Akli AdjaouteDownload PDFPatent Trials and Appeals BoardAug 14, 201914938844 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Aug. 14, 2019) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 14/938,844 11/12/2015 Akli Adjaoute 51403-US-CIP1-CIP1-CIP4 2997 150180 7590 08/14/2019 Hovey Williams LLP 10801 Mastin Blvd., Suite 1000 Overland Park, KS 66210 EXAMINER OYEBISI, OJO O ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3697 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 08/14/2019 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): uspatents@hoveywilliams.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________________ Ex parte AKLI ADJAOUTE ____________________ Appeal 2018-004697 Application 14/938,8441 Technology Center 3600 ____________________ Before HUNG H. BUI, ADAM J. PYONIN, and DAVID J. CUTITTA II, Administrative Patent Judges. CUTITTA, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appellant appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a final rejection of claims 1–8, all of the claims pending in the application.2 We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM. 1 Appellant is identified as the applicant and real party in interest, Brighterion, Inc. See Appeal Br. 3. 2 Claim 9 is cancelled. See Appeal Br. 13. Appeal 2018-004697 Application 14/938,844 2 STATEMENT OF THE CASE Invention According to Appellant, the claimed invention relates to “a method for improving the profitability” of commercial transactions by “accepting increased transaction risks of selected customers in selected transactions.” Spec. 1:12–15.3 Specifically, “business method embodiments of the present invention will reverse an authorization request denial made according to general guidelines if the particular customer and the particular transaction pass various threshold tests.” Spec. 3:2–6. Representative Claim Claim 1, reproduced below with bracketed material added, is the sole independent claim and is representative of the claimed subject matter: 1. An electronic and smart agent based method for deciding if an adverse fraud score for a particular customer in a particular transaction should be overruled given that particular customer’s business value and the consequential impact to the company making a decision to authorize that transaction, comprising: [(a)] keeping individual profiles learned from past business transactions with a plurality of customers rather than keeping transaction records of the past business transactions as historical data in a database, for fast access with a network server using an apparatus for executing an algorithm for creating, initiating, and updating a plurality of corresponding and matching smart agents each having a non-transitory profile and individualized thresholds in a computer storage memory; 3 This Decision refers to: (1) Appellant’s Specification filed November 12, 2015 (Spec.); (2) the Final Office Action mailed August 23, 2017 (Final Act.); (3) the Appeal Brief filed October 31, 2017 (Appeal Br.); (4) the Examiner’s Answer (Ans.), mailed March 12, 2018; and (5) the Reply Brief filed March 28, 2018 (Reply Br.). Appeal 2018-004697 Application 14/938,844 3 [(b)] receiving a transaction record and identifying a particular customer from attributes in the record with the apparatus for executing an algorithm for creating, initiating, and updating a plurality of corresponding and matching smart agents; [(c)] determining a fraud score for a transaction risk represented in the transaction record with an apparatus for executing an algorithm for finding and matching a profile in computer memory storage for one of the plurality of corresponding and matching smart agents; [(d)] determining a profitability score for a business value represented in attributes of the transaction record with an electronic apparatus for executing an algorithm for using the one smart agent to set a comparison threshold stored in computer memory storage for each of a customer value, an impact, and a projected revenue loss; [(e)] determining between outputting a decision to approve the transaction, or deciding to decline the transaction, using an apparatus for executing an algorithm that tests the comparison thresholds stored in computer memory storage for each customer value, impact, and projected revenue loss; and [(f)] outputting a decision through an electronic financial network server. Appeal Br. 11. REJECTION Claims 1–8 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed to patent- ineligible subject matter. See Final Act. 8–15. Our review in this appeal is limited to the above rejection and the issues raised by Appellant. Arguments not made are waived. See MPEP § 1205.02; 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv). Appeal 2018-004697 Application 14/938,844 4 ANALYSIS I. Principles of Law An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a “new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101. However, the Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to include implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas” are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014) (citation omitted). In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we are guided by the Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo and Alice. Id. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with that framework, we first determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See id. at 219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4 in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting against risk.”). Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible, include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611); mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67–68 (1972)). Concepts determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes, such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191 (1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing Appeal 2018-004697 Application 14/938,844 5 India rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S. 252, 267–68 (1854))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69 (citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))). In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the Supreme Court held that “[a] claim drawn to subject matter otherwise statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a mathematical formula.” Diehr, 450 U.S. at 176; see also id. at 191 (“We view respondents’ claims as nothing more than a process for molding rubber products and not as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Having said that, the Supreme Court also indicated that a claim “seeking patent protection for that formula in the abstract . . . is not accorded the protection of our patent laws, . . . and this principle cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological environment.” Id. (citing Benson and Flook); see, e.g., id. at 187 (“It is now commonplace that an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula to a known structure or process may well be deserving of patent protection.”). If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent- eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (citation omitted). “A claim that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77). Appeal 2018-004697 Application 14/938,844 6 “[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[] fail[s] to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id. The PTO recently published revised guidance on the application of § 101. See 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (USPTO Jan. 7, 2019) (“Guidance”). Under that guidance, we first look to whether the claim recites: (1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing human activities such as a fundamental economic practice, or mental processes); and (2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a practical application (see MPEP §§ 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h) (9th ed. Rev. 08.2017, Jan. 2018)). Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then look to whether the claim: (3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or (4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception. See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56. Appeal 2018-004697 Application 14/938,844 7 II. The Examiner’s § 101 Rejection The Examiner determines that representative4 claim 1 is directed to a judicial exception: an abstract idea. See Final Act. 2–4; Ans. 3–8. According to the Examiner, claim 1 “is directed towards the abstract idea of analyzing financial transaction risk,” which “is a fundamental economic practice.” Final Act. 3. The Examiner also determines that “taken alone, the additional elements do not amount to significantly more than the above- identified judicial exception (the abstract idea)” and “the limitations as an ordered combination of elements add nothing that is not already present when looking at the elements taken individually.” Final Act. 4, 6. We analyze the claims and the Examiner’s rejection in view of the Guidance and we adopt the nomenclature for the steps used in the Guidance. III. Guidance, Step 1 Analyzing the Examiner’s rejection in view of the Guidance, we must first determine whether the claim is directed to a statutory class of invention. Section 101 provides that “[w]hoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.” 35 U.S.C. § 101. Independent claim 1 recites a method. See Appeal Br. 11. As such, the claim is directed to a statutory class of invention within 35 U.S.C. § 101, i.e., a process. 4 Appellant argues the claims as a group. See Appeal Br. 6. We, thus, select independent claim 1 as representative of claims 1–8. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv). Appeal 2018-004697 Application 14/938,844 8 IV. Guidance Step 2A–Prong 1, (Alice/Mayo—Step 1) We next determine whether the claim, being directed to a statutory class of invention, nonetheless falls within a judicial exception. See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 51. The PTO has synthesized the key concepts identified by the courts as abstract ideas into three primary subject-matter groupings: (1) mathematical concepts, (2) certain methods of organizing human activities (e.g., a fundamental economic practice), and (3) mental processes. Id. at 52. Apart from generic hardware and extra-solution activity discussed in sections V and VI below, claim 1 recites (a) “keeping individual profiles learned from past business transactions with a plurality of customers,” (b) “identifying a particular customer from attributes in the record” and “updating . . . smart agents, (c) “determining a fraud score for a transaction risk represented in the transaction record” and “matching a profile,” (d) “determining a profitability score for a business