Accenture Global Services Limited

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jun 26, 2020

14481352 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Jun. 26, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/481,352 09/09/2014 Rajan SHINGARI 0095-0096 4498
113123 7590 06/26/2020
Harrity & Harrity, LLP
11350 Random hills road
Suite 600
Fairfax, VA 22030
EXAMINER
NAOREEN, NAZIA
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2458
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
06/26/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
docket@harrityllp.com
mpick@harrityllp.com
ptomail@harrityllp.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________________

Ex parte RAJAN SHINGARI, KAUSHIK SANYAL, DIMAS HARTZ
PINTO, ARNAB CHAKRABORTY, WALLACE SILVA, GARVIT
GUPTA, SHILPA TANEJA, SAURABH MATHUR, LUIZ C. NUNES,
FRANCISCO M. VASCONCELOS, and MARCO T. BAPTISTA
____________________

Appeal 2019-0023451
Application 14/481,352
Technology Center 2400
____________________

Before ERIC S. FRAHM, JOHNNY A. KUMAR, and
CATHERINE SHIANG, Administrative Patent Judges.

FRAHM, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

STATEMENT OF CASE
Introduction
Appellant2 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a final rejection of
claims 1–6, 8–15, 17–20, 22, and 23. Claims 7, 16, and 21 have been

1 Throughout this Opinion, we refer to: (1) the Final Office Action mailed
March 22, 2018 (“Final Act.”); (2) the Appeal Brief filed August 3, 2018
(“Appeal Br.”); (3) the Examiner’s Answer mailed November 30, 2018
(“Ans.”); and (4) the Reply Brief filed January 30, 2019 (“Reply Br.”).
2 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in
Appeal 2019-002345
Application 14/481,352

2
canceled (see Amendment filed May 8, 2018 (pp. 2–6)). We have
jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.
Appellant’s Disclosed and Claimed Invention
Appellant’s invention, entitled “Network Service Analytics” (Title),
relates to network service management processes (e.g., a command center
working in conjunction with a field force) used to resolve customer issues
associated with network services such as broadband and landline services
provided by network service providers (see Spec. ¶ 2). By using
performance metrics, key questions, root cause analyses, remote resolution
protocols, forecast modeling, capacity planning, and identified network
service resources in the network service management process, network
service resources can be more efficiently dispatched (see Spec. ¶¶ 3–5, 15–
17; claims 1, 8, 15). With this in mind, Appellant’s claimed invention
concerns “[a] device, compromising: one or more processors” (claim 1), and
methods for operating a device (claims 8, 15), for dispatching network
service resources (see claims 1, 8, 15).
Exemplary Claim
Independent claim 1 under appeal is exemplary. Claim 1, with
bracketed lettering, formatting, and emphases added to key portions of the
claim at issue, reads as follows:
1. A device, comprising:

37 C.F.R. § 1.42. “The word ‘applicant’ when used in this title refers to the
inventor or all of the joint inventors, or to the person applying for a patent as
provided in §§ 1.43, 1.45, or 1.46.” 37 C.F.R. § 1.42(a). Appellant
identifies the real party in interest as Accenture Global Services Limited
(Appeal Br. 3).
Appeal 2019-002345
Application 14/481,352

3
one or more processors to:
[A] determine a performance metric associated with a
network service management process for at least one of a
broadband service or a landline service,
[A1] the performance metric being determined
based on network service information associated with the
network service management process; determine a key
question, associated with the performance metric, based
on determining the performance metric,
[A2] the key question identifying a network issue
associated with improving the performance metric, and
[A3] the network issue being associated with
increasing remote resolution of customer issues via the
broadband service or the landline service; perform a root
cause analysis, associated with the key question, that
identifies a solution to the key question,
[A4] the solution identifying a manner in which
the network service management process is to be
modified in order to improve the performance metric, and
[A5] the solution including modifying a remote
resolution protocol, via the broadband service or the
landline service, used to resolve a network issue;
[B] determine a group of forecast models associated with
forecasting a network service demand for the at least one of the
broadband service or the landline service;
[C] identify, based on the network service information, a
particular forecast model of the group of forecast models;
[D] forecast the network service demand using the
particular forecast model and based on the solution to the key
question,
[D1] the network service demand being forecasted
based on historical network service information that
identifies a quantity of customer calls received at
an earlier time,
[D2] the forecasted network service demand
identifying a quantity of future network service actions
expected based on implementing the solution within
the network service management process and improving
Appeal 2019-002345
Application 14/481,352

4
the remote resolution via the broadband service or the
landline service, and
[D3] the quantity of future network service actions
identified by the forecasted network service demand
including at least one of:
[D3a] a quantity of expected service orders
associated with customer issues to be resolved by a
field force,
[D3b] a quantity of expected installations,
[D3c] a quantity of expected cancellations,
[D3d] a quantity of expected repairs, or
[D3e] a quantity of calls expected from
network service technicians in a field;
[E] perform capacity planning based on the forecasted
network service demand,
[E1] a result of performing the capacity planning
identifying network service resources required to satisfy
the forecasted network service demand; and
[F] dispatch the network service resources, based on the
result of performing the capacity planning, such that the
solution is implemented within the network
service management process to modify the remote resolution
protocol and to accommodate for the forecasted network service
demand for the at least one of the broadband service or
the landline service.

