Admiral Semmes Hotel

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Aug 6, 1965

154 N.L.R.B. 338 (N.L.R.B. 1965)

338 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
539 and Local 15, and Respondent Mechanical Contractors Association of Minne-
apolis, Inc., and its Member -Contractors engaged in and are engaging in unfair labor
practices within the meaning of Section 8 (e) of the Act.
6. By threatening, coercing, and restraining Lamb Plumbing & Heating Company
with an object of forcing or requiring said Company to enter into an agreement
prohibited by Section 8(e) and to cease using, selling, handling, or otherwise dealing
in the products of, or doing business with, Cleaver-Brooks Company, its representa-
tive the Heinen Company, and Tonka Toys, Incorporated, Respondent Local 539
thereby violated Section 8 (b)(4)(ii)(A) and (B) of the Act.
7. By inducing and encouraging the employees of Lamb Plumbing & Heating Com-
pany in the manner and for the objectives found herein, Local 539 thereby violated
Section8 (b)(4)(i)(A) and (B ) of the Act.
8. By inducing and encouraging the employees of Bjorkman Bros. Co. in the
manner and for the objectives found herein, Local 539 thereby violated Section
8(b)(4)(1)(A) and (B) of the Act.
9. By threatening, coercing, and restraining Paragon Heating & Plumbing Com-
pany with an object of forcing or requiring said Company to enter into an agreement
prohibited by Section 8(e) and to cease using, selling, handling, or otherwise dealing
in the products of, or doing business with, Orr & Sembower, Inc., and its representa-
tive Blesi-Evans Company, Respondent Local 539 thereby violated Section 8(b) (4)
(ii)(A) and (B) of the Act.
10. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting com-
merce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
11. Respondent Local 539 did not interpret, construe, and apply its fabrication
clause in violation of Section 8(e) insofar as Burniece's, Inc., is concerned, and did
not threaten, coerce, or restrain said Company for any unlawful objective, and I
recommend the complaints, in this respect, be dismissed.
12. Respondent Local 15, except for the fair standards provision, has not engaged
in any unfair labor practices in violation of Section 8(e), and I recommend the com-
plaint, in other respects, be dismissed.
[Recommended Order omitted from publication.]
Gal Tex Hotel Corporation , d/b/a Admiral Semmes Hotel and
Motor Hotel and Hotel and Restaurant Employees and Bar-
tenders Union , Local 176, AFL-CIO. Case No. 15-CA-93484.
August 6,1965
DECISION AND ORDER
On March 22, 1965, Trial Examiner David London issued his Deci-
sion in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respondent
had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices
within the meaning of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended,
and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain
affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Deci-
sion. Thereafter, the Respondent filed exceptions to the Trial Exam-
iner's Decision and a supporting brief, and the General Counsel filed
exceptions 1 and a brief in support of the Trial Examiner's Decision.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3 (b) of the Act, the National
Labor Relations Board has delegated its powers in connection with
this case to a three-member panel [Chairman McCulloch and Members
Brown and Jenkins].
'The General Counsel excepted only to the Trial Examiner's apparently inadvertent
failure to include, in his Recommended Order and Notice, provisions covering certain con-
duct he found to be violative of the Act.
154 NLRB No. 22.
ADMIRAL SEMMES HOTEL AND MOTOR HOTEL 339
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made
at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The
rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial
Examiner's Decision, the exceptions and briefs, and the entire record
in the case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recom-
mendations of the Trial Examiner with the following additions, modi-
fications, and exceptions.
1. The Trial Examiner concluded, and we agree, that the Respond-
ent violated Section 8(a) (1) of the Act by unlawfully interrogating
and threatening employees, and by creating the impression of surveil-
lance of union activities. In adopting this conclusion of the Trial
Examiner we rely specifically on the following conduct :
(a) As to interrogation, Taylor, the Respondent's assistant man-
ager, asked Alexander, in March 1964, apparently in reference to his
union views, how he "was thinking." Ostrow, the Respondent's house-
keeper and an admitted supervisor, questioned Chandler in April about
whether she had attended union meetings and questioned Jenkins
approximately a week before the May 6 election about whether Jen-
kins had decided what she "was going to do about the election."
(b) As to threats, Taylor told Alexander, a bellman, in March that
he had heard that Alexander was for the Union, and when Alexander
admitted this, told him, as testified to by Alexander, that "the union
didn't have anything to fight with but strikes" and that if the employ-
ees went on strike, he, Taylor, "would stand in the door and laugh at
us ... they would have to hire someone to take our place ... he would
even tote bags himself." Taylor also indicated to Alexander and Lind-
say in late April or May that in the event the Union won the election,
stricter work rules would be put into effect as a result of which
employees late for work might be subject to discharge, as was the case
at another local hotel where employees were represented by a union;
and told Lindsay, who frequently obtained advances on his pay from
the Respondent, that if the Union won the election and if the Respond-
ent had a rule prohibiting advances, such as the rule at another hotel
where there was a union, Lindsay would not be able to get his cus-
tomary advances.2 In addition, Ostrow told Jenkins, about a week
before the election, after interrogating Jenkins about whether she had
decided how she would vote in the election and receiving a negative
reply, that Jenkins should think about it because management had
been "good" to Jenkins and to the other employees, and that if the
2 The record indicates that the rules referred to by Taylor in these statements were
in fact management rules at the hotel in question and were not part of the collective-
bargaining agreement in effect at that hotel.
We do not adopt the Trial Examiner 's comments , in connection with Taylor 's state-
ments, concerning the effect of a "cold reading of the record," Taylor's intention in mak-
ing the statements , and the effect of the relative unsophistication of Lindsay and Alexan-
der in construing Taylor 's statements.
340 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Union won the election, the Respondent could not do for the employees
the things it had done in the past, and Ostrow did not "know what will
happen."