value represented in attributes of the transaction record,” and (e) “determining between outputting a decision to approve the transaction, or deciding to decline the transaction.” Appeal Br. 11. These claimed steps describe, under a broadest reasonable interpretation as determined by the Examiner, the concept of “analyzing financial transaction risk.” Final Act. 3. We therefore agree with the Examiner that these limitations recite a fundamental economic practice. See id. Fundamental economic practices fall into the category of certain methods of organizing human activity and claim 1, therefore, recites a judicial exception, i.e., an abstract idea. See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52. Appeal 2018-004697 Application 14/938,844 9 V. Guidance Step 2A, Prong Two (Integration into a Practical Application) Because claim 1 recites an abstract idea, we now determine whether the claim integrates the abstract idea into a practical application, i.e., whether the claim is directed to an improvement to the underlying technology. See, e.g., Alice, 573 U.S. at 223, discussing Diehr, 450 U.S. at 175. Under prong two of revised step 2A, we determine whether the recited judicial exception is integrated into a practical application by: (a) identifying whether there are any additional elements recited in the claim beyond the judicial exception; and (b) evaluating those additional elements individually and in combination to determine whether they integrate the exception into a practical application. We use the term “additional elements” to refer to features, limitations, or steps that the claim recites beyond the abstract idea itself. Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55 n.24. The Examiner determines that in claim 1, “[t]here are no improvements to the technical field or the technology, nor are there improvements to the computer system itself.” Final Act. 3 (emphasis omitted). Appellant argues “the use of smart agents allow[s] for a drastic reduction in data size” because “[r]ather than keeping transaction records of past business transactions as historical data in a database, the claimed method uses individual profiles, represented by smart agents, that are learned from past business transactions.” Appeal Br. 7 (citing Spec. 63:4– 9). Appellant argues the claimed invention, thus, “seeks to harness such data size reduction, which represents a technical solution to the problems associated with the use of massive databases.” Appeal Br. 7. Appeal 2018-004697 Application 14/938,844 10 We are not persuaded that the claimed “abstract idea” is integrated into a practical application. In claim 1, the additional limitations are (a) “a network server,” “an apparatus for executing an algorithm,” “a computer storage memory,” (b) “receiving a transaction record,” (d) “computer memory storage,” and (f) “outputting a decision through an electronic financial network server.” These additional elements––considered in the context of claim 1 as a whole––do not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application because they merely add generic hardware to execute the abstract idea, store data, and output data, which is insufficient to integrate the judicial exception into a practical application. See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55, nn.25 & 27–32 (citing MPEP §§ 2106.05(a)-(c), (e))- (h)). For instance, the network server and apparatus are used to execute the claimed algorithm, but the claim does not recite a technical improvement aside from the algorithm itself, which is already identified as an abstract idea. See section IV above. In addition, a mere data gathering step, such as “receiving a transaction record” recited in (b), is insignificant extra-solution activity that is insufficient to render the claim patent-eligible. See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 963 (characterizing data gathering steps as insignificant extra-solution activity). The same applies to “outputting a decision through an electronic financial network server” in (e), because outputting of data is also insignificant extra-solution activity. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 at 590 (“[t]he notion that post-solution activity, no matter how conventional or obvious in itself, can transform an unpatentable principle into a patentable process exalts form over substance.”). Appeal 2018-004697 Application 14/938,844 11 Appellant’s argument that the claimed invention reduces the size of stored data is not persuasive. See Appeal Br. 7. Even if less storage is used, the reason is because the claimed abstract idea results in the storage of a smaller amount of data, not because the functioning of the computer has been improved. That is, less memory is used because less data is stored when saving smart agent data rather than historical data, not because the functioning of the computer is improved. See Spec. 63:4–8. Appellant argues the Examiner errs because the “US Supreme has ruled that section 101 is to be broadly interpreted such that claimed subject matter containing any non-abstract subject matter of sufficient specificity would meet the requirements of patent eligibility for utility patents” and claim 1 recites several apparatuses and an electronic financial network server. Appeal Br. 5–6 (citing Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980)); see also id. at 7. Appellant’s characterization of Diamond