Akli Adjaoute

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Aug 14, 2019

14938844 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Aug. 14, 2019)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/938,844 11/12/2015 Akli Adjaoute 51403-US-CIP1-CIP1-CIP4 2997
150180 7590 08/14/2019
Hovey Williams LLP
10801 Mastin Blvd., Suite 1000
Overland Park, KS 66210
EXAMINER
OYEBISI, OJO O
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3697
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
08/14/2019 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
uspatents@hoveywilliams.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________________

Ex parte AKLI ADJAOUTE
____________________

Appeal 2018-004697
Application 14/938,8441
Technology Center 3600
____________________
Before HUNG H. BUI, ADAM J. PYONIN, and DAVID J. CUTITTA II,
Administrative Patent Judges.
CUTITTA, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a final rejection of
claims 1–8, all of the claims pending in the application.2 We have
jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 Appellant is identified as the applicant and real party in interest,
Brighterion, Inc. See Appeal Br. 3.
2 Claim 9 is cancelled. See Appeal Br. 13.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Invention
According to Appellant, the claimed invention relates to “a method
for improving the profitability” of commercial transactions by “accepting
increased transaction risks of selected customers in selected transactions.”
Spec. 1:12–15.3 Specifically, “business method embodiments of the present
invention will reverse an authorization request denial made according to
general guidelines if the particular customer and the particular transaction
pass various threshold tests.” Spec. 3:2–6.
Representative Claim
Claim 1, reproduced below with bracketed material added, is the sole
independent claim and is representative of the claimed subject matter:
1. An electronic and smart agent based method for
deciding if an adverse fraud score for a particular customer in a
particular transaction should be overruled given that particular
customer’s business value and the consequential impact to the
company making a decision to authorize that transaction,
comprising:
[(a)] keeping individual profiles learned from past
business transactions with a plurality of customers rather than
keeping transaction records of the past business transactions as
historical data in a database, for fast access with a network
server using an apparatus for executing an algorithm for
creating, initiating, and updating a plurality of corresponding
and matching smart agents each having a non-transitory profile
and individualized thresholds in a computer storage memory;

3 This Decision refers to: (1) Appellant’s Specification filed November 12,
2015 (Spec.); (2) the Final Office Action mailed August 23, 2017 (Final
Act.); (3) the Appeal Brief filed October 31, 2017 (Appeal Br.); (4) the
Examiner’s Answer (Ans.), mailed March 12, 2018; and (5) the Reply Brief
filed March 28, 2018 (Reply Br.).
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[(b)] receiving a transaction record and identifying a
particular customer from attributes in the record with the
apparatus for executing an algorithm for creating, initiating, and
updating a plurality of corresponding and matching smart
agents;
[(c)] determining a fraud score for a transaction risk
represented in the transaction record with an apparatus for
executing an algorithm for finding and matching a profile in
computer memory storage for one of the plurality of
corresponding and matching smart agents;
[(d)] determining a profitability score for a business
value represented in attributes of the transaction record with an
electronic apparatus for executing an algorithm for using the
one smart agent to set a comparison threshold stored in
computer memory storage for each of a customer value, an
impact, and a projected revenue loss;
[(e)] determining between outputting a decision to
approve the transaction, or deciding to decline the transaction,
using an apparatus for executing an algorithm that tests the
comparison thresholds stored in computer memory storage for
each customer value, impact, and projected revenue loss; and
[(f)] outputting a decision through an electronic financial
network server.
Appeal Br. 11.
REJECTION
Claims 1–8 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed to patent-
ineligible subject matter. See Final Act. 8–15.
Our review in this appeal is limited to the above rejection and the
issues raised by Appellant. Arguments not made are waived. See MPEP
§ 1205.02; 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).

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ANALYSIS
I. Principles of Law
An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a “new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101.
However, the Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to include
implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract
ideas” are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573
U.S. 208, 216 (2014) (citation omitted).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo
and Alice. Id. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus
Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with that framework,
we first determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See id. at 219
(“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of
intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement
risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4
in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting
against risk.”).
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611);
mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and
mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67–68 (1972)).
Concepts determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical
processes, such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S.
175, 191 (1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing
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India rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56
U.S. 252, 267–68 (1854))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69
(citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).
In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the
Supreme Court held that “[a] claim drawn to subject matter otherwise
statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a
mathematical formula.” Diehr, 450 U.S. at 176; see also id. at 191 (“We
view respondents’ claims as nothing more than a process for molding rubber
products and not as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Having
said that, the Supreme Court also indicated that a claim “seeking patent
protection for that formula in the abstract . . . is not accorded the protection
of our patent laws, . . . and this principle cannot be circumvented by
attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological
environment.” Id. (citing Benson and Flook); see, e.g., id. at 187 (“It is now
commonplace that an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula
to a known structure or process may well be deserving of patent
protection.”).
If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second
step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the
elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive
concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-
eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (citation omitted). “A claim
that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to ensure ‘that
the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the
[abstract idea].’” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77).
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“[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[] fail[s] to transform
that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id.
The PTO recently published revised guidance on the application of
§ 101. See 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84
Fed. Reg. 50 (USPTO Jan. 7, 2019) (“Guidance”). Under that guidance, we
first look to whether the claim recites:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract
ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing
human activities such as a fundamental economic practice, or mental
processes); and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a
practical application (see MPEP §§ 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h) (9th ed.
Rev. 08.2017, Jan. 2018)).
Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not integrate that
exception into a practical application, do we then look to whether the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not
“well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see MPEP
§ 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities
previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of
generality, to the judicial exception.
See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56.

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II. The Examiner’s § 101 Rejection
The Examiner determines that representative4 claim 1 is directed to a
judicial exception: an abstract idea. See Final Act. 2–4; Ans. 3–8.
According to the Examiner, claim 1 “is directed towards the abstract idea of
analyzing financial transaction risk,” which “is a fundamental economic
practice.” Final Act. 3. The Examiner also determines that “taken alone, the
additional elements do not amount to significantly more than the above-
identified judicial exception (the abstract idea)” and “the limitations as an
ordered combination of elements add nothing that is not already present
when looking at the elements taken individually.” Final Act. 4, 6.
We analyze the claims and the Examiner’s rejection in view of the
Guidance and we adopt the nomenclature for the steps used in the Guidance.

III. Guidance, Step 1
Analyzing the Examiner’s rejection in view of the Guidance, we must
first determine whether the claim is directed to a statutory class of invention.
Section 101 provides that “[w]hoever invents or discovers any new and
useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new
and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the
conditions and requirements of this title.” 35 U.S.C. § 101. Independent
claim 1 recites a method. See Appeal Br. 11. As such, the claim is directed
to a statutory class of invention within 35 U.S.C. § 101, i.e., a process.

4 Appellant argues the claims as a group. See Appeal Br. 6. We, thus,
select independent claim 1 as representative of claims 1–8. See
37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
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IV. Guidance Step 2A–Prong 1, (Alice/Mayo—Step 1)
We next determine whether the claim, being directed to a statutory
class of invention, nonetheless falls within a judicial exception. See
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 51. The PTO has synthesized the key concepts
identified by the courts as abstract ideas into three primary subject-matter
groupings: (1) mathematical concepts, (2) certain methods of organizing
human activities (e.g., a fundamental economic practice), and (3) mental
processes. Id. at 52. Apart from generic hardware and extra-solution
activity discussed in sections V and VI below, claim 1 recites (a) “keeping
individual profiles learned from past business transactions with a plurality of
customers,” (b) “identifying a particular customer from attributes in the
record” and “updating . . . smart agents, (c) “determining a fraud score for a
transaction risk represented in the transaction record” and “matching a
profile,” (d) “determining a profitability score for a business value
represented in attributes of the transaction record,” and (e) “determining
between outputting a decision to approve the transaction, or deciding to
decline the transaction.” Appeal Br. 11.
These claimed steps describe, under a broadest reasonable
interpretation as determined by the Examiner, the concept of “analyzing
financial transaction risk.” Final Act. 3. We therefore agree with the
Examiner that these limitations recite a fundamental economic practice. See
id. Fundamental economic practices fall into the category of certain methods
of organizing human activity and claim 1, therefore, recites a judicial
exception, i.e., an abstract idea. See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52.

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V. Guidance Step 2A, Prong Two (Integration into a Practical Application)
Because claim 1 recites an abstract idea, we now determine whether
the claim integrates the abstract idea into a practical application, i.e.,
whether the claim is directed to an improvement to the underlying
technology. See, e.g., Alice, 573 U.S. at 223, discussing Diehr, 450 U.S. at
175. Under prong two of revised step 2A, we determine whether the recited
judicial exception is integrated into a practical application by: (a)
identifying whether there are any additional elements recited in the claim
beyond the judicial exception; and (b) evaluating those additional elements
individually and in combination to determine whether they integrate the
exception into a practical application. We use the term “additional
elements” to refer to features, limitations, or steps that the claim recites
beyond the abstract idea itself. Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55 n.24.
The Examiner determines that in claim 1, “[t]here are no
improvements to the technical field or the technology, nor are there
improvements to the computer system itself.” Final Act. 3 (emphasis
omitted).
Appellant argues “the use of smart agents allow[s] for a drastic
reduction in data size” because “[r]ather than keeping transaction records of
past business transactions as historical data in a database, the claimed
method uses individual profiles, represented by smart agents, that are
learned from past business transactions.” Appeal Br. 7 (citing Spec. 63:4–
9). Appellant argues the claimed invention, thus, “seeks to harness such data
size reduction, which represents a technical solution to the problems
associated with the use of massive databases.” Appeal Br. 7.
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We are not persuaded that the claimed “abstract idea” is integrated
into a practical application. In claim 1, the additional limitations are (a) “a
network server,” “an apparatus for executing an algorithm,” “a computer
storage memory,” (b) “receiving a transaction record,” (d) “computer
memory storage,” and (f) “outputting a decision through an electronic
financial network server.” These additional elements––considered in the
context of claim 1 as a whole––do not integrate the abstract idea into a
practical application because they merely add generic hardware to execute
the abstract idea, store data, and output data, which is insufficient to
integrate the judicial exception into a practical application. See Guidance,
84 Fed. Reg. at 55, nn.25 & 27–32 (citing MPEP §§ 2106.05(a)-(c), (e))-
(h)). For instance, the network server and apparatus are used to execute the
claimed algorithm, but the claim does not recite a technical improvement
aside from the algorithm itself, which is already identified as an abstract
idea. See section IV above.
In addition, a mere data gathering step, such as “receiving a
transaction record” recited in (b), is insignificant extra-solution activity that
is insufficient to render the claim patent-eligible. See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d
at 963 (characterizing data gathering steps as insignificant extra-solution
activity). The same applies to “outputting a decision through an electronic
financial network server” in (e), because outputting of data is also
insignificant extra-solution activity. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 at 590 (“[t]he
notion that post-solution activity, no matter how conventional or obvious in
itself, can transform an unpatentable principle into a patentable process
exalts form over substance.”).
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Appellant’s argument that the claimed invention reduces the size of
stored data is not persuasive. See Appeal Br. 7. Even if less storage is used,
the reason is because the claimed abstract idea results in the storage of a
smaller amount of data, not because the functioning of the computer has
been improved. That is, less memory is used because less data is stored
when saving smart agent data rather than historical data, not because the
functioning of the computer is improved. See Spec. 63:4–8.
Appellant argues the Examiner errs because the “US Supreme has
ruled that section 101 is to be broadly interpreted such that claimed subject
matter containing any non-abstract subject matter of sufficient specificity
would meet the requirements of patent eligibility for utility patents” and
claim 1 recites several apparatuses and an electronic financial network
server. Appeal Br. 5–6 (citing Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303
(1980)); see also id. at 7.
Appellant’s characterization of Diamond v. Chakrabarty as holding
that a claim “containing any non-abstract subject matter” must be patent
eligible is not an accurate reflection of the current state of the law. Rather,
the incidental use of a computer or other generic hardware does not make a
claim otherwise directed to an abstract process patent eligible. See
CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1375, 1372
(Fed. Cir. 2011) (“That purely mental processes can be unpatentable, even
when performed by a computer, was precisely the holding of the Supreme
Court in Gottschalk v. Benson.”).
Contrary to Appellant’s argument, the solution addressed by
Appellant’s claim is a business problem, not a technical problem. Rather
than addressing a problem unique to the technology in which the solution is
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implemented, Appellant’s claim 1 merely automates, using generic computer
technology, a business process in which profitability is increased by
“accepting increased transaction risks of selected customers in selected
transactions.” Spec. 1:12–15. As further set forth in the Specification,
“business method embodiments of the present invention will reverse an
authorization request denial made according to general guidelines if the
particular customer and the particular transaction pass various threshold
tests.” Spec. 3:2–6. Thus, claim 1 is directed to enhancing profitability by
accepting increased transaction risk, which is not an improvement to
technology and does not recite a particular solution to a technological
problem or a particular way to achieve a desired outcome by reciting an
improvement to technology. See MPEP § 2106.05 (a).
Nor do Appellant’s claimed additional elements require a particular
computer; thus the claim also does not define or rely on a “particular
machine.” See MPEP § 2106.05(b). Further, the claim does not transform
matter; at best, it transforms information. That is, the claim simply
manipulates and outputs data such as by (e) “determining between
outputting a decision to approve the transaction, or deciding to decline the
transaction” and (f) “outputting a decision.” See MPEP § 2106.05 (c); see
also Benson, 409 U.S. at 71–72) (holding that a computer based algorithm
that merely transforms data from one form to another is not patent-eligible).
As such, the claim has no other meaningful limitations (see MPEP § 2106.05
(e)), and merely recites instructions to execute an abstract idea on a generic
computer hardware (see MPEP § 2106.05 (f)), along with insignificant
extra-solution activity. See MPEP § 2106.05 (g).
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We, therefore, determine claim 1 is not directed to a specific asserted
improvement in computer technology or otherwise integrated into a practical
application and thus is directed to a judicial exception.

VI. Guidance Step 2B, Alice/Mayo—Step 2 (Inventive Concept)
Next, we determine whether the claim includes additional elements
that provide significantly more than the recited judicial exception, thereby
providing an inventive concept. Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (quoting Mayo, 566
U.S. at 72–73). To determine whether the claim provides an inventive
concept, the additional elements are considered—individually and in
combination—to determine whether they (1) add a specific limitation
beyond the judicial exception that is not “well-understood, routine,
conventional” in the field or (2) simply append well-understood, routine,
conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high
level of generality, to the judicial exception. Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56.
The Examiner finds “the recited ‘computer network server’ and ‘smart
agents’ are recited at a high level of generality to simply perform the generic
computer functions of receiving, processing, calculating, storing,
transmitting information and displaying data” and “generic computer
components recited as performing generic computer functions that are well-
understood, routine and conventional activities amount to no more than
implementing the abstract idea with a computerized system.” Ans. 6.
“Thus, taken alone, . . . the additional elements do not amount to
significantly more than the above-identified judicial exception (the abstract
idea).” Id. We agree with the Examiner. Indeed, Appellant’s Specification
describes that the computing elements are generic computing elements. See
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Spec. 8:4–10 (discussing “[c]omputer-implemented method embodiments”
implemented by generic “computer apparatus” and delivered to “clients, and
other users through network servers” that are also generic); see also Alice,
573 U.S. at 226 (“Nearly every computer will include a ‘communications
controller’ and ‘data storage unit’ capable of performing the basic
calculation, storage, and transmission functions required by the method
claims.”).
Appellant argues the ordered combination of claim elements contains
an inventive concept like the claims in Bascom, and that because “Claim 1
recites the term ‘electronic,’” and “[i]t is well known that, factually
speaking, electrons are a composition of matter that together with protons
and optionally neutrons form atoms” and [c]ompositions of matter are
specifically identified in 35 USC 101 as patent eligible subject matter.”
Appeal Br. 6 (citing Bascom Glob. Internet Servs. v. AT&T Mobility, LLC,
827 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016)).
We do not agree that Appellant’s claim 1 is patent eligible merely
because it recites the term “electronic.” See Appeal Br. 6. Neither do we
determine Appellant’s claim 1 to be similar to claims in Bascom. The
claims in Bascom described a particular arrangement of filtering software at
a specific location, remote from the end-users, with customizable filtering
features specific to each end user. The filtering software enabled
individually customizable filtering at the remote ISP server by taking
advantage of the technical ability of the ISP server to identify individual
accounts and associate a request for Internet content with a specific
individual account. The Federal Circuit recognized that Bascom’s
installation of an Internet content filter at a particular network location was
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“a technical improvement over prior art ways of filtering such content”
because such an arrangement advantageously allows the Internet content
filter to have “both the benefits of a filter on a local computer and the
benefits of a filter on the ISP server” and “give[s] users the ability to
customize filtering for their individual network accounts.” Bascom, 827
F.3d at 1350, 1352.
In contrast to Bascom, Appellant’s claim 1 is directed to “a method
for improving the profitability, and more specifically to accepting increased
transaction risks of selected customers in selected transactions.” Spec. 1:12–
15. As recognized by the Examiner, “the recited ‘computing systems’ are
recited at a high level of generality to simply perform the generic computer
functions of receiving, processing, storing, comparing and transmitting
information” and so “the limitations as an ordered combination of elements
add nothing that is not already present when looking at the elements taken
individually.” Final Act. 4. Appellant, in turn, does not identify the ordered
combination in the claim that allegedly adds significantly more to the
abstract idea to provide an inventive concept.
Thus, considering the claimed functions of the recited computing
components, both separately and as an ordered combination, we agree with
the Examiner that those computer functions are generic, routine, and
conventional computer activities that are performed only for their
conventional uses in an ordinary manner. See Elec. Power Grp. v. Alstom
S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“The focus of the asserted
claims . . . is on collecting information, analyzing it, and outputting certain
results of the collection and analysis.”); see also In re Katz Interactive Call
Processing Patent Litig., 639 F.3d 1303, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“Absent a
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possible narrower construction of the terms ‘processing,’ ‘receiving,’ and
‘storing,’ . . . those functions can be achieved by any general purpose
computer without special programming.”); see also Ultramercial, Inc. v.
Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 715 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (sequence of receiving,
selecting, offering for exchange, display, allowing access, and receiving
payment recited an abstraction).
Appellant next argues that “[because the] procedural posture [in the
current case] is patent prosecution, not litigation . . . none of the case law
originally cited by the Examiner is particularly relevant here, because they
took place during litigation.” Reply Br. 1; see Appeal Br. 5.
We disagree. Patent eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101 remains the
same whether the claim is examined in the context of prosecution before the
PTO or is challenged in the context of litigation before federal courts
(district courts or the Federal Circuit). Appellant, in turn, provides no
authority for such a distinction.
Appellant further provides a joint declaration submitted by
“colleagues of the inventor.” Reply 2 (citing Appendix A including Joint
Declaration of Dr. Akli Adjaoute, Francois Stehlin, and Louis Wu.). In the
Declaration, the Declarants affirm “[w]e have read the contents of U.S.
Patent Application Serial No. 14/938,844 and the pending claims” and “[w]e
believe that all claims set forth subject matter that comport with all
requirements of 35 U.S.C. 101, without exception, judicial or otherwise.”
Reply, Appendix A.
Patent eligibility is a question of law that is reviewable de novo.
Dealertrack, Inc. v. Huber, 674 F.3d 1315, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2012). As such,
these Joint Declarations are not persuasive because they only provide an
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unsupported conclusion of patentability without evidence or reasoned
argument as to the patentability of claim 1.
We, thus, conclude that claim 1 does not provide an inventive concept
because the additional elements recited in claim 1 do not provide
significantly more than the recited judicial exception. Accordingly, claim 1
does not recite patent-eligible subject matter. Because claim 1 is argued as
representative of the other claims, we also conclude that dependent claims
2–8 do not recite patent-eligible subject matter. Therefore, we sustain the
rejection of claims 1–8 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to patent-
ineligible subject matter.

DECISION
We affirm the Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–8 under
35 U.S.C. § 101.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.50(f).
AFFIRMED