Appeal Br. 20–22, Claim Appendix (emphases, formatting, and bracketed
lettering added). Remaining independent claims 8 and 15 recite methods of
managing network service resources and dispatching (claim 8) or scheduling
(claim 15) network service resources commensurate in scope with the device
of claim 1.
Examiner’s Rejection
Claims 1–6, 8–15, 17–20, 22, and 23 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C.
Appeal 2019-002345
Application 14/481,352

5
§ 101 as being directed to patent-ineligible subject matter (an abstract idea),
without significantly more. Final Act. 2–5; Ans. 3–5.
Appellant’s Contentions
With regard to the patent eligibility rejection, Appellant primarily
makes arguments regarding claim 1, relies on those arguments for the
eligibility of claims 2–6, 8–15, 17–20, 22, and 23, and generally contends
the claims are not directed to an abstract idea (e.g., math concepts, methods
of organizing human activity, mental processes), but to improvements in
broadband or landline network performance and efficiency (see Appeal Br.
10–19; Reply Br. 2–9). Appellant nominates claim 1 as representative of all
claims on appeal (see Appeal Br. 16; Reply Br. 5, 6).
With regard to claim 1, Appellant generally contends claim 1 is not
directed to an abstract idea (see Appeal Br. 10–15), but to a technical
solution to a technical problem that produces specific improvements to
remote resolution protocol determinations used to perform broadband or
landline network service repair. Appellant also contends claim 1 requires a
physical device to perform the process, and cannot be performed by a person
in a person’s mind (see Reply Br. 2–5). Finally, Appellant argues that even
if the claims are directed to a mental process, and thus an abstract idea, the
abstract idea is integrated into a practical application because it is limited to
a technology-specific solution to a technical problem, such as dispatching
network service resources and modifying a remote solution protocol that
accommodates for forecasted network service demand to improve broadband
or landline service and/or performance (see Reply Br. 5–8).
Therefore, based on Appellant’s patent eligibility arguments, and
because claims 1–6, 8–15, 17–20, 22, and 23 contain commensurate
Appeal 2019-002345
Application 14/481,352

6
limitations, we select claim 1 as representative of claims 1–6, 8–15, 17–20,
22, and 23 rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 for patent-ineligibility.
Principal Issue on Appeal
Based on Appellant’s arguments in the Appeal Brief (Appeal Br. 10–
19) and the Reply Brief (Reply Br. 2–9), the following principal issue is
presented on appeal:
Has Appellant shown the Examiner erred in rejecting representative
claim 1, as well as claims 2–6, 8–15, 17–20, 22, and 23 grouped therewith,
under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to patent-ineligible subject matter
(i.e., a judicial exception such as an abstract idea), without significantly
more?

ANALYSIS
Patent Eligibility Under 35 U.S.C. § 101
Section 101 of the Patent Act provides “[w]hoever invents or
discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may
obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this
title.” 35 U.S.C. § 101. However, the Supreme Court has long interpreted
35 U.S.C. § 101 to include implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural
phenomena, and abstract ideas” are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS
Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo
and Alice. Id. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus
Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with that framework,
Appeal 2019-002345
Application 14/481,352

7
we first determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See Alice, 573
U.S. at 219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of
intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement
risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4
in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting
against risk.”).
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and, thus, patent ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611);
mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and
mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). Concepts
determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes,
such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191
(1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India
rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S.
(15 How.) 252, 267–68 (1854))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S.
at 69 (citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).
In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the
Supreme Court held that “[a] claim drawn to subject matter otherwise
statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a
mathematical formula.” Diehr, 450 U.S. at 176; see also id. at 191 (“We
view respondents’ claims as nothing more than a process for molding rubber
products and not as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Having
said that, the Supreme Court also indicated that a claim “seeking patent
protection for that formula in the abstract . . . is not accorded the protection
of our patent laws, . . . and this principle cannot be circumvented by
Appeal 2019-002345
Application 14/481,352