(c) As to creating the impression of surveillance of employees' union
activities, Taylor, during the second week in March, told Alexander
that he had heard "something bad" about him, that Alexander was
"the hot seat" or "on the hot seat . . . was for the Union 100 percent."
General Manager Drane told Alexander in March that he had heard
about the union meetings and knew who had attended the meetings and
how many times they had attended ; told Chandler in April that he had
heard she was not attending union meetings; and told Jenkins on the
Sunday prior to the election that he believed she was for the Union.3
2. The Trial Examiner found that the incidents mentioned above
were part of a planned campaign by the Respondent, which included
the use of letters, posters, and speeches, seeking to induce the employ-
ees to reject the Union. Although he found that much of the material in
question was permissible campaign propaganda, he found further that
"cumulatively . . . the effect of the posters and Drane's letters and
speeches was intimidatory in nature" when considered with the remain-
der of the record and was itself a violation of Section 8(a) (1). The
complaint, as amended, does not allege, however, that these letters,
posters, and speeches constituted a violation of the Act. When the
General Counsel sought to introduce the written material into evidence,
the Respondent objected on the ground that there was no allegation in
the complaint to which this material was relevant. After some dis-
cussion, the Trial Examiner stated that, because of the length of the
documents, he would admit this material into evidence subject to the
"General Counsel either in their argument or their brief to point spe-
cifically to the portions of this exhibit which he thinks shed some light
on the issues." In our opinion, this issue was not sufficiently litigated
at the hearing to warrant finding a violation of the Act on this basis.
During the course of the hearing, moreover, the Trial Examiner indi-
cated he would make no findings on matters not alleged in the com-
plaint. In these circumstances, we do not adopt the conclusions of the
Trial Examiner that the Respondent violated the Act with respect to
the matters discussed in the section of his Decision entitled "Drane's
letters and speeches."
3. An election was held at the Respondent's plant on May 6, which
the Union lost. On that day, the Union filed charges with the Board
alleging unlawful preelection conduct by the Respondent and on
May 12 filed objections to the election. On May 21, while both the
charges and objections were pending before the Board, General Man-
'In the absence of exceptions , we do not pass upon other conduct alleged to constitute
additional violations of Section 8(a) (1) as to which the Trial Examiner made no
disposition.
ADMIRAL SEMMES HOTEL AND MOTOR HOTEL 341
ager Drane delivered a speech to the employees to thank them for their
support in the election . During the course of this speech , Drane stated
that "some union people" might visit employees at their homes and
"try to get you to give statements against your company." Drane
continued
They may tell you that these statements will be confidential and
that they will not be shown to anyone. If they tell you this it will
not be the truth. The law is, that if you are taken into court and
forced to testify because you gave a statement against your com-
pany, then that statement which you gave has to be turned over
to the hotel's lawyers.
The Trial Examiner found that the Respondent by this speech
unlawfully interfered with the rights of employees to obtain redress
from the Board, citing Certain-Teed Products Corporation, 147 NLRB
1517, where the Board found unlawful a statement that employees
"need not cooperate with Board agents." The Trial Examiner con-
cluded that there was no meaningful distinction between the situation
in that case and the one herein, where the reference was to "union
people," on the ground that the Respondent "must have known that
the Union's purpose in soliciting statements from the employees was
for their use in either or both of the pending Board proceedings.''
In appraising Drane's comments about giving "a statement against
your company," we do so in the context of an employer who had been
engaging in conduct violative of Section 8(a) (1) of the Act. The rec-
ord shows that the Respondent coercively interrogated employees,
threatened them with loss of privileges and other reprisals if they sup-
ported the Union, gave them the impression of surveillance of union
activities, and made statements of inevitable strikes and job loss should
the Union prevail in the election. Respondent's representatives mean-
while sought to impress on the employees how "good" management had
been to them and that the Respondent's continued favor depended on
the Union's rejection . Then, when the Union filed objections to the
representation election held in May 1964 and filed the charges in the
present unfair labor practice case, which charges deal with the afore-
mentioned conduct, the Respondent intimated to its assembled employ-
ees that those employees who give written statements in connection
with those proceedings can be "forced to testify" because they executed
such statements "against your company" and that such statements
would have to be turned over to the company lawyers. Drane's com-
ments clearly represent the Respondent's continuing efforts to coerce
the employees, this time in an endeavor to cause them to withhold
action, for their mutual aid and protection, in proceedings under the
Act. Cf. Texas Industries, Inc., et al. v. N.L.R.B., 336 F.2cl 128, 134
342 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
(C.A. 5) ; Surprenant Manufacturing Company v. N.L.R.B., 341 F. 2d
756,762 (C.A. 6) . We accordingly agree with the Trial Examiner that
Drape's speech violated Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act.
4. We find further, for the reasons given by the Trial Examiner, that
the Respondent also violated Section 8(a) (1) of the Act by granting
wage increases while objections to the election were pending with the
Board. N.L.R.B. v. Exchange Parts Company, 375 U.S. 405; North-
west Engineering Company, 148 NLRB 1136.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as
amended, the National Labor Relations Board hereby adopts as its
Order the Recommended Order of the Trial Examiner, as modified
herein, and orders that the Respondent, Gal Tex Hotel Corporation,
d/b/a Admiral Semmes Hotel and Motor Hotel, -Mobile, Alabama, its
officers, agents, successors , and assigns, shall take the action set forth
in the Trial Examiner's Recommended Order, as so modified:
1. Substitute the following as paragraph 1(b) in the Trial Exatn-
iner's Recommended Order, in place of the present paragraph 1(b) :
"(b) Engaging in surveillance , or creating the impression that it
was engaged in surveillance , of the union activities of its employees."
2. Add the following as paragraph 1(e) to the Trial Examiner's
Recommended Order, the present paragraph 1(e) being relettered
1(f) :
"(e) Seeking to deter its employees from assisting the Union in
investigating and preparing cases before the Board in their behalf."