v. Chakrabarty as holding that a claim “containing any non-abstract subject matter” must be patent eligible is not an accurate reflection of the current state of the law. Rather, the incidental use of a computer or other generic hardware does not make a claim otherwise directed to an abstract process patent eligible. See CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1375, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“That purely mental processes can be unpatentable, even when performed by a computer, was precisely the holding of the Supreme Court in Gottschalk v. Benson.”). Contrary to Appellant’s argument, the solution addressed by Appellant’s claim is a business problem, not a technical problem. Rather than addressing a problem unique to the technology in which the solution is Appeal 2018-004697 Application 14/938,844 12 implemented, Appellant’s claim 1 merely automates, using generic computer technology, a business process in which profitability is increased by “accepting increased transaction risks of selected customers in selected transactions.” Spec. 1:12–15. As further set forth in the Specification, “business method embodiments of the present invention will reverse an authorization request denial made according to general guidelines if the particular customer and the particular transaction pass various threshold tests.” Spec. 3:2–6. Thus, claim 1 is directed to enhancing profitability by accepting increased transaction risk, which is not an improvement to technology and does not recite a particular solution to a technological problem or a particular way to achieve a desired outcome by reciting an improvement to technology. See MPEP § 2106.05 (a). Nor do Appellant’s claimed additional elements require a particular computer; thus the claim also does not define or rely on a “particular machine.” See MPEP § 2106.05(b). Further, the claim does not transform matter; at best, it transforms information. That is, the claim simply manipulates and outputs data such as by (e) “determining between outputting a decision to approve the transaction, or deciding to decline the transaction” and (f) “outputting a decision.” See MPEP § 2106.05 (c); see also Benson, 409 U.S. at 71–72) (holding that a computer based algorithm that merely transforms data from one form to another is not patent-eligible). As such, the claim has no other meaningful limitations (see MPEP § 2106.05 (e)), and merely recites instructions to execute an abstract idea on a generic computer hardware (see MPEP § 2106.05 (f)), along with insignificant extra-solution activity. See MPEP § 2106.05 (g). Appeal 2018-004697 Application 14/938,844 13 We, therefore, determine claim 1 is not directed to a specific asserted improvement in computer technology or otherwise integrated into a practical application and thus is directed to a judicial exception. VI. Guidance Step 2B, Alice/Mayo—Step 2 (Inventive Concept) Next, we determine whether the claim includes additional elements that provide significantly more than the recited judicial exception, thereby providing an inventive concept. Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72–73). To determine whether the claim provides an inventive concept, the additional elements are considered—individually and in combination—to determine whether they (1) add a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field or (2) simply append well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception. Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56. The Examiner finds “the recited ‘computer network server’ and ‘smart agents’ are recited at a high level of generality to simply perform the generic computer functions of receiving, processing, calculating, storing, transmitting information and displaying data” and “generic computer components recited as performing generic computer functions that are well- understood, routine and conventional activities amount to no more than implementing the abstract idea with a computerized system.” Ans. 6. “Thus, taken alone, . . . the additional elements do not amount to significantly more than the above-identified judicial exception (the abstract idea).” Id. We agree with the Examiner. Indeed, Appellant’s Specification describes that the computing elements are generic computing elements. See Appeal 2018-004697 Application 14/938,844 14 Spec. 8:4–10 (discussing “[c]omputer-implemented method embodiments” implemented by generic “computer apparatus” and delivered to “clients, and other users through network servers” that are also generic); see also Alice, 573 U.S. at 226 (“Nearly every computer will include a ‘communications controller’ and ‘data storage unit’ capable of performing the basic calculation, storage, and transmission functions required by the method claims.”). Appellant argues the ordered combination of claim elements contains an inventive concept like the claims in Bascom, and that because “Claim 1 recites the term ‘electronic,’” and “[i]t is well known that, factually speaking, electrons are a composition of matter that together with protons and optionally neutrons form atoms” and [c]ompositions of matter are specifically identified in 35 USC 101 as patent eligible subject matter.” Appeal Br. 6 (citing Bascom Glob. Internet Servs. v. AT&T Mobility, LLC, 827 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016)). We do not agree that Appellant’s claim 1 is patent eligible merely