8
attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological
environment.” Id. (citing Benson and Flook); see, e.g., id. at 187 (“It is now
commonplace that an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula
to a known structure or process may well be deserving of patent
protection.”).
If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second
step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the
elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive
concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-
eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (internal quotation marks
omitted). “A claim that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional
features’ to ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to
monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Mayo,
566 U.S. at 77). “[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[]
fail[s] to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id.
The PTO published revised guidance on the application of § 101.
USPTO, 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed.
Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“Guidance”).3 Under the Guidance, we first look to
whether the claim recites:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of
abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of

3 In response to received public comments, the Office issued further
guidance on October 17, 2019, updating and clarifying the Guidance.
USPTO, October 2019 Update: Subject Matter Eligibility (the “October
2019 Update”) (available at
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/peg_oct_2019_update.p
df).
Appeal 2019-002345
Application 14/481,352

9
organizing human activity such as a fundamental economic
practice, or mental processes) (“Step 2A, Prong 1”); and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into
a practical application (see MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING
PROCEDURE (“MPEP”) § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h)) (9th Ed., Rev.
08.2017, 2018) (“Step 2A, Prong 2”).4
Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not
integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then look to
whether the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that
is not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see
MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional
activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high
level of generality, to the judicial exception (“Step 2B”).
See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54–56.
Even if the claim recites an abstract idea, the Federal Circuit explains
the “directed to” inquiry is not simply asking whether the claims involve a
patent-ineligible concept:
The “directed to” inquiry . . . cannot simply ask whether the
claims involve a patent-ineligible concept, because essentially
every routinely patent-eligible claim involving physical
products and actions involves a law of nature and/or natural
phenomenon—after all, they take place in the physical world.
See Mayo, 132 S.Ct. at 1293 (“For all inventions at some level
embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or apply laws of nature, natural
phenomena, or abstract ideas.”) Rather, the “directed to”

4 This evaluation is performed by (a) identifying whether there are any
additional elements recited in the claim beyond the judicial exception, and
(b) evaluating those additional elements individually and in combination to
determine whether the claim as a whole integrates the exception into a
practical application. See Guidance — Section III(A)(2), 84 Fed. Reg. 54–
55.
Appeal 2019-002345
Application 14/481,352

10
inquiry applies a stage-one filter to claims, considered in light
of the specification, based on whether “their character as a
whole is directed to excluded subject matter.”
Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2016); see
also Diehr, 450 U.S. at 188 (“In determining the eligibility of respondents’
claimed process for patent protection under § 101, their claims must be
considered as a whole.”); McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837
F.3d 1299, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (the question is whether the claims as a
whole “focus on a specific means or method that improves the relevant
technology or are instead directed to a result or effect that itself is the
abstract idea and merely invoke generic processes and machinery”).
Step 1
Under Step 1 of the patent-eligibility inquiry under § 101, we
determine whether a claim is directed to one of the four statutory categories
of invention, i.e., a process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.
In the instant case on appeal, representative claim 1 recites “[a]
device, comprising: one or more processors” (claim 1). Therefore, claim 1,
as an apparatus claim, recites at least one of the enumerated categories (e.g.,
machine or manufacture) of eligible subject matter in 35 U.S.C. § 101.
As a result, as to claim 1, as well as claims 2–6, 8–15, 17–20, 22, and
23 grouped therewith, we continue our analysis under Step 2A, Prong 1 of
the Guidance to determine whether claim 1 recites a judicial exception (a
law of nature, natural phenomenon, or subject matter within the enumerated
groupings of abstract ideas above).

Appeal 2019-002345
Application 14/481,352

11
Step 2A, Prong 1
The Guidance states that the abstract idea exception includes mental
processes, which include “concepts performed in the human mind (including
an observation, evaluation, judgment, opinion).” Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at
52. Such concepts must be capable of being practically performed in the
human mind, although the use of a physical aid, such as a pen and paper, or
a computer does not negate the mental nature of such a concept. October
2019 Update: Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance (hereinafter, 2019
Update) 8–9 (October 2019), available at
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/peg_oct_2019_update.p
df.
We agree with the Examiner’s determination (see Final Act. 2–4; Ans.
3–5) that claim 1 recites limitations falling within the mental process
category of abstract ideas, including the step of “determining performance
metrics in a network” (Final Act. 2). Although claim 1 nominally recites a
“device” including “one or more processors” (see claim 1), the focus of
claim 1 is on performing the steps of a mental process (see Gottschalk v.
Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972), i.e., using a network services management
process (see claim 1, limitations A–E) to dispatch network service resources
(see claim 1, limitation F). Here, we conclude representative claim 1 recites
a mental process (i.e., a concept performed in the human mind, such as, an
observation, evaluation, judgment, and opinion), which is an abstract idea.
See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52. In particular, claim 1 generally is directed
to determining a performance metric and forecast model (claim 1, limitations
A–C) to forecast network service demand (claim 1, limitation D) used for
Appeal 2019-002345
Application 14/481,352

12
capacity planning (claim 1, limitation E) in order to dispatch network service
resources (claim 1, limitation F).
As such, the claimed invention recites a mental process, which is an
abstract idea. See, e.g., Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., 839 F.3d
1138, 1146 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“analyzing information by steps people [can]
go through in their minds, or by mathematical algorithms, without more
[are] mental processes within the abstract-idea category.”); Clarilogic v.
Formfree Holdings, 681 F. App’x. 950, 954–55 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (gathering,
analyzing, and outputting financial data/assessment is an abstract idea that is
patent ineligible).
The limitations that make up the concept recited in representative
claim 1 are simply a series of observations, evaluations, and judgements for
determining data to generate a demand forecast model and apply that model
to plan for meeting network service demand. Limitations A–F recite the
types of observation, evaluation, and judgment that are characteristic of
mental processes that may be practically performed in the human mind, or
with the aid of pen and paper. See Synopsys, 839 F.3d at 1146 (“While the
Supreme Court has altered the § 101 analysis since CyberSource in cases
like Mayo and Alice, we continue to ‘treat[] analyzing information by steps
people go through in their minds, or by mathematical algorithms, without
more, as essentially mental processes within the abstract-idea category.’”)
(quoting Elec. Power Group, LLC v. Alstrom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1354
(Fed. Cir. 2016)); see also CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654
F.3d 1366, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“That purely mental processes can be
unpatentable, even when performed by a computer, was precisely the
Appeal 2019-002345
Application 14/481,352

13
holding of the Supreme Court in Gottschalk v. Benson.”); Benson, 409 U.S.
at 67.
Appellant’s contentions that claim 1 requires a physical device to
perform the process, and cannot be performed by a person in a person’s
mind (see Reply Br. 2–5), are unpersuasive. Because the claimed “device”
is made up only of “one or more processors” (see claim 1), claim 1 merely
requires one single processor to perform the entire process set forth in
limitations A through F. With this in mind, and the lack of any further
description, or requirements as to the composition, of the “processor” (see
claim 1), the broadest reasonable interpretation of “processor” in claim 1
could include the human mind. And, even if claim 1 were limited to the
computer devices described in the Specification (see e.g., the generic
computer components show in Fig. 3; Spec. ¶¶ 31–38, 121), any computer
device is simply used as a tool to perform the recited process. Thus, claim 1
is “not directed to an improvement in the way computers operate” and “the
focus of the claims is not on . . . an improvement in computers as tools, but
on certain independently abstract ideas that use computers as tools.”
FairWarning IP, LLC v. Iatric Sys., Inc., 839 F.3d 1089, 1095 (Fed. Cir.
2016).
Thus, consistent with the Guidance and case law, we conclude
representative claim 1 recites mental processes (i.e., concepts performed in
the human mind, such as, an observation, evaluation, judgment, and
opinion), which are abstract ideas. See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52;
Guidance Update, 7–9; Digitech Image Techs., LLC v. Elecs. For Imaging,
Inc., 758 F.3d 1344, 1351 (2014) (concluding claims reciting receiving two
data sets, and combining those data sets into a single data set is “an
Appeal 2019-002345
Application 14/481,352

14
ineligible abstract process of gathering and combining data”); CyberSource
654 F.3d at 1372–73 (concluding claims reciting obtaining a data transaction
set affiliated with a particular Internet address, generating a map based on
those transaction, and using the map to determine whether a transaction is
valid were abstract because they were directed to steps a person could
perform mentally); Elec. Power Group, 830 F.3d at 1353–54 (concluding
claims directed to “collecting information, analyzing it, and displaying
certain results of the collection and analysis” were abstract); SAP Am., Inc.
v. InvestPic, LLC, 898 F.3d 1161, 1167 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (concluding claims
were directed to the abstract idea of “selecting certain information, analyzing
it using mathematical techniques, and reporting or displaying the results of
the analysis”); OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1361–
62 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (determining claims reciting obtaining statistics,
analyzing those statistics to determine another piece of information—i.e., a
price at which to sell a product—was directed to the abstract idea of offer-
based price optimization).
Our reviewing court has also concluded that abstract ideas include the
concepts of collecting data, recognizing certain data within the collected data
set, and storing the data in memory. Content Extraction & Transmission
LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 776 F.3d 1343, 1347 (Fed. Cir.
2014); see also Smart Sys. Innovations, LLC v. Chicago Transit Auth., 873
F.3d 1364, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (concluding “claims directed to the
collection, storage, and recognition of data are directed to an abstract idea”).
Moreover, our reviewing court has concluded that acts of parsing,
comparing, storing, and editing data are abstract ideas. Berkheimer v. HP
Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2018). In addition, the collection of
Appeal 2019-002345
Application 14/481,352

15
information and analysis of information (e.g., recognizing certain data
within the dataset) are also abstract ideas. Elec. Power Grp., 830 F.3d at
1353. Similarly, “collecting, displaying, and manipulating data” is an
abstract idea. Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Fin. Corp., 850
F.3d 1332, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2017); see also SAP Am., Inc. v. InvestPic, LLC,
898 F.3d 1161, 1167 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“merely presenting the results of
abstract processes of collecting and analyzing information . . . is abstract as
an ancillary part of such collection and analysis”) (quotations omitted). In
this light, reconciling data with the use of processor, is similar to the
concepts of collecting, parsing, comparing, storing, and analyzing data
recognized by our reviewing court to be abstract ideas. The network service
management process set forth in claim 1 also collects information (e.g.,
performance metrics and forecast models) for analysis and analyzes that data
(e.g., forecasting network service demand to perform capacity planning in
order to dispatch network service resources).
Because we conclude claim 1 recites mental processes which are an
abstract idea, we proceed to Step 2A, Prong 2 of the Guidance to determine
whether claim 1 is “directed to” the judicial exception, by determining
whether additional elements of the claim integrate the abstract idea into a
practical application. Such additional elements may reflect an improvement
to a technology or technical field. See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55.
Step 2A, Prong 2 – Practical Application
Having determined that claim 1 recites an abstract idea, we next
determine, under Step 2A, Prong 2 of the Guidance, whether claim 1 is
directed to that abstract idea, or whether the claims have additional elements
Appeal 2019-002345
Application 14/481,352

16
that integrate the abstract idea into a practical application of that abstract
idea. Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54.
Here, claim 1 recites the additional elements of “[a] device” and “one
or more processors” (claim 1). Although Appellant contends that claim 1 is
not directed to an abstract idea, but to a technical solution to a technical
problem such as improving network performance or efficiency (see Reply
Br. 4), we do not agree that claim 1 recites any improvement in speed or
efficiency to the processor(s) or device. Instead, the focus of claim 1 is on
an improvement in managing network service resources.
As noted in our discussion of Step 2A, Prong 1 above, the device and
processor(s) for implementing a network management process using
performance metrics to model and forecast network service
resources/demand, perform capacity planning, and dispatch network service
resources set forth in claim 1 is only used as a tool for performing certain
activities of the recited process (to collect and analyze necessary
information). Appellant’s claim 1 recites “determining a performance
metric” (claim 1, limitation A) and “a group of forecast models” (claim 1,
limitation B), forecasting network service demand (claim 1, limitation D)
using an identified or selected forecast model (claim 1, limitations C, D),
performing capacity planning (claim 1, limitation E), and dispatching
network service resources based on the results of the steps of limitations A–
E (claim 1, limitation F). However, claim 1 fails to require any physical
result, such as actually performing network services, repair, or improvement,
or improving the efficiency or performance of the device or its processor(s).
The network service management process recited in claim 1 only serves to
gather metrics and forecast models needed for analysis (see claim 1,
Appeal 2019-002345
Application 14/481,352

17
limitations A, B, C), perform capacity planning based on forecasted network
service demand (claim 1, limitations D, E), and use the results to dispatch
network service resources (see claim 1, limitation F).
The mere recitation of determining a performance metric and a group
of forecast models, selecting data, and modifying data to perform forecast
modeling in claim 1 (see claim 1, limitations A–E) does not embody an
improvement in computer capabilities as in Enfish. See 822 F.3d at 1336
(“[T]he plain focus of the claims is on an improvement to computer
functionality itself, not on economic or other tasks for which a computer is
used in its ordinary capacity.”).
In the instant case, the additional limitations recited beyond the
judicial exception itself fail to integrate the exception into a practical
application. More particularly, representative claim 1 does not recite: (i) an
improvement to the functionality of a computer or other technology or
technical field (see MPEP § 2106.05(a)); (ii) a “particular machine” to apply
or use the judicial exception (see MPEP § 2106.05(b)); (iii) a particular
transformation of an article to a different thing or state (see MPEP
§ 2106.05(c)); or (iv) any other meaningful limitation (see MPEP
§ 2106.05(e)). See also Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55.
Rather, the additional element of a processor in claim 1 simply recites
insignificant extra-solution activity, i.e., determining a performance metric
and a forecast model to use in dispatch network service resources based on
demand and capacity, which is merely conventional data gathering (see
MPEP § 2106.05(g); OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359,
1363 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Elec. Power, 830 F.3d at 1354); and/or insignificant
Appeal 2019-002345
Application 14/481,352

18
extra-solution activity that does not meaningfully limit the claim (see MPEP
§ 2106.05(g)).
Specifically, limitations A, B, and C add only insignificant extra-
solution activity because these steps in the network service management
process merely determine operational data to enable executing the mental
steps making up the abstract idea. Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55; see Bilski
v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 612 (2010) (holding the use of well-known
techniques to establish inputs to the abstract idea as extra-solution activity
that fails to make the underlying concept patent eligible); CyberSource, 654
F.3d at 1372 (finding that, even to the extent certain “physical steps are
required to obtain information from the database . . . such data-gathering
steps cannot alone confer patentability”); Elec. Power, 830 F.3d at 1355
(explaining that “selecting information, by content or source, for collection,
analysis, and display does nothing significant to differentiate a process from
ordinary mental processes”). In other words, the data-gathering steps merely
obtain information needed to perform the recited abstract idea. Further, the
resultant output and use of the results, dispatching network service resources
as set forth in limitation F, is also insignificant extra-solution activity that
does not meaningfully limit the claim (see MPEP § 2106.05(g)).
Therefore, we consider the steps set forth in limitations A, B, C, and F
to be steps in addition to the abstract idea that, considered in light of the
claim as a whole, that fail to integrate the abstract idea into a practical
application.
To the extent that the claimed device having one or more processors
may perform network service demand forecasting (claim 1, limitation D) and
capacity planning (claim 1, limitation E) faster than other computerized
Appeal 2019-002345
Application 14/481,352

19
dispatching methods, that would not provide an improvement to the device
or processor itself. See, e.g., Versata Dev. Grp., Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 793
F.3d 1306, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (explaining that in order for a machine to
add significantly more, it must “play a significant part in permitting the
claimed method to be performed, rather than function solely as an obvious
mechanism for permitting a solution to be achieved more quickly”)
(emphasis added); FairWarning IP, LLC v. Iatric Sys., Inc., 839 F.3d 1089,
1095 (2016) (“While the claimed system and method certainly purport to
accelerate the process of analyzing audit log data, the speed increase comes
from the capabilities of a general-purpose computer, rather than the patented
method itself”); Bancorp Servs., L.L.C. v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Can.
(U.S.), 687 F.3d 1266, 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“[T]he fact that the required
calculations could be performed more efficiently via a computer does not
materially alter the patent eligibility of the claimed subject matter”).
Merely adding a programmed computer to perform generic computer
functions does not automatically overcome an eligibility rejection. Alice,
573 U.S. at 223–24. Furthermore, the use of a general purpose computer to
apply an otherwise ineligible algorithm does not qualify as a particular
machine. See Ultramercial, 772 F.3d at 716–17; In re TLI Commc’ns LLC
v. AV Automotive, LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 613 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (mere recitation
of concrete or tangible components is not an inventive concept); Eon Corp.
IP Holdings LLC v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 785 F.3d 616, 623 (Fed. Cir. 2015)
(noting that Alappat’s rationale that an otherwise ineligible algorithm or
software could be made patent-eligible by merely adding a generic computer
to the claim was superseded by the Supreme Court’s Bilski and Alice
decisions). In the instant case, using a computer421 to more quickly
Appeal 2019-002345
Application 14/481,352

20
facilitate or reconcile power plant modeling data is nothing more than the
abstract idea itself (i.e., a mental process).
And while Appellant acknowledges that the claimed solution is useful
to improve the performance of landline or broadband networks (see Appeal
Br. 10, 13, 17) by improving remote solution of network issues (see Appeal
Br. 16), and optimizing the network service management process (see Spec.
¶¶ 16, 17), these types of improvements to the abstract idea result from the
routine application of computers as tools, not from any technical innovation.
See Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363,
1367 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“claiming the improved speed or efficiency inherent
with applying the abstract idea on a computer [does not] provide a sufficient
inventive concept”); Bancorp Servs., L.L.C. v. Sun Life Assur. Co. of Can.
(U.S.), 687 F.3d 1266, 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“[T]he fact that the required
calculations could be performed more efficiently via a computer does not
materially alter the patent eligibility of the claimed subject matter.”).
“[R]elying on a computer to perform routine tasks more quickly or more
accurately is insufficient to render a claim patent eligible.” OIP
Technologies, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1363 (Fed. Cir.
2015) (citing Alice Corp., 134 S. Ct. at 2359). We do not consider
representative claim 1 to recite any element(s), or ordered combination of
elements, which transforms the abstract idea to patent eligible subject
matter.
Merely adding a programmed computer to perform generic computer
functions does not automatically overcome an eligibility rejection. Alice,
573 U.S. at 223–24. Furthermore, the use of a general purpose computer to
apply an otherwise ineligible algorithm does not qualify as a particular
Appeal 2019-002345
Application 14/481,352

21
machine. See Ultramercial, 772 F.3d at 716–17; In re TLI Commc’ns LLC
v. AV Automotive, LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 613 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (mere recitation
of concrete or tangible components is not an inventive concept); Eon Corp.
IP Holdings LLC v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 785 F.3d 616, 623 (Fed. Cir. 2015)
(noting that Alappat’s rationale that an otherwise ineligible algorithm or
software could be made patent-eligible by merely adding a generic computer
to the claim was superseded by the Supreme Court’s Bilski and Alice
decisions). In the instant case, using a computer to more accurately or
efficiently dispatch network service resources is nothing more than the
abstract idea itself.
For the reasons discussed above, we conclude Appellant’s claim 1
(and claims 2–6, 8–15, 17–20, 22, and 23 grouped therewith) invokes
generic computer components (one or more processors) merely as tools in
which the computer instructions apply the judicial exception and, thus, the
abstract idea is not integrated into a practical application. Because
Appellant has not persuaded us the Examiner’s determination that claim 1
recites an abstract idea under Step 2A is in error, and claim 1 recites a
judicial exception (i.e., the abstract idea of a method of organizing human
activity and/or mental process) that is not integrated into a practical
application, in accordance with the Guidance, we conclude claim 1 and
claims 2–6, 8–15, 17–20, 22, and 23 grouped therewith, are directed to an
abstract idea under Step 2A, and the eligibility analysis with regard to claims
1–6, 8–15, 17–20, 22, and 23 proceeds to Step 2B.
Step 2B — Inventive Concept
Having determined claim 1 and claims 2–6, 8–15, 17–20, 22, and 23
grouped therewith are directed to an abstract idea that is not integrated into a
Appeal 2019-002345
Application 14/481,352

22
practical application, we now evaluate whether the additional elements,
whether examined alone or as an ordered combination, add a specific
limitation that is not well-understood, routine, or conventional activity in the
field, or simply append well-understood, routine, conventional activities
previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to
the abstract idea. See generally Guidance.
Here, claim 1 recites the additional elements of “[a] device,
comprising: one or more processors” (claim 1). Considering claim 1 as a
whole, none of the additional elements applies or uses the abstract idea in a
meaningful way such that the claim as a whole is more than a drafting effort
designed to monopolize the exception.
The processor(s) recited in claim 1 serve merely to gather and analyze
network service management data. And, the dispatching of network service
resources based on the results recited in limitation F is a post-solution
activity.
Appellant contends claim 1 is “directed to an inventive algorithm that
address[es] a technology-specific need and improves performance of
landline and/or broadband networks” (see Appeal Br. 10) by using a “unique
algorithm” in a “novel and unconventional manner” to “modify[] a remote
resolution protocol” (Appeal Br. 13; see also Appeal Br. 16).
Although Appellant contends claim 1 recites significantly more than
determining performance metrics in a network (see Appeal Br. 10–18), and
recites features that are (i) not well-understood, routine, and conventional,
and (ii) have not been shown to be otherwise with the proper evidence
required by Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 890 F.3d 1369, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2018)
(see Appeal Br. 17), we agree with the Examiner (Ans. 3) that at least
Appeal 2019-002345
Application 14/481,352

23
paragraph 37 supports the Examiner’s finding in this regard. In addition, the
Examiner determines, and we agree, that the only elements beyond the
abstract idea are generic computer components or combinations of generic
components used to perform generic computer functions (Final Act. 3–4;
Ans. 3–4) — a determination that is supported by Appellant’s Figures 2 and
3 and the accompanying descriptions found in the Specification (see Spec.
¶¶ 24–38, 121). Appellant’s Specification only shows (see Figs. 2, 3) and
describes (see e.g., Spec. ¶¶ 24–38, 121) well-understood, routine,
conventional computer components used for network service resource
management (e.g., devices connected through a communications network)
that are in a general purpose computing environment in a manner that
indicates the components and the functions they perform were well-known
in the art. See Hybritech Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367,
1384 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (explaining that “a patent need not teach, and
preferably omits, what is well known in the art”); see also USPTO,
Memorandum on Changes in Examination Procedure Pertaining to Subject
Matter Eligibility, Recent Subject Matter Eligibility Decision (Berkheimer v.
HP, Inc.) at 3 (Apr. 19, 2018), available at
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/memo-berkheimer-
20180419.PDF (explaining that a specification that describes additional
elements “in a manner that indicates that the additional elements are
sufficiently well-known that the specification does not need to describe the
particulars of such additional elements to satisfy 35 U.S.C. § 112(a)” can
show that the elements are well understood, routine, and conventional);
Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Erie Indem. Co., 850 F.3d 1315, 1331 (Fed.
Cir. 2017) (“The claimed mobile interface is so lacking in implementation
Appeal 2019-002345
Application 14/481,352

24
details that it amounts to merely a generic component (software, hardware,
or firmware) that permits the performance of the abstract idea, i.e., to
retrieve the user-specific resources.”).
As a result, we are not persuaded that the network service resource
determinations recited in claim 1 are anything beyond generic computer
functions as opposed to an improvement to a mental process. Considering
the elements of claim 1 individually and as an ordered combination, claim 1
does no more than simply instruct the practitioner to implement the abstract
idea on a generic computer, processor, and/or user interface. Dealertrack,
Inc. v. Huber, 674 F.3d 1315, 1333–34 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“Simply adding a
‘computer aided’ limitation to a claim covering an abstract concept, without
more, is insufficient to render [a] claim patent eligible.”).
Furthermore, generically claimed elements of processor and
controllers/computers have been found to be no more than well-understood,
routine, and conventional activity in the context of gathering and assembling
data. See, e.g., Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 890 F.3d 1369, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2018)
(“The conventional limitations of claim 1, combined with limitations of
analyzing and comparing data and reconciling differences between the data
. . . amount to no more than performing the abstract idea of parsing and
comparing data with conventional computer components) (emphasis added);
Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 716 (updating an activity log
by computer is well-understood, routine, conventional activity). As
explained by the Supreme Court, the presence of a generic computer
performing generic computer functions, such as calculation and transmission
of data, is not enough to transform an abstract idea into a patent-eligible
invention. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank, 573 U.S. 208, 225–226 (2014).
Appeal 2019-002345
Application 14/481,352

25
Additionally, as noted in MPEP § 2106.05(d)(II), the courts have
previously recognized that using computer processors and memories to
collect data and keep records, perform repetitive calculations, and/or
receive/send data are well‐understood, routine, and conventional functions
when they are claimed in a merely generic manner (e.g., at a high level of
generality), or as insignificant extra-solution activity (see MPEP
§ 2106.05(d)(II)(i)–(iv)). See also Berkheimer, 881 F.3d at 1366 (acts of
parsing, comparing, storing, and editing data are abstract ideas); SAP Am.,
Inc. v. InvestPic, LLC, 898 1161, 1167 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“[M]erely
presenting the results of abstract processes of collecting and analyzing
information . . . is abstract as an ancillary part of such collection and
analysis”); Intellectual Ventures I, 850 F.3d at 1340 (“collecting, displaying,
and manipulating data” is an abstract idea); Smart Sys., 873 F.3d at 1372
(concluding “claims directed to the collection, storage, and recognition of
data are directed to an abstract idea.”).
As a result, Appellant has not persuaded us the Examiner erred with
respect to the Guidance’s Step 2B analysis. See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at
Step 2B.
Summary
As explained above, under the USPTO’s Revised Patent Eligibility
Guidance, based on the record before us, and informed by our governing
case law concerning 35 U.S.C. § 101, Appellant has not sufficiently shown
the Examiner erred in rejecting representative claim 1, as well as claims 2–6,
8–15, 17–20, 22, and 23 grouped therewith, as being directed to patent-
ineligible subject matter without significantly more, and we sustain the
rejection of claims 1–6, 8–15, 17–20, 22, and 23 under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Appeal 2019-002345
Application 14/481,352

26
CONCLUSION
As explained above, under the USPTO’s Revised Patent Eligibility
Guidance, based on the record before us, and informed by our governing
case law concerning 35 U.S.C. § 101, Appellant has not shown the Examiner
erred in rejecting representative claim 1, as well as claims 2–6, 8–15, 17–20,
22, and 23 grouped therewith, as being directed to patent-ineligible subject
matter without significantly more, and we sustain the rejection of claims 1–
6, 8–15, 17–20, 22, and 23 under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
In summary, for all of the reasons above, we affirm the Examiner’s
decision to reject claims 1–6, 8–15, 17–20, 22, and 23, and we hold as
follows:

Claims
Rejected
35
U.S.C. §
Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–6, 8–
15, 17–
20, 22,
23
101 Eligibility 1–6, 8–15, 17–
20, 22, 23

TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). See
37 C.F.R. §§ 41.50(f), 41.52(b) (2013).

AFFIRMED