3. Substitute the following for the second indented paragraph of
the Appendix attached to the Trial Examiner's Decision :
WE WILL NOT engage in surveillance , or create the impression
that we are engaging in surveillance, of the union activities of our
employees.
4. Add the following after the fifth indented paragraph of the
Appendix to the Trial Examiner's Decision :
WE WILL NOT seek to deter our employees from assisting the
Union in investigating and preparing cases before the Board on
their behalf.
TRIAL EXAMINER 'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Upon a charge and an amended charge filed May 6 , 1964, and August 14, 1964,
respectively, by Hotel and Restaurant Employees and Bartenders Union , Local 176,
AFL-CIO, herein called the Union, a complaint was issued herein on August 28,
1964 . That complaint , as thereafter amended, alleges that Respondent Gal Tex Hotel
Corporation , d/b/a Admiral Semmes Hotel and Motor Hotel, had engaged in speci-
fied conduct declared to be violative of Section 8(a) (1) of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act, as amended , herein called the Act. Respondent filed an answer denying it
ADMIRAL SEMMES HOTEL AND MOTOR HOTEL 343
had engaged in the alleged violative conduct. Pursuant to due notice, a hearing was
held before Trial Examiner David London at Mobile, Alabama, on November 9 and
10, 1964. Thereafter, the General Counsel and Respondent filed briefs which have
been carefully considered by me.
On the entire record in the case, and my observation of the demeanor of the wit-
nesses who testified, I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE BUSINESS OF RESPONDENT
The complaint alleges, Respondent's answer admits, and I find that Respondent
is a Texas corporation engaged in furnishing lodgings and other related services to
guests at premises known as the Admiral Semmes Hotel and Motor Hotel located
at Mobile, Alabama During the 12 months preceding the filing of the complaint
herein, Respondent, in the course and conduct of its business operations at Mobile,
Alabama, had a gross volume of business in excess of $500,000. During the same
period, Respondent received more than 25 percent of its rental income from, and
rented more than 25 percent of its rental units to, transient guests who stayed for
periods of less than 1 month. During the same 12-month period, Respondent, in
the course and conduct of its business operations, purchased whiskeys from the State
of Alabama valued in excess of $75,000, which whiskeys were shipped directly to
the State of Alabama from points outside that State. By reason of all the foregoing,
I find that Respondent is, and has been at all times material herein, an employer
engaged in and affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of
the Act.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
The Union is, and has been at all times material herein, a labor organization
within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Prefatory statement
On March 3, 1964, the Union filed a petition with the Board in Case No. 15-RC-
2871 seeking certification as collective-bargaining representative of Respondent's
employees. Following a hearing on that petition, the Board's duly authorized
Regional Director for Region 15, on April 8, 1964, issued his Decision and Direction
of Election setting up an appropriate unit of Respondent's employees for the purpose
of collective bargaining and directing that an election be conducted among the
employees in that unit to determine whether they desired representation by the Union.
Of the 172 votes cast at the election conducted on May 6, 1964, 63 were cast for the
Union, 107 against that organization, and 2 votes were challenged.
At the opening of the hearing the General Counsel sought to incorporate as part
of the record herein additional documents pertaining to proceedings following the
aforementioned election and establishing that on August 28, 1964, the aforesaid
Regional Director, on application of the Union, had set that election aside and
ordered a new election. From the ensuing colloquy between counsel and with me,
and an examination of the proffered exhibits, it appeared that the Regional Director
had set the election aside because his investigation disclosed that the Union's objec-
tions to that election, based on Respondent's conduct preceding the election, should
be sustained. Because that conduct was substantially the same conduct complained
of and alleged in the complaint herein, I ruled that the Regional Director's deter-
mination, and particularly his reasons for doing so, were irrelevant to the issues
before me. Accordingly, I sustained Respondent's objection to the receipt in evi-
dence of the proffered documents and announced that the Regional Director's reasons
for his determination aforementioned would play no part in arriving at my decision
herein.
In his posthearing brief, the General Counsel asks that I reconsider my aforesaid
ruling and now admit these exhibits into evidence. I see no reason to do so and
adhere to the ruling made and the views expressed by me at the hearing with refer-
ence thereto. I have, however, as further requested by the General Counsel, taken
official notice of the following facts as disclosed by the Board's records and files in
Case No. 15-RC-2871: (a) On May 12, 1964, the Union filed timely objection to
the election described above; (b) on August 28, 1964, the Board's Regional Director
set that election aside and ordered a new election without consideration, however,
344 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
for the reasons assigned by him for taking that action; (c) on or about September 9,
1964, Respondent requested the Board to reverse and overrule the said Regional
Directors' order.1
All of the allegations of the complaint herein pertain to conduct of Respondent
which the General Counsel contends interfered with, restrained, and coerced its
employees in the exercise of their guaranteed right to designate the Union as their
collective-bargaining representative at the election of May 6, 1964. With respect
thereto, the record abundantly establishes, and Respondent does not dispute, that it
was vigorously opposed to the organization of its employees. In this connection,
General Counsel concedes, as indeed he must, that Respondent had the right to express
its views, argument, and opinion, and to urge its employees to reject the Union or
any other collective-bargaining representative.' Our problem therefore is to deter-
mine whether Respondent, in waging its vigorous campaign against the Union,
exceeded the boundaries prescribed by Section 8(c) of the Act.
B. Interference, restraint, and coercion
1. Interrogation, threats, and the impression of surveillance
Rose Jenkins was employed by Respondent as a maid for 4 years, and was so
employed at the time of the hearing. About a week or two before the election on
May 6, 1964, Thelma Ostrow, Respondent's housekeeper and admittedly a super-
visor within the meaning of the Act, asked Jenkins whether she had decided what
she "was going to do about the election." When Jenkins, who had attended most
of the union meetings, replied in the negative, Ostrow told her to think about it
because management had been "nice" to all the employees and if they won the
election they could not "do the things" they had done in the past.
In April 1964, Ostrow asked Inola Chandler, a maid employed by Respondent for
about 3 years, whether she had been at the union meetings or had heard about
them, and Chandler denied that she had attended such meetings or had any knowl-
edge thereof. About 3 weeks before the election, Ostrow asked maid Mary
Harper whether she had heard about the Union and Harper replied that she had.
Upon being urged by Ostrow to "vote for the Company," Harper told her she would
think about it.
Though denying that she interrogated employees about their union activities,
Ostrow admitted that she talked about the Union to all of the approximately 25
employees under her supervision, to some of them more than once, and that at man-
agement meetings she talked "about how certain employees felt about the Union "
She further admitted she had three conversations with Jenkins about the Union
before the election in which she expressed her belief that the Union was not "good"
for either the hotel or the employees. She also admitted that during the second con-
versation with Jenkins, she reminded her how "good" management had been to her
since Jenkins was first employed by Respondent, and that if the Union came in she
did not "know what will happen" nor what she personally could do for her.
The findings in the preceding paragraphs pertaining to Ostrow's conversation with
Jenkins, Chandler, and Harper are based on the composite testimony of these three
employees, which I credit Their demeanor, while testifying, gave me no reason to
doubt the truthfulness of their testimony. On the other hand, Ostrow gave me the
distinct impression of a witness determined to absolve Respondent of liability herein
regardless of the means employed.
During the second week in March, Frank Taylor, Respondent's assistant man-
ager, told bellman George Alexander that he had heard "something bad" about him,
that he, Alexander, was "on the hot seat, ... was for the Union 100 percent." When
Alexander admitted that he was for the Union and had been "all [hisl life," Taylor
told him that "the Union didn't have anything to fight with but strikes" and that if
the employees were called out on strike Taylor would carry bags and "would stand
in the door and laugh" at the employees. Two or three days later, Taylor asked
Alexander "how [hel was thinking," an inquiry which would have reference only to
his adherence to the Union, and Alexander replied that there was no change.
i To the time of the hearing herein, no action had been taken by the Board on this
request
2 Section 8(c) of the Act provides that "[tlhe expressing of any views, argument, or
opinion, or the dissemination thereof, whether in written, printed, graphic, or visual
form, shall not constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor practice under any of the
provisions of this Act, if such expression contains no threat of reprisal or force or
promise of benefit."
ADMIRAL SEMMES HOTEL AND MOTOR HOTEL 345
About 4 or 5 days before the union election, Taylor called Alexander to the
bellmen's locker room. There, Taylor showed him his timecard and remarked that
it disclosed that he had been late several times. He then told Alexander that "if the
Union got in there," as it had in the Battle House, another Mobile hotel, and he were
thereafter late in reporting for work, he "would be fired." It was undisputed, how-
ever, that up to this time 3 no one had ever talked to Alexander about being late in
reporting because, he testified, on occasions he worked beyond his regular hours.
Taylor, who testified that he talked about the Union to all of the approximately 150
employees under his supervision in the hotel, did not deny making the threat attrib-
uted to him by Alexander. Indeed, he admitted making a similar threat to employee
David Lindsay the day before the election. Taylor also admitted that he told
Lindsay, who had frequently obtained cash from the hotel in advance of his pay,
that "the Battle House has a union and they don't allow their employees to get
advances." He further admitted that he also told Lindsay "if that Union should
get in here and we should have that rule, then you wouldn't be able to get this
advance"
Respondent, in its brief, contends that what I have characterized above as threats
made by Taylor are mere "privileged" statements concerning "a stricter rule" main-
tained by the Battle House, "a unionized hotel." While a cold reading of the record
pertaining to these incidents lends an air of plausibility to Respondent's argument,
I am convinced and find that Taylor intended that Alexander and Lindsay should
understand his remarks pertaining to late reporting and wage advances as threats
that whatever privileges they enjoyed with respect thereto would be lost and taken
away from them if the Union should win the election. Nor do I have any hesitation
in finding that Alexander and Lindsay, unsophisticated as they appeared to be, con-
strued Taylor's remarks to be the direct threats of reprisal that Taylor intended them
tobe4
During the last week in March, Frank C. Drane, Respondent's general manager,
told Alexander that he was not going to have the Union come into the plant, he had
heard about the Union's meetings, he knew who had attended these meetings, and
how many times they had attended. In April, after Ostrow informed Drane that
she had asked Chandler whether she had attended the union meeting, Drane told
Chandler that he had heard that she was not going to those meetings. On the Sun-
day before the election, after telling Jenkins that Respondent did not want the
Union, Drane also told her that he believed that she was for the Union. By the
foregoing conduct Respondent created the impression that the union activities of
its employees were under surveillance, thereby interfering with, restraining, and
coercing those employees in the unfettered exercise of rights guaranteed by Section 7
of the Act.
2. Drane's letters and speeches
All the foregoing incidents were part of an extremely intensive and well-planned
campaign waged by means of letters, posters, and speeches whereby Respondent
sought to induce its employees to reject the Union as their collective-bargaining rep-
resentative. Thus, the record discloses that on April 9, 14, 17, and 28 and May 1
and 4, Respondent mailed letters to the homes of all its approximately 200 employees,
signed by Drane as general manager and addressed to all the employees "and their
families," urging them to vote against the Union at the approaching election.6 The
April 9 letter explained that the reason the letter was sent to each employee's home
was because "this union question affects not only '[the employee], but [his] family
as well."
While much of the text of these letters was designed to answer contentions of the
Union and otherwise was mere argument which Respondent could legitimately ask
its employees to consider before casting their votes at the election of May 6, the
effect of these letters in their entirety, when considered with the remainder of the
record, was intended to restrain and coerce Respondent's employees in the exercise
of their rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act and, accordingly, violative of Sec-
tion 8 (a) (1) thereof. In this campaign to defeat the Union, Respondent emphasized
that if the Union won the election and made economic demands which Respondent
3 Alexander had been in Respondent's employment since November 15, 1962
4 Taylor was an extremely evasive witness who impressed me as determined to with-
hold relevant testimony that might prove detrimental to Respondent.
6 Unless otherwise indicated, all references to dates herein are in the year 1964.
0 The record contains another such communication which, however, was undated
346 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
would not meet, the Union 's sole course would be to call a strike in which event
Respondent could permanently replace the strikers . While Respondent did not state
specifically that it would not bargain with the Union should it win the election, an
analysis of Respondent 's entire antiunion campaign reveals an implicit warning that
in dealing with the Union Respondent would so conduct the negotiations that a
strike would result. There was but one theme: the inevitability of a strike if the
employees selected the Union as their bargaining representative , and the dire conse-
quences of such a strike , namely, ensuing violence and the loss of jobs by the strikers.
Thus, Respondent 's letter of April 17 read as follows:
TO ALL OUR EMPLOYEES AND THEIR FAMILIES:
WATCH OUT FOR THE UNION'S SALESTALK. The union organizers
will make lots of big promises to you to try to get you to vote for the union.
But remember-it is easy to make big promises , but it is something else to fulfill
them.
Don't be tricked by the union lie that is being spread that if you vote the union
in, the company will automatically have to sign a contract and give the things
that the union has promised you. The truth is that there is no law that forces
us to agree with the views and demands of the union . We do not intend to let
the union walk over us and they cannot force us to do anything which would
be harmful to our best interest.
Suppose the company did not agree to the union 's demands-WHAT COULD
THE UNION DO ABOUT IT? The only true answer is that the union would
call you out on strike to try to get the things the union promised to get for you.
You would be the ones walking around on the outside , going without pay.
You and your families would suffer. The union bosses would go right on
drawing their fat paychecks.
(1) YOU WILL NOT GET PAID. The company does not pay you
wages when you are on strike, and you can be sure that the union will not
pay you wages either.
(2) YOU WILL NOT GET UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION.
Under the laws of Alabama no unemployment money is paid to people
off of work because of a strike.
(3) YOU COULD LOSE YOUR JOB. This is the most important part
of all. Under federal laws the company can permanently replace economic
strikers . If that happened to you, you would no longer have a job even
after the strike ended.
Thousands of union members have lost their pay and their jobs because of
union strikes.
DON'T LET THIS HAPPEN TO YOU-VOTE NO UNION AND PRO-
TECT YOURSELF.?
Sincerely,
(S) Frank C Drane
FRANK C. DRANE,
General Manager.
Respondent 's undated letter referred to a strike by a sister local at Arnaud's Res-
taurant in New Orleans which began in September 1963 and was allegedly in progress
6 months later when the undated letter was circulated . The letter continued:
As soon as the strike was called, the company began to hire replacements for
the employees who went out on strike . The company kept its doors open and
continued to serve its customers. To date, the company has not missed one day
of operations.
The striking employees went without pay. They were not able to collect
unemployment money. Many of them were replaced. Some are still out on
strike.
They have been out on strike for over six months-for over 180 days. During
this period the union has not paid these employees their wages . The union
organizers were not hurt by the strike-they continued to collect their big sal-
aries. The employees and their families were the ones who suffered when the
union called them out on strike.
7 All the Italics In this and all other letters that follow was supplied by Respondent
In the original texts thereof
ADMIRAL SEMMES HOTEL AND MOTOR HOTEL 347
The letter of April 28, listed questions which Drane stated had been asked of him
and to which he gave the following answers:
Q. If the union should go in , does the company automatically have to sign
a contract with the union?
A. NO. The company does not have to sign any contract that is not in the
good interest of the business . There is no law that forces the company to agree
with the demands and views of the union.
Q. If the union calls us out on strike, will we be paid while the strike is
going on7
A. NO. The moment you walk out on strike the company stops paying you
money. You do not receive one penny from the company while you are out
on strike . And the union is not going to pay you wages either-it is here to
take money from you, not to give money to you.
Q. Can we get unemployment money while we are on strike?
A. NO. Under the laws of the State of Alabama, you cannot collect unem-
ployment compensation if you are out of work on strike.
Q. If the union calls a strike, can I lose my job?
A. YES. Under the law if the union calls you out on an economic strike,
the company is perfectly free to permanently replace you with another person.
If you are permanently replaced, then you have lost your job forever. So, if
you go out on strike for more money , you do not get paid by the company, you
cannot get unemployment money from the state, and you could lose your job.
The letter of May 1 repeated the following:
3 THERE IS NO LAW THAT FORCES THE COMPANY TO AGREE
TO THE UNION DEMANDS.
4. IF THE UNION CALLS YOU OUT ON STRIKE, YOU DO NOT
RECEIVE ANY PAY FROM THE COMPANY WHILE YOU ARE OUT
ON STRIKE.
5. YOU CANNOT COLLECT UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION
IF YOU ARE OUT ON STRIKE.
6. IF YOU ARE ON AN ECONOMIC STRIKE, THE COMPANY IS
PERFECTLY FREE TO PERMANENTLY REPLACE YOU WITH AN-
OTHER WORKER.
In addition to the letters , Drane made three speeches to all the assembled employ-
ees in the campaign that preceded the election . In the first speech , Drane told the
employees "there is no law in this land that forces a company to agree with the
demands and views of a union, even if the Union should win an election here." He
next told them that the only course open to the Union if "the company did not
agree to all the union demands and contract proposals " would be to call the employ-
ees out on strike. In that event , he stated , it would not be union officials who
would suffer because "they could continue to draw their big salaries back in Atlanta,
Georgia; their families would not suffer; they have nothing to lose, so they do not
mind calling a strike." With respect to Respondent's employees, however, he told
them that they would lose their wages, be unable to collect unemployment com-
pensation, and "most important of all, if you go out on strike , you con lose your
job forever," 8 adding that "thousands of union members have lost their jobs this
way and the same thing could happen here if the union got in and called a strike."
While Drane's reference to the loss of wages and inability to collect unemploy-
ment compensation in the event the employees became strikers were considerations
which Respondent could legitimately ask its employees to consider, Drane went
further and told the employees that if they went out on strike they could lose their
jobs "forever," thereby implying that Respondent would never reemploy such eco-
nomic strikers even though future vacancies should arise. Such a threat is violative
of the Act. Strikers may not be subjected to such discrimination for they are
engaging in an activity protected by Section 7 of the Act.
In his next speech, delivered to all employees about 2 weeks before the elec-
tion, Drane illustrated his theme by displaying pictures portraying strike action.
With reference thereto, he said: "I have a few pictures here that will show you
some of the things that may happen when unions cause strikes . First, here is a
picture of two men who were beaten during a union strike. That is one thing that
union strikes can cause-violence. Here is a picture of police being needed to quell
mob actions . That is another thing that union strikes can cause-mass picketing,
8 This emphasis was supplied in the text from which Drane read
348 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
which may have to be broken up by police. Here are some more pictures of auto-
mobiles which were shot at, and which were wrecked during union strikes. This is
another thing which can happen during union strikes-destruction of property-
your own property. Finally, here is a picture of a man, who was connected with a
labor union, who was badly burned in a fire which he had set himself. This picture
shows just what can happen, and what has happened, when goons and hoodlums get
involved in labor unions."
He next repeated his portrayal of the alleged events at Arnaud's of New Orleans
where, he said, "Arnaud's had no trouble finding replacements." With respect to
Arnaud's striking employees, however, he told them that some of them had been
going without pay "for over half a year ... almost 200 days. They have gone hun-
gry, and their children have gone hungry, and their families have gone hungry.
Union organizers did not go hungry. They were not hurt at all. They left those
people alone when it was too late to go on anymore. You see what happened to
those people at Arnaud's. I would hate to see it happen here."
During the campaign, Respondent also maintained graphic posters on its prem-
ises seeking to influence its employees with respect to the approaching election. One
of these posters (General Counsel's Exhibit No. 8, attachment No. I) stated that at
4 locations in Louisiana 1,425 employees lost their jobs as a result of strikes
which in two instances lasted for more than 2 years. The poster further reported
that during one of these strikes, "cars were overturned, shotguns were fired into
homes, and one man was killed." At another of these locations, the poster stated,
"there were numerous instances of violence including dynamiting and the firing of
shotguns into homes and automobiles." Another poster entitled "Look-People
shot and beaten in union strikes Four-month-old baby shot in the head. Workers
beaten in strike. Protect yourself and your family, Vote No." A poster, entitled
"Facts You Should Know," reported that "there are 5600 persons in Mobile looking
for work right now."
As I have previously indicated, much of what Drane wrote and said, as well as
what was contained on Respondent's posters, was permissible campaign propaganda D
Cumulatively, however, and when considered in cohesive combination, the effect of
the posters and Drane's letters and speeches was intimidatory in nature and intended
to impress upon the employees that if they voted for the Union they would not only
lose their means of livelihood but that they and their families would be subjected
to hunger and physical violence "This unremitting effort on the part of the
Respondent to impress upon the employees the dangers inherent in their selection of
the union as their bargaining agent, particularly the danger of job loss, followed up
by the baleful representation of the prospect of violence, physical injury, and prop-
erty damage as the ordinary result of voting for the union in the election, was not
an attempt to influence the employees by reason, but was an appeal to fear. Indeed,
Respondent's entire preelection campaign was intimidatory in nature, and intended
to convey the threat of job loss and physical violence should the union win the
election. Accordingly, [I] conclude that Respondent's entire preelection, antiunion
campaign, when considered as a whole, was intended to interfere with, restrain, and
coerce its employees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed by Section 7, and was,
accordingly, violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act" Ideal Baking Company of
Tennessee, Inc., 143 NLRB 546, 552; see also Northwest Engineering Company, 148
NLRB 1136; Indiana Rayon Corporation, 151 NLRB 130.
3. The post election speech
As previously indicated, the Union lost the election held on May 6. On the same
day, the Union filed the unfair labor practice charge which instituted the instant
proceeding and, on May 12, filed its objections to the election and seeking an order
setting aside the results thereof. On or about May 21, Drane assembled all the
approximately 200 employees and read a prepared speech to them (General Coun-
sel's Exhibit No. 9). After thanking them for their "good help," he told the employ-
ees they had thereby avoided "picket lines and fighting with [their] friends and get-
ting mixed up in violence that causes people to be thrown in jail and getting involved
in all kinds of hating one another."
Drane next informed the assembled group that a few days after the election he
received "in the mail all kinds of legal documents showing" that the Union had
complained to the Board about Respondent's conduct, and that "some union people"
O The complete text of this propaganda against the Union is contained in General
Counsel's Exhibit No. 8, attachments A-T inclusive, and General Counsel's Exhibit No. 10.
ADMIRAL SEMMES HOTEL AND MOTOR HOTEL 349
might soon come to their homes trying to induce them to give statements against
Respondent. He then stated: "I am not going to tell you what you should do. It
is entirely your business as to whether or not you want to give a statement against
your company, but I want to tell you the truth about some things so that you will
not believe everything you may be told by the Union, with reference to the state-
ments that they want you to give against your company. They may try to get you
to say things that aren't so. They may tell you that these statements will be confi-
dential and that they will not be shown to anyone. If they tell you this it will not
be the truth. The law is, that if you are taken into court and forced to testify
because you gave a statement against your company, then that statement which you
gave has to be turned over to the hotel's lawyers."
Relying on Certain-Teed Products Corporation, 147 NLRB 1517, the General
Counsel contends that Drane's speech aforementioned interfered with the Board's
ability to secure vindication of rights protected by the Act. Considering facts
extremely similar to those found here, the Board there stated:
The Board's ability to secure vindication of rights protected by the Act depends
in large measure upon the ability of its agents to investigate charges fully and to
obtain relevant information and supporting statements from individuals. It is
for this reason that the Board has carefully sought to protect the integrity of its
processes by preventing any obstruction of Board agents in their investigation
of charges. Here, as noted, Respondent told 90 percent of its employees that
they need not cooperate with Board agents in their investigation. While it may
be technically true that an individual may not be forced to give statements to a
Board agent unless subpenaed, it is clear, and we find, that under the circum-
stances in the present case, Respondent's advice was designed to and would in
fact tend to discourage employees from supplying information to a Board agent
and thus to hinder him in investigating the charges filed in this case against the
Respondent. In reaching this conclusion, we rely on the facts that Respondent
advised virtually all of its approximately 100 employees that they need not
cooperate in the Board investigation; that it told several of these employees that
their cooperation would result in their being subpenaed and forced to testify
at a hearing, thus indicating that their cooperation would involve them more
deeply in the litigation; ... and that Respondent made other coercive statements
to employees which we have previously found violated Section 8(a)(1). We
find, therefore, that the above-described conduct by Respondent interfered with
the rights of employees to obtain redress from the Board and thereby violated
Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act.
The only distinction between Certain-Teed Products and this case is that in
Certain-Teed Products the employees were told "that they need not cooperate with
Board agents in their investigation," whereas here Drane's remarks were concerned
with anticipated efforts by union agents to get statements which might be used
against Respondent in either this unfair labor practice proceeding or the represen-
tation proceedings then pending before the Board.
I see no meaningful distinction between the two situations. At the time Drane
made this speech on or about May 21 he had already received a copy of the charge
filed by the Union in the instant proceeding as well as notice that proceedings were
pending before the Board's Regional Director seeking to set aside the results of the
May 6 election and demanding a new election. Drane, who impressed me as a
person knowledgeable in Board proceedings and labor law, must have known that
the Union's purpose in soliciting statements from the employees was for their use
in either or both of the pending Board proceedings. Accordingly, I find that the
above-described conduct by Respondent interfered with the rights of employees to
obtain redress from the Board and thereby violated Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act.
4. The wage increases
The complaint alleges that "during the month of June and/or July, Respondent
granted its employees wage increases to induce them to refrain from becoming or
remaining members of the Union, or giving any assistance or support to it." In
support thereof, the testimony shows that within 2 months after the election, dur-
ing June and July, and while the Union's unfair labor practice charges and its
demand for a new election were pending, Respondent granted wage increases to
approximately 150 of the 188 employees who voted in the election. Thus, the maids,
who were paid approximately $85 a month, received raises of $10 to $15 a month;
the hallboys, who were receiving $95 a month, were raised to $105 or $110; the
350 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
dishwashers were given a $10 raise over their then salary of $75 a month; the bus-
boys who were making $75 or $80 a month, got a $7.50 raise, and the waitresses
were raised from $60 to $65 a month.
While it is of course true, as Respondent argues in its brief, that "the Act does
not condemn wage increases," it is equally true "that the conferral of employee
benefits while a representation election is pending, for the purpose of inducing
employees to vote against the Union," interferes with the employees' protected right
to organize. N.L.R.B. v. Exchange Parts Company, 375 U.S. 405, 409. On the
entire record made here, and on the authority of Exchange Pai is, supra, I find and
conclude that the wage increases under consideration were granted for the unlawful
purpose mentioned immediately above. While the economic benefits which the
Supreme Court found violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act were granted before
the election , whereas here they were granted after the election, the distinction is
without controlling significance. Here, as in Exchange Parts, the representation
proceeding seeking an election was pending when the wage increases were announced
and granted, a fact of which Drane admittedly was aware.
In ascertaining Respondent's motive for granting the increases, Respondent's ear-
lier campaign against the Union cannot be ignored. Thus, Drane by his letters and
speeches repeatedly warned the employees that they could place no reliance on the
"beautiful sounding promises" of the Union because "talk is cheap," and that it was
only the Respondent who provided them with their jobs and paid their wages (Gen-
eral Counsel's Exhibit No. 8, attachment B). Consideration must also be given to the
fact that in his speech to the employees on or about May 21, Drane told them that
though he wanted to help them with respect to their wages, he was unable to do so
because the hotel was not "full enough to make a profit," that Respondent was
"losing money right along, and when you lose money you have a hard time paying
out more salaries because that means losing that much more." Yet, within approxi-
mately 1 month thereafter, and without any proof or suggestion that hotel occu-
pancy had increased, or that Respondent's economic condition had otherwise
improved so as to justify granting a wage increase, Respondent granted wage increases
ranging from 10 to 15 percent to approximately 150 employees.
In sum , I find as the Board did in Northwest Engineering Company, 148 NLRB
1136, that "[t]hese additional benefits were granted to employees while objections to
the May [6] representation election were still pending and unresolved and the possi-
bility that the Board would direct a second election was indeed real. Moreover, the
Respondent does not show that the granting of these benefits were governed by fac-
tors other than the election (Glosser Bros. Inc., 120 NLRB 965). Upon considera-
tion of the entire record in [this case, I] conclude that these benefits were granted as
a reward to employees for having rejected the Union and as a further inducement to
employees to vote against the Union should the opportunity again arise . As such,
the [wage] increases constituted further interference, restraint, and coercion within
the meaning of Section 8 (a)( I) of the Act." [Emphasis supplied.]
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE
The activities of Respondent set forth in section III, above, occurring in connec-
tion with the operations of Respondent described in section I, above, have a close,
intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several
States and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening nad obstructing commerce and
the free flow thereof.
V. THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices violative of
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, I recommend that it cease and desist therefrom and
take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the National
Labor Relations Act, as amended.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and upon the entire record in the
case, I make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent is engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and
(7) of the Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2 (5) of the
Act.
3. By interrogating its employees concerning their union sympathies, membership,
or activities , Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning
of Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act.
ADMIRAL SEMMES HOTEL AND MOTOR HOTEL 351
4. By creating the impression that it was surveilling the union activities of its
employees, Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of
Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act.
5. By threatening to withhold existing benefits if they should support the Union,
and by granting wage increases as an inducement to reject the Union or to refrain
from activities in support thereof, Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(1) of
the Act.
6. By threatening employees with adverse consequences, including job loss, in the
event they selected the Union as their collective-bargaining agent, and by creating
an atmosphere of futility to discourage support for the Union among employees,
Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the
meaning of Section 8(a) (1) of the Act.
7. The aforesaid unfair labor practices affect commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
RECOMMENDED ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, it is
hereby ordered that the Respondents Gal Tex Hotel Corporation, d/b/a Admiral
Semmes Hotel and Motor Hotel, its officers, agents, and representatives, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Interrogating its employees concerning their union sympathies, membership,
or activities in a manner violative of Section 8(a) (1) of the Act.
(b) Surveilling, or creating the impression that it was surveilling, the union
activities of its employees.
(c) Withholding, or threatening to withhold, from its employees benefits if they
should join or support the Union.
(d) Granting wage increases or other economic benefit to its employees as an
inducement to reject the Union, or to refrain from activities in support thereof.
(e) Threatening employees with adverse consequences, including job loss, in the
event they select the Union as their collective-bargaining agent, or, in any like or
similar manner, interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise
of their right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist the Union herein, or any
other labor organization, to bargain collectively through representatives of their
own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of col-
lective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection as guaranteed in Section 7 of
the Act, or to refrain from any and all such activities.
2. Take the following affirmative action which I find will effectuate the policies
of the Act:
(a) Post at its hotel and motor hotel, Mobile, Alabama, copies of the attached
notice marked "Appendix." 10 Copies of said notice, to be furnished by the Regional
Director for Region 15, shall, after being duly signed by an authorized representa-
tive of Respondent, be posted immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained
by it for a period of 60 consecutive days thereafter in conspicuous places, including
all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps
shall be taken by Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or
covered by any other material.
(b) Notify the Regional Director for Region 15, in writing, within 20 days from
the date of the receipt of this Decision what steps Respondent has taken to comply
herewith 11
It is further recommended that unless within 20 days from the date of the receipt
of this Decision, Respondent notifies said Regional Director, in writing, that it will
comply with the foregoing Recommended Order, the Board issue an Order requiring
the Respondent to take the aforesaid action.
1o In the event that this Recommended Order be adopted by the Board, the words "a
Decision and Order" shall be substituted for the words "the Recommended Order of a
Trial Examiner" in the notice. In the further event that the Board's Order be enforced
by a decree of a United States Court of Appeals, the words "a Decree of the United States
Court of Appeals, Enforcing an Order" shall be substituted for the words "a Decision
and Order".
"In the event that this Recommended Order be adopted by the Board, this provision
shall be modified to read: "Notify said Regional Director, in writing, within 10 days from
the date of this Order, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith "
352 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor
Relations Board , and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act, as amended , we hereby notify our employees that:
WE WILL NOT interrogate our employees concerning their union sympathies,
membership, or activities in a manner violative of Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act.
WE WILL NOT engage in surveillance of, or create the impression that we are
surveilling, the union activities of our employees.
WE WILL NOT withhold, or threaten to withhold, existing benefits from our
employees if they should join or support Hotel and Restaurant Employees and
Bartenders Union, Local 176, AFL-CIO.
WE WILL NOT grant wage increases or other economic benefits to our employ-
ees as an inducement to reject the above -named Union , or any other labor organi-
zation , as their collective -bargaining representative.
WE WILL NOT threaten our employees with adverse consequences , including
job loss, in the event they select the above -named Union , or any other union, as
their collective -bargaining agent.
WE WILL NOT in any like or similar manner interfere with , restrain , or coerce
employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization , to join or assist the
above-named or any other labor organization , to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing , or to engage in other concerted activities
for the purpose of collective bargaining and other mutual aid or protection or
to refrain from any and all such activities.
All our employees are free to become or remain members of the above-named
or any other labor organization , or to refrain from such membership.
GAL TEX HOTEL CORPORATION, D/B/A ADMIRAL
SEMMES HOTEL AND MOTOR HOTEL,
Employer.
Dated------------------- By-------------------------------------------
(Representative) (Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting,
and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
Employees may communicate directly with the Board's Regional Office, T6024
Federal Building (Loyola), 701 Loyola Avenue, New Orleans, Louisiana, Tele-
phone No. 529-2411, Extension 6396, if they have any question concerning this
notice or compliance with its provisions.
Chrysler Corporation-Space Division , Michoud Operations and
International Union, United Automobile , Aerospace and Agri-
cultural Implement Workers of America (UAW), AFL-CIO,
Petitioner and Paul Fassnacht et al., Movants . Case No. 15-
RC-2911. August 6,1965
DECISION AND ORDER ON MOTION
Pursuant to a stipulation for certification upon consent election exe-
cuted by the Employer and Petitioner on May 29, 1964, an election by
secret ballot was conducted on June 11, 1964, under the direction and
supervision of the Regional Director for Region 15, among certain
154 NLRB No. 28.