because it recites the term “electronic.” See Appeal Br. 6. Neither do we determine Appellant’s claim 1 to be similar to claims in Bascom. The claims in Bascom described a particular arrangement of filtering software at a specific location, remote from the end-users, with customizable filtering features specific to each end user. The filtering software enabled individually customizable filtering at the remote ISP server by taking advantage of the technical ability of the ISP server to identify individual accounts and associate a request for Internet content with a specific individual account. The Federal Circuit recognized that Bascom’s installation of an Internet content filter at a particular network location was Appeal 2018-004697 Application 14/938,844 15 “a technical improvement over prior art ways of filtering such content” because such an arrangement advantageously allows the Internet content filter to have “both the benefits of a filter on a local computer and the benefits of a filter on the ISP server” and “give[s] users the ability to customize filtering for their individual network accounts.” Bascom, 827 F.3d at 1350, 1352. In contrast to Bascom, Appellant’s claim 1 is directed to “a method for improving the profitability, and more specifically to accepting increased transaction risks of selected customers in selected transactions.” Spec. 1:12– 15. As recognized by the Examiner, “the recited ‘computing systems’ are recited at a high level of generality to simply perform the generic computer functions of receiving, processing, storing, comparing and transmitting information” and so “the limitations as an ordered combination of elements add nothing that is not already present when looking at the elements taken individually.” Final Act. 4. Appellant, in turn, does not identify the ordered combination in the claim that allegedly adds significantly more to the abstract idea to provide an inventive concept. Thus, considering the claimed functions of the recited computing components, both separately and as an ordered combination, we agree with the Examiner that those computer functions are generic, routine, and conventional computer activities that are performed only for their conventional uses in an ordinary manner. See Elec. Power Grp. v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“The focus of the asserted claims . . . is on collecting information, analyzing it, and outputting certain results of the collection and analysis.”); see also In re Katz Interactive Call Processing Patent Litig., 639 F.3d 1303, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“Absent a Appeal 2018-004697 Application 14/938,844 16 possible narrower construction of the terms ‘processing,’ ‘receiving,’ and ‘storing,’ . . . those functions can be achieved by any general purpose computer without special programming.”); see also Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 715 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (sequence of receiving, selecting, offering for exchange, display, allowing access, and receiving payment recited an abstraction). Appellant next argues that “[because the] procedural posture [in the current case] is patent prosecution, not litigation . . . none of the case law originally cited by the Examiner is particularly relevant here, because they took place during litigation.” Reply Br. 1; see Appeal Br. 5. We disagree. Patent eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101 remains the same whether the claim is examined in the context of prosecution before the PTO or is challenged in the context of litigation before federal courts (district courts or the Federal Circuit). Appellant, in turn, provides no authority for such a distinction. Appellant further provides a joint declaration submitted by “colleagues of the inventor.” Reply 2 (citing Appendix A including Joint Declaration of Dr. Akli Adjaoute, Francois Stehlin, and Louis Wu.). In the Declaration, the Declarants affirm “[w]e have read the contents of U.S. Patent Application Serial No. 14/938,844 and the pending claims” and “[w]e believe that all claims set forth subject matter that comport with all requirements of 35 U.S.C. 101, without exception, judicial or otherwise.” Reply, Appendix A. Patent eligibility is a question of law that is reviewable de novo. Dealertrack, Inc. v. Huber, 674 F.3d 1315, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2012). As such, these Joint Declarations are not persuasive because they only provide an Appeal 2018-004697 Application 14/938,844 17 unsupported conclusion of patentability without evidence or reasoned argument as to the patentability of claim 1. We, thus, conclude that claim 1 does not provide an inventive concept because the additional elements recited in claim 1 do not provide significantly more than the recited judicial exception. Accordingly, claim 1 does not recite patent-eligible subject matter. Because claim 1 is argued as representative of the other claims, we also conclude that dependent claims 2–8 do not recite patent-eligible subject matter. Therefore, we sustain the rejection of claims 1–8 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to patent- ineligible subject matter. DECISION We affirm the Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–8 under 35 U.S.C. § 101. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(f). AFFIRMED Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation