Apple Inc.v.Relix LLC Apple Corps Ltd. v. Relix LLC

Trademark Trial and Appeal BoardSep 12, 2012

No. 91176659 (T.T.A.B. Sep. 12, 2012)

THIS OPINION IS NOT A PRECEDENT OF THE T.T.A.B. Hearing: March 22, 2012 Mailed: September 12, 2012 UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE _____ Trademark Trial and Appeal Board ______ Apple Inc. v. Relix LLC Opposition No. 91176659 to application Serial No. 78822935 and Apple Corps Ltd. v. Relix LLC _____ Opposition No. 91175475 also to application Serial No. 788229351 _____ Joseph Petersen, Robert N. Potter and Allison Scott Roach of Kilpatrick Townsend & Stockton LLP for Apple Inc. and Apple Corps Ltd. Michael H. Sproule of Akabas & Cohen for Relix LLC. ______ Before Cataldo, Mermelstein and Ritchie, Administrative Trademark Judges.2 1 Opposer Apple Inc.’s motion to consolidate the above proceedings was granted in a Board order issued on March 26, 2008. 2 Judge Wolfson sat on the panel at the oral argument but subsequently has recused herself. Judge Ritchie has been Opposition Nos. 91175475 and 91176659 2 Opinion by Cataldo, Administrative Trademark Judge: Applicant, Relix LLC, filed an application to register in standard characters on the Principal Register the mark GREEN APPLE, based upon an assertion of its bona fide intent to use the mark in commerce for Streaming of audio material on the Internet; Streaming of video material on the Internet, in International Class 38; and Entertainment namely, live performances by a musical band; Entertainment services, namely, providing a web site featuring musical performances, musical videos, related film clips, photographs, and other multimedia materials; Entertainment, namely live music concerts, in International Class 41.3 Registration has been opposed by Apple Inc. and Apple Corps Ltd. (“opposers”). As grounds for opposition, opposers assert in their amended notice of opposition that opposer, Apple Inc., provides numerous goods and services related to computers, mobile communications and media devices, downloading and streaming digital music and audiovisual content under its famous APPLE and apple logo marks; and that it is the owner of, inter alia, the substituted for Judge Wolfson. The change in composition of the panel does not necessitate a rehearing of the oral argument. Hunt Control Systems Inc. v. Koninklijke Philips Electronics N.V., 98 USPQ2d 1558, 1560 (TTAB 2011). See also In re Bose, 772 F.2d 866, 227 USPQ 1, 4 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 3 Application Serial No. 78822935. Opposition Nos. 91175475 and 91176659 3 following marks, previously used and registered on the Principal Register: APPLE (“APPLE mark”) in standard characters for Communication filed by computer, namely, electronic transmission of data and documents via computer, delivery of messages by electronic transmission, in International Class 38;4 and (“apple logo”) for goods including Computer software for use in authoring, downloading, transmitting, receiving, editing, extracting, encoding, decoding, playing, storing and organizing audio, video, still images and other digital data in International Class 9;5 and for services including Telecommunications services, namely, electronic transmission of data and images via computer networks; electronic transmission of data and information by computer, in International Class 38.6 4 Registration No. 2079765 issued on July 15, 1997. Section 8 affidavit accepted; Section 15 affidavit acknowledged. Renewed. 5 Registration No. 2715578 issued on May 13, 2003. Section 8 affidavit accepted; Section 15 affidavit acknowledged. 6 Registration No. 2870477 issued on August 3, 2004. Section 8 affidavit accepted; Section 15 affidavit acknowledged. Opposition Nos. 91175475 and 91176659 4 Opposers further assert that opposer, Apple Corps Ltd., provides video and sound recordings, live performances, and video games, relating primarily to the musical band, The Beatles; and that opposer Apple Inc. is the owner by assignment from opposer Apple Corps Ltd. of, inter alia, the following famous marks, previously registered on the Principal Register: APPLE (“APPLE Corps mark”) in standard characters for goods including Musical sound records; sound records featuring music, musicians, documentaries, biographies, interviews, performances, reviews, drama and fiction; musical video records; downloadable musical sound and video records; downloadable sound and video records featuring or relating to music, entertainment and films, in International Class 9;7 and (“whole apple logo”) for Musical sound recordings; musical video recordings; downloadable musical sound and video records; downloadable sound or video records featuring or relating to music, entertainment and films, 7 Registration No. 3317089 issued on October 23, 2007. Opposition Nos. 91175475 and 91176659 5 in International Class 9.8 Opposers further assert that opposer, Apple Corps Ltd., continues its use of the Apple Corps marks as the exclusive licensee of opposer, Apple Inc. Opposers allege in addition that applicant’s mark, when used in connection with applicant’s services, so resemble opposers’ previously used and registered marks for their recited goods and services as to be likely to cause confusion, to cause mistake, and to deceive; that in addition, registration of applicant’s mark will cause the distinctiveness of opposers’ famous marks to be diluted; and that opposers will be damaged thereby. Opposers also allege that at the time the application was filed, applicant lacked a bona fide intent to use the mark in commerce in connection with the services recited in International Class 38; and that, as a result, the application is void ab initio with regard to those services.9 Applicant’s answer consists of denials of the allegations in the notice of opposition.10 8 Registration No. 3221275 issued on March 27, 2007. 9 We note that in the amended notice of opposition, opposers assert a pleading of fraud. However, the parties’ arguments and evidence on this issue appear to be directed to opposers’ asserted claim of lack of a bona fide intent to use the mark in commerce, and have been so construed. 10 It appears that, as a result of an inadvertence on the part of the Board, applicant did not file an answer to the amended notice of opposition. However, it is clear from applicant’s arguments that it denies the additional allegations, which relate to its asserted lack of a bona fide intent to use the mark in commerce in connection with the Class 38 services. Accordingly, any allegations in the amended notice of opposition not addressed by applicant’s original answer are deemed denied. Opposition Nos. 91175475 and 91176659 6 The Record The record in this case consists of the pleadings and the file of the involved application. In addition, during the assigned testimony period, opposers introduced the testimony affidavits, with accompanying exhibits, of Thomas La Perle, director of legal affairs for Apple Inc., and Jeffrey Vaughan Jones, the chief executive officer of Apple Corps Ltd.11 In addition, opposer submitted notices of reliance. During its assigned testimony period, applicant submitted notices of reliance. Opposers and applicant filed main briefs on the case, and opposers filed a reply brief. In addition, counsel for both parties presented arguments at an oral hearing held before this panel on March 22, 2012. Opposer’s Standing and Priority of Use Because opposers have properly made their pleaded registrations of record, we find that opposers have established their standing to oppose registration of applicant’s mark.12 See Cunningham v. Laser Golf Corp., 222 F.3d 943, 55 USPQ2d 1842 (Fed. Cir. 2000); and Lipton Industries, Inc. v. Ralston Purina Co., 670 F.2d 1024, 213 USPQ 185 (CCPA 1982). 11 The parties’ stipulation to introduce testimony by affidavit was approved by the Board on June 4, 2010. 12 Opposer’s second notice of reliance. Opposition Nos. 91175475 and 91176659 7 Moreover, because opposers’ pleaded registrations are of record, Section 2(d) priority is not an issue in this case as to the marks therein and goods and services covered thereby. See King Candy Co. v. Eunice King’s Kitchen, Inc., 496 F.2d 1400, 182 USPQ 108 (CCPA 1974). Likelihood of Confusion Our likelihood of confusion determination under Section 2(d) is based on an analysis of all of the facts in evidence that are relevant to the factors bearing on the likelihood of confusion issue. See In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 177 USPQ 563 (CCPA 1973). See also Palm Bay Imports, Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 73 USPQ2d 1689 (Fed. Cir. 2005); In re Majestic Distilling Company, Inc., 315 F.3d 1311, 65 USPQ2d 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2003); and In re Dixie Restaurants Inc., 105 F.3d 1405, 41 USPQ2d 1531 (Fed. Cir. 1997). Opposers’ Pleaded APPLE and APPLE Corps Marks In this case, we will concentrate our discussion of the issue of likelihood of confusion on those registrations of opposers which are closest to the marks and services for which applicant is seeking registration, namely: opposer Apple Inc.’s Registration No. 2079765 for the mark APPLE (standard characters) for Opposition Nos. 91175475 and 91176659 8 Communication filed by computer, namely, electronic transmission of data and documents via computer, delivery of messages by electronic transmission in International Class 38; and opposer Apple Corps Ltd.’s Registration No. 3317089 for the mark APPLE (standard characters) for goods including Musical sound records; sound records featuring music, musicians, documentaries, biographies, interviews, performances, reviews, drama and fiction; musical video records; downloadable musical sound and video records; downloadable sound and video records featuring or relating to music, entertainment and films, in International Class 9. Fame of Opposers’ APPLE and APPLE Corps Marks We begin our likelihood of confusion analysis with the fifth du Pont factor, which requires us to consider evidence of the fame of opposers’ APPLE and APPLE Corps marks and to give great weight to such evidence if it exists. See Bose Corp. v. QSC Audio Products Inc., 293 F.3d 1367, 63 USPQ2d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Recot Inc. v. Becton, 214 F.3d 1322, 54 F.2d 1894 (Fed. Cir. 2000); and Kenner Parker Toys, Inc. v. Rose Art Industries, Inc., 963 F.2d 350, 22 USPQ2d 1453 (Fed. Cir. 1992). Fame of an opposer’s mark or marks, if it exists, plays a “dominant role in the process of balancing the DuPont factors,” Recot, 214 F.3d at 1327, 54 USPQ2d at 1456, and “[f]amous marks thus enjoy a wide latitude of legal protection.” Opposition Nos. 91175475 and 91176659 9 Id. This is true as famous marks are more likely to be remembered and associated in the public mind than a weaker mark, and are thus more attractive as targets for would-be copyists. Id. Indeed, “[a] strong mark … casts a long shadow which competitors must avoid.” Kenner Parker Toys, 963 F.2d at 353, 22 USPQ2d at 1456. A famous mark is one “with extensive public recognition and renown.” Id. Bose Corp. v. QSC Audio Products Inc., 63 USPQ2d at 1305. Opposer Apple Inc.’s APPLE Mark In support of their claim that opposer Apple Inc.’s APPLE mark is famous, opposers cite to the following evidence:13 - Continuous use of the APPLE mark since 1977; - Steady increase in sales of goods bearing the APPLE mark from $3 billion in 2003 to $14.5 billion in 2009; - Total revenues in United States of $65 billion between 2001 and 2009; - Exposure to APPLE and apple logo marks on opposer Apple Inc.’s internet website by 100 million users per year from 2002 to 2004 and increased exposure since then; - Exposure to APPLE and apple logo marks in opposer Apple Inc.’s 200 brick and mortar stores in the United States by over 100 million visitors per year; 13 La Perle affidavit and exhibits thereto. Opposition Nos. 91175475 and 91176659 10 - Advertising and promotional expenditures of nearly $4 billion since 1994 of goods and services bearing the APPLE and apple logo mark in magazines, television, the internet, billboards and signage; - Extensive print advertisement in major publications and television advertisement on major network and cable stations as well as the internet; - Extensive unsolicited media recognition in major publications such as The Wall Street Journal; Time; and Newsweek. Based upon the evidence of record, highlighted above, we find that opposers have made an overwhelming showing that opposer Apple Inc.’s APPLE mark is famous for purposes of our likelihood of confusion determination. Opposer Apple Corps Ltd.’s APPLE Corps Mark In support of their claim that opposer Apple Corps Ltd.’s APPLE Corps mark is famous, opposers cite to the following evidence:14 - Continuous use of the APPLE Corps mark since 1968, in connection with essentially all sound recordings released under the Apple Corps label, beginning with the release of the single “Hey Jude” by the Beatles, and including all subsequent studio albums by the 14 Jones affidavit and exhibits thereto. Opposition Nos. 91175475 and 91176659 11 Beatles and all compilation albums released from the 1980s to the present; - Steady sales of Beatles studio and compilation albums numbering in the millions of units sold, including 32 million units of sound recordings sold under the APPLE Corps mark between 2000 and 2009; - Continuous use of APPLE Corps mark since 1960s in connection with the marketing and sale of films and video recordings, including the films “Help!,” “Magical Mystery Tour,” “Yellow Submarine,” “Concert for Bangladesh,” and documentary films released in 1994 and 2004; - Sales of such films and videos numbering over one million units between 2002 and 2009; - Use of the APPLE Corps mark in connection with advertisements for the show “The Beatles LOVE” in collaboration with Cirque du Soleil in 2006; - Use of the APPLE Corps mark in connection with the video game “The Beatles: Rock Band” in 2009, featuring 45 Beatles songs to which players may sing and play along; - Sales of such video game numbering 1.3 million units in 2009 alone; - Advertisement of goods and services under the APPLE Corps mark in print, internet and other media Opposition Nos. 91175475 and 91176659 12 outlets, including such publications as Rolling Stone and New York Times and opposer Apple Corps Ltd.’s website beatles.com; - Extensive exposure to APPLE Corps mark on beatles.com website, including over 600,000 visits from internet users in the United States between January and April 2010; - Unsolicited media recognition of APPLE Corps mark in third-party books, National Public Radio, and such publications as Fast Company, New York Times, Washington Post, USA Today, and Life. Based upon the evidence of record, highlighted above, we find that opposers have made a sufficient showing that opposer Apple Corps Ltd.’s APPLE Corps mark, while perhaps not a famous mark for purposes of the fifth du Pont factor, nonetheless is well-known and strong as applied to its goods and services.15 The Marks We turn to the first du Pont factor, i.e., whether applicant’s GREEN APPLE mark and opposers’ APPLE mark and APPLE Corps mark, all registered in standard character form, 15 We recognize that this case presents an unusual situation inasmuch as the APPLE and APPLE Corps marks point to two iconic sources. Nonetheless, we find no evidence that opposers’ use of these marks somehow lessens the strength of either. In addition, opposers’ relationship as owner of both marks (Apple Inc.) and exclusive licensee of the APPLE Corps marks (Apple Corps) would appear to mitigate any potential weakening of opposers’ marks. Opposition Nos. 91175475 and 91176659 13 are similar or dissimilar when viewed in their entireties in terms of appearance, sound, connotation and overall commercial impression. See Palm Bay Imports, Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot, supra. The test is not whether the marks can be distinguished when subjected to a side-by-side comparison, but rather whether the marks are sufficiently similar in terms of their overall commercial impression that confusion as to the source of the goods and/or services offered under the respective marks is likely to result. Because the similarity or dissimilarity of the marks is determined based on the marks in their entireties, the analysis cannot be predicated on dissecting the marks into their various components; that is, the decision must be based on the entire marks, not just part of the marks. In re National Data Corp., 753 F.2d 1056, 224 USPQ 749, 751 (Fed. Cir. 1985). See also Franklin Mint Corp. V. Master Mfg. Co., 667 F.2d 1005, 212 USPQ 23, 234 (CCPA 1981) (“It is axiomatic that a mark should not be dissected and considered piecemeal; rather, it must be considered as a whole in determining likelihood of confusion”). On the other hand, different features may be analyzed to determine whether the marks are similar. Price Candy Company v. Gold Medal Candy Corporation, 220 F.2d 759, 105 USPQ 266, 268 (CCPA 1955). In fact, there is nothing improper in stating that, for rational reasons, more or less weight has been Opposition Nos. 91175475 and 91176659 14 given to a particular feature of a mark, provided the ultimate conclusion rests on a consideration of the marks in their entireties. In re National Data Corp., 224 USPQ at 751. In comparing the marks, we note that applicant’s mark, GREEN APPLE, incorporates the entirety of the wording in opposers’ APPLE and APPLE Corps marks. Thus, the marks are similar in that they contain the identical term APPLE. In addition, applicant’s mark contains the term GREEN which modifies the term APPLE. Although the term GREEN does not appear in opposers’ marks, it does little to distinguish applicant’s mark from them because a “green apple” is a common type of apple. As used in applicant’s mark, GREEN reinforces the similarity of its mark with opposers’ more than it distinguishes them. We thus find that the term APPLE is the dominant portion of applicant’s mark while the term GREEN possesses less source identifying significance. For this reason, we find that the term APPLE as it appears in applicant’s mark is entitled to more weight in our analysis. Id. With regard to connotation, the term APPLE in opposers’ marks appears to be arbitrary as applied to the goods and services identified thereby. Applicant argues that its GREEN APPLE mark is used in connection with music festivals promoting environmental consciousness and as a result the Opposition Nos. 91175475 and 91176659 15 term GREEN in its mark has an environmental connotation. However, there is no evidence of record of the extent to which the consuming public is aware of such connotation. As a result, on this record it appears just as likely that consumers would view applicant’s GREEN APPLE mark as connoting unripe or green varieties of apples. Based upon the foregoing, we find that, when viewed in their entireties, the marks GREEN APPLE and APPLE are more similar than they are different. Applicant has taken the wording in opposers’ marks, which as discussed above are famous and very strong, respectively, and added a term commonly used to modify it. Thus, it is likely that the marks would be viewed as variations of each other, but still pointing to opposers or connoting an association with or sponsorship by them. Accordingly, this du Pont factor favors a finding of likelihood of confusion. The Goods and Services With respect to the goods and services, it is well- established that the goods and services of the parties need not be similar or competitive, or even offered through the same channels of trade, to support a holding of likelihood of confusion. It is sufficient that the respective goods and services of the parties are related in some manner, and/or that the conditions and activities surrounding the Opposition Nos. 91175475 and 91176659 16 marketing thereof are such that they would or could be encountered by the same persons under circumstances that could give rise to the mistaken belief that they originate from the same source. See Hilson Research, Inc. v. Society for Human Resource Management, 27 USPQ2d 1423 (TTAB 1993); and In re International Telephone & Telephone Corp., 197 USPQ 910, 911 (TTAB 1978). The issue, of course, is not whether purchasers would confuse the parties’ goods and services, but rather whether there is a likelihood of confusion as to the source thereof. See In re Rexel Inc., 223 USPQ 830 (TTAB 1984). We base our determination of the similarity or dissimilarity between the parties’ respective goods and services, as we must, upon the services recited in the involved applications and opposers’ above-noted registrations. See Paula Payne Products v. Johnson Publishing Co., 473 F.2d 901, 177 USPQ 76, 77 (CCPA 1973) (“Trademark cases involving the issue of likelihood of confusion must be decided on the basis of the respective descriptions of goods.”) In this case, applicant recites “Streaming of audio material on the Internet; Streaming of video material on the Internet,” in Class 38. As recited, these services involve providing audio and video files over the internet, by means of a computer. Opposer Apple Inc.’s Registration No. Opposition Nos. 91175475 and 91176659 17 2079765 recites “communication filed by computer, namely, electronic transmission of data and documents via computer, delivery of messages by electronic transmission” in Class 38. Thus, as recited, opposer Apple Inc.’s services encompass those of applicant. That is to say, the broadly worded “electronic transmission of data and documents by computer” must be presumed to include applicant’s more narrowly identified transmission of all types of data and documents, including audio and video files streamed on the internet. See, e.g., In re Thor Tech, Inc., 90 USPQ2d 1634 (TTAB 2009)(finding “recreational vehicles, namely, travel trailers and fifth wheel trailers” to be encompassed by and legally identical to “trailers”); and In re Linkvest S.A., 24 USPQ2d 1716 (TTAB 1992)(finding “computer software for data integration and transfer” to be encompassed by and legally identical to “computer programs recorded on magnetic disks”). Applicant also recites “Entertainment namely, live performances by a musical band; Entertainment services, namely, providing a web site featuring musical performances, musical videos, related film clips, photographs, and other multimedia materials; Entertainment, namely live music concerts,” in Class 41. Opposer Apple Corps Ltd.’s Registration No. 3317089 recites goods including “musical sound records; sound records featuring music, musicians, Opposition Nos. 91175475 and 91176659 18 documentaries, biographies, interviews, performances, reviews, drama and fiction; musical video records; downloadable musical sound and video records; downloadable sound and video records featuring or relating to music, entertainment and films,” in Class 9. Thus, opposer Apple Corps provides downloadable sound and video recordings, musical performances and films. These goods are identical in subject matter to the musical performances, music videos, and film clips provided by applicant’s web site. Thus, opposer Apple Corps’ goods in Class 9 are related on their face to applicant’s Class 41 services. We are not persuaded by applicant’s arguments that because its services are in the nature of environmentally conscious music festivals, they are somehow distinct from opposers’ goods and services. Because neither opposers’ nor applicant’s recitation of goods or services articulates any limitations as to the type of musical goods or services provided under their marks, we must presume that applicant’s services as well as opposers’ goods and services encompass any musical events, regardless of whether they feature an environmental theme. See Octocom Systems, Inc. v. Houston Computers Services Inc., 918 F.2d 937, 16 USPQ2d 1783, 1787 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (“The authority is legion that the question of registrability of an applicant’s mark must be decided on the basis of the identification of goods set forth in the Opposition Nos. 91175475 and 91176659 19 application regardless of what the record may reveal as to the particular nature of an applicant’s goods, the particular channels of trade or the class of purchasers to which the sales of goods are directed.”) Thus, we do not read limitations on the parties’ goods or services, but rather base our determination on the goods and services as identified in their respective registrations and application. The face of their respective recitations supports a finding that opposers’ goods and services and applicant’s services are related. In view thereof, this du Pont factor also favors a finding of likelihood of confusion. Channels of Trade Because there are no recited restrictions as to the channels of trade or classes of purchasers of the goods or services identified in either opposers’ pleaded registrations or the services in the involved application, we must assume that the goods services are available in all the normal channels of trade to all the usual purchasers for such goods and services. See Octocom Systems, Inc. v. Houston Computers Services Inc., supra. See also Paula Payne Products v. Johnson Publishing Co., supra. Furthermore, because the goods and services of both parties, as identified, are the type of goods and services that are offered to the general public, the classes of consumers are Opposition Nos. 91175475 and 91176659 20 presumed to be the same. As a result of the foregoing, this du Pont factor also favors a finding of likelihood of confusion. Actual Confusion Another du Pont factor discussed by the parties is the existence or lack of actual confusion. Opposers argue that the application at issue is based upon intent to use and that applicant has only asserted use of the mark in connection with an annual music event for five years. Thus, opposers argue that the lack of actual confusion is not probative in this case. On the other hand, applicant asserts, without evidentiary support, that its “festival has taken place in cities all across the Unites States for five years,” “has been extensively advertised,” and attended by “more than a million people.”16 Applicant’s mere reliance upon contemporaneous use of the marks in the United States for five years, and its unsupported allegations regarding the extent of advertisement and attendance of its musical events, is not probative. See, e.g., Saul Zaentz Co. v. Bumb, 95 USPQ2d 1723, 1725 n.7 (TTAB 2010). In assessing this du Pont factor, five years is not a particularly long time. Therefore, in order for the absence of evidence of actual confusion to be a significant consideration, we would expect 16 Applicant’s brief, page 6. Opposition Nos. 91175475 and 91176659 21 solid evidence of a very high level of contemporaneous use of the marks under such circumstances that confusion, if likely, would not only have occurred, but would likely have been reported. Applicant has not established such a record. It has often been recognized that evidence of actual confusion is very difficult to obtain. Lebanon Seaboard Corp. v. R&R Turf Supply Inc., 101 USPQ2d 1826, 1834 (TTAB 2012). Moreover, it is not necessary to show actual confusion in order to establish likelihood of confusion. See Weiss Associates Inc. v. HRL Associates Inc. 902 F.2d 1546, 223 USPQ 1025 (Fed. Cir. 1990). As a result, this du Pont factor is neutral. Conclusion We have carefully considered all of the evidence pertaining to priority of use and the relevant du Pont factors, as well as all of the parties’ arguments with respect thereto, including any evidence and arguments not specifically discussed in this opinion. We conclude that opposers have established priority of use and that consumers familiar with opposers’ goods and services under their APPLE mark and APPLE Corps mark would be likely to believe, upon encountering applicant’s GREEN APPLE mark for its recited services, that the parties’ services originate with or are associated with or sponsored by the same entity. In making our determination, we have Opposition Nos. 91175475 and 91176659 22 balanced the relevant du Pont factors. The factors of fame of opposer Apple Inc.’s APPLE mark and the strength of opposer Apple Corp Ltd.’s APPLE Corp mark, the similarity between the marks and the relatedness of the goods and services weigh strongly in opposers’ favor. Dilution and Bona Fide Intent to Use Given our determination that there is a likelihood of confusion, we decline to reach a determination on the questions of dilution and whether applicant lacked a bona fide intent to use the applied-for mark in commerce as to the services in Class 38 in this proceeding. DECISION: The opposition is sustained, and registration to applicant is refused on the ground of priority and likelihood of confusion.

Apple Inc. v. Relix LLC Apple Corps Ltd. v. Relix LLC