in accordance
with the terms of the arbitration provision.
WE WILL NOT take actions to enforce the arbitration/dispute
resolution provision of our commission agreement—sales in the
Los Angeles Superior Court class action litigation, Sanchez v.
Planet Beauty, Inc., Case No. BC566065, specifically by letter
of December 30, 2014, by our March 31 and April 30 motions
to compel arbitration and our briefs in support of these motions.
WE WILL NOT maintain the arbitration/dispute resolution pro-
vision of our commission agreement—sales, which is reasona-
bly interpreted as precluding you from filing unfair labor prac-
tice charges with the Board.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, re-
strain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
you by Federal law.
WE WILL reimburse Sanchez for all reasonable litigation ex-
penses and legal fees with interest directly related to our mo-
tions to compel individual arbitration and expenses.
WE WILL withdraw our letter, motions to compel individual
arbitration, and briefs in support of those motions and move the
Los Angeles Superior Court, jointly with Sanchez, to vacate its
order compelling arbitration.
BEENA BEAUTY HOLDING, INC. D/B/A PLANET BEAUTY
The Administrative Law Judge’s decision can be found at
www.nlrb.gov/case/31-CA-144492 or by using the QR code
below. Alternatively, you can obtain a copy of the decision
from the Executive Secretary, National Labor Relations Board,
1015 Half Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20570, or by calling
(202) 273